The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics) (119 page)

3
      (6) Apart from the great difficulty of stating the case truly with regard to these matters,
(20)
it is very hard to say, with regard to the first principles, whether it is the genera that should be taken as elements and principles, or rather the primary constituents of a thing; e. g. it is the primary parts of which articulate sounds consist that are thought to be elements and principles of articulate sound,
(25)
not the common genus—articulate sound; and we give the name of ‘elements’ to those geometrical propositions, the proofs of which are implied in the proofs of the others, either of all or of most. Further, both those who say there are several elements of corporeal things and those who say there is one,
(30)
say the parts of which bodies are compounded and consist are principles; e. g. Empedocles says fire and water and the rest are the constituent elements of things, but does not describe these as genera of existing things.
[998b]
Besides this, if we want to examine the nature of anything else, we examine the parts of which, e. g., a bed consists and how they are put together, and then we know its nature.

To, judge from these arguments, then, the principles of things would not be the genera; but if we know each thing by its definition,
(5)
and the genera are the principles or starting-points of definitions, the genera must also be the principles of definable things. And if to get the knowledge of the species according to which things are named is to get the knowledge of things, the genera are at least starting-points of the
species
. And some also of those who say unity or being,
³¹
or the great and the small,
³²
(10)
are elements of things, seem to treat them as genera.

But, again, it is not possible to describe the principles in
both
ways. For the formula of the essence is one; but definition by genera will be different from that which states the constituent parts of a thing.
³³

(7) Besides this, even if the genera are in the highest degree principles,
(15)
should one regard the first of the genera as principles, or those which are predicated directly of the individuals? This also admits of dispute. For if the universals are always more of the nature of principles,
evidently the uppermost of the genera are the principles; for these are predicated of all things. There will, then, be as many principles of things as there are primary genera, so that both being and unity will be principles and substances; for these are most of all predicated of all existing things.
(20)
But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things; for the differentiae of any genus must each of them both have being and be one, but it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae; so that if unity or being is a genus,
(25)
no differentia will either have being or be one. But if unity and being are not genera, neither will they be principles, if the genera are the principles.—Again, the intermediate kinds, in whose nature the differentiae are included, will on this theory be genera, down to the indivisible species; but as it is, some are thought to be genera and others are not thought to be so. Besides this,
(30)
the differentiae are principles even more than the genera; and if these also are principles, there comes to be practically an infinite number of principles, especially if we suppose the highest genus to be a principle.—But again, if unity
is
more of the nature of a principle, and the indivisible is one, and everything indivisible is so either in quantity or in species, and that which is so in species is the prior, and genera are divisible into species (for man is not the
genus
of individual men), that which is predicated directly of the individuals will have more unity.
[999a]
(5)
—Further, in the case of things in which the distinction of prior and posterior is present, that which is predicable of these things cannot be something apart from them (e. g. if two is the first of numbers, there will not be a Number apart from the kinds of numbers; and similarly there will not be a Figure apart from the kinds of figures; and if the genera of these things do not exist apart from the species,
(10)
the genera of
other
things will scarcely do so; for genera of these things are thought to exist if any do). But among the individuals one is not prior and another posterior. Further, where one thing is better and another worse, the better is always prior; so that of these also no genus can exist.

From these considerations, then, the species predicated of individuals seem to be principles rather than the genera.
(15)
But again, it is not easy to say in what sense these are to be taken as principles. For the principle, and must be capable of existing in separation from the principle, and must be capable of existing in separation from them; but for what reason should we suppose any such thing to exist alongside of the individual, except that it is predicated universally and of all? But if this is the reason,
(20)
the things that are more universal
must be supposed to be more of the nature of principles; so that the highest genera would be the principles.
³⁴

4
     (8) There is a difficulty connected with these,
(25)
the hardest of all and the most necessary to examine, and of this the discussion now awaits us. If, on the one hand, there is nothing apart from individual things, and the individuals are infinite in number, how then is it possible to get knowledge of the infinite individuals? For all things that we come to know, we come to know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally.

