The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (38 page)

10
     First, then, a definition must be given of a ‘dialectical proposition’ and a ‘dialectical problem’. For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that is to be set down as dialectical: for no one in his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds,
(5)
nor yet make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people: for the latter admits of no doubt, while to the former no one would assent. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers, i. e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these,
(10)
provided it be not
contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably assent to the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical propositions also include views which are like those generally accepted; also propositions which contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally accepted,
(15)
and also all opinions that are in accordance with the recognized arts. Thus, supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same, it might probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception of contraries is the same: also, supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science of flute-playing as well, whereas, if it be a general opinion that there is more than one science of grammar, it might pass for a general opinion that there is more than one science of flute-playing as well: for all these seem to be alike and akin.
(20)
Likewise, also, propositions contradicting the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good to one’s friends, it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do them harm. Here, that one ought to do harm to one’s friends is contrary to the general view, and that one ought not to do them harm is the contradictory of that contrary.
(25)
Likewise also, if one ought to do good to one’s friends, one ought not to do good to one’s enemies: this too is the contradictory of the view contrary to the general view; the contrary being that one ought to do good to one’s enemies. Likewise, also, in other cases. Also, on comparison, it will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate belongs to the contrary subject: e. g. if one ought to do good to one’s friends,
(30)
one ought also to do evil to one’s enemies. It might appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but whether this is or is not so in reality as well will be stated in the course of the discussion upon contraries.
⁶
Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts are dialectical propositions; for people are likely to assent to the views held by those who have made a study of these things,
(35)
e. g. on a question of medicine they will agree with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician; and likewise also in other cases.

11
     
[104b]
A dialectical problem is a subject of inquiry that contributes either to choice and avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself, or as a help to the solution of some other such problem. It must, moreover, be something on which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses hold a contrary opinion to the
philosophers, or the philosophers to the masses, or each of them among themselves.
(5)
For some problems it is useful to know with a view to choice or avoidance, e. g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not, while some it is useful to know merely with a view to knowledge, e. g. whether the universe is eternal or not: others, again, are not useful in and by themselves for either of these purposes, but yet help us in regard to some such problems; for there are many things which we do not wish to know in and by themselves,
(10)
but for the sake of other things, in order that through them we may come to know something else. Problems also include questions in regard to which reasonings conflict (the difficulty then being whether so-and-so is so or not, there being convincing arguments for both views); others also in regard to which we have no argument because they are so vast,
(15)
and we find it difficult to give our reasons, e. g. the question whether the universe is eternal or no: for into questions of that kind too it is possible to inquire.

Problems, then, and propositions are to be defined as aforesaid.
⁷
A ‘thesis’ is a supposition of some eminent philosopher that conflicts with the general opinion; e. g. the view that contradiction is impossible,
(20)
as Antisthenes said; or the view of Heraclitus that all things are in motion; or that Being is one, as Melissus says: for to take notice when any ordinary person expresses views contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. Or it may be a view about which we have a reasoned theory contrary to men’s usual opinions, e. g. the view maintained by the sophists that what is need not in every case either have come to be or be eternal: for a musician who is a grammarian ‘is’ so without ever having ‘come to be’ so,
(25)
or being so eternally. For even if a man does not accept this view, he might do so on the ground that it is reasonable.

Now a ‘thesis’ also is a problem, though a problem is not always a thesis, inasmuch as some problems are such that we have no opinion about them either way.
(30)
That a thesis, however, also forms a problem, is clear: for it follows of necessity from what has been said that either the mass of men disagree with the philosophers about the thesis, or that the one or the other class disagree among themselves, seeing that the thesis is a supposition in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical problems indeed are now called ‘theses’.
(35)
But it should make no difference whichever description is used; for our object in thus distinguishing them has not been to create a terminology, but to recognize what differences happen to be found between them.
[105a]

Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument,
(5)
not punishment or perception. For people who are puzzled to know whether one ought to honour the gods and love one’s parents or not need punishment, while those who are puzzled to know whether snow is white or not need perception. The subjects should not border too closely upon the sphere of demonstration, nor yet be too far removed from it: for the former cases admit of no doubt, while the latter involve difficulties too great for the art of the trainer.

