The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (124 page)

6
     There are, both among those who have these convictions and among those who merely profess these views, some who raise a difficulty by asking, who is to be the judge of the healthy man,
(5)
and in general who is likely to judge rightly on each class of questions. But such inquiries are like puzzling over the question whether we are now asleep or awake. And all such questions have the same meaning. These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything;
⁴²
for they seek a starting-point, and they seek to get this by demonstration,
(10)
while it
is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration.

These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth,
(15)
for it is not difficult to grasp; but those who seek merely compulsion in argument seek what is impossible; for they demand to be allowed to contradict themselves—a claim which contradicts itself from the very first.
⁴³
—But if not all things are relative, but some are self-existent, not everything that appears will be true; for that which appears is apparent to some one; so that he who says all things that appear are true,
(20)
makes all things relative. And, therefore, those who ask for an irresistible argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists
for him to whom
it appears, and
when
, and
to the sense to which
, and
under the conditions under which
it appears. And if they give an account of their view, but do not give it in this way, they will soon find themselves contradicting themselves.
(25)
For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each, if their sight is unlike. For to those who for the reasons named some time ago
⁴⁴
say that what appears is true,
(30)
and therefore that all things are alike false and true, for things do not appear either the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight says there is one),
⁴⁵
—to these we shall say ‘yes,
(35)
but not to the same sense and in the same part of it and under the same conditions and at the same time’, so that what appears will be with these qualifications true.
[1011b]
But perhaps for this reason those who argue thus not because they feel a difficulty but for the sake of argument, should say that this is not true, but true for this man. And as has been said
⁴⁶
before, they must make everything relative—relative to opinion and perception,
(5)
so that nothing either has come to be or will be without some one’s first thinking so. But if things
have
come to be or will be,
⁴⁷
evidently not all things will be relative to opinion.—Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number of things; and if the same thing is both half and equal, it is not to the
double that the equal is correlative.
⁴⁸
If, then, in relation to that which thinks, man and that which is thought are the same, man will not be that which thinks,
(10)
but only that which is thought. And if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.

Let this, then, suffice to show (1) that the most indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true, and (2) what consequences follow from the assertion that they are, and (3) why people do assert this. Now since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing,
(15)
obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. For of contraries, one is a privation no less than it is a contrary—and a privation of the essential nature; and privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus. If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time,
(20)
it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification.
⁴⁹

7
     But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. This is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are.
(25)
To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.
⁵⁰
—Again, the intermediate between the contradictories will be so either in the way in which grey is between black and white,
⁵¹
(30)
or as that which is neither man nor horse is between man and horse. (
a
) If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into the extremes (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good), but as a matter of fact when there is an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes. For there is no change except to opposites
⁵²
and to their intermediates.
(35)
(
b
) But if it is really intermediate,
⁵³
in this way too there would have
to be a change to white, which was not from not-white; but as it is, this is never seen.
[1012a]
—Again, every object of understanding or reason the understanding either affirms or denies—this is obvious from the definition—whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects in one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true,
(5)
and when it does so in another way, what is false.—Again, there must be an intermediate between
all
contradictories, if one is not arguing merely for the sake of argument; so that it will be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor untrue, and there will be a middle between that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between generation and destruction.—Again, in all classes in which the negation of an attribute involves the assertion of its contrary,
(10)
even in these there will be an intermediate; for instance, in the sphere of numbers there will be number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is obvious from the definition.—Again, the process will go on
ad infinitum
, and the number of realities will be not only half as great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation,
⁵⁴
and this new term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something different.
(15)
—Again, when a man, on being asked whether a thing is white, says ‘no’, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not being is a negation.

Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical arguments,
(20)
they give in to the argument and agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some express this view; others do so because they demand a reason for everything.
⁵⁵
And the starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something; for the form of words of which the word is a sign will be its definition.
⁵⁶
—While the doctrine of Heraclitus,
(25)
that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.

8
     In view of these distinctions it is obvious that the one-sided theories which some people express about all things cannot be valid—on the one hand the theory that nothing is true (for,
(30)
say they, there is nothing
to prevent every statement from being like the statement ‘the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side’), on the other hand the theory that everything is true. These views are practically the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that ‘all things are true and all are false’ also makes each of these statements separately,
(35)
so that since they are impossible, the double statement must be impossible too.
[1012b]
—Again, there are obviously contradictories which cannot be at the same time true—nor on the other hand can all statements be false; yet this would
seem
more possible in the light of what has been said.—But against all such views we must postulate, as we said above,
⁵⁷
not that something is or is not,
(5)
but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible that all statements should be false; for one side of the contradiction must be true. Again,
(10)
if it is necessary with regard to everything either to assert or to deny it, it is impossible that both should be false; for it is
one
side of the contradiction that is false.—Therefore all such views are also exposed to the often expressed objection, that they destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is true makes even the statement contrary to his own true,
(15)
and therefore his own not true (for the contrary statement denies that it is true), while he who says everything is false makes himself also false.
⁵⁸
—And if the former person excepts the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while the latter excepts his own as being not false, none the less they are driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite number of statements; for that which says the true statement is true is true,
(20)
and this process will go on to infinity.

Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest are not right, nor are those who say all things are in movement. For if all things are at rest, the same statements will always be true and the same always false—but this obviously changes; for he who makes a statement,
(25)
himself at one time was not and again will not be. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true; everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible. Again, it must be that which is that changes; for change is from something to something. But again it is not the case that all things are at rest or in motion
sometimes
, and nothing
for ever
; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion,
(30)
and the first mover is itself unmoved.

¹
With 1004
^a
2–9 Cf. iii. 995
^b
10–13, 997
^a
15–25, vi. 1.

²
i. e. iii. 995
^b
18–27, 997
^a
25–34.

³
sc
. which they do not do.

⁴
The Pythagoreans.

⁵
Parmenides in the ‘Way of Opinion’.

⁶
The Platonists.

⁷
Empedocles.

⁸
With 1003
^b
22–1005
^a
18 Cf. iii. 995
^b
18–27, 997
^a
25–34. With the whole ch. Cf. xi. 3.

⁹
With 1005
^a
19–
^b
2 Cf. xi. 4.

¹⁰
The reference may be to Antisthenes.

¹¹
With ch. 3 Cf. iii. 995
^b
6–10, 996
^b
26–997
^a
15. With 1005
^b
8–34 Cf. xi. 1061
^b
34–1062
^a
2 (with 1005
^b
23–6 Cf. 1002
^a
31–5).

¹²
Apparently a loose reference to 1005
^b
23–5.

¹³
The Megaric school may be referred to.

¹⁴
With ll. 5–18 Cf. xi. 1062
^a
2–5.

¹⁵
For ‘so and not so’ Cf. Pl.
Theaet
. 183
A
.

^16
a
21, 31.

¹⁷
ll. 11–15.

¹⁸
in
^a
31 f.

¹⁹
1006
^b
17.

²⁰
With 1006
^a
18–1007
^a
Cf. xi. 1062
^a
5–20 (with 1006
^b
28–34 Cf. 1062
^a
20–3).

²¹
sc
. and hence (on the view attacked) should be compatible with it.

²²
i. e. in the direction of predicates, which are naturally wider or higher than the subject.

²³
Sense (1) reduces to sense (2), and in this an infinite number of accidents combined together is impossible; there must be substance somewhere.

²⁴
sc
. ‘trireme’.

²⁵
With 1007
^b
18–1008
^a
2 Cf. xi. 1062
^a
23–30.

²⁶
sc
. that the thing is a man and a not-man.

²⁷
With ll. 6–7 Cf. xi. 1062
^a
36–
^b
7.

²⁸
1006
^b
17, 1007
^a
6.

²⁹
With ll. 12–27 Cf. xi. 1063
^a
28–35.

³⁰
With ll. 16–22 Cf. xi. 1063
^b
7–16.

³¹
With ll. 6–16, 22–30 Cf. xi. 1062
^b
12–24.

³²
With ll. 30–6 Cf. xi. 1062
^b
24–33.

³³
With
^a
38–
^b
33 Cf. xi. 1063
^a
35–
^b
7.

³⁴
Cf. 1009
^a
32.

³⁵
Epicharmus may have said that Xenophanes’ views were ‘neither plausible nor true’, or that they were ‘true but not plausible’.

³⁶
With ll. 22–5 Cf. xi. 1063
^a
22–8.

³⁷
With ll. 25–32 Cf. xi. 1063
^a
10–17.

³⁸
Cf. 1009
^a
36–8.

³⁹
Cf.
Theaetetus
178 B–179 A.

⁴⁰
e. g. the awareness which smell gives us of savour and of odour respectively.

⁴¹
With ll. 1–26 Cf. xi. 1062
^b
33–1063
^a
10.

⁴²
The reference may be to Antisthenes.

⁴³
With ll. 3–16 Cf. xi. 1063
^b
7–16.

⁴⁴
Cf. 1009
^a
38–1010
^a
15.

⁴⁵
With ll. 31–4 Cf. xi. 1062
^b
33–1063
^a
10.

^46
a
19 f.

⁴⁷
sc
. without some one’s first thinking so.

⁴⁸
sc
. but the equal to the equal, the half to the double.

⁴⁹
With ll. 17–22 Cf. xi. 1063
^b
17–19.

⁵⁰
sc
. by those who say there is an intermediate between contradictories. Hence such a statement is neither true nor false, which is absurd.

⁵¹
Though of course it differs from this case in being between contradictories, not contraries.

⁵²
sc
. contrary, not contradictory opposites.

⁵³
sc
. as grey is between black and white.

⁵⁴
i. e. if there is a term
B
which is neither
A
nor not-
A
, there will be a new term
C
which is neither
B
nor not-
B
.

⁵⁵
The reference may be to Antisthenes.

⁵⁶
With 1011
^b
23–1012
^a
24 Cf. xi. 1063
^b
19–24.

⁵⁷
Cf. 1006
^a
18–22.

⁵⁸
With
^a
24–
^b
18 Cf. xi. 1063
^b
24–35 (with
^b
13–18 Cf. 1062
^b
7–9).