Supreme Commander (44 page)

The CCS passed Eisenhower’s request on to the heads of government, who relented and gave Eisenhower authorization to proceed with the surrender negotiations on the basis of the short terms.
¹³
Zanussi, meanwhile, had proved to be most co-operative. After a discussion with Eisenhower, he agreed to send his aide back to Italy with a letter to General d’Armata Ambrosio, chief of
Comando Supremo
. The letter would make four points: (1) that there was need for immediate acceptance of the short terms; (2) that the long terms dealt “with political, economic and other questions of only relative importance” and that the question at issue “was not one of formulas but of the general Italian attitude”; (3) that the Italians should “believe in the good faith of the Allied governments”; (4) that either Zanussi or Castellano should remain in Sicily in permanent contact with AFHQ. Then Eisenhower decided he would not let Zanussi send the long terms with his aide, for he feared that they might fall into German hands. This later led to additional confusion.

Zanussi and Eisenhower then discussed the political situation in Italy. Zanussi pointed out that a major difficulty was that Italy was dominated by “used men” like the King and Badoglio, who had for years submitted to the Fascists. He warned Eisenhower not to expect any spectacular
initiative on their part. They were terrified of the Germans, the more so because of the slowness of the negotiations with the Allies, which had given the Germans time to prepare plans to take over the Italian government. The Germans might move on Rome, Zanussi said, within days or even hours. He also pointed out that the House of Savoy had “acted as a stabilizing influence in Italy for the past six centuries,” which made it a “peg on which a transition regime may be attached.” The King and Badoglio, he added, were managing to keep comparative order and tranquillity in Italy, which should work to the benefit of the Allies. Zanussi confided that, although the Italians had told the Germans that they were moving troops to meet the expected Allied landing, in fact the movements were intended to protect Rome and its airfields. He pleaded with Eisenhower to hurry and get as many divisions into Italy as possible.
¹⁴

The Allied governments shortly showed that they could be almost as troublesome as the Germans or Italians. In the midst of the negotiations, messages began to pour in on AFHQ from London asking what arrangements were being made for representatives of governments of the Dominions and other United Nations to attend the surrender ceremony. The British wanted to celebrate their first official victory in the war in a grand manner, with appropriate ceremony and publicity. They even wanted De Gaulle informed.
¹⁵
Macmillan “kept sending back protests at this folly,” and Eisenhower and Murphy together told Marshall and Secretary of State Hull it was absurd. “At what seems to us a very premature stage of an extremely delicate negotiation with emissaries who have come to us at a great risk of precipitating German seizure of the present Italian Government,” they declared, “we are astounded that any thought may be entertained of something in the nature of a public armistice ceremony.…” The CCS saw to it that the matter was quietly dropped.
¹⁶

On August 31 Smith and Alexander met with Castellano and Zanussi at Alexander’s headquarters in Cassibile, Sicily. Castellano reported that his government would not announce the armistice until the Allies had landed in massive force. The Italians wanted fifteen Allied divisions north of Rome; any lesser force would be insufficient. The Germans would pour into the capital and take over the government, and under those circumstances the Italians would have gained nothing by surrendering. Smith bluntly replied that this was unacceptable—the Italians could either take the short terms or reject them, but they could not bargain. He would not tell Castellano when the Allies were landing, or
in what force. Smith’s attitude aroused Castellano’s suspicions—perhaps, he began to think, the Allies were not as strong as they should be. Much as the Italians yearned to be rid of the Germans, they could not afford to commit themselves without some guarantees about their own safety.

After long discussions, with Murphy, Macmillan, and Alexander all trying to convince Castellano to accept the armistice on the basis of the short terms, Castellano proposed an alternative. Would the Allies at least help hold Rome by sending some assistance to the Italians there? Smith said that it might be possible to bring in an airborne division on the day of the invasion. Could the Italians hold an airfield for the Allied airborne troops? Castellano thought they could. On that note, Castellano returned to Rome. He promised to urge Badoglio to accept the short terms, with the proviso that an airborne division would land in Rome. The announcement of the armistice would be made the evening before the Allied landings.
¹⁷
Smith, meanwhile, flew to Algiers to brief Eisenhower.

