Supreme Commander (108 page)

But if the BCOS challenge had been met and overcome, there were still other British sources of power that could challenge Eisenhower’s plans. Both Montgomery and Churchill were angry, and both made their views known. On March 29 Montgomery cabled Eisenhower, “I note that you intend to change the command set up. If you feel this is necessary I pray you do not do so until we reach the Elbe as such action would not help the great movement which is now beginning to develop.” Eisenhower told Whiteley to prepare an answer. It went out on March 31. “My plan is simple and aims at dividing and destroying the German forces and joining hands with the Red Army,” it began. The best way to do that was to drive through central Germany on the Kassel-Leipzig axis. Before this thrust could begin, however, it was necessary to destroy the German forces encircled in the Ruhr (Generalfeldmarschall Walther von Model’s Army Group B), a task that would involve elements of both U. S. First and Ninth Armies. “A mopping task of this nature,” Whiteley explained, “in a densely populated area, should clearly be controlled by one commander.” Thus Bradley had to have Ninth Army under him. “Moreover, it is Bradley who will be straining to release his thrust to the east and it is clearly very desirable that he should be in the position to judge when the situation in the Ruhr warrants it.” Eisenhower therefore would not change his decision, and Ninth Army would go to Bradley.

“You will note that in none of this do I mention Berlin,” Whiteley’s draft continued. “That place has become, so far as I am concerned, nothing but a geographical location, and I have never been interested in these. My purpose is to destroy the enemy’s forces and his powers to resist.” In conclusion, the message said that after the AEF-Red Army link-up and the division of Germany, Eisenhower intended to push across the Elbe near its mouth, take Luebeck, and seal off the Danish Peninsula. This was the first mention of Lubeck; later, Eisenhower would explain that he wanted to control the land approaches to Denmark in order to prevent the Russians from liberating the area (Denmark, of course, had not been assigned to any of the Big Three for occupation purposes, as presumably it would have its sovereignty restored).
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Montgomery had objected to Eisenhower’s plan on the narrow basis that it upset his own calculations. Churchill broadened the discussion. A firm believer in civilian control of the military, he did not want his own soldiers raising political issues. He had already called down the BCOS for using a phrase in reference to Berlin that read, “issues which have a wider import than the destruction of the main enemy forces in
Germany.” Churchill commented this was “a very odd phrase to be used in a staff communication. I should have thought it laid itself open to a charge of extreme unorthodoxy.”
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Churchill did not hesitate to take up the theme himself. On March 30 he called Eisenhower on the telephone to ask why SHAEF had changed the plan. Eisenhower had Bull send a brief explanation. The next morning the Prime Minister wired the Supreme Commander. On both military and political grounds, he made clear, he felt serious errors were about to be made. “If the enemy’s resistance should weaken,” Churchill said, “as you evidently expect and which may well be accorded, why should we not cross the Elbe and advance as far eastward as possible? This has an important political bearing, as the Russian Army of the south seems certain to enter Vienna and overrun Austria. If we deliberately leave Berlin to them, even if it should be in our grasp, the double event may strengthen their conviction, already apparent, that they have done everything.” Aside from the effect on the Russians, who to Churchill seemed already to be displaying a bullying attitude with regard to such issues as the German surrender in Italy and the future Polish government and borders, the Prime Minister thought the fall of Berlin would have a “profound psychological effect on German resistance in every part of the Reich.” He felt that “whilst Berlin remains under the German flag, it cannot in my opinion fail to be the most decisive point in Germany.” The difficulty with this argument was that presumably the effect of the fall of Berlin on the Germans would be the same whatever the nationality of the army that took the city. What really stood out in Churchill’s message was his suggestion that Ninth Army remain under Montgomery, since this “only shifts the weight of one Army to the northernmost flank and this avoids the relegation of His Majesty’s Forces to an unexpected restricted sphere.”
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Churchill’s message, according to the SHAEF office diary, “upset Eisenhower quite a bit.” He dictated the reply himself. “In the first place,” he began, “I repeat that I have not changed any plan.” The furthest he had ever gone in approving or formulating specific strategic plans, he declared, was to the encirclement of the Ruhr and the elimination of the German armies there. Beyond that, he had always insisted on flexibility. The first phase was almost completed and it created new situations “requiring study and analysis before the next broad pattern of effort could be accurately sketched.” The problem was to “determine the direction of the blow that would create maximum disorganization of the remaining German forces and the German power to resist.”

