Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America (7 page)

Russia is clearly determined to make clear to the West that it remains a global power—and not a mere “regional power,” as President Obama dismissively described it. Struggling under the Western sanctions and exclusion from the G8 after the Ukraine crisis, Russia is looking for new partners—and it tends to find them among nations already hostile to the United States. Moscow even appears ready to get involved in some long-running Latin American disputes, whether the U.S. blockade of Cuba or the Falklands–Malvinas Islands standoff between Argentina and the United Kingdom.
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China is already Latin America’s biggest creditor. Earlier this year, Xi pledged massive new direct investment commitments for Latin America, and Chinese companies announced a slew of new deals in the region. At least for now, the Chinese push seems more economic than political, but like Moscow, Beijing is doing business with the regional players most at odds with Washington: Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, which all have a harder time getting loans from Western banking institutions, especially the American-dominated World Bank. China is setting itself up as an alternative funder for Latin America. The leading beneficiary has been Venezuela, which has supplied oil to Beijing in exchange for funding for economic and infrastructure-development projects.
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Last year, Xi visited Venezuela and formally upgraded the two countries’ relationship to a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”

In the economic sphere, as in others, the United States has not kept pace with its determined adversaries, with one encouraging exception:
The Obama administration has boldly pushed for passage of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), a trade deal involving the United States and mostly Asian nations as well as others, including Canada—but excluding China. “China wants to write the rules for the world’s fastest-growing region,” the president said. “Why would we let that happen? We should write those rules.”
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He has shown this kind of vision and purpose only rarely during his presidency, however.

THE CLOUD OF WAR AND THE URGENCY OF ACTION

It has become a commonplace in recent years to observe that the American public is “tuned out” when it comes to foreign policy and that during election time foreign-policy issues—with the exception of terrorism—tend not to engage voters. Certainly there is some truth to this, and in recent years the tendency has become exacerbated by a growing distaste, at least among a portion of the voting public, for international involvement on the part of the United States. President Obama’s call to “do some nation building here at home” has resonated with Americans who rightly worry about our mounting list of domestic problems, from spiraling budget deficits and unfunded entitlement programs to failing public schools and crumbling infrastructure. It’s a time-honored American tendency to want to turn away from the problems of the world.

But if there is a single prevailing point that we wish to stress in the book you are about to read, it is that the time when Americans could afford such isolationist impulses (if we ever could) has passed. A second common refrain of recent years—that we live in an interconnected world—cuts against the first. In this interconnected world, the United States remains indispensable, even if our conduct in recent years has suggested otherwise. It is our hope that, after reading
Return to
Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America
, you will share our view that the United States must reassume world leadership in the face of mounting threats and challenges—both for its own good and for the peace and security of the world.

INTRODUCTION

While America Slept

“That is why the strategic partnership between us is of great importance on both a bilateral and global scale. [Russia-China relations are] the best in their centuries-long history. They are characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect for each other’s interests, support in vital issues. They are a true partnership.”

—
VLADIMIR PUTIN
¹

I
t was a dramatic, even spellbinding, scene. A Russian honor guard stood at attention and martial music played as the jetliner taxied into Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport. As millions of Russians watched live on television or at their computers, seemingly every cameraman and print reporter in the country jostled for position—something like when the Beatles arrived at Idlewild Airport. And then, finally, the sighting: Xi Jinping, China’s new president, touched Russian soil for the first time.

The hype didn’t end at his arrival. Those millions of Russians continued to watch live as Xi went directly to the Grand Kremlin Palace, where, for the first time in memory, Russian cavalry units greeted a visiting dignitary. They watched as Russian president Vladimir Putin greeted Xi warmly. They watched as Xi’s glamorous wife, a renowned singer and actress, carried herself with poise and elegance. The day played out on television almost like a royal wedding. And in many ways, it was. The pomp reflected reality: China and Russia have increasingly become devoted to each other.

Like smitten newlyweds, the two leaders even parroted each other’s lines. “China will make developing relations with Russia a priority in its foreign-policy orientation,” Xi said before arriving in Moscow.
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Said Putin: “Russian-Chinese relations are a crucial factor of international politics. Our trade is growing, both countries are involved in large humanitarian projects, and all of that serves the interests of the Chinese and Russian people.”
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“The fact that I will visit Russia, our friendly neighbor, shortly after assuming presidency is a testimony to the great importance China places on its relations with Russia,” Xi told Chinese journalists before departing. “The two sides have had closer strategic coordination on the world stage.”
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Putin agreed: “The strategic partnership between us is of great importance on both a bilateral and global scale.” The Russian-Chinese partnership, Putin added, was “characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect for each other’s interests, support in vital issues.” It was “a true partnership,”
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and Russian-Chinese relations were “the best in their centuries-long history.”
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Xi spoke of the two nations as close friends who treat each other with “open souls.”
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He even expressed his love of Russian literature and culture.

What’s happening here? Russia and China, suspicious neighbors for centuries and fellow Communist antagonists during the Cold War, have been drawing closer and closer together because of a confluence of geostrategic, political, and economic interests. The overwhelming evidence suggests that an unprecedented partnership has developed.

The world is seeing the formalization and strengthening of a historic new alliance—a Russia-China Axis that presents the leading national-security threat to the United States in this young century, against which we seem almost willfully unprepared. Few appreciate the full nature of the threat; far fewer are even aware of it. Some who are, such as journalist Joshua Kurlantzick, see the Russia-China cooperation as part of an adverse trend for democratic governance, which is
losing ground around the world to autocracy.
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But the significance of the Russia-China Axis is even broader.

