Storms of My Grandchildren (31 page)

Apprehension about nuclear power will diminish as word spreads that the nuclear energy safety record, already unsurpassed by any comparable industry, is even further enhanced by the advent of reactors that will shut down harmlessly, without human intervention, in response to abnormal situations such as those that triggered the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl.

The combination of third- and fourth-generation nuclear power plants would solve another problem sometimes cited by foes of nuclear power: uranium mining. They claim we will run out of uranium in several decades and also that it takes a lot of energy to mine and process uranium. With fourth-generation nuclear power plants in the mix, that debate disappears. We already have enough fuel stockpiled, in nuclear waste and by-products of nuclear weapons production, to supply all of our fuel needs for about a thousand years.

In fact, given that fast reactors make it economical to extract uranium from seawater, we now have enough fuel, in theory, to run nuclear power plants for several billion years. In other words, nuclear fuel is inexhaustible, putting it in the same category as renewable solar energy.

Another concern about nuclear power, in addition to nuclear waste, is the possibility of weapons-grade nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorists or rogue nations. Weapons proliferation is a valid concern, and a serious one, but the danger is not increased by fourth-generation nuclear power. Many nuclear opponents seem to believe that this weapons danger will be removed or at least reduced if nuclear power is eliminated in the United States. On the contrary. The nuclear genie is out of the bottle. And several nations are already working on fourth-generation reactors.

Rather than the United States abandoning advanced reactor development, the better approach would be for the United States to (once again) lead that technology development—in a direction that minimizes proliferation risks. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the international organizations to control proliferation can be effective without U.S. leadership—and how can we lead, if we abandon the technology? The way to minimize nuclear proliferation risks is to be a leader in the technology, to make it as fail-safe and proliferation-resistant as possible, and to cooperate in international management of nuclear material.

When I became acquainted with this matter in 2008, I began recommending in public talks that the United States should initiate urgent development of a demonstration fourth-generation nuclear power plant. There would be no need to decide immediately about commercialization of fourth-generation technology, but we should understand its potential. Indeed, that knowledge affects the viability of third-generation nuclear power plants—can we anticipate help from fourth-generation technology to solve the nuclear waste problem?

I have spoken with numerous utility executives and their technical staff. Every one of them asserts that efficiency and renewables will not be enough in the foreseeable future. In practice, they say, they will need either fossil fuels or nuclear power for baseload capacity. Maybe they are wrong—maybe they are underestimating the potential of efficiency and renewables—but it would be foolish for us to assume that they are all wrong. Rather, it seems clear that efficiency and renewable energies will not be sufficient to allow phaseout of coal.

Yet, when I recommended urgent testing of fourth-generation nuclear power capabilities, I was bombarded with messages from environmentalists and antinuclear people. Mostly it was friendly advice—after all, they agreed with my climate concerns—but they invariably directed me to one or more of a handful of nuclear experts. Some of the experts were associated with organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense Council, the World Wildlife Fund, or the Union of Concerned Scientists—and there was Amory Lovins of Rocky Mountain Institute.

These are fine organizations. I am sure that I agree with more than 90 percent of the things that they advocate, and I am proud to have received the World Wildlife Fund’s Duke of Edinburgh Conservation Medal from Prince Philip himself. (Anniek and I got to have lunch with him, but he would not answer a question that I brought from my granddaughter: What is your favorite color? He said that if he specified a favorite color, all future gifts would be that color.)

Then I learned that the same small number of organizations and experts, who had been repeating the same message for decades, had an influence way out of proportion to their numbers. I found that members of Congress and their staffers, none of them nuclear scientists, were getting most of their advice on nuclear power from the same organizations. The organizations trot out the same few “experts,” who speak with technical detail that snows the listener and who conclude that the United States, in effect, should terminate peaceful use of nuclear energy.

That’s what began to make me a bit angry. Do these people have the right to, in effect, make a decision that may determine the fate of my grandchildren? The antinuke advocates are so certain of their righteousness that they would eliminate the availability of an alternative to fossil fuels, should efficiency and renewables prove inadequate to provide all electricity. What if the utility executives are right, and we must choose between coal or nuclear for baseload power? Even if renewables are sufficient to produce the electricity needed by the United States, what about India and China? It’s one world, and we have to live with pollution from China and India.

But, you may say, aren’t these good scientific organizations representing a lot of people who are making recommendations based on the scientific method? Umm, not exactly. The Union of Concerned Scientists seems to me to be a lobbying organization. It lobbied hard for the Kyoto Protocol. When I published the “alternative scenario” paper, which the organization considered to be critical of the Kyoto Protocol, it encouraged the writing of an article criticizing our paper and sent out an “information update” to its members strongly criticizing and mischaracterizing our paper. The union would not provide me with its mailing list so that I could respond. So I wrote an open letter, published on the naturalSCIENCE Web site, to correct misimpressions. Since then I have referred to it, kiddingly of course, as the Union of Concerned Lobbyists. I agree with most of what it promotes, but people should understand that this is not a group of scientists in lab coats sending out their most recent scientific analysis. The head of the organization is not a scientist and neither are many of the members.

