The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (231 page)

¹
‘Rhetoric’ and ‘Dialectic’ may be roughly Englished as ‘the art of public speaking’ and ‘the art of logical discussion’. Aristotle’s philosophical definition of ‘Rhetoric’ is given at the beginning of c. 2.

²
Here, and in what follows, the English reader should understand ‘judge’ in a broad sense, including ‘jurymen’ and others who ‘judge’.

³
The words ‘orator’ and ‘oratory’ have the advantage of brevity, but the reader will bear in mind that ‘public speaker’ and ‘public speaking’ are in some ways nearer the Greek conception of ‘rhetor’ and ‘rhetoric’.

⁴
1354
^a
22.

⁵
Topics
, i. 2, 101
^a
30–4.

⁶
i. e. the right, fit, required frame of mind.

⁷
ii, cc. 2–11.

⁸
i. 1. 1354
^a
1.

⁹
Anal. Pr.
ii. 23, 24.
Anal. Post.
i. 1. Cp. 68
^b
13.

¹⁰
Top.
i. 1 and 12.

¹¹
A lost logical treatise of Aristotle.

¹²
ii, cc. 20–4.

¹³
An. Pr.
i. 8, 12–14, 27.

¹⁴
An. Pr.
ii. 27.

¹⁵
Or Topics, Commonplaces.

¹⁶
i. e. the topic of
degree.

¹⁷
Cp.
Top.
1. 10, 14; iii. 5;
Soph. El.
9.

¹⁸
Or: deliberative (advisory), legal, and epideictic—the oratory respectively of parliamentary assemblies, of law-courts, and of ceremonial occasions when there is an element of ‘display’, ‘show’, ‘declamation’, and the result is a ‘set speech’ or ‘harangue’.

¹⁹
i. e. of Complete Proofs, Probabilities, and Signs relating to the three subjects of the expedient, the just, and the noble.

²⁰
i. 2. 1356
^a
25 ff.

²¹
i. c. 9.

²²
in c. 9.

²³
Iliad
, i. 255.

²⁴
Iliad
, ii. 160.

²⁵
Iliad
, ii. 298.

²⁶
1362
^a
23.

²⁷
i. e. we have already (1363
^b
15) said that what is productive of good is good; it follows, then, from our way of looking at ‘productivity’ and ‘degree’, that what is productive of a greater good is a greater good.

²⁸
1362
^a
22.

²⁹
Pindar,
Olympians
, i. 1.

³⁰
Cp. 1363
^b
14.

³¹
1363
^b
14.

³²
Iliad
, ix. 592–4.

³³
Simonides.

³⁴
Odyssey
, xxii. 347.

³⁵
Politics
, iii and iv.

³⁶
1356
^a
2 and 5.

³⁷
i. e. enough to make our meaning clear.

³⁸
Cp. 1362
^b
10–28.

³⁹
Cp. Plato,
Menexenus
, 235
D
.

⁴⁰
Cp. i. 7, 1365
^a
24–8, for this and the previous quotation.

⁴¹
Cp. Isocrates,
Evagoras
§ 45 and
Panath.
§ 32.

⁴²
i. e. and therefore conscious.

⁴³
i. e. and therefore voluntary.

⁴⁴
i, c. 9.

⁴⁵
ii, cc. 1–11.

⁴⁶
ii, cc. 12–17.

⁴⁷
i, c. 6.

⁴⁸
ii, c. 2.

⁴⁹
i, c. 6.

⁵⁰
Evenus.

⁵¹
Euripides.

⁵²
Cp.
Odyssey
, xv. 400, 401.

⁵³
Iliad
, xviii. 109.

⁵⁴
Iliad
, xxiii. 108;
Odyssey
, iv. 183.

⁵⁵
i, c. 10, 1369
^b
16.

⁵⁶
Euripides,
Orestes
, 234.

⁵⁷
Cp.
Poetics
, c. 4, 1448
^b
5–19.

⁵⁸
Odyssey
, xvii. 218.

⁵⁹
Euripides.

⁶⁰
Not found in the
Poetics
, as it exists to-day. Aristotle probably analysed the causes and conditions of laughter, when treating of Comedy in his lost Second Book.

⁶¹
ii, c. 19.

⁶²
i. e. an easy prey.

⁶³
Sophocles,
Antigone
, 456, 7.

⁶⁴
According to the scholiast, the words of Alcidamas were, ‘God has left all men free; Nature has made no man a slave’.

⁶⁵
i, c. 10.

⁶⁶
i, c. 6.

⁶⁷
i, c. 10.

⁶⁸
ii, c. 2.

