Shake Hands With the Devil (90 page)

The best account of the actual genocide, one which is also very detailed and very painful to read, is a book by the American human rights activist Alison Des Forges, called
Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999). Alison is an expert on the history of human rights in Rwanda and was one of our greatest allies in 1994 in trying to encourage the international community to intervene in Rwanda and to expose the genocide for what it was. She has testified at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda at Arusha and is considered an expert on all aspects of the genocide.

The most disturbing account on the tragedy of genocide, written from a personal perspective, is Philip Gourevitch's
We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories From Rwanda
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998). Gourevitch was one of the first journalists to enter post-genocide Rwanda and speak directly with survivors. He took that information and produced a work that strikes directly at your soul.

For a picture of post-genocide Rwanda, Shaharyar Khan's
The Shallow Graves of Rwanda
(London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000) is the most complete account of how the international community failed to help the survivors of the genocide. Khan was the
UN
's Secretary-General's Special Representative in the last days of
UNAMIR
. We served a little over a month together, and I found him to be a superbly experienced diplomat, an innovator, a talented leader and a wonderful human being.

The official Canadian Forces history of
UNAMIR
was written by Dr. Jacques Castonguay, a military historian who was principal of the Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean and was a professor when I attended that institution as a cadet. From the start, I wanted an official history of the mission, the sort the Canadian Army used to produce during military campaigns in the past. Dr. Castonguay travelled to the mission area while the headquarters was still in place and reviewed documents that have since gone missing. His account also reflects Brent Beardsley's and my own thinking about the genocide immediately after it occurred.

Two senior officers have written excellent books on the complex
military command and political interface on the ground during the mission. The first was written by my deputy force commander, Ghanaian Brigadier General Henry Anyidoho, and is called
Guns over Kigali
(Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1997). It is the story of the mission from the perspective of an experienced African soldier and peacekeeper. Henry served under me and my successor; he had the opportunity to view Rwanda first-hand both during and after the genocide. His insight on the command of African troops is particularly valuable. He, too, returned to a nation where colleagues were jealous and the government apathetic. The Ghanaian troops of
UNAMIR
never received full recognition from their government, their army or their fellow citizens for the courageous work they performed in Rwanda. The other work I want to mention is
Rwanda: la descente aux enfers: Témoignage d'un peacekeeper Décembre 1993–Avril 1994
(Brussels: Éditions Labor, 2001) by Colonel Luc Marchal, who served as my Kigali sector commander as well as the Belgian contingent commander. He has written a first-class account of leadership in a peacekeeping mission in crisis, where one is torn by loyalty to country and loyalty to the mission and morality. He had the most difficult command in
UNAMIR
, the Kigali Weapons Secure Area, and his book is an extremely personal reflection on the complexities of this new era of conflict resolution. He performed his duties beyond the call; his actions and his high personal moral standards permitted Belgium to be perceived as behaving with a modicum of dignity as its government abandoned us in the field and then attempted to influence the rest of the world not to help. In response, his home country did nothing less than try to destroy him. There is no better example of the risks of command in operations.

During the genocide, I produced a plan for an emergency international intervention of 5,500 troops to stop the slaughter, a plan that was never adopted. In 1997, this plan was subjected to international military analysis at Georgetown University, where Colonel Scott Feil of the U.S. Army was studying under a fellowship from the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. The plan was assessed by high-ranking officers from several nations. Their analysis was published
by Colonel Feil as
Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda
(New York: Carnegie Commission, 1998). In their judgment, the planned intervention would have at best stopped and at least dramatically reduced the casualties of the genocide.

The
OAU
and the United Nations have both conducted full inquiries into the Rwanda genocide of 1994. The
OAU
report is the more detailed and accurate of the two from my perspective. The Brahimi Report on
UN
Peacekeeping Reform, a major study of the
UN
's peacekeeping efforts by a panel of experts led by Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, is a solid compendium of the lessons learned from
UNAMIR
and several other
UN
missions over the last decade or so. It outlines the reforms needed at the
UN
in order to meet the complexity of conflict resolution and peacekeeping in this uncertain era.

I am sure I have missed other fine accounts and I apologize to their authors. I urge readers to carefully check library catalogues and book-store shelves for all accounts of what happened in Rwanda in 1994. Most importantly, I encourage young authors, journalists and scholars to continue to study this human tragedy and to contribute to our growing understanding of the genocide. If we do not understand what happened, how will we ever ensure it does not happen again?

The last reading I want to recommend is the seminal report, “We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,” which was given as a speech by the Secretary-General of the
UN
, Kofi Annan. In this report, Annan calls on us to meet the challenges of the new “millennium of humanity” and insists that we will prevail over conflict. After all I have witnessed, I too believe we can prevail.

The page references in this index correspond to the printed edition from which this ebook was created. To find a specific word or phrase from the index, please use the search feature of your ebook reader.

5ième Régiment d'artillerie légère du Canada, 22–3, 34, 36–7, 40, 44

430th Tactical Helicopter Squadron, 42

Adinkra, Lieutenant Colonel Joe, 344–5, 446

African states and
UNAMIR
2, 375

Ahsan, Major, 423–4

airport (Kigali)