Eisenhower continued to insist that he had not changed his plans. He did admit that Churchill had introduced “a new idea respecting the political importance of the early attainment of particular objectives.” He said he could “clearly see your point in this matter,” but insisted that the only difference between the SHAEF plan and Churchill’s suggestion was one of timing. After he had linked up with the Red Army near Dresden, Eisenhower said, he would give American troops to Montgomery for a drive over the Elbe to Luebeck. Although Eisenhower did not say so, this policy would not meet Churchill’s demands for the capture of Berlin, but it would give the British a leading role in the last act. “I am disturbed, if not hurt,” Eisenhower declared, “that you should suggest any thought on my part to ‘relegate His Majesty’s Forces to an unexpected restricted sphere.’ Nothing is further from my mind and I think my record over two and a half years of commanding Allied forces should eliminate any such idea.”
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Eisenhower was not being totally candid with Churchill, a reflection perhaps of his irritation at having had his every move called into question. Like Marshall, he felt he had proven he should be trusted. Probably more important was the fact that he would not give in. Marshall had informed him of the backing the JCS was giving him, and Eisenhower knew how strong his position was. He did not want to hurt or disturb the British, but neither would he allow them to set the objectives of his last campaign. Determined to hold to his own plan, he still hoped to satisfy the British; thus his refusal to take up a discussion with Churchill on Berlin, which could only have led to recrimination and bad feeling, or to admit that he had made any change in plan. If he were forced, however, he would speak out. “So earnestly did I believe in the military soundness of what we were doing,” Eisenhower later declared, “that my intimates on the staff knew I was prepared to make an issue of it.”
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One way to avoid placing a strain on the alliance, and the one Eisenhower usually tried to adopt, was to act as if there were only objective military considerations at stake. This would work, however, only if the British agreed to limit the discussion to military objectives. Eisenhower tried to get them to do so, and at the same time to feel that British interests were well protected in SHAEF, by emphasizing the number and importance of the British officers on his staff. “I hope it will not be forgotten that some of the ablest members of my staff are from the British Army,” he said in one cable to Marshall. “Such men as Tedder, Morgan, Whiteley and Strong possess great ability and are absolutely unimpeachable in their objective approach to every question.” He said Tedder had
been consulted at every step of the way.
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To Churchill, Brooke, and Montgomery, this was hardly satisfactory, however, as they considered that the British officers at SHAEF were too much under Eisenhower’s influence.

Still, the BCOS quickly recognized that, unlike the 1942–43 period, they could no longer control CCS decisions. To save face, they decided to accept Eisenhower’s formula, which held that there had been no change in plans. At an April 1 meeting at Chequers, the Chiefs discussed the entire problem. Brooke said he was mollified because “it is quite clear that there is no very great change,” but he was still irritated because “most of the changes are due to national aspirations and to ensure that the U.S. effort will not be lost under British command. It is all a pity and straightforward strategy is being affected by the nationalistic outlook of allies.”
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There was a court of last resort. If the British contribution to the AEF was not sufficient to allow the BCOS to dominate or even have an equal voice in the CCS, Churchill still might be able to persuade the President of the soundness of British policy and thereby bring about a switch in the plans. His appeals to Roosevelt, however, were unsuccessful. Marshall, whose influence with the President had grown steadily throughout the war, convinced Roosevelt that all matters of military importance should be left to Eisenhower.

The storm now began to subside. Neither side wanted a split. The British agreed in practice to the relegation of Montgomery to a secondary role. Churchill, deeply impressed by the need for Anglo-American solidarity in the postwar world, took the lead in calming the waters. In a message to Roosevelt he said, “I wish to place on record the complete confidence felt by His Majesty’s Government in General Eisenhower, our pleasure that our armies are serving under his command and our admiration of his great and shining quality, character and personality.…” Churchill passed the statement on to Eisenhower, saying in addition that it would “be a grief to me” if anything he had said “pains you.” The Prime Minister took the opportunity, however, to add that he still felt the AEF should take Berlin. “I deem it highly important that we should shake hands with the Russians as far to the east as possible.” Thus, though the British had accepted the transfer of Ninth Army from Montgomery to Bradley, they still wanted the question of Berlin left open.