But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from the individuals,
(30)
it will be necessary that the genera exist apart from the individuals—either the lowest or the highest genera; but we found by discussion just now that this is impossible.
³⁵

Further, if we admit in the fullest sense that something exists apart from the concrete thing, whenever something is predicated of the matter, must there, if there is something apart, be something apart from each set of individuals, or from some and not from others, or from none? (A) If there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and there will not be knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is knowledge.
³⁶
[999b]
Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable; for all perceptible things perish and are in movement.
(5)
But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be a process of coming to be; for there must be something that comes to be, i. e. from which something comes to be, and the ultimate term in this series cannot have come to be, since the series has a limit and since nothing can come to be out of that which is not. Further, if generation and movement exist there must also be a limit; for no movement is infinite,
(10)
but every movement has an end, and that which is incapable of completing its coming to be cannot be in process of coming to be; and that which has completed its coming to be must
be
as soon as it has come to be.
³⁷
Further, since the matter exists, because it is ungenerated, it is
a fortiori
reasonable that the substance or essence, that which the matter is at any time coming to be, should exist; for if neither essence nor matter is to be,
(15)
nothing will be at all, and since this is impossible there must be something besides the concrete thing, viz. the shape or form.

But again (B) if we are to suppose this, it is hard to say in which cases we are to suppose it and in which not. For evidently it is not possible to suppose it in all cases; we could not suppose that there is a house besides the particular houses.—Besides this,
(20)
will the substance of all the individuals, e. g. of all men, be one? This is paradoxical, for all the things whose substance is one are one. But are the substances many and different? This also is unreasonable.—At the same time, how does the matter become each of the individuals, and how
is
the concrete thing these two elements?
³⁸

(9) Again, one might ask the following question also about the first principles. If they are one
in kind
only, nothing will be numerically one,
(25)
not even unity-itself and being-itself; and how will knowing exist, if there is not to be something common to a whole set of individuals?

But if there is a common element which is
numerically
one, and each of the principles is one, and the principles are not as in the case of perceptible things different for different things (e. g. since this particular syllable is the same in kind whenever it occurs, the elements of it are also the same in kind; only in kind, for these also,
(30)
like the syllable, are numerically different in different contexts),—if it is not like this but the principles of things are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements (for there is no difference of meaning between ‘numerically one’ and ‘individual’; for this is just what we mean by the individual—the numerically one, and by the universal we mean that which is predicable of the individuals).
[1000a]
Therefore it will be just as if the elements of articulate sound were limited in number; all the language in the world would be confined to the ABC, since there could not be two or more letters of the same kind.
³⁹

(10) One difficulty which is as great as any has been neglected both by modern philosophers and by their predecessors—whether the principles of perishable and those of imperishable things are the same or different.
(5)
If they are the same, how are some things perishable and others imperishable, and for what reason? The school of Hesiod and all the theologians thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods,
(10)
they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension. For
if the gods taste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure,
(15)
these are in no wise the causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their existence, how can gods who need food be eternal?—But into the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously; those, however, who use the language of proof we must cross-examine and ask why,
(20)
after all, things which consist of the same elements are, some of them, eternal in nature, while others perish. Since these philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, evidently the principles or causes of things cannot be the same. Even the man whom one might suppose to speak most consistently—Empedocles—even he has made the same mistake; for he maintains that strife is a principle that causes
destruction
,
(25)
but even strife would seem no less to
produce
everything, except the One; for all things excepting God proceed from strife. At least he says:—

The implication is evident even apart from these words; for if strife had not been present in things, all things would have been one, according to him; for when they have come together, ‘then strife stood outermost.’
[1000b]
Hence it also follows on his theory that God most blessed is less wise than all others; for he does not know all the elements; for he has in him no strife,
(5)
and knowledge is of the like by the like. ‘For by earth,’ he says,

But—and this is the point we started from—this at least is evident,
(10)
that on his theory it follows that strife is as much the cause of existence as of destruction. And similarly love is not specially the cause of existence; for in collecting things into the One it destroys all other things. And at the same time Empedocles mentions no cause of the change itself, except that things are so by nature.

