The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (147 page)

¹
Cf. Bk. i. 3–10.

²
Cf. ii. 996
^a
18–
^b
26.

³
Cf. ii. 996
^b
26–997
^a
15.

⁴
Cf. ii. 997
^a
15–25.

⁵
Cf. ii. 997
^a
25–34.

⁶
The material, formal, efficient, and final causes (
Phys
. ii. 3).

⁷
Cf. ii. 996
^a
21–
^b
1.

⁸
Cf. ii. 997
^a
34–998
^a
19.

⁹
Cf. ii. 998
^b
15.

¹⁰
Cf. ii. 998
^a
20–999
^a
23.

¹¹
1059
^b
24–38.

¹²
It must be remembered that A. is only stating common opinions and the consequent difficulties.

¹³
Cf. ii. 999
^a
24–
^b
24.

¹⁴
Cf. ii. 1000
^a
5–1001
^a
3.

¹⁵
The Pythagoreans and Plato.

¹⁶
Cf. ii. 1001
^a
4–1002
^b
11.

¹⁷
Cf. ii. 1003
^a
5–17.

¹⁸
Cf. ii. 999
^a
24–
^b
24.

¹⁹
Cf. ii. 999
^b
24–1000
^a
4.

²⁰
1059
^a
20–23. Cf. iv. 2. The question raised in 1059
^a
29–34 has also incidentally been answered.

²¹
Cf. iv. 1005
^a
19–
^b
2, xi. 1059
^a
23–26.

²²
Cf. iv. 1005
^b
8–34.

²³
Cf. iv. 1006
^a
5–18.

²⁴
Cf. iv. 1006
^a
18–1007
^a
20.

²⁵
sc
. of that of which the word is asserted.

²⁶
Cf. iv. 1006
^b
28–34.

²⁷
Cf. iv. 1007
^b
18–1008
^a
2.

²⁸
Cf. iv. 1005
^b
23–26.

²⁹
Cf. iv. 1008
^a
6–7.

³⁰
Cf. iv. 1012
^b
13–18.

³¹
Cf. iv. 1009
^a
6–16, 22–30.

³²
Phys
. i. 7–9,
De Gen. et Corr.
i. 317
^b
14–319
^b
5.

³³
Cf. iv. 1009
^a
30–36.

³⁴
Cf. iv. 1010
^b
1–26, 1011
^a
31–4.

³⁵
Cf. iv. 1010
^a
25–32.

³⁶
Cf. iv. 1010
^a
22–25.

³⁷
Cf. iv. 1008
^b
12–27.

³⁸
Cf. 1063
^a
35.

³⁹
Cf. iv. 1009
^a
38–
^b
33.

⁴⁰
In 1062
^b
20–1063
^b
7.

⁴¹
Cf. iv. 1009
^a
16–22, 1011
^a
3–16.

⁴²
Cf. iv. 1011
^b
15–22.

⁴³
sc
. ‘not white’ and ‘not black’.

⁴⁴
Cf. iv. 1011
^b
23–1012
^a
24.

⁴⁵
Cf. 1062
^a
31–
^b
2.

⁴⁶
Cf. iv. 1012
^a
24–
^b
18.

⁴⁷
Cf. v. 6, 7.

⁴⁸
Cf. vi. 1, xi. 1059
^a
26–29.

⁴⁹
Cf.
Sophistes
254 A.

⁵⁰
Cf. vi. 2–4.

⁵¹
sc
. which happen
usually
by nature or as the result of thought.

⁵²
Cf.
Phys
. ii. 196
^b
21–25.

⁵³
Cf.
Phys
. ii. 197
^a
5–14.

⁵⁴
Cf.
Phys
. ii. 197
^a
25–27.

⁵⁵
Cf.
Phys
. ii. 198
^a
5–13.

⁵⁶
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 200
^b
26–28.

⁵⁷
i. e. not as so much matter, but as matter capable of being made into a building.

⁵⁸
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 200
^b
32–201
^a
19.

⁵⁹
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 201
^b
6, 7.

⁶⁰
The Pythagoreans and Platonists are meant; Cf. Pl.
Soph
. 256
D
,
Tim
. 57
E
ff.

⁶¹
With 1065
^b
22–1066
^a
27 cf.
Phys
. iii. 201
^a
27–202
^a
3.

⁶²
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 202
^a
13–21.

⁶³
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^a
3–14.

⁶⁴
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^a
17–19.

⁶⁵
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^a
14–17.

⁶⁶
l.
9.

⁶⁷
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^a
20–32.

⁶⁸
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^a
34–
^b
8.

⁶⁹
Anaximander is meant.

⁷⁰
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^b
10–24.

⁷¹
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 204
^b
32–205
^a
7.

⁷²
Cf.
Phys
. iii, 205
^a
29–32.

⁷³
sc
. up and down, right and left, before and behind.

⁷⁴
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 205
^b
24–206
^a
7.

⁷⁵
Cf.
Phys
. iii. 207
^b
21–25.

⁷⁶
Cf.
Phys
. v. 224
^a
21–
^b
1.

⁷⁷
Cf.
Phys
. v. 224
^b
11–16.

⁷⁸
Cf.
Phys
. v. 224
^b
28–30.

⁷⁹
Cf. vi. 1026
^a
33–
^b
2, 1027
^b
18–19.

⁸⁰
i. e. to ‘that which is not’ in the sense of ‘the judgment which is false’.

⁸¹
i. e. a thing cannot be moved when it does not exist actually, but exists potentially.

⁸²
i. e. even if the not-being (privation) which is the starting-point of generation can exist only as an accident of prime matter, still not-being
is
the starting-point of absolute generation (i. e. generation of a substance, not of a quality).

⁸³
In 1067
^b
19.