12
      Having drawn these definitions,
(10)
we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction, on the other Reasoning. Now what reasoning is has been said before:
⁸
induction is a passage from individuals to universals, e. g. the argument that supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective,
(15)
and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task. Induction is the more convincing and clear: it is more readily learnt by the use of the senses, and is applicable generally to the mass of men, though Reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictious people.

13
      The classes,
(20)
then, of things about which, and of things out of which, arguments are constructed, are to be distinguished in the way we have said before. The means whereby we are to become well supplied with reasonings are four: (1) the securing of propositions; (2) the power to distinguish in how many senses a particular expression is used; (3) the discovery of the differences of things; (4) the investigation of likeness.
(25)
The last three, as well, are in a certain sense propositions: for it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of them, e. g. (1) ‘The desirable may mean either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient’; and (2) ‘Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be recovered again after it has been lost,
(30)
while the former cannot’; and (3) ‘The relation of the healthy to health is like that of the vigorous to vigour’. The first proposition depends upon the use of one term in several senses, the second upon the differences of things, the third upon their likenesses.

14
     Propositions should be selected in a number of ways corresponding to the number of distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men or by the philosophers,
(35)
i. e. by all, or most, or the most notable
of them; or opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held; and, again, all opinions that are in accordance with the arts.
[105b]
We must make propositions also of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem to be generally held, as was laid down before. It is useful also to make them by selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted, but also those that are like these,
(5)
e. g. ‘The perception of contraries is the same’—the knowledge of them being so—and ‘we see by admission of something into ourselves, not by an emission’; for so it is, too, in the case of the other senses; for in hearing we admit something into ourselves; we do not emit; and we taste in the same way. Likewise also in the other cases. Moreover, all statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases,
(10)
should be taken as a principle or accepted position; for they are posited by those who do not also see what exception there may be. We should select also from the written handbooks of argument, and should draw up sketchlists of them upon each several kind of subject, putting them down under separate headings, e. g. ‘On Good’, or ‘On Life’—and that ‘On Good’ should deal with every form of good,
(15)
beginning with the category of essence. In the margin, too, one should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers, e. g. ‘Empedocles said that the elements of bodies were four’: for any one might assent to the saying of some generally accepted authority.

Of propositions and problems there are—to comprehend the matter in outline—three divisions: for some are ethical propositions,
(20)
some are on natural philosophy, while some are logical. Propositions such as the following are ethical, e. g. ‘Ought one rather to obey one’s parents or the laws, if they disagree?’; such as this are logical, e. g. ‘Is the knowledge of opposites the same or not?’; while such as this are on natural philosophy, e. g. ‘Is the universe eternal or not?’ Likewise also with problems.
(25)
The nature of each of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in a definition, but we have to try to recognize each of them by means of the familiarity attained through induction, examining them in the light of the illustrations given above.

For purposes of philosophy we must treat of these things according to their truth,
(30)
but for dialectic only with an eye to general opinion. All propositions should be taken in their most universal form; then, the one should be made into many. e. g. ‘The knowledge of opposites is the same’; next, ‘The knowledge of contraries is the same’, and that ‘of relative terms’. In the same way these two should again be divided, as long as division is possible,
(35)
e. g. the knowledge of ‘good and evil’, of ‘white and black’, or ‘cold and hot’. Likewise also in other cases.

15
     
[106a]
On the formation, then, of propositions, the above remarks are enough. As regards the number of senses a term bears, we must not only treat of those terms which bear different senses, but we must also try to render their definitions; e. g.
(5)
we must not merely say that justice and courage are called ‘good’ in one sense, and that what conduces to vigour and what conduces to health are called so in another, but also that the former are so called because of a certain intrinsic quality they themselves have, the latter because they are productive of a certain result and not because of any intrinsic quality in themselves. Similarly also in other cases.

Whether a term bears a number of specific meanings or one only,
(10)
may be considered by the following means. First, look and see if its contrary bears a number of meanings, whether the discrepancy between them be one of kind or one of names. For in some cases a difference is at once displayed even in the names; e. g. the contrary of ‘sharp’ in the case of a note is ‘flat’, while in the case of a solid edge it is ‘dull’. Clearly, then, the contrary of ‘sharp’ bears several meanings,
(15)
and if so, so also does ‘sharp’; for corresponding to each of the former terms the meaning of its contrary will be different. For ‘sharp’ will not be the same when contrary to ‘dull’ and to ‘flat’, though ‘sharp’ is the contrary of each. Again
baru
(‘flat’, ‘heavy’) in the case of a note has ‘sharp’ as its contrary, but in the case of a solid mass ‘light’, so that
baru
is used with a number of meanings,
(20)
inasmuch as its contrary also is so used. Likewise, also, ‘fine’ as applied to a picture has ‘ugly’ as its contrary, but, as applied to a house, ‘ramshackle’; so that ‘fine’ is an ambiguous term.

