Storms of My Grandchildren (9 page)

When Connaughton later testified before Henry Waxman’s Committee on Oversight and Government Reform on March 19, 2007, he said that the Bush administration had responded to my recommendations for reducing non–carbon dioxide emissions, including methane and black soot. I do not know that in fact their actions were based on my recommendations. Dina Kruger of the EPA had been advocating methane programs for years, and scientists such as Mark Jacobson of Stanford University had been making a strong case for reducing black soot emissions. However, Kruger mentioned to me in 2003 that the interest of the White House in these non–carbon dioxide climate forcings permitted significant programs to move forward.

One resulting action was a methane-to-markets program that helps reduce methane emissions via capture at coal mines, landfills, and agricultural and waste management facilities and uses the captured methane as fuel. White House interest helped Kruger and the EPA initiate the program in the United States and extend its effectiveness via cooperation with several developing countries that have larger methane emissions than the United States. This approach, extended globally, is better than the Kyoto Protocol approach, in my opinion. Methane is one of the escape hatches that make the Kyoto approach ineffectual for carbon dioxide. The Bush administration also deserves credit for major tightening of soot emission limits in the face of opposition from diesel producers, truckers, and other industries. In addition to supporting rules that reduced soot emissions from trucks and buses, the administration later expanded regulations to cover tractors, trains, and ships.

So, it seems to me that Connaughton is justified in his assertion that he, CEQ, and the administration have been responsive to recommendations regarding the non–carbon dioxide climate forcings. With regard to the more important issue, carbon dioxide, it is not clear how much possibility there was for Connaughton to influence the policies set by the president and vice president. He was in a position to make recommendations. But did I or anybody else make a case strong enough for him to be able to challenge decisions of Cheney and the Task Force?

During my presentation, I showed graphs for fossil-fuel-use scenarios designed to keep additional global warming less than 1 degree Celsius (the alternative scenario) and less than 2 degrees. I argued, based primarily on paleoclimate sea levels, that we should aim to keep warming less than 1 degree. But I had to admit that some other scientists, with more of a background in ice sheet physics and paleoclimate studies, were arguing that a 2-degree-Celsius limit was appropriate. Also, it must have been apparent that my arguments about the potential instability of ice sheets during “wet” disintegration involved a good deal of “arm waving”—a qualitative argument without much quantitative backing.

The friendly discussion with Connaughton and the other participants from CEQ, OSTP, and OMB left me with positive impressions of the group and individuals that I spoke with. Connaughton, in particular, was interested in a number of things discussed—he impressed me as being smart (his biography notes that he received a B.A. from Yale University and graduated second in his class, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, from the Northwestern University School of Law). Often in talking with people in high positions I can sense that they have rigid positions they are defensive about, but I did not get that impression about Connaughton. Anniek tells me that I always wear my opinions and feelings plainly on my face, and warns me that most people do not do that. She is right that I am not good at reading people, but I saw no hint that Connaughton was Machiavellian.

I was escorted from the briefing by David Halpern, a staff member in Marburger’s OSTP, who commented that they would have another presentation the following week on the same topic—by Richard Lindzen. Hmm, I thought, as any faint hopes of a change in policy quickly began to dim. I declined an invitation to return to Washington for Lindzen’s talk because I had other obligations, but I later received a copy of Lindzen’s presentation from Halpern. I left a copy of my presentation with OSTP, and I also made the presentation available on the Internet.

Lindzen’s presentation warrants comment, because U.S. policies regarding carbon dioxide during the Bush-Cheney administration seem to have been based on, or at minimum, congruent with, Lindzen’s perspective.

I realized that climate sensitivity was in the process of being nailed down—rigorously and accurately defined by the paleoclimate information discussed in this chapter. Of course, even today it is possible to find scientists and published papers concluding that climate sensitivity is quite uncertain. A common approach is to calculate the expected warming of the past century based on assumed climate forcings—then, because of uncertainties in actual forcings, conclude that climate sensitivity is only constrained to lie somewhere within a large range, say 2 to 8 degrees Celsius for doubled carbon dioxide. That logic is a case of failing to see the forest for the trees. Our knowledge is not based on the dullest instrument in our tool bag. Rather it is based on the sharpest, most discriminating information we can muster.

Obtuseness concerning climate sensitivity reminds me of a story Richard Feynman told about his early experience at Los Alamos, where many of the top physicists in the world had assembled to work on the Manhattan Project. Feynman would eventually become known, at least among many physicists, as the second greatest scientist of the twentieth century, but at that time he was just becoming a postdoc. He finished his Ph.D. thesis in a rush, as he and many of the top physicists essentially dropped everything to join the effort to help build an atomic bomb (after Einstein warned President Roosevelt, in a now-famous letter, that Germany was probably working on a bomb of monstrous power).

