Supreme Commander (43 page)

It has been argued that Eisenhower’s approach represented not so much a desire to simplify as simple-mindedness. He had forgotten his Clausewitz, critics charged, and did not realize that in war the real objective is not the defeat of the enemy but rather the political end of the continuing security of the nation, which involves much more than
victory on the battlefield. In the critics’ view, Eisenhower’s political naïveté cost the Americans dearly in the postwar world.

What the critics have failed to recognize was the political motivation inherent in Eisenhower’s thought. The decision to defeat Germany was not his, but he heartily agreed with it, for the obvious reason—too easily forgotten during the Cold War—that the
sine qua non
of American security in 1943 was the defeat of the armed forces of Nazi Germany. Within that context, anything that speeded up the process was a political gain, since it would save American lives and money and would also allow the United States to turn its full might against the Japanese sooner.

In the case under consideration, the Italian surrender negotiations, Eisenhower was the man on the spot, responsible not only for victory but also for the lives of the men entrusted to him. He saw clearly that which Churchill and Roosevelt always failed to recognize—that the Italians had something to offer and to get it the Allies had to give them some positive inducement, not just the sterile and negative formula of surrender and occupation.

Eisenhower also realized that success in war can justify almost anything. In their national capitals, close to the critics, Roosevelt and Churchill could not help but take into account the liberal sentiment that permeated the Allied world throughout the war. When an Italian double-cross of the Germans became a real possibility, the soldier leading the Allied forces thought only of the advantages offered, while the heads of government thought of the reaction at home. “The merest suggestion of recognition of the Badoglio government,” Robert Sherwood noted, “brought down more and more opprobrium on the State Department which by now was regarded in liberal circles as the very citadel of reaction.…”
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Churchill and Roosevelt were perfectly aware that it would have been supreme folly not to exploit the Italian situation, but they also felt that it was impossible to make an open deal with the King and Badoglio on the Darlan model. Their solution was to ignore Eisenhower’s pleas for an easy armistice and demand unconditional surrender, then give that surrender an elastic implementation. They would ultimately allow the Italians to prove their worth by joining in the crusade against the Nazis. This had the advantage of keeping morale at home high and satisfying public opinion and, somewhat later, of getting Italian help.
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The only trouble was that it took so long in coming. By the time the agreement was concluded to everyone’s satisfaction, the Germans had
nineteen divisions in Italy. The bill for the delay was paid in blood at Salerno, Anzio, and Cassino.

The tangled story began on the morning of August 17. Eisenhower had just returned from Sicily to Algiers. When he got to his headquarters he found copies of three messages from Eden, in London, to Churchill, who was in Quebec for the QUADRANT Conference of the CCS. Eden reported that General Giuseppe Castellano, assistant to the chief of the Italian high command, had arrived in Madrid and talked with the British ambassador there. Castellano had no credentials from his government to work out an armistice, but he did want to negotiate with Allied military representatives in order to arrange an Italian double-cross. He wanted the Allies to first land on the Italian mainland in force, to be followed by Italy’s joining the war against the Germans.