⁶⁹
i, cc. 11 and 12.

⁷⁰
Cp. c. 2,
supra.

⁷¹
Sophocles,
Antigone
, 456.

⁷²
sc, and our written laws, which were made for us, may not reach the abstract ideal of perfection, but they probably suit us better than if they did.

⁷³
Iliad
, ii. 557.

⁷⁴
A general statement, apparently.

⁷⁵
Stasinus,
Cypria.

⁷⁶
Disputed whether the Comic Poet or the Philosopher.

⁷⁷
‘enthymemes’: Cp. ii, c. 23

⁷⁸
i. e. both demand an oath from his adversary (call upon him to swear to the truth of his statements) and take an oath himself.

1
     We have now considered the materials to be used in supporting or opposing a political measure, in pronouncing eulogies or censures, and for prosecution and defence in the law courts. We have considered the received opinions on which we may best base our arguments so as to convince our hearers—those opinions with which our enthymemes deal, and out of which they are built, in each of the three kinds of oratory, according to what may be called the special needs of each.
(20)

But since rhetoric exists to affect the giving of decisions—the hearers decide between one political speaker and another, and a legal verdict
is
a decision—the orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind. Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator’s influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings toward his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind.
(25)
That the orator’s own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking: that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits.
(30)
When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they
feel hostile, they take the opposite view.
[1378a]
Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them: whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed,
(5)
they do not think so.

There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator’s own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.
(10)
False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases. It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience.
(15)
The way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given:
¹
the way to establish your own goodness is the same as the way to establish that of others. Good will and friendliness of disposition will form part of our discussion of the emotions,
²
to which we must now turn.
(25)

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry,
(25)
and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one. The same is true of the other emotions. So just as earlier in this work we drew up a list of useful propositions for the orator,
(30)
let us now proceed in the same way to analyse the subject before us.

2
     Anger may be defined as an impulse, accompanied by pain, to a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight directed without justification towards what concerns oneself or towards what concerns one’s friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt towards some particular individual, e. g. Cleon, and not ‘man’ in general. It must be felt because the other has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends.
[1378b]
It must always be attended
by a certain pleasure—that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For since nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain, the angry man is aiming at what he can attain, and the belief that you will attain your aim is pleasant. Hence it has been well said about wrath,
(5)

It is also attended by a certain pleasure because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams.

Now slighting is the actively entertained opinion of something as obviously of no importance.
(10)
We think bad things, as well as good ones, have serious importance; and we think the same of anything that tends to produce such things, while those which have little or no such tendency we consider unimportant. There are three kinds of slighting—contempt, spite, and insolence, (1) Contempt is one kind of slighting: you feel contempt for what you consider unimportant,
(15)
and it is just such things that you slight. (2) Spite is another kind; it is a thwarting another man’s wishes, not to get something yourself but to prevent his getting it. The slight arises just from the fact that you do not aim at something for yourself: clearly you do not think that he can do you harm, for then you would be afraid of him instead of slighting him,
(20)
nor yet that he can do you any good worth mentioning, for then you would be anxious to make friends with him. (3) Insolence is also a form of slighting, since it consists in doing and saying things that cause shame to the victim, not in order that anything may happen to yourself, or because anything has happened to yourself,
(25)
but simply for the pleasure involved. (Retaliation is not ‘insolence’, but vengeance.) The cause of the pleasure thus enjoyed by the insolent man is that he thinks himself greatly superior to others when ill-treating them. That is why youths and rich men are insolent; they think themselves superior when they show insolence. One sort of insolence is to rob people of the honour due to them; you certainly slight them thus; for it is the unimportant, for good or evil,
(30)
that has no honour paid to it. So Achilles says in anger:

and:

meaning that this is why he is angry. A man expects to be especially
respected by his inferiors in birth, in capacity, in goodness, and generally in anything in which he is much their superior: as where money is concerned a wealthy man looks for respect from a poor man; where speaking is concerned, the man with a turn for oratory looks for respect from one who cannot speak; the ruler demands the respect of the ruled, and the man who thinks he ought to be a ruler demands the respect of the man whom he thinks he ought to be ruling.
[1739a]
Hence it has been said

and

their great resentment being due to their great superiority. Then again a man looks for respect from those who he thinks owe him good treatment, and these are the people whom he has treated or is treating well, or means or has meant to treat well, either himself, or through his friends, or through others at his request.