The next day, September 1, Eisenhower sent a full report to the CCS. Italy, he began, “is in fact an occupied country and its government has no freedom of independent action.” The best the Allies could hope for from the Italians was a general strike, which would increase the Germans’ transportation problems. The Italians were “far more frightened of the German strength and reprisals within the country than they are of our threat of invasion or even of our bombing operations.” They were particularly concerned about Rome, so Eisenhower had accepted Smith’s suggestion and agreed to fly the 82d Airborne Division into Rome on the eve of AVALANCHE. This had to be done because the Italians were “merely frightened individuals that are trying to get out of a bad mess in the best possible way.…” Eisenhower intended to do all he could to help them; at the same time he assured the CCS that “nothing that I am doing now or will do in the future implies any promises to any particular government or heads of government with respect to their status after occupation by Allied forces.

“I have no repeat no thought of abandoning plans for AVALANCHE,” Eisenhower declared, but he did want the CCS to know the extent of the risks, which he felt justified his doing everything possible to get Italian help. Castellano thought the Allies needed fifteen divisions landing north of Rome to secure the peninsula. AVALANCHE in fact projected an initial Allied landing of only three divisions nearly a hundred and fifty miles south of Rome, with a build-up over two weeks to a maximum
of eight divisions. The Germans had nineteen divisions in Italy. If the Italians, fighting on their own soil, stayed with the Germans, the Allies would face a major disaster, one that would have catastrophic repercussions in England and the United States. Thus sending the 82d into Rome was a “good gamble,” since it would reassure the Italians. Unfortunately, Eisenhower concluded, “my own belief is that the Italians will probably allow this situation to drift and will not seek a formal armistice. They are too badly demoralized to face up to consequences and are not sufficiently assured of the safety of Rome.” Still, if the Italians did nothing, even that was better than having them oppose the landing.
¹⁸

Castellano and Zanussi, meanwhile, had gotten back to Rome. So far only Zanussi knew of the long terms—when he tried to tell Castellano about them Castellano brushed him off—and the government thought that after signing the short terms all disagreements would end and preparations to fight beside the Allies could begin. On this basis, and encouraged by Eisenhower’s willingness to bring the 82d into Rome, Badoglio decided to continue the negotiations. AFHQ received a radio message to that effect around 11
P.M
., September l.
¹⁹
Castellano was returning to Sicily, where he would meet with Smith.

The CCS had instructed Eisenhower to sign the formal armistice agreement, and on September 2 he told Smith he was ready to “come any place any time to do this.” He felt, however, that anything Castellano (rather than Badoglio) signed would be a “preliminary document,” and thought that Smith should sign for AFHQ.
²⁰

Smith, meanwhile, discovered that Castellano wanted to discuss military co-operation and had no authority to sign an armistice. Smith suggested that Castellano wire Rome for permission; after a long discussion and much confusion, Castellano did so and received authority to sign. One of the deciding factors was that Montgomery’s Eighth Army had begun to cross the Messina Strait that morning, September 3. The British met with no serious opposition. Allied troops were back on the continent of Europe.

At Smith’s urging, Eisenhower flew to Sicily the next day to witness the signing. After Smith and Castellano affixed their signatures, which was done quickly and quietly, the two sides arranged to announce the armistice late in the evening of September 8, a few hours before Clark’s Fifth Army hit the beaches at Salerno. Eisenhower told the CCS that a final signing would take place later, when he was able to get together with
the King and Badoglio, and begged the Chiefs to keep everything secret for the time being.
²¹