In some cases there is no discrepancy of any sort in the names used, but a difference of kind between the meanings is at once obvious: e. g. in the case of ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’: for sound is called ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’,
(25)
just as ‘colour’ is too. As regards the names, then, there is no discrepancy, but the difference in kind between the meanings is at once obvious: for colour is not called ‘clear’ in a like sense to sound. This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are the same in kind we have the same sensation,
(30)
whereas we do not judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and of colour, but in the latter case we judge by sight, in the former by hearing. Likewise also with ‘sharp’ and ‘dull’ in regard to flavours and solid edges: here in the latter case we judge by touch, but in the former by taste. For here again there is no discrepancy in the names used,
(35)
in the case either of the original terms or of their contraries: for the contrary also of sharp in either sense is ‘dull’.

Moreover, see if one sense of a term has a contrary, while another has absolutely none; e. g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary in the pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal is incommensurate with the side has none, so that ‘pleasure’ is used in more than one sense.
[106b]
To ‘love’ also, used of the frame of mind, has to ‘hate’ as its contrary, while as used of the physical activity (kissing) it has none: clearly, therefore, to ‘love’ is an ambiguous term. Further, see in regard to their intermediates, if some meanings and their contraries have an intermediate, while others have none, or if both have one but not the same one,
(5)
as e. g. ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’ in the case of colours have ‘grey’ as an intermediate, whereas in the case of sound they have none, or, if they have, it is ‘harsh’, as some people say that a harsh sound is intermediate. ‘Clear’, then, is an ambiguous term, and likewise also ‘obscure’. See, moreover, if some of them have more than one intermediate,
(10)
while others have but one, as is the case with ‘clear’ and ‘obscure’, for in the case of colours there are numbers of intermediates, whereas in regard to sound there is but one, viz. ‘harsh’.

Again, in the case of the contradictory opposite, look and see if it bears more than one meaning. For if this bears more than one meaning, then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one meaning;
(15)
e. g. ‘to fail to see’ is a phrase with more than one meaning, viz. (1) to fail to possess the power of sight, (2) to fail to put that power to active use. But if this has more than one meaning, it follows necessarily that ‘to see’ also has more than one meaning: for there will be an opposite to each sense of ‘to fail to see’; e. g. the opposite of ‘not to possess the power of sight’ is to possess it, while of ‘not to put the power of sight to active use’, the opposite is to put it to active use.
(20)

Moreover, examine the case of terms that denote the privation or presence of a certain state: for if the one term bears more than one meaning, then so will the remaining term: e. g. if ‘to have sense’ be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body, then ‘to be wanting in sense’ too will be used with more than one meaning, as applied to the soul and to the body.
(25)
That the opposition between the terms now in question depends upon the privation or presence of a certain state is clear, since animals naturally possess each kind of ‘sense’, both as applied to the soul and as applied to the body.

Moreover, examine the inflected forms. For if ‘justly’ has more than one meaning, then ‘just’, also, will be used with more than one meaning; for there will be a meaning of ‘just’ corresponding to each
of the meanings of ‘justly’; e. g. if the word ‘justly’ be used of judging according to one’s own opinion,
(30)
and also of judging as one ought, then ‘just’ also will be used in like manner. In the same way also, if ‘healthy’ has more than one meaning, then ‘healthily’ also will be used with more than one meaning:
(35)
e. g. if ‘healthy’ describes both what produces health and what preserves health and what betokens health, then ‘healthily’ also will be used to mean ‘in such a way as to produce’ or ‘preserve’ or ‘betoken’ health. Likewise also in other cases, whenever the original term bears more than one meaning, the inflexion also that is formed from it will be used with more than one meaning, and vice versa.
[107a]