Eden was the first high official to react to the Italian offer and his attitude set the tone for the Allies throughout the negotiations. “Although at first sight this offer of cooperation sounds tempting,” Eden told Churchill, “I feel that if we accept it it will land us in all sorts of difficulties both military and political with few if any corresponding advantages.… I am sure we ought to stick to our present policy of refusing to make the Italian government any promises or enter into any bargain with them in return for their surrender.”
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Eisenhower took the opposite view. After consulting with his G-2, Brigadier Strong, and Macmillan, he sent a message to the CCS at Quebec. He said he wanted to send Strong, in civilian clothes, to Lisbon (where Castellano was headed) with instructions to get all the military information he could from Castellano. The proposal was that Strong should tell the Italian general that if Italy was anxious to speed up the day when an Allied force would land on the mainland, the Italians should undertake widespread sabotaging operations. Eisenhower also wanted Strong to tell Castellano that the Italians “have no recourse except to depend upon the decency and sense of justice of the Allied Governments when once we have arrived in Italy.” In short, Eisenhower wanted to avoid all the complications of any formal negotiations, make a simple military agreement with the Italians, and deal with the political aspects of the situation once the Allies were firmly ashore.
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The CCS replied the next day, August 18, in what became known as the Quebec Memorandum. The Chiefs told Eisenhower to send two staff officers—Strong and an American—to meet Castellano. They should tell Castellano that the Allies would accept the unconditional surrender of
Italy on the basis of the “short terms,” which followed closely the terms Eisenhower had outlined and wanted to offer the Italians on July 27. Churchill and Roosevelt, meanwhile, would work out at Quebec the “long term” agreements, which would include economic, political, and financial terms and which the Italians would eventually also be required to sign. Under the short terms, the Italians were to announce the armistice at once and to send their fleet and air force to Allied territory. The army was to “collaborate with the Allies and resist the Germans.” If the Italians complied, Eisenhower had the authority to soften the armistice terms proportionately to the scale of the assistance the Italians rendered to the Allies.
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The Quebec Memorandum was a strange document. Eisenhower was supposed to require Italian collaboration, but he was specifically forbidden to reveal his military plans to Badoglio’s representative. How, under such circumstances, could the Italians collaborate? Eisenhower was supposed to demand “unconditional surrender” on the conditions of the short terms, in itself a comment on the logic being used. In addition the question of to whom Badoglio was to surrender was open. There were no Allied troops in Italy, much less in Rome, to accept a surrender. The Chiefs gave Eisenhower the power to accept a surrender, but he—the man on the spot—could not negotiate.

The Chiefs ignored the reality of the Italian situation. Italy was caught between the hammer and the anvil. Germany had lost the military momentum and it was time for Italy, never fully mobilized and absolutely unable to carry on, to get out. Allied troops in Sicily were poised for invasion, while Allied planes pounded Italian cities from the skies. But the Germans were already in Italy in large numbers, with more coming in every day. If Italy surrendered to the Allies before Eisenhower’s divisions occupied the peninsula at least up to Rome, the Germans would overthrow the government and occupy the country.

The Italians scarcely knew where the greater threat lay. Their key question to Eisenhower, the one on which their decision would have to be based, was: Are you able to occupy Rome and protect us from the Germans? If so, the Italians would do all they could to help, and do it immediately. But in the Quebec Memorandum the Chiefs told Eisenhower that under no circumstances should he answer the Italian question. All he could do was send Smith and Strong to see Castellano in Lisbon to demand surrender.

One reason the Chiefs were so hesitant to let the Italians have any information, and one which would later play a role in Eisenhower’s
decisions, was that they felt they could not afford to have the Italians discover how weak the Allies were in the Mediterranean. As far as the Italians knew, the Mediterranean was still the main theater of war for the Allies, and Eisenhower had unlimited resources. Castellano, for example, was thinking of a landing of fifteen divisions in the Rome area; in fact Eisenhower did not have enough resources to land three divisions. The Chiefs wanted to keep the Italians ignorant so that they would continue to overestimate Allied strength. In short, they did not allow Eisenhower to answer the key question because the answer would have been “No, we cannot occupy and protect Rome.” Eisenhower was still unhappy because he felt that with generous terms he could get Italian co-operation and occupy the peninsula before the Germans built up their strength.

Smith and Strong flew to Lisbon on August 19 and held a nine-hour conference with Castellano. Smith told Castellano that the Allies were prepared to accept an unconditional surrender. Castellano, taken aback, replied that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the question of how Italy could join the Allies in operations against the Germans, and more specifically to ask what help the Allies could give the Italians on the mainland. Smith said that he was only prepared to discuss surrender and read to Castellano the “short terms.” Castellano tried to make it clear that such matters were irrelevant; what he needed to know was something quite different and in any case he had no authority to discuss any terms. Smith understood well enough, but his hands were tied because of the orders Eisenhower had received from the CCS. He did manage to emphasize to Castellano the statement in the Quebec Memorandum that declared that the armistice terms would be modified in favor of Italy in accordance with the amount of help the Italians gave the Allies. Castellano grasped at the straw and said he would take the short terms back to Rome for governmental approval. He and the AFHQ representatives arranged to meet again on August 31.