battleground, 378–9, 408–9

a battleground, 336

closed, 264, 411

control of, 270–1, 275–6, 284–5, 321, 362

evacuation of, 286–7

and Habyarimana crash, 225, 243, 259

neutrality of, 324

protection of, 161

re-opening of, 485–6

RGF
control of, 310–11

withdrawal from, 384–6

Albright, Madeleine, 374, 505–6

Al-Khussaiby, Salim bin Mohammed, 436

Allard, General Jean Victor, 17, 22, 24

Amahoro (Peace) Stadium.
See also
headquarters of
UNAMIR

cleaning up of, 490

as a shelter, 270, 291, 466, 478

transfers from, 396–7, 419–20

American Rangers, 147

Annabi, Hedi, 51, 86

Annan, Kofi A., 50, 92–3, 520.
See also
triumvirate of
DPKO

Anyidoho, Brigadier General Henry

and ceasefire, 371–2

and civilian transfers, 350

description of, 156, 257–8

and father's death, 463

honoured, 445

and hostage taking, 423–6

as a leader, 205–6, 319, 408

and meeting with Bizimungu, 442–3

and more Ghanaian troops, 411–12

to replace Dallaire, 470–1, 496, 502

APC
(armoured personnel carrier).
See also
equipment

from Belgians, 113

as functional, 181, 204, 243, 331, 383

number needed, 88, 375–6

arms smuggling, 114, 156–7, 201

Arone, Shidane, 207

Arp, Jan, 507

Arusha negotiations, 320–1, 327, 340, 355

Arusha Peace Agreement.
See also
broad-based transitional government

amnesty provision, 137

beginnings of, 43, 48, 51

commitment to, 123

demise of, 212, 214

governance under, 194

joint session with
RPF
and
RGF
, 72–4

outline of, 54–5

Political Code of Ethics, 211

RPF
support of, 66–7, 138

signing of, 53

“Assessment of the Proposed French-led Initiative in the Rwandese Crisis,” 433–4

Atwood, Brian, 398–400

Austdal, Lieutenant Colonel Mike, 362, 503

Australia, 468–9, 491

Ayala Lasso, José, 354, 363

Bagosora, Colonel Théoneste.
See also
Crisis Committee; interim government

an extremist, 293, 324

and Belgian soldiers, 184

and control of genocide, 386

and death of Habyarimana, 222–7

and joint session
RPF
and
RGF
, 72–3

and
KWSA
, 125–6

meeting with, 77, 383, 456

and meeting with Interahamwe, 345–7

Bagotville, Quebec, 28

Baker, Major General Doug “Two Gun,” 35

Balcer, Léon, 17

Ballis, Lieutenant Colonel Walter, 228, 266

Bangladeshi troops

engineers, 175, 217

frustrations with, 157–8, 204–5, 215, 243–4, 269–71, 273, 323–4

impressive, 195

and language, 176, 222, 228, 231–2

for phase three, 407

poorly equipped, 123–4

their quarters, 127

Barahinyura, Jean Shyirambere, 132

Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco, 132, 184

Baril, General Maurice, 33, 44, 48–50, 354–5

challenges at
UN
, 51–2

direct communication with, 145, 145n1

funding of mission, 56

in Rwanda, 387–93

technical mission to Rwanda, 75

BBC
.
See
Doyle, Mark

Beadengar, Dessande, 171, 381

Beardsley, Major Brent

after Rwanda, xii

choice for
UN
mission, 45

and death of Gatabazi, 187–8

departure of, 340–1

description of, 46

honoured, 445–5n

rescuing nuns, 339–40

saving lives, 157–8, 160

wife and family, 53, 91, 127

witness at International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, xiii

Beatty, Perrin, 38

Beaudry, Major Bob, 28–9

BELBAT
, 113

Belgacem, Commandant Mohammed, 152–3, 302–3

Belgian contingent in Rwanda

accommodations for, 120–1

ambushed, 192–3

arrival of, 106

attitude of, 112–13, 182–7, 215

death of soldiers, 255–6, 258

disciplinary infractions of, 183–5, 193

evacuation force, 286–7

heroes of Rwanda, 239–40

impressive, 195

prisoners, 233, 236–7, 239, 243, 246, 254

target for extremists, 143–4, 161, 228, 240

withdrawal of, 251, 254, 289–90, 293–5, 311–12, 317–18

Belgium

colonial past, 47, 61, 318

evacuation of expatriates, 275

informed of extremist agenda, 148

loss of soldiers, xi

military advisers, 68, 70–1, 223–3n

military advisers to
RGF
, 225

reconnaissance group, 105–6

support for mission, 84, 90, 209, 276

Bennett, Doug, 169

Bernatchez, Major General J.E.P., 17

Bicamumpaka, Jérôme, 288–9, 463

Bizimana, Augustin

absence of, 104, 357

appeal to help, 168–9, 191

in Cameroon, 223, 242, 283

control of Gendarmerie, 70

co-operative, 175

extremist, 293

and informant's information, 148–9

meeting with, 213–14

withdrawal of Belgians, 297

Bizimana, Jean-Damascène, 195

description of, 58

Bizimungu, Major General Augustin

description of, 292–3, 315–16

meeting with, 324, 337–8, 506–7

meeting with Interahamwe, 345–7

meeting with Opération Turquoise, 473

threats to Dallaire, 442–3

Tutsi-hater, 355

Bizimungu, Pasteur

attendance at flag-raising, 104

description of, 65–6

and French prime minister, 495–6

and Gatabazi's funeral, 196

joint session
RPF
and
RGF
, 72

meeting with, 327

new president, 475, 504–5

Blagdon, Brigadier Paddy, 59, 151

Bleim, Manfred, 159–60

blue berets

deliberate targeting of, 41–2

obtaining the hats, 103–4

Bonner, Captain Michel, 36

Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger

and death of Habyarimana, 227

departure of, 330–1, 420

description of, 98, 114–15

informed of extremist agenda, 148

lifestyle, 118, 175–6, 393

meeting with
PL
factions, 140

meeting with U.S., 211

protection of, 161, 213, 232–3, 265, 283

relationship with Dallaire, 118–19

ultimatum for political impasse, 178

Bosnia, 41, 240

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 51, 193, 293

and political impasse in Rwanda, 164

Brahimi Report on
UN
Peacekeeping Reform, 548