Look also at the classes of the predicates signified by the term, and see if they are the same in all cases. For if they are not the same,
(5)
then clearly the term is ambiguous: e. g. ‘good’ in the case of food means ‘productive of pleasure’, and in the case of medicine ‘productive of health’, whereas as applied to the soul it means to be of a certain quality, e. g. temperate or courageous or just: and likewise also, as applied to ‘man’. Sometimes it signifies what happens at a certain time, as (e. g.) the good that happens at the right time: for what happens at the right time is called good.
(10)
Often it signifies what is of a certain quantity, e. g. as applied to the proper amount: for the proper amount too is called good. So then the term ‘good’ is ambiguous. In the same way also ‘clear’, as applied to a body, signifies a colour, but in regard to a note it denotes what is ‘easy to hear’. ‘Sharp’, too, is in a closely similar case: for the same term does not bear the same meaning in all its applications: for a sharp note is a swift note,
(15)
as the mathematical theorists of harmony tell us, whereas a sharp (acute) angle is one that is less than a right angle, while a sharp dagger is one containing a sharp angle (point).

Look also at the genera of the objects denoted by the same term, and see if they are different without being subaltern, as (e. g.) ‘donkey’, which denotes both the animal and the engine.
(20)
For the definition of them that corresponds to the name is different: for the one will be declared to be an animal of a certain kind, and the other to be an engine of a certain kind. If, however, the genera be subaltern, there is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e. g.) ‘animal’ is the genus of ‘raven’, and so is ‘bird’. Whenever therefore we say that the raven is a bird, we also say that it is a certain kind of animal,
(25)
so that both the genera are predicated of it. Likewise also whenever we call the raven a ‘flying biped animal’, we declare it to be a bird: in this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera
that are not subaltern this does not happen, for whenever we call a thing an ‘engine’,
(30)
we do not call it an animal, nor vice versa.

Look also and see not only if the genera of the term before you are different without being subaltern, but also in the case of its contrary: for if its contrary bears several senses,
(35)
clearly the term before you does so as well.

It is useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use of the term in combination, e. g. of a ‘clear (
lit.
white) body’ and of a ‘clear note’. For then if what is peculiar in each case be abstracted, the same expression ought to remain over. This does not happen in the case of ambiguous terms, e. g. in the cases just mentioned.
[107b]
For the former will be ‘a body possessing such and such a colour’, while the latter will be ‘a note easy to hear’. Abstract, then, ‘a body’ and ‘a note’, and the remainder in each case is not the same. It should, however, have been had the meaning of ‘clear’ in each case been synonymous.
(5)

Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should be examined. If (e. g.) any one describes what betokens and what produces health as ‘related commensurably to health’, we must not desist but go on to examine in what sense he has used the term ‘commensurably’ in each case,
(10)
e. g. if in the latter case it means that ‘it is of the right amount to produce health’, whereas in the former it means that ‘it is such as to betoken what kind of state prevails’.

Moreover, see if the terms cannot be compared as ‘more or less’ or as ‘in like manner’, as is the case (e. g.) with a ‘clear’ (
lit.
white) sound and a ‘clear’ garment, and a ‘sharp’ flavour and a ‘sharp’ note.
(15)
For neither are these things said to be clear or sharp ‘in a like degree’, nor yet is the one said to be clearer or sharper than the other. ‘Clear’, then, and ‘sharp’ are ambiguous. For synonyms are always comparable; for they will always be used either in like manner, or else in a greater degree in one case.

Now since of genera that are different without being subaltern the differentiae also are different in kind,
(20)
e. g. those of ‘animal’ and ‘knowledge’ (for the differentiae of these are different), look and see if the meanings comprised under the same term are differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern, as e. g. ‘sharp’ is of a ‘note’ and a ‘solid’. For being ‘sharp’ differentiates note from note, and likewise also one solid from another. ‘Sharp’, then, is an ambiguous term: for it forms differentiae of genera that are different without being subaltern.
(25)

Again, see if the actual meanings included under the same term
themselves have different differentiae, e. g. ‘colour’ in bodies and ‘colour’ in tunes: for the differentiae of ‘colour’ in bodies are ‘sightpiercing’ and ‘sight-compressing’,
(30)
whereas ‘colour’ in melodies has not the same differentiae. Colour, then, is an ambiguous term; for things that are the same have the same differentiae.

Moreover, since the species is never the differentia of anything, look and see if one of the meanings included under the same term be a species and another a differentia, as (e. g.) ‘clear’ (
lit.
(35)
white) as applied to a body is a species of colour, whereas in the case of a note it is a differentia; for one note is differentiated from another by being ‘clear’.