Smith returned to Algiers on August 20 and helped Eisenhower prepare a report to the CCS. Castellano had given much useful military information on German formations and positions in Italy, and it all matched what AFHQ G-2 already knew. Eisenhower emphasized to the CCS that Castellano had given the impression of “intense hatred and intense fear of Germans” and said the Italians seemed completely willing to co-operate “if they have reasonable assurance of protection and support.”
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During the next week Castellano made his way home; because of the
need to keep his mission a secret from the Germans, he took extreme precautions and did not reach the capital until August 27. The CCS, Churchill, and Roosevelt, meanwhile, discussed Eisenhower’s cable and prepared their position. The result was approval of the comprehensive surrender document, known as the “long terms,” which were transmitted to Eisenhower on August 27.

The long terms contained forty-one tightly worded paragraphs covering military, civil, social, economic, and political affairs. Macmillan called the long terms “a planner’s dream and a general’s nightmare.”
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Eisenhower, meanwhile, was pushing ahead with preparations for AVALANCHE. He was not at all happy about the prospects, since he was undertaking the operation with limited forces and resources, especially in landing craft and bombers. In addition he had learned from Castellano that the Germans had 400,000 men in Italy, with more coming every day. His G-2 confirmed this estimate, which meant that the Germans were far stronger than AFHQ had thought they would be when AVALANCHE was planned. Eisenhower thus could use all the help he could get from the Italians and was willing to make any concession to get it.

The CCS and heads of government were not, and on August 27 ordered Eisenhower to use the long terms in all future negotiations with the Italians. Aside from the fact that the sternness of the long terms would cause the Italians to hesitate before accepting them, the situation was doubly complicated because the day Eisenhower received his orders Castellano was in Rome showing his government the “short terms.”
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At Eisenhower’s urging, Macmillan told his government that it was possible that Castellano might not return to meet his August 31 date with Smith but would simply send over the radio the Italian government’s acceptance of the short terms. If the Italians did do this, Macmillan said, Eisenhower should be empowered to proceed to conclude a military armistice. The British War Cabinet agreed.

Eisenhower passed this information on to the CCS and added that, if the Italians took only the short terms, “I strongly urge that the matter be closed on the spot.” He would then transmit the long terms to Castellano and tell him that “these are the complete surrender terms which will be imposed by the United Nations.”
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The imposition of the long terms had not helped a confusing situation; neither did the actions of the Italian government. Unknown to Castellano and the faction backing him, another negotiator had shown up at Lisbon, General Giacomo Zanussi. Zanussi represented General Mario Roatta,
the Army Chief of Staff, a man thought to be pro-German. AFHQ did not know if Zanussi had come to check on Castellano, if he had come to support Castellano, or if Roatta had sent him in good faith, not knowning about Castellano’s mission (the last interpretation was the correct one). Eisenhower ordered Zanussi brought to Algiers. The trouble was that the British ambassador in Lisbon, acting upon previous instructions from the War Cabinet, had already shown Zanussi the long terms.
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This caused Eisenhower “grave apprehension,” since he feared it would delay the armistice at best and make it impossible at worst. He hoped to straighten this out with Zanussi when he arrived in Algiers.

All of which emphasized the importance of letting AFHQ go ahead on the basis of the short terms. Eisenhower told the CCS that he was perfectly willing to accept the risks inherent in AVALANCHE but wanted to point out that the risks would be “minimized to a large extent if we are able to secure Italian assistance just prior to and during the critical period of the actual landing. Even passive assistance will greatly increase our chances of success and there is even some possibility of the Italians being willing to immobilize certain German Divisions.” Eisenhower concluded, “It is these factors which make me so very anxious to get something done now.”
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