Supreme Commander (42 page)

Plans for the invasion of Italy, meanwhile, went forward. Eisenhower had anticipated German reinforcement of Italy in reaction to the change of government, and it made him even more anxious to get the invasion started. The day Mussolini fell he met with his deputies to try to settle the vexing question of where and when to invade. Just before the meeting Eisenhower’s planners told him that after intensive study they had decided that, because of the shortage of landing craft and the commitment of these craft to supply duty on Sicily, it would be impossible to launch an attack before September 10. Eisenhower was disappointed, but facts were facts. For three hours he and his deputies went over the list of available equipment; in the end the planners, “as usual, backed by stern reality, won the day.” Eisenhower did get the date advanced to September 7, but he was “obviously disappointed at the inability to move ahead.”
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The commanders were unable to settle upon a landing site; they wanted to wait a few days to determine “the military significance of recent political changes in Italy.” Eisenhower and his deputies did narrow the range of choice down to two alternatives: BUTTRESS, a British invasion of the toe at Gioia, and AVALANCHE, an invasion of Salerno, twenty-five miles south of Naples, with one British and one American corps, both under Clark’s Fifth Army. They also ordered plans prepared to rush two divisions into Naples, one by sea and one by air drop, in the event of a complete Italian collapse.
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The independent strategic air war, meanwhile, continued. Immediately upon the conclusion of the attack on Rome, the air forces began training for Operation TIDALWAVE. The target was the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania. Oil had always had a high priority in the planning of the Combined Bomber Offensive but Ploesti, the most inviting of all oil targets, lay beyond the reach of planes based in the United Kingdom. Bombers from North Africa, however, could hit Ploesti. It was heavily defended but since it provided one third of Germany’s total supply of oil was obviously worth attacking. Eisenhower was an enthusiastic proponent of the operation.
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Marshall had his doubts. On July 19 he had urged Eisenhower to co-operate with the British-based Eighth Air Force in a raid on the German fighter airplane factories in Austria, even if it was done at the expense of TIDALWAVE. He also urged Eisenhower to return to Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, commander of the Eighth Air Force, three B-24 groups that the Ninth Air Force in the Mediterranean had borrowed.
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Eisenhower called in Tedder and Spaatz to discuss the situation. They agreed with him that TIDALWAVE was important, but that it should
follow the raid against the fighter factories, mainly because it was the more dangerous of the two missions and would have higher losses.

When he reported this conclusion to Marshall, Eisenhower went on to discuss the broader policy of withdrawing bombers from the Mediterranean for use in England. In so doing he began a debate that was to be one of the most exasperating of the entire war. Eisenhower said he could understand Eaker’s desire to get his bombers back, but pointed out that the operations scheduled for the Ninth Air Force would have a direct effect upon the whole European situation. “In other words,” Eisenhower said, “both these operations are in support of the raids now being carried out from the U.K. and it merely happens that we have the more practicable bases from which to execute them.” He wanted the borrowed groups to stay with Ninth Air Force until TIDALWAVE was completed, and warned that one raid against Ploesti would not be enough—there would have to be a follow-up. Finally, he assured Marshall that he was not simply trying to retain forces in his theater at the expense of OVERLORD. Neither the fighter factories nor Ploesti, he reminded the Chief, “is a specific or particular objective for this theater.”
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Marshall would not agree. He did allow the Ploesti raid to go ahead, but he told Eisenhower to launch it first, then make the attack against the fighter factories, and then return the three borrowed groups to England. TIDALWAVE went on August 1. In one of the most controversial actions of the war the Ninth Air Force lost 54 planes while destroying forty per cent of Ploesti’s total refining capacity. By activating idle units at Ploesti, however, the Germans quickly made up for their losses. Because there was no follow-up raid, TIDALWAVE was a failure.
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So, it seemed, was Eisenhower’s attempt to keep Eighth Air Force’s bombers, but he would not give up the two hundred or so planes involved without a fight, and even went so far as to expand his demand. Marshall had not accepted his strategic argument, so on July 28 Eisenhower shifted to a tactical one. Tedder had pointed out that the Germans were rushing fighters and bombers into Italy along with the ground divisions, which made AVALANCHE a risky undertaking, since Salerno was at the extreme limit of fighter aircraft range. Eisenhower told the CCS that the tenor of the messages pouring in on AFHQ from London and Washington indicated that everyone expected great results from Mussolini’s fall. AFHQ would like to meet the expectations, but it could take “bold and rapid advantage” of the situation only if it had the strength necessary to assure reasonable success in AVALANCHE. Specifically,
Eisenhower said he and Tedder believed that, if they could keep the borrowed bombers for three or four more weeks and use them in Italy, “we could practically paralyze the German air effort in all southern Italy and almost immobilize his ground units.”

