Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions (2003) (5 page)

From the start, Americans saw themselves as an exception to the normal run of nations. Having formed the first republic since classical times, they saw it as the start of a whole new human history. As such, it was not to be contaminated by reliance on or adoption of the ways of peoples of the old history. At the same time, Americans were convinced that they were a beacon to mankind, and came to think of themselves as, in the words of the chapter epigraph, ‘the Peculiar Chosen People – the Israel of our time.’ If Americans were the chosen people, then America was the Promised Land. ‘Manifest Destiny’ was the term for the doctrine that Americans must create one nation spanning the continent from sea to sea. By 1885, that had become a reality. Of course, it was a reality that came at the expense of Mexico, which lost half its territory in an American-instigated war, and of Native Americans who were nearly exterminated. That reality somehow went unnoticed at the time, garbed as it was in the rhetoric of what President Andrew Jackson called ‘extending the area of freedom.’

This area was about to take a quantum leap by the end of the nineteenth century. With the materialization of its manifest destiny, America’s expansionist spirit turned toward foreign shores. In fact, the United States was no stranger abroad, having already fought overseas on more than one hundred occasions. Indeed, the U.S. Navy had been patrolling China’s Yangtze River since the 1840
s
. But in 1898, President McKinley asked Congress to authorize use of force to protect American interests and halt Spanish oppression of Cuba. Said McKinley, ‘We intervene not for conquest. We intervene for humanity’s sake’ and to ‘earn the praises of every lover of freedom the world over.’ But when the end of the war left the formerly Spanish Philippines in American hands McKinley, after much ‘prayerful agonizing’ (and despite a declaration of independence by the Filipinos) concluded, ‘There was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift, and civilize, and Christianize them.’
 27 
Thus the Philippines became an American colony after four hundred years as a Spanish one.

Woodrow Wilson, who presided over no major expansion of American controlled territory, nonetheless articulated McKinley’s sense of mission in a new way with profound implications that would reverberate down to our own time. First, he waited until German submarine attacks ‘pushed’ America into World War I, and when he led the country into the war, it was for the purpose of making the world ‘safe for democracy.’ His League of Nations failed because, it was said, of isolationists in the U.S. Senate. Actually, however, the opposing senators had been enthusiastic supporters of U.S. colonial expansion; they weren’t isolationists. Rather they rejected the League because they were unilateralists. In a way, this was American exceptionalism, versus American exceptionalism, and if Wilson lost the first round, he nevertheless established the tone and framework of American foreign policy for the rest of the century.

American policy and objectives in World War II were almost totally Wilsonian. Said President Roosevelt upon declaring war: ‘We fight not for conquest, but for a world in which this nation and all that this nation represents will be safe for our children.’
 28 
America, of course, emerged from the war as the overwhelmingly dominant power. Yet, it did something no such power had done before. Rejecting its old tradition of unilateralism, it laid the foundation for a new world of multilateralism. It is fascinating to speculate on how the world might look had there been no Cold War. But there was, and President Truman chose to respond in the now familiar way, saying, ‘If we falter in our leadership we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.’
 29 

The policy of containment, by which America and its allies outlasted communism in the Cold War, was built on several supports. First, the United States defined its national interest in terms of entangling itself in alliances and multinational institutions aimed at preventing the spread of communism and, where possible, at preserving and promoting democracy, the global rule of law, non-aggression, and due process. Second was the maintenance, apparently permanent, of a very large standing military force, which entailed the expenditure of 3 to 10 percent of GDP on defense and the creation of an enormous and powerful military-industrial complex.
 30 
Third was a habit of expediency. With full knowledge that such actions undermined its credibility as an advocate of freedom, the United States frequently backed dictators and authoritarian rulers as long as they professed anticommunism. (The Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, and a succession of military dictators in Latin America, South Korea, Pakistan, and Taiwan come readily to mind.) Finally, free trade and open markets became inextricably entwined with the promotion of democracy, the view being that free-market economic policies would lead to political liberalization. These policies were also, of course, good for U.S. commercial interests. The Cold War was thus won through the classic American quest for both fortune and paradise that I mentioned earlier.

In the sudden absence of any threat to U.S. security and with most of the world rushing to adopt democratic politics and market capitalism along with free trade, it almost seemed there was nothing left to debate. In his
The End of History
, Francis Fukuyama heralded a new era in which the adoption of the universal U.S. or, more broadly, ‘western’ values and systems would establish global prosperity and peace. Now that American values had apparently triumphed, here was the moment when the nation could step back, dramatically reduce its military establishment, close many of its far-flung bases, revise American commitments abroad, and lead the world by example. The U.S. could stand fast as the ‘Citty upon a Hill,’ glad to have ‘the eies of all people upon us,’ as the Governor John Winthrop had envisioned centuries ago.

But while U.S. forces and spending were reduced, their presence abroad remained large, and their proportion of the world’s military force and expenditure actually grew, as former Soviet and other forces melted away. The hegemony America had exercised during the Cold War began sliding toward supremacy. During the Cold War, America had been
primus inter pares
, the first among equals. It was the leader of its various alliances, but still had to consult and achieve some measure of consensus. Now it moved toward complete dominance. Driving it were the forces of inertia and habit, the interests of a large professional military, a resurgence of the do-good Wilsonian strain of American exceptionalism and unilateralism, the Gulf War of 1991, and an enhanced economic agenda.