I will discuss nonprofit and environmental organizations a bit more later, because they have a huge influence on a topic that is broader and more important than nuclear power. But first, please allow me one (long, sorry!) paragraph to summarize the nuclear story.

The scientific method requires that we keep an open mind and change our conclusions when new evidence indicates that we should. The new evidence affecting the nuclear debate is climate change, specifically the urgency of moving beyond fossil fuels to carbon-free energy sources. We need an urgent, substantial research and development program on fourth-generation nuclear power, so that we have at least one viable option in the likely event that efficiency and renewables cannot provide all needed energy. A phaseout of coal emissions in the West can proceed promptly on the basis of efficiency, renewables, third-generation nuclear power, and possibly a contribution from carbon capture and storage—although it also requires a price on carbon emissions, as discussed below. A phaseout of coal emissions in China and India almost certainly requires a cost-competitive alternative to coal. One reason for urgent development of fourth-generation nuclear power is the possibility of producing a design for a modular reactor, which would reduce costs if built in large number. It is conceivable that next-generation nuclear power might begin to be broadly deployed in China or India as early as the 2020s. Deployment would be soonest if the United States would cooperate with these nations and treat this as a matter of urgency. If you do not believe that such rapid development is feasible, you should read some of the stories about the Manhattan Project.

We have finally arrived at the main story: what we need to do to solve the climate problem, and how we can save the future for our grandchildren.

The problem demands a solution with a clear framework and a strong backbone. Yes, I know that halting and reversing the growth of carbon dioxide in the air requires an “all hands on deck” approach—there is no “silver bullet” solution for world energy requirements. People need to make basic changes in the way they live. Countries need to cooperate. Matters as seemingly intractable as population must be addressed. And the required changes must be economically efficient. Such a pathway exists and is achievable.

Let’s define what a workable backbone and framework should look like. The essential backbone is a rising price on carbon applied at the source (the mine, wellhead, or port of entry), such that it would affect all activities that use fossil fuels, directly or indirectly. Our goal is a global phaseout of fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions. We have shown, quantitatively, that the only practical way to achieve an acceptable carbon dioxide level is to disallow the use of coal and unconventional fossil fuels (such as tar sands and oil shale) unless the resulting carbon is captured and stored. We realize that remaining, readily available pools of oil and gas will be used during the transition to a post-fossil-fuel world. But a rising carbon price surely will make it economically senseless to go after every last drop of oil and gas—even though use of those fuels with carbon capture and storage may be technically feasible and permissible.

Global phaseout of fossil fuel carbon dioxide emissions is a stringent requirement. Proposed government policies, consisting of an improved Kyoto Protocol approach with more ambitious targets, do not have a prayer of achieving that result. Our governments are deceiving us, and perhaps conveniently deceiving themselves, when they say that it is possible to reduce emissions 80 percent by 2050 with such an approach.

The world as a whole did much more poorly than Japan, as shown in figure 25. Results fluctuated from place to place, depending on historical accidents, not on anything that the Kyoto Protocol engendered. Germany did well because it incorporated East Germany and closed down dirty, inefficient communist-era factories. The U.K. did well because North Sea gas allowed it to close most coal mines and replace coal-fired power with gas. But overall, global emissions shot up faster than Japan’s.

The public must be firm and unwavering in demanding “no offsets,” because this sort of monkey business is exactly the type of thing that politicians love and will try to keep. Offsets are like the indulgences that were sold by the church in the Middle Ages. People of means loved indulgences, because they could practice any hanky-panky or worse, then simply purchase an indulgence to avoid punishment for their sins. Bishops loved them too, because they brought in lots of moola. Anybody who argues for offsets today is either a sinner who wants to pretend he or she has done adequate penance or a bishop collecting moola.

Let us return one more time to figure 2 of chapter 2 (page 21), which provides an overview of prospective actions for phasing out carbon emissions. First, this graph illustrates a mistake made by energy professionals that continues to be made today. It shows that energy use in the United States grew far more slowly than energy experts predicted. Growth of energy use was moderate despite strong economic growth and an unexpectedly rapid population expansion fueled by immigration. For one decade, beginning in the late 1970s, energy use did not even increase, as a consequence of imposed improvements on vehicle fuel efficiency, escalating energy prices in the wake of the second “oil shock,” and widespread cost overruns in the electricity sector.

Nevertheless, be prepared for energy experts telling you that a kazillion units of energy will be needed in 2050 or 2100. They will calculate how many square miles of solar power plants must be built every day or how many nuclear power plants must be built every year, and then they will wring their hands and perhaps try to sell you something. Yes, energy use is going to increase—mainly because parts of the world are developing rapidly and raising their standards of living and energy use. But energy growth need not be exceedingly rapid—figure 2 shows that energy use hardly grew during rapid economic growth in the world’s largest economy, even though the great potential of energy efficiency was barely tapped. Also remember that the solution to the climate problem requires a phasedown of carbon emissions, not necessarily a phasedown of energy use. We will need to slow the energy growth rate and decarbonize our energy sources to solve the problem.