Then, expanding his claim, Eisenhower said that if the CCS would send three or four more bomber groups from Eighth Air Force to North Africa the chances for achieving a decisive success in AVALANCHE “would be tremendously enhanced.” While on the surface such a shift would mean taking away from the central effort against Germany, Eisenhower felt that it was strategically sound. One of the purposes of the Mediterranean campaign was to secure bases for continuation of the bombing offensive against Germany, a purpose which would be furthered by using Eighth Air Force bombers on tactical missions in Italy. Eisenhower said that if the CCS agreed to the shift General Eaker should “lead his formations here in person in order that there may be no misapprehension as to the temporary and specific nature of the reinforcement.”
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Lieutenant General Jacob Devers, the commanding general of ETO, saw a copy of Eisenhower’s request and protested bitterly. He argued that a diversion of bombers from ETO to AFHQ would be a mistake for a number of reasons: the Eighth Air Force was already too small to carry out its mission; August and the first half of September were critical for the Combined Bomber Offensive; the RAF was counting on a maximum effort from Eighth Air Force; and maintenance crews and bases were already established in the United Kingdom. Summing up, Devers said he had to consider “the overall war effort. I must be guided by the greatest damage to the German enemy and I must never lose sight of the imminence of OVERLORD.” The German high command would be delighted if the shift were made, Devers declared, and added that he felt the Eighth Air Force should “never be diverted” from its “primary task.”
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Eisenhower received a copy of Devers’ protest; he contented himself with sending a short cable to Marshall saying that he found Devers’ arguments unconvincing. Around the office, however, he made no attempt to hide his feelings. “Ike is furious with Devers,” an aide recorded, “and feels that the much flaunted mobility of our Air Force has been exposed as talk rather than action.”
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On July 31 Marshall entered the fray. He sent a message to both Devers and Eisenhower, saying that he had decided that Devers was right and the heavy bombers had to stay in England. He did ask Devers
if he could spare four groups of medium bombers, and asked Eisenhower if mediums would meet his needs.
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Eisenhower replied that, while mediums would not really answer the requirements of the theater, still he could certainly use them. But Devers said he could not spare even those planes, and on August 4 Marshall told Eisenhower that after full consideration he had decided against the transfer.
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Eisenhower then tried another tack. The three B-24 groups that had participated in TIDALWAVE were waiting for good weather to return to the United Kingdom. On August 12 Eisenhower again asked the CCS to be allowed to retain them. “We consider that at this juncture every available force should be brought to bear against Italy and the German in Italy,” he declared.
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Again Devers protested, and again Eisenhower’s superiors said the planes would have to be returned.