Still, in the absence of a strong opposing power, certain contradictions began to surface. If our example was so powerful, why did we need all these soldiers and guns? The initial answer from the strategists was that a weakened Soviet Union could unleash instability and regional conflicts that only the United States could manage. U.S. forces would have to remain preeminent to ensure that the emerging order would be shaped in accord with American interests. The Gulf War strengthened this thinking. But behind it was a larger rationale: If history had ended, it had left winners and losers. At a 1997 press conference, President Clinton chided China for being on the ‘wrong side of history’
 31 
; and in a speech in Hong Kong in July 1998, he said that America had come to define ‘the right side of history.’
 32 
America was now at a moment, in the words of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Republican from Georgia, ‘of unmatched wealth, power, and opportunity’ to direct the world’s destiny, and that opportunity was not to be squandered.
 33 
Clinton was echoed by future National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, who in 1999 told the Los Angeles Foreign Affairs Council that the essential question was whether the United States would ‘accept responsibility for being on the right side of history.’
 34 

A big part of the ‘right side of history’ is globalization, the removal of all barriers to the movement of goods, information, money, and people and the creation of one integrated worldwide system of commerce. As the
New York Times
columnist Tom Friedman said, ‘We want enlargement of both our values and our Pizza Huts.’
 35 
Americas role, according to President Clinton, was to be ‘at the center of every vital global network’ that ‘dramatically increases our leverage to work with people for peace, for human rights, and for stability.’ In this context, the strategy of America’s immense military machine became one of ‘engagement’ to ‘shape the international environment’ in ways conducive to the advance of the ‘right side of history.’
 36 

At first, the election of President Bush in 2000 suggested a new direction. During the campaign, Bush had said, ‘If we are an arrogant nation, they’ll view us that way. But if we’re a humble nation, they’ll respect us.’ He had also advocated reducing America’s many foreign commitments and warned against ‘nation building.’
 37 
But early into the new administration, the terminology for China was changed from ‘partner’ to ‘strategic competitor,’ and the need for scrapping the ABM Treaty and building a National Missile Defense was reemphasized in urgent terms. Whatever potential might have existed for new directions was definitively erased by the events of September 11. Speaking to Congress on September 20, the president said, ‘Freedom itself is under attack.’ In his West Point speech of June 2002, where he spoke of promoting our model of human progress ‘based on the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance,’ he added, ‘we have a great opportunity to extend a just peace by replacing poverty, repression, and resentment around the world with the hope of a better day.’ Thus did Bush unwittingly declare himself emperor of a dominion whose ‘recognition,’ in the words of the Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, we are ‘frantically avoiding.’
 38 

THE SPIRIT OF EMPIRE

‘
It has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one
.’

—Richard Hofstader

America is the only country with an ‘ism’ attached to its name. ‘Americanism’ is a familiar word (more commonly heard in the negative, ‘anti-Americanism,’ but we never hear ‘anti-Japaneseism’ or ‘anti-Germanism’). Other countries are typically birthright communities whose identity derives from a common history and heritage. But America was founded on a set of ideas, and one becomes an American by converting to those propositions in what Emerson called a ‘religious experience.’ As the English writer G.K. Chesterton noted, ‘America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed.’
 39 
Richard Hofstadter took it a step further with his comment that serves as epigraph to this chapter.
 40 
The key principles of that ideology are liberty, equality, individualism, populism, and limited government.
 41 
Seeing themselves as a chosen people laboring in God’s vineyard to create a new, perfect society, Americans find in these values their true religion. They may differ vigorously on everything from God to football, but none will question the validity or universality of these propositions.

In the wake of September 11, American flags were displayed, it seemed, in every available space. Every speech ended with the words ‘God Bless America.’ Having just returned from abroad, I knew how strange and irritating this must have been to foreigners. When Irish Republican Army terrorists had carried out attacks in Britain, or Algerian terrorists in France, or Aum terrorists in Japan, those nations were not suddenly bedecked with flags and their prime ministers didn’t call for God’s special blessing. Did the Americans think they were somehow more sacred than others? No – but they were certain they had a better, more sacred idea than others. President Bush expressed it perfectly when he said that ‘freedom itself has been attacked’ – not the World Trade Towers or the Pentagon or America, but something much more important: Freedom, the creed, the true religion, the only thing that provides hope for a better world.
 42 

Because Americans believe in the universality of Americanism, they don’t see themselves as being better or more sacred so much as being in the vanguard. The nice thing about this religion is that it is a kind of super church that anyone can join regardless of other beliefs or associations. Indeed, the chief reason Americans are blind to their own empire is their implicit belief that every human being is a potential American, and that his or her present national or cultural affiliations are an unfortunate but reversible accident. Emerson wrote that America would be the ‘first nation of men’ – the first nation of individuals rather than of kings or classes, but it would not be the last.
 43 
Americans see themselves as showing the way for others, and in their view, the rest of the world wants to follow. When American leaders promise to promote the spread of freedom globally, what they have in mind is Americanism.

This creed, is powerfully attractive in many respects – in none more than in the assertion of equality. In the American creed, equality doesn’t mean equal social status or equal reward; it means equal opportunity. The earliest colonists came to the new world to get rich, and the creed has promised all its adherents the same opportunity for now and evermore. As the American historian Frederick Jackson Turner noted, ‘Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World, America has been another name for opportunity, and the people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which has not only been open but has even been forced upon them… The American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise.’
 44 
For most of our history, America has been open to newcomers and has been the place where talent, entrepreneurial skills, and hard work can expect a just reward (or better), and nothing is impossible. I once wrote, in comparing Japan and the United States, that in Japan everything is prohibited unless expressly permitted, while in the United States everything is permitted unless expressly forbidden. It is that freedom, perhaps even more than political freedom, that makes America a magnet for immigrants and a source of hope for many peoples around the globe. Adding to the attraction is our tolerance and the inclusiveness of our immigrant society. As long as you hew to the Creed, you can be almost anything you want.