Eisenhower was fulsome in his reply. “I feel an immense satisfaction that up to this point our strategic plans formulated more than a year ago have successfully developed so closely according to conception,” he
declared. “The generosity of your language is equalled only by my continued determination that every action of mine shall be governed by the single purpose of winning this campaign at the earliest possible moment. In doing so I shall likewise devote myself toward sustaining among the forces of the United States and Great Britain those feelings of mutual respect and unification that have been the mainspring of effectiveness in this command.” He promised that the G.I. and the Tommy would march forward shoulder to shoulder, and “if Berlin can be brought into the orbit of our success the honors will be equitably shared.”
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Three days later Brooke sent Eisenhower his best wishes on the occasion of the U. S. Army Day. The CIGS offered his “warmest congratulations” on Eisenhower’s “super-leadership” and said the overwhelming victories which Eisenhower was winning would “go down in history as among the greatest military achievements of all time.”
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Eisenhower told Marshall of Brooke’s message, said it was especially pleasing because of all the arguments he had had with the CIGS, and added that it showed “that there is a bigness about him that I have found lacking in a few people I have run into on this side of the water.”
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On April 5 Churchill put the seal on the controversy by wiring the President: “The changes in the main plan have now turned out to be very much less than we at first supposed. My personal relations with General Eisenhower are of the most friendly character. I regard the matter as closed, and to prove my sincerity I will use one of my very few Latin quotations:
Amantium irae amoris integratio est
,” which the War Department translated to read, “Lovers’ quarrels are a part of love.”
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Eisenhower had not waited for the BCOS or Churchill to approve of his plans; he had already acted. On April 2 he sent out the directive that implemented his program. The Ruhr had been isolated, and so Eisenhower declared it was his intention to divide and destroy the enemy forces by launching a powerful thrust on the axis Kassel-Leipzig. He gave Montgomery the objective of advancing on Bremen, then going on to the Elbe, where he should “seize any opportunity” to capture a bridgehead “and be prepared” to conduct operations east of the river. Bradley’s task was to mop up the encircled German forces in the Ruhr, drive from Kassel to Leipzig, and take bridgeheads over the Elbe if possible. Devers was to protect Bradley’s right flank and, after that was secured, advance on the axis Nuremberg-Linz.
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The British did not approve. Having surrendered on the point of command of Ninth Army, they still wanted the advance from Kassel to head for Berlin. Again, however, the BCOS were rebuffed by the JCS.
On April 6 the JCS told their British counterparts, “Only Eisenhower is in a position to know how to fight his battle, and to exploit to the full the changing situation.” Even if the JCS wanted to interfere they would not in this case, because they agreed with the Supreme Commander’s assessment of the situation. On Berlin, the JCS declared that such “psychological and political advantages as would result from the possible capture of Berlin ahead of the Russians should not override the imperative military consideration, which in our opinion is the destruction and dismemberment of the German armed forces.”
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The next day Eisenhower told Marshall that once he reached the Elbe River he planned to clear out his northern and southern flanks. If after these operations were concluded he could still take Berlin, he would do so. He insisted that his judgments were made purely on military grounds, and declared that he would need a new directive if the CCS wished him to operate on political grounds. He said he regarded a drive to Berlin as militarily unsound and added, “I am the first to admit that a war is waged in pursuance of political aims, and if the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide that the Allied effort to take Berlin outweighs purely military considerations in this theater, I would cheerfully readjust my plans and my thinking so as to carry out such an operation.”
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If, in other words, Churchill was prepared to make Russia instead of Germany the enemy, and if he could get Roosevelt to agree, Eisenhower would willingly change his plans, for then the military considerations would be much different. But the CCS did not even discuss Eisenhower’s cable or the question of Berlin, and the final decision was left to Eisenhower.
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His directive remained unchanged, Germany remained the enemy, and Russia continued to be an ally.