The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (203 page)

17
     But may not all this be true in some cases and not in others? for there is by nature both a justice and an advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to kingly rule, another to constitutional rule; but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other perverted form of government; for these come into being contrary to nature. Now, to judge at least from what has been said, it is manifest that,
(40)
where men are alike and equal, it is neither expedient nor just that one man should be lord of all, whether there are laws, or whether there are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law.
[1288a]
Neither should
a good man be lord over good men, nor a bad man over bad; nor, even if he excels in virtue, should he have a right to rule, unless in a particular case, at which I have already hinted, and to which I will once more recur.
⁷²
(5)
But first of all, I must determine what natures are suited for government by a king, and what for an aristocracy, and what for a constitutional government.

A people who are by nature capable of producing a race superior in the virtue needed for political rule are fitted for kingly government; and a people submitting to be ruled as freemen by men whose virtue renders them capable of political command are adapted for an aristocracy:
(10)
while the people who are suited for constitutional freedom are those among whom there naturally exists a warlike multitude
⁷³
able to rule and to obey in turn by a law which gives office to the well-to-do according to their desert.
(15)
But when a whole family, or some individual, happens to be so pre-eminent in virtue as to surpass all others, then it is just that they should be the royal family and supreme over all, or that this one citizen should be king of the whole nation.
(20)
For, as I said before,
⁷⁴
to give them authority is not only agreeable to that ground of right which the founders of all states, whether aristocratical, or oligarchical, or again democratical, are accustomed to put forward (for these all recognize the claim of excellence,
(25)
although not the same excellence), but accords with the principle already laid down. For surely it would not be right to kill, or ostracize, or exile such a person, or require that he should take his turn in being governed. The whole is naturally superior to the part, and he who has this pre-eminence is in the relation of a whole to a part. But if so, the only alternative is that he should have the supreme power,
(30)
and that mankind should obey him, not in turn, but always. These are the conclusions at which we arrive respecting royalty and its various forms, and this is the answer to the question, whether it is or is not advantageous to states, and to which, and how.

18
     We maintain
⁷⁵
that the true forms of government are three,
(35)
and that the best must be that which is administered by the best, and in which there is one man, or a whole family, or many persons, excelling all the others together in virtue, and both rulers and subjects are fitted, the one to rule, the others to be ruled, in such a manner as to attain the most eligible life. We showed at the commencement of our inquiry
⁷⁶
that the virtue of the good man is necessarily the same
as the virtue of the citizen of the perfect state. Clearly then in the same manner, and by the same means through which a man becomes truly good,
(40)
he will frame a state that is to be ruled by an aristocracy or by a king, and the same education and the same habits will be found to make a good man and a man fit to be a statesman or king.
[1288b]

Having arrived at these conclusions, we must proceed to speak of the perfect state, and describe how it comes into being and is established.
(5)

¹
Cp. 1276
^a
8.

²
‘Dicast’ = juryman and judge in one: ‘ecclesiast’ = member of the ecclesia or assembly of the citizens.

³
Cp. 1279
^a
19.

⁴
Cp. ii. 1273
^a
19.

⁵
An untranslatable play upon the word
demiourgos
, which means either ‘a magistrate’ or ‘an artisan’.

⁶
1275
^a
22 sqq.

⁷
Cp. 1274
^b
34.

⁸
i. e.
Polls
means both ‘state’ and ‘city’.

⁹
Cp. ii. 1265
^a
14.

¹⁰
The size of the state is discussed in vii. 1326
^a
8–1327
^a
3; the question whether it should consist of more than one nation is barely touched upon, in
V
. 1303
^a
25–
^b
3.

¹¹
Cp.
N. Eth.
V
. 1130
^b
28.

¹²
Cp. i. 1255
^b
20–37.

¹³
Cp. viii. 1337
^b
15.

¹⁴
Cp. i. 1260
^a
20.

¹⁵
Cp.
Rep.
iv. 428.

¹⁶
Cp.
Rep.
X
. 601
D, E
.

¹⁷
Cp. 1278
^a
40, 1288
^a
39, iv. 1293
^b
5, vii. 1333
^a
II
.

¹⁸
sc.
that they grow up to be men.

¹⁹
1275
^a
38 sqq.

²⁰
Cp. vi. 1321
^a
28.

²¹
Achilles complains of Agamemnon’s so treating him,
Il.
ix. 648, xvi. 59.

²²
Cp. 1274
^b
38, iv. 1289
^a
15.

²³
Cp. i. 1253
^a
2.

²⁴
Cp. Pl.
Rep.
i. 341
D
.

²⁵
Cp. ii. 1261
^a
37–
^b
6.

²⁶
Cp.
N. Eth.
viii. 10.

²⁷
V
. 1131
^a
15.

²⁸
Cp. 1275
^a
10.

²⁹
Cp.
Protag.
322
B
.

³⁰
Cp. i. 1252
^b
27;
N. Eth.
i. 1097
^b
6.

³¹
Cp. 1282
^b
6.

³²
Cp. Il. 11–34.

³³
cc. 12–17, iv., vi.

³⁴
c. 10.

³⁵
Cp. ii. 1274
^a
15.