Feynman was at a meeting of some of the physics giants—Richard C. Tolman, Arthur Compton, Isidor Isaac Rabi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and others—and they were talking about the theory of how they were going to separate uranium. Feynman understood the specific matter being discussed pretty well. Compton explained one point of view, which Feynman could see was right. But they went around the table, someone saying there’s a different possibility, another suggesting still a different idea, all the time Feynman becoming more and more antsy and jumpy, thinking, why didn’t Compton repeat his argument? After they had gone around the table, Tolman, the chairman, said something to the effect of “Well, it’s clear that Compton’s argument is best, and now it’s time to go ahead.” It made a big impression on young Feynman—seeing how really good scientists work. They wanted to look at a problem from all angles, reexamining alternatives and different facets, to guard against a mistake. All the while they could recognize the best idea without having to repeat the arguments.

Jule Charney, were he alive today, would be thrilled by the paleoclimate information on climate sensitivity. Undoubtedly he would stand up and say, “Great, now let’s move ahead.” Dick Lindzen is a whole different kettle of fish. He has made numerous scientific contributions, received significant honors, and suggested interesting ideas. But as for an overview and insight about how climate works, he is no Jule Charney by any means. Lindzen’s perspective on climate sensitivity, as he told Richard Kerr, stems from an idea of a theological or philosophical perspective that he doggedly adheres to. Lindzen is convinced that nature will find ways to cool itself, that negative feedbacks will diminish the effect of climate forcings. This notion spurred Lindzen to propose a specific mechanism for how the atmosphere takes care of itself: He suggests that columns of tropical cumulus convection intensify if carbon dioxide increases, piping energy high into the atmosphere, where the heat would be radiated to space. This mechanism, he suggests, is nature’s thermostat, which keeps global warming at a few tenths of a degree for doubled carbon dioxide, rather than a few degrees.

Charney would understand very well that if the real world possesses such a negative feedback, its effect is included in the empirical sensitivity extracted from Earth’s paleoclimate history. A reliable, accurate evaluation of climate sensitivity now exists, including all feedbacks. Is Lindzen likely to admit that he’s wrong? Probably not. I expect him to keep asserting that human-made climate change is unimportant on his deathbed, defending that position as a lawyer defends a client. A lawyer does not seek truth; a lawyer seeks a win for a client. That approach makes it difficult for the public. Lindzen makes qualitative statements that sound reasonable, and he raises technical matters that a layperson cannot assess, making it sound like there is an argument among theorists.

Abraham Lincoln, as I have noted, established the National Academy of Sciences for the purpose of providing advice on technical matters. President Bush, early in his first term, asked the academy for advice on global warming. Specifically, the White House sought the academy’s evaluation of the conclusions reached by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, in its most recent report, made increasingly strong statements about the likely consequences of continued increases of greenhouse gases. The White House was probably hoping that the academy would document some criticisms of the IPCC report. If so, the White House was disappointed. The academy’s evaluation had only mild reservations, giving the conclusions of IPCC strong endorsement overall.

Lindzen, though, had an explanation for the academy report. His talk at the White House was titled “Getting Serious About Global Warming.” His first chart, titled “The UC Irvine Atmospheric Chemist Gambit,” claimed that Ralph Cicerone and Sherwood Rowland had inserted an “irrelevant opener” into the executive summary of the academy report after the text of the report itself had been agreed to by all participants. Cicerone was chairman of the committee, Rowland was one of the principal authors, and Lindzen and I were two of the other nine committee members.

Cicerone is one of the most respected scientists in the United States and is now president of the National Academy of Sciences. Rowland won the Nobel Prize in chemistry, with Mario Molina and Paul Crutzen, for his prediction that chlorofluorocarbons could destroy stratospheric ozone. Rowland’s prediction was validated by nature with the appearance of the Antarctic ozone hole. Because of the warning issued by these scientists, the heavily populated northern hemisphere was largely spared the consequences of ozone depletion.

The paragraph that Lindzen objected to, the first paragraph of the executive summary, reads:

Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth’s atmosphere as a result of human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part of these changes is also a reflection of natural variability. Human-induced warming and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through the 21st century. Secondary effects are suggested by computer model simulations and basic physical reasoning. These include increases in rainfall rates and increased susceptibility of semi-arid regions to drought. The impacts of these changes will be critically dependent on the magnitude of the warming and the rate with which it occurs.

Lindzen’s charge—that changes were made late in the reviewing process and that the changes affected the essence of the report’s conclusions—sounds serious to the public. But all other committee members know it is nonsense. The report was done quickly at the request of the White House, but editing was done openly, with continual e-mail exchanges with committee members. The public has access to both the executive summary and the full report and can verify that the summary reflects the report’s contents—but how many will do so? Instead, the public hears a “balanced” perspective: Many scientists agree that humans are altering climate, but there seems to be disagreement about that conclusion within the scientific community.

Lindzen’s perspective is summed up in the final statements on his concluding chart shown at the White House meeting, which read:

(1) Scientists who are willing to speak out in support of hysteria are supported with funding, awards, and even legal assistance. (2) The environmental movement coordinates public pronouncements so as to guarantee that all spokesmen are “on the same page.” (3) Institutions, dependent on support, are supportive of alarmism. (4) Scientists who protest alarmism are out in the cold. There is no assistance from any direction.

(These statements are similar to his conclusions at the second meeting of Vice President Cheney’s Task Force.)