After the signing, Smith calmly handed Castellano a copy of the long terms. Castellano had so far managed to avoid the humiliating unconditional surrender phrase in all his negotiations and he was painfully surprised to read the opening line: “The Italian Land, Sea and Air Forces wherever located, hereby surrender unconditionally.” He protested violently, which in turn surprised Smith. He said that surely Castellano knew about the long terms, since Zanussi had received a copy in Lisbon. Castellano replied that not only did he not know about them, his government did not either, and that this development put a whole new light on the armistice. Smith reminded him of the modifying force of the Quebec Memorandum, but Castellano was not impressed, since it contained only general promises. Smith then sat down and made a promise in writing. “The additional clauses,” he declared, “have only a relative value insofar as Italy collaborates in the war against the Germans.”
²²

Finally on September 6, after two days of continuous discussion between Castellano and the staff, Eisenhower made a series of adjustments to his plans to take advantage of Italian aid. These adjustments satisfied the Italian leaders. The most important was pulling the 82d out of AVALANCHE (the paratroopers had been scheduled to be used as a floating reserve) and flying it into Rome. Half the division would go in on the night of September 8, with the remainder following over the next few days. Castellano said that the Italians would be able to open the ports of Taranto and Brindisi to the Allies, and Cunningham said that as soon as the Italian fleet came under Allied control, in accordance with the armistice terms, he could release some cruisers and destroyers for escort duty. Eisenhower therefore decided to take the British 1st Airborne Division, which was in North Africa awaiting transportation to Britain, and rush it to Taranto, on the Italian heel, on D-Day. Last, Eisenhower and Badoglio would simultaneously announce the armistice on the radio at 6:30
P.M
. on September 8.
²³

The over-all picture, in short, was suddenly rosy. Eisenhower would be entering Italy from four different directions, with Montgomery coming north from the toe, the British paratroopers on the heel, the 82d Airborne in Rome, and Clark’s Fifth Army at Salerno. The prospects for AVALANCHE looked especially good, since taking the 82d Airborne out of floating reserve released some landing craft, and the absence of opposition in the toe against Montgomery had released additional craft.
With the 82d in Rome, the Germans would find it difficult to move reserves into the Salerno area to oppose the Allies. If everything worked out, and the Italians stuck to their agreements, the Allies could count on being north of Rome in a matter of days.

All of these developments had happened so quickly that it seemed too good to be true, and Eisenhower curbed his optimism. On September 6 he told Marshall that the Italian negotiations were complete, “and I hope that something real will come from them. If we can only produce a situation that will force the Germans in the south to become fearful and retire rather than to counterattack us quickly and seriously, my greatest concern will be alleviated.” Even if the campaign on the ground stalled, however, getting the Italian fleet would be a major gain. Eisenhower said he was encouraged at the absence of opposition on the toe, but “the AVALANCHE operation is a horse of a different color and I am frank to state that there is more than a faint possibility that we may have some hard going.” But the commanders and troops were in good spirits, and “I am determined to hit as hard as I can.”
²⁴

Two days later Eisenhower’s caution became justified as the high hopes began to fall. Castellano conferred with his government and reported that Badoglio wanted a larger force in Rome, with at least an armored division supporting the 82d Airborne. This request came on the eve of the invasion, but neither Castellano nor Badoglio knew how imminent AVALANCHE was.

Eisenhower flatly refused. Castellano then asked if the Italians could keep a portion of their fleet for the use of the King. As soon as the armistice was announced, the King decided he wanted to put to sea and stay there until the situation had crystallized. Eisenhower agreed to give them one cruiser and three gunboats, but for a few days only. Castellano had other requests, all of which Eisenhower turned down.
²⁵

By far the most disturbing aspect of the requests was Italian nervousness about Rome. Fortunately, Eisenhower already had officers there who could keep Badoglio in line. On September 6 Eisenhower met with Major General Maxwell Taylor, commanding the 82d’s artillery, and Colonel William T. Gardiner. He was sending the two officers into Rome to make last-minute arrangements with Badoglio and to recommend changes as needed. An elaborate code system was worked out; the key word was “Innocuous.” If for any reason Taylor thought the airborne operation should be canceled, he would radio the word “innocuous” to AFHQ. Taylor was a West Point graduate with a reputation for brilliance
and an ability to keep his head in a crisis. Eisenhower was sure he could trust him.