⁸⁴
Change between contraries is movement, change between contradictories is generation or destruction.

⁸⁵
This is possible, though excluded by the theory in question.

⁸⁶
With 1067
^b
14–1068
^b
15 Cf.
Phys
. v. 225
^a
3–226
^a
16.

⁸⁷
Cf.
Phys
. v. 226
^a
23–29.

⁸⁸
Cf.
Phys
. v. 226
^b
10–16.

⁸⁹
Cf.
Phys
. v. 226
^b
21–25.

⁹⁰
Cf.
Phys
. v. 226
^b
32–227
^a
31.

1
     The subject of our inquiry is substance; for the principles and the causes we are seeking are those of substances. For if the universe is of the nature of a whole,
(20)
substance is its first part; and if it coheres merely by virtue of serial succession, on this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity. At the same time these latter are not even being in the full sense, but are qualities and movements of it—or else even the not-white and the not-straight would be being; at least we say even these
are
, e. g. ‘there is a not-white’.
¹
Further,
(25)
none of the categories other than substance can exist apart. And the early philosophers also in practice testify to the primacy of substance; for it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and causes. The thinkers of the present
²
day tend to rank universals as substances (for genera are universals, and these they tend to describe as principles and substances, owing to the abstract nature of their inquiry); but the thinkers of old ranked particular things as substances, e. g. fire and earth, not what is common to both, body.

There are three kinds of substance—one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and another is perishable; the latter is recognized by all men,
(30)
and includes e. g. plants and animals), of which we must grasp the elements, whether one or many; and another that is immovable, and this certain thinkers assert to be capable of existing apart,
(35)
some dividing it into two, others identifying the Forms and the objects of mathematics, and others positing, of these two, only the objects of mathematics.
³
The former two kinds of substance are the subject of physics (for they imply movement); but the third kind belongs to another science, if there is no principle common to it and to the other kinds.
[1069b]

2
     Sensible substance is changeable. Now if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, and not from all opposites (for the voice is not-white [but it does not therefore change to white]),
(5)
but from the contrary, there must be something underlying which changes into the contrary state; for the
contraries
do not change. Further, something persists, but the contrary does not persist; there is, then, some third thing besides the contraries, viz. the matter. Now since changes are of four kinds—either in respect of the ‘what’ or of the quality or of the quantity or of the place,
(10)
and change in respect of ‘thisness’ is
simple generation and destruction, and change in quantity is increase and diminution, and change in respect of an affection is alteration, and change of place is motion, changes will be from given states into those contrary to them in these several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states.
(15)
And since that which ‘is’ has two senses, we must say that everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually, e. g. from potentially white to actually white, and similarly in the case of increase and diminution. Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually. And this is the ‘One’ of Anaxagoras; for instead of ‘all things were together’—and the ‘Mixture’ of Empedocles and Anaximander and the account given by Democritus—it is better to say ‘all things were together potentially but not actually’.
(20)
Therefore these thinkers seem to have had some notion of matter. Now all things that change have matter,
(25)
but different matter; and of eternal things those which are not generable but are movable in space have matter—not matter for generation, however, but for motion from one place to another.

One might raise the question from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for ‘non-being’ has three senses. If, then, one form of nonbeing exists potentially, still it is not by virtue of a potentiality for any and every thing, but different things come from different things; nor is it satisfactory to say that ‘all things were together’; for they differ in their matter,
(30)
since otherwise why did an infinity of things come to be, and not one thing? For ‘reason’ is one, so that if matter also were one, that must have come to be in actuality which the matter was in potency.
⁴
The causes and the principles, then, are three, two being the pair of contraries of which one is definition and form and the other is privation, and the third being the matter.

3
     Note, next, that neither the matter nor the form comes to be—and I mean the last matter and form.
(35)
For everything that changes is something and is changed by something and into something.
[1070a]
That by which it is changed is the immediate mover; that which is changed, the matter; that into which it is changed, the form. The process, then, will go on to infinity, if not only the bronze comes to be round but also the round or the bronze comes to be; therefore there must be a stop.

Note, next, that each substance comes into being out of something that shares its name. (Natural objects and other things both rank as substances.)
(5)
For things come into being either by art or by nature or
by luck or by spontaneity. Now art is a principle of movement in something other than the thing moved, nature is a principle in the thing itself (for man begets man), and the other causes are privations of these two.

There are three kinds of substance—the matter, which is a ‘this’ in appearance (for all things that are characterized by contact and not by organic unity are matter and substratum,
(10)
e. g. fire, flesh, head; for these are all matter,
(19)
and the last matter is the matter of that which is in the full sense substance); the nature,
(11)
which is a ‘this’ or positive state towards which movement takes place; and again, thirdly, the particular substance which is composed of these two, e. g. Socrates or Callias. Now in some cases the ‘this’ does not exist apart from the composite substance, e. g. the form of house does not so exist,
(15)
unless the art of building exists apart (nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in another way that the house apart from its matter, and health, and all ideals of art, exist and do not exist); but if the ‘this’ exists apart from the concrete thing, it is only in the case of natural objects. And so Plato was not far wrong when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object (if there
are
Forms distinct from the things of this earth).
(21)
The moving causes exist as things preceding the effects, but causes in the sense of definitions are simultaneous with their effects. For when a man is healthy, then health also exists; and the shape of a bronze sphere exists at the same time as the bronze sphere.
(25)
(But we must examine whether any form also survives afterwards. For in some cases there is nothing to prevent this; e. g. the soul may be of this sort—not all soul but the reason; for presumably it is impossible that
all
soul should survive.) Evidently then there is no necessity, on this ground at least, for the existence of the Ideas. For man is begotten by man, a given man by an individual father; and similarly in the arts; for the medical art is the formal cause of health.
(30)