³⁶
1281
^a
40–
^b
21.

³⁷
1281
^b
32.

³⁸
C
. 10.

³⁹
Cp.
N. Eth.
V
. 1137
^b
19.

⁴⁰
Cp. 1281
^a
36.

⁴¹
Cp. i. 1252
^a
2;
N. Eth.
i. 1094
^a
1.

⁴²
Cp. 1280
^a
9.

⁴³
Cp.
N. Eth.
v. 3.

⁴⁴
Cp. iv. 1291
^a
19–33.

⁴⁵
Cp. 1281
^a
4.

⁴⁶
1280
^a
9 sqq.

⁴⁷
Cp. i. 1255
^a
32.

⁴⁸
Cp. i. 1253
^a
37.

⁴⁹
Cp.
N. Eth.
v. 1129
^b
25.

⁵⁰
i. e. when the many collectively are better than the few.

⁵¹
i. e. ‘where are your claws and teeth?’

⁵²
Cp. v. 1311
^a
20.

⁵³
Cp. v. 1302
^b
18.

⁵⁴
Cp. v. 1302
^b
34, 1309
^b
21; vii. 1326
^a
35;
Rep.
iv. 420.

⁵⁵
Il.
ii. 391–393. The last clause is not found in our Homer.

⁵⁶
Cp. i, 1252
^b
7.

⁵⁷
Cp. v, 1311
^a
7.

⁵⁸
Cp. v, 1310
^b
10.

⁵⁹
It is not discussed later.

⁶⁰
Cp. Plato,
Polit.
294
A
–295
C
.

⁶¹
Cp. 1281
^a
42.

⁶²
Cp. 1. 27.

⁶³
Cp. 1285
^b
6.

⁶⁴
Cp. iv. 1293
^a
1, 1297
^b
22.

⁶⁵
1286
^a
2.

⁶⁶
Cp. v. 1301
^b
21.

⁶⁷
Cp. 1286
^a
12–14,
Polit.
296
B
.

⁶⁸
Cp.
N. Eth.
v. 1132
^a
22.

⁶⁹
1283
^b
21, 1284
^b
32.

⁷⁰
Il.
x. 224.

⁷¹
Il.
ii. 372.

⁷²
1284
^a
3, and 1288
^a
15.

⁷³
Cp. 1279
^b
2.

⁷⁴
1283
^b
20, 1284
^a
3–17,
^b
25.

⁷⁵
Cp. 1279
^b
22–
^b
4.

⁷⁶
CC
. 4, 5.

1
     In all arts and sciences which embrace the whole of any subject,
(10)
and do not come into being in a fragmentary way, it is the province of a single art or science to consider all that appertains to a single subject. For example, the art of gymnastic considers not only the suitableness of different modes of training to different bodies (2), but what sort is absolutely the best (1); (for the absolutely best must suit that which is by nature best and best furnished with the means of life), and also what common form of training is adapted to the great majority of men (4).
(15)
And if a man does not desire the best habit of body, or the greatest skill in gymnastics, which might be attained by him, still the trainer or the teacher of gymnastic should be able to impart any lower degree of either (3). The same principle equally holds in medicine and ship-building, and the making of clothes, and in the arts generally.
¹

Hence it is obvious that government too is the subject of a single science,
(20)
which has to consider what government is best and of what sort it must be, to be most in accordance with our aspirations, if there were no external impediment, and also what kind of government is adapted to particular states. For the best is often unattainable,
(25)
and therefore the true legislator and statesman ought to be acquainted, not only with (1) that which is best in the abstract, but also with (2) that which is best relatively to circumstances. We should be able further to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions (3); both how it is originally formed and, when formed, how it may be longest preserved; the supposed state being so far from having the best constitution that it is unprovided even with the conditions necessary for the best; neither is it the best under the circumstances,
(30)
but of an inferior type.

He ought, moreover, to know (4) the form of government which is best suited to states in general; for political writers,
(35)
although they
have excellent ideas, are often unpractical. We should consider, not only what form of government is best, but also what is possible and what is easily attainable by all. There are some who would have none but the most perfect; for this many natural advantages are required.
(40)
Others, again, speak of a more attainable form, and, although they reject the constitution under which they are living, they extol some one in particular, for example the Lacedaemonian.
²
Any change of government which has to be introduced should be one which men, starting from their existing constitutions, will be both willing and able to adopt, since there is quite as much trouble in the reformation of an old constitution as in the establishment of a new one,
(5)
just as to unlearn is as hard as to learn.
[1289a]
And therefore, in addition to the qualifications of the statesman already mentioned, he should be able to find remedies for the defects of existing constitutions, as has been said before.
³
This he cannot do unless he knows how many forms of government there are. It is often supposed that there is only one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy.
(10)
But this is a mistake; and, in order to avoid such mistakes, we must ascertain what differences there are in the constitutions of states, and in how many ways they are combined. The same political insight will enable a man to know which laws are the best, and which are suited to different constitutions; for the laws are, and ought to be, relative to the constitution,
(15)
and not the constitution to the laws. A constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders.
(20)
So that we must know the varieties, and the number of varieties, of each form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy.
(25)