It will be plain by now, from what has been said, (1) in what frame of mind, (2) with what persons, and (3) on what grounds people grow angry.
(10)
(1) The frame of mind is that in which any pain is being felt. In that condition, a man is always aiming at something. Whether, then, another man opposes him either directly in any way, as by preventing him from drinking when he is thirsty, or indirectly, the act appears to him just the same; whether some one works against him, or fails to work with him, or otherwise vexes him while he is in this mood,
(15)
he is equally angry in all these cases. Hence people who are afflicted by sickness or poverty or love or thirst or any other unsatisfied desires are prone to anger and easily roused: especially against those who slight their present distress. Thus a sick man is angered by disregard of his illness, a poor man by disregard of his poverty, a man waging war by disregard of the war he is waging, a lover by disregard of his love,
(20)
and so throughout, any other sort of slight being enough if special slights are wanting. Each man is predisposed, by the emotion now controlling him, to his own particular anger. Further, we are angered if we happen to be expecting a contrary result: for a quite unexpected evil is especially painful, just as the quite unexpected fulfilment of our wishes is specially pleasant.
(25)
Hence it is plain what seasons, times, conditions, and periods of life tend to stir men easily to anger, and where and when this will happen; and it is plain that the more we are under these conditions the more easily we are stirred.

These, then, are the frames of mind in which men are easily stirred to anger. The persons with whom we get angry are those who laugh, mock, or jeer at us, for such conduct is insolent. Also those who inflict injuries upon us that are marks of insolence.
(30)
These injuries must be such as are neither retaliatory nor profitable to the doers: for only then will they be felt to be due to insolence. Also those who speak ill of us, and show contempt for us, in connexion with the things we ourselves most care about: thus those who are eager to win fame as philosophers get angry with those who show contempt for their philosophy; those who pride themselves upon their appearance get angry with those who show contempt for their appearance; and so on in other cases.
(35)
We feel particularly angry on this account if we suspect that we are in fact, or that people think we are, lacking completely or to any effective extent in the qualities in question.
[1379b]
For when we are convinced that we excel in the qualities for which we are jeered at, we can ignore the jeering. Again, we are angrier with our friends than with other people, since we feel that our friends ought to treat us well and not badly. We are angry with those who have usually treated us with honour or regard, if a change comes and they behave to us otherwise: for we think that they feel contempt for us,
(5)
or they would still be behaving as they did before. And with those who do not return our kindnesses or fail to return them adequately, and with those who oppose us though they are our inferiors: for all such persons seem to feel contempt for us; those who oppose us seem to think us inferior to themselves, and those who do not return our kindnesses seem to think that those kindnesses were conferred by inferiors. And we feel particularly angry with men of no account at all, if they slight us. For,
(10)
by our hypothesis, the anger caused by the slight is felt towards people who are not justified in slighting us, and our inferiors are not thus justified. Again, we feel angry with friends if they do not speak well of us or treat us well; and still more, if they do the contrary; or if they do not perceive our needs, which is why Plexippus is angry with Meleager in Antiphon’s play; for this want of perception shows that they are slighting us—we do not fail to perceive the needs of those for whom we care.
(15)
Again, we are angry with those who rejoice at our misfortunes or simply keep cheerful in the midst of our misfortunes, since this shows that they either hate us or are slighting us. Also with those who are indifferent to the pain they give us: this is why we get angry with bringers of bad news.
(20)
And with those who listen to stories about us or keep on looking at our weaknesses; this seems like either slighting us or hating us; for those who love us share in all our distresses and
it must distress any one to keep on looking at his own weaknesses. Further, with those who slight us before five classes of people: namely,
(25)
(1) our rivals, (2) those whom we admire, (3) those whom we wish to admire us, (4) those for whom we feel reverence, (5) those who feel reverence for us: if any one slights us before such persons, we feel particularly angry. Again, we feel angry with those who slight us in connexion with what we are as honourable men bound to champion—our parents, children, wives, or subjects. And with those who do not return a favour,
(30)
since such a slight is unjustifiable. Also with those who reply with humorous levity when we are speaking seriously, for such behaviour indicates contempt. And with those who treat us less well than they treat everybody else; it is another mark of contempt that they should think we do not deserve what every one else deserves.
(35)
Forgetfulness, too, causes anger, as when our own names are forgotten, trifling as this may be; since forgetfulness is felt to be another sign that we are being slighted; it is due to negligence, and to neglect us is to slight us.

The persons with whom we feel anger, the frame of mind in which we feel it, and the reasons why we feel it, have now all been set forth.
[1380a]
Clearly the orator will have to speak so as to bring his hearers into a frame of mind that will dispose them to anger, and to represent his adversaries as open to such charges and possessed of such qualities as do make people angry.