Eisenhower was not accustomed to having his requests to Marshall turned down and he found it difficult to accept. After getting off his cable to the CCS, he sent a fervent plea to Marshall. “I am not submitting any detailed argument on the point,” he began, “because I am sure you understand that we are not asking, from this theater, for anything we do not believe to be absoluely necessary to carry out our mission.” He asked that before Marshall gave any adverse decision, “I first be given further opportunity to describe the situation in detail. The hostile bomber strength has been steadily building up in this theater for some days and we simply must be on top of this matter if AVALANCHE is to be a success.”
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Arnold replied for Marshall. He told Eisenhower that the Eighth Air Force was engaged in a “critical battle” for air supremacy over Germany and the three groups would provide Eaker with another long-range striking force “which might well account for an aircraft factory each week.” These actions, he emphasized, turning Eisenhower’s original argument end to end, would help the Mediterranean forces as much as those in England. The three groups returned to Eighth Air Force that week.
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It was a victory for the advocates of strategic bombing, a defeat for those who felt the air forces made their greatest contribution by working in close co-ordination with the needs of the ground campaign. It was also a decision which, within a month, Eisenhower’s superiors would sadly regret, and one which they would have to reverse.

The decision also emphasized that Marshall remained wedded to OVERLORD. He would do nothing that even hinted at reducing the commitment to the cross-Channel invasion, even for his protégé. The
incident also showed that Eisenhower did not handle affairs with his usual smoothness when his theater was relegated to a secondary status. When it came to stripping AFHQ of material he protested as vigorously as MacArthur in his Pacific domain. He did so, however, only after convincing himself that he would be using the planes on operations that would help OVERLORD as much as AVALANCHE. Still, he was a long way from the position he had taken a year earlier, when he promised Marshall he “would not be adding to your troubles by insistently clamoring for more than you can furnish.…”
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Eisenhower could not resist firing one parting shot. He told the CCS that, despite the adverse decision, he was going ahead with AVALANCHE “with whatever forces we have at the moment. But I think it only fair to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give them the essential factors on which risks must be calculated.” There was a German corps of three divisions in the Naples area, plus the Hermann Goering Division, which had just evacuated Sicily. German bomber strength was increasing daily, while AFHQ’s was diminishing. The way to keep air activity over Salerno down on D-Day was to bomb German airfields, but there were not enough Allied bombers in the Mediterranean to do this. Salerno was at the extreme range of fighter cover: “As a consequence of these things our convoys will have to anticipate higher losses from air attack while at sea and while lying offshore.” Tedder and Spaatz, Eisenhower added, agreed with his view. “I repeat,” Eisenhower ended, “that my plans for attack will not repeat not be altered as a result of this transfer.”
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Despite the statement, Eisenhower was disturbed at his apparent inability to get the CCS to understand his needs. He felt that the Chiefs still did not appreciate the precariousness of the air situation in the Mediterranean. In addition, they apparently were not aware of the high replacement rate required for landing craft. Most important of all, neither the Chiefs nor the governments seemed to have a sense of urgency about the Italian situation. Because of his material shortages, Eisenhower was still extremely anxious to take advantage of Mussolini’s fall and make a deal with the Italians, but he had been unable to get even a directive on armistice terms. He would very soon have need of one.

“The first Italian-Allied exchanges resembled two persons talking to each other in their sleep, each the victim of his own hallucination. In the nightmare of German occupation, Italy gasped, ‘Help, I am not free.’ After a long pause, the Allies replied, ‘Say Uncle.’ ”
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One of Eisenhower’s major characteristics was his desire to simplify. Faced with a complex situation, he usually tried to separate it into its essentials, extract a principal point, and then make that point his guiding star for all decisions. The defeat of Germany’s armed forces was his aim and anything that contributed to that end was good, while anything that did not was, if not bad, at least superfluous. Thus, since the Allies could defeat Germany more quickly and easily if they fought together, Eisenhower bent every effort to make the alliance work. Or, equally pragmatically, since the greatest contribution the French could make to victory would be to provide a secure rear in North Africa for the Allied forces, Eisenhower’s sole criterion for picking a French leader was simple: “Who can control?” At first it was Darlan, then Giraud, and finally De Gaulle, and Eisenhower worked smoothly with each one.

What Eisenhower wanted from the Italians was help in getting ashore and up to the Po Valley, where there were airfields in striking distance of the heart of Germany. He would gladly deal with any Italian government that would co-operate.