This implies that change was necessary; but he shows no cause of the necessity. But yet so far at least he alone speaks consistently; for he
does not make some things perishable and others imperishable, but makes all perishable except the elements. The difficulty we are speaking of now is,
(20)
why some things are perishable and others are not, if they consist of the same principles.

Let this suffice as proof of the fact that the principles cannot be the same. But if there are different principles, one difficulty is whether these also will be imperishable or perishable. For if they are
perishable
, evidently these also must consist of certain elements (for all things that perish,
(25)
perish by being resolved into the elements of which they consist); so that it follows that prior to the principles there are other principles. But this is impossible, whether the process has a limit or proceeds to infinity. Further, how will perishable things exist, if their principles are to be annulled? But if the principles are
imperishable
, why will things composed of
some
imperishable principles be perishable, while those composed of the others are imperishable? This is not probable,
(30)
but is either impossible or needs much proof. Further, no one has even tried to maintain different principles; they maintain the same principles for all things. But they swallow the difficulty we stated first
⁴⁰
as if they took it to be something trifling.
⁴¹
[1001a]

(11) The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity are the substances of things,
(5)
and whether each of them, without being anything else, is being or unity respectively,
or
we must inquire what being and unity are, with the implication that they have some other underlying nature. For some people think they are of the former, others think they are of the latter character. Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being and unity were nothing else, but this was their nature,
(10)
their essence being just unity and being. But the natural philosophers take a different line; e. g. Empedocles—as though reducing it to something more intelligible—says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is love: at least, this is for all things the cause of their being one. Others say this unity and being,
(15)
of which things consist and have been made, is fire,
⁴²
and others say it is air.
⁴³
A similar view is expressed by those who make the elements more than one; for these also must say that unity and being are precisely all the things which they say are principles.

(A) If we do not suppose unity and being to be substances, it
follows that none of the other universals is a substance; for these are most universal of all,
(20)
and if there is no unity-itself or being-itself, there will scarcely be in any
other
case anything apart from what are called the individuals.
(25)
Further, if unity is not a substance, evidently number also will not exist as an entity separate from the individual things; for number is units, and the unit is precisely a certain kind of one.

But (B) if there is a unity-itself and a being-itself, unity and being must be their substance; for it is not something else that is predicated universally of the things that are and are one, but just unity and being.
(30)
But if there
is
to be a being-itself and a unity-itself, there is much difficulty in seeing how there will be anything else besides these—I mean, how things will be more than one in number. For what is different from being does not exist, so that it necessarily follows, according to the argument of Parmenides, that all things that are are one and this is being.

[1001b]
There are objections to both views. For whether unity is not a substance or there
is
a unity-itself, number cannot be a substance. We have already
⁴⁴
said why this result follows if unity is not a substance; and if it is, the same difficulty arises as arose
⁴⁵
with regard to being.
(5)
For whence is there to be another one besides unity-itself? It must be not-one; but all things are either one or many, and of the many each is one.

Further, if unity-itself is indivisible, according to Zeno’s postulate it will be nothing. For that which neither when added makes a thing greater nor when subtracted makes it less, he asserts to have no being,
(10)
evidently assuming that whatever has being is a spatial magnitude. And if it is a magnitude, it is corporeal; for the corporeal has being in every dimension, while the other objects of mathematics, e. g. a plane or a line, added in one way will increase what they are added to, but in another way will not do so,
⁴⁶
and a point or a unit does so in no way. But, since his theory is of a low order,
(15)
and an indivisible thing
can
exist in such a way as to have a defence even against him (for the indivisible when added will make the number, though not the size, greater)—yet how can a
magnitude
proceed from one such indivisible or from many? It is like saying that the line is made out of points.

But even if one supposes the case to be such that,
(20)
as some say, number proceeds from unity-itself and something else which is not one, none the less we must inquire why and how the product will be
sometimes a number and sometimes a magnitude, if the not-one was inequality
⁴⁷
and was the same principle in either case. For it is not evident how magnitudes could proceed either from the one and this principle, or from some number and this principle.
⁴⁸