Russia and China now cooperate and coordinate to an unprecedented degree—politically, militarily, economically—and their cooperation, almost without deviation, carries anti-American and anti-Western ramifications. Russia, China, and a constellation of satellite states seek to undermine American power, dislodge America from its leading position in the world, and establish a new, anti-Western global power structure. And both Russia in Eastern and Central Europe and China throughout Asia are becoming increasingly aggressive and assertive, even hegemonic, in the absence of a systematic U.S. response—notwithstanding the Obama administration’s “strategic pivot to Asia.” For now, the most obvious example of American impotence is the Russian repossession of Crimea in March 2014 and the seemingly inexorable preparation for further territorial claims in Ukraine. Here as elsewhere, Russia, with the quiet but clear backing of China, has called America’s—and the West’s—bluff, with little consequence.

In short, there is a new Cold War in progress, with our old adversaries back in the game, more powerful than they have been for decades, and with America more confused and tentative than it has been since the Carter years.

Those in the Russia-China Axis now operate against American and Western interests in nearly every conceivable area. Their efforts include the following:

       
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Overseeing massive military buildups of conventional and nuclear forces, on which they often collaborate and supply each other, as well as of missile defense—on which they have signed an agreement of partnership

       
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Conducting aggressive and often underhanded trade and economic policies—in everything from major gas and oil deals to
collaboration with newly developed nations on creating alternative international financial institutions

       
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Taking aggressive action to consolidate and expand territorial claims in their spheres of influence, often in violation of UN norms: Russia in Central Asia and its “near abroad”; China, with its belligerence toward various disputed islands in the East and South China Seas and also toward its Asian neighbors

       
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Facilitating rogue regimes, both economically and militarily, especially in regard to nuclear weaponry. China has kept the deranged North Korean regime afloat for years with economic aid and enabled Pyongyang’s nuclear pursuits by its refusal to enforce UN sanctions. Russia has bankrolled Iran’s nuclear program and also acted as Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s strongest ally, showering his regime with weapons systems, bases, and funding—even as Putin has played a key role in spearheading the diplomatic agreement calling for Assad to turn over his chemical weapons.

       
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Using energy resources and other raw materials as weapons in trade wars

       
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Acting as the two leading perpetrators of cyber warfare worldwide—activity almost entirely directed against U.S. or Western targets

       
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Waging a war of intelligence theft and espionage against the West—an effort that has gone on for years but was epitomized in 2013, when China temporarily sheltered, and then Russia accepted for asylum, American NSA contractor and intelligence leaker Edward Snowden

       
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Facilitating, albeit indirectly, terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah

       
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Standing together at the UN, as when the Russians vetoed—and the Chinese abstained from voting on—a Security Council resolution declaring the Crimea referendum invalid
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Indeed, Russia and China exacerbate virtually every threat or problem facing the United States today—from terrorism to the war in Afghanistan to instability in the Western hemisphere and the possibility of a nuclear-armed Iran.

We understand why, to some ears, this argument might sound extreme or unfounded. The recent warmth between the two regimes masks a long history of division and hostility, most recently during the Cold War, when the Sino–Soviet split divided the Communist world. The relations of the two countries reached a nadir in 1969, when tensions between them nearly led to all-out war. But since Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to China in May 1989, and especially since the fall of the Soviet Union a few years later, growing strategic affinity has prompted stronger bilateral ties. To be sure, the two nations remain rivals as well as partners in the Far East. The Russians, in particular, worry about Chinese expansionism and the penetration of Chinese refugees into their sphere of influence. The Chinese worry about Russian desires to merge the former Soviet republics into some kind of alternative European Union, thus threatening Chinese economic opportunities in Central Asia.
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It’s certainly possible that their shared interests could erode under the pressure of competition and divergent goals.

We understand, too, that Russia and China have compelling economic and political reasons for maintaining strong ties with the United States: All three nations share key mutual interests, such as steadying global financial markets and combating Islamic terrorism. Russia and China have even voted America’s way recently in the UN—on North Korean nuclear proliferation, for example. But these factors only obscure a much longer track record of oppositional and even aggressive action that shows every sign of becoming a formalized, dangerous alliance. Russia and China have mastered the art of a kind of geopolitical two-step: doing the bare minimum necessary to create the impression of cooperation (voting for sanctions on North Korea, for instance) while
doing nothing substantive to truly cooperate (not lifting a finger to enforce those same sanctions). Often, the two partners adopt intermittently conciliatory positions to provide themselves with deniability on major international crises—not just in North Korea, but also in Iran and Syria. Indeed, Assad’s use of chemical weapons against his own people in August 2013 was a case in point. American blundering and lack of resolve left an opening for Russia to play conciliator-in-chief by proposing a diplomatic solution to the crisis, although President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry had initially pushed for a military strike. But when Kerry inadvertently stated that Assad could avoid the attack by turning over his chemical weapons to inspectors, the Russians saw their chance and stepped in, announcing their support for that plan and offering their assistance in brokering it. (Unsurprisingly, China supported Putin’s plan.) The agreement did hold off the American attack—but also almost certainly bought Assad time to hide and move his chemical-weapons supplies before inspectors could come in. Indeed, Assad missed his first deadline—December 31, 2013—to turn over the first tranche of Syria’s chemical weapons, forcing Norwegian and Danish ships sent to collect the weapons to turn back.
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The UN blamed security concerns and bureaucracy for the delay, and, in typical fashion, the State Department sought to play down the issue. “As long as we see forward progress that’s what’s most important here, and we have,” Marie Harf, the State Department’s deputy spokesperson, said.
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But how the process will unfold remains to be seen, and Assad continues to consolidate his power as the June 2014 presidential elections approach.

The Syria crisis showed the Axis powers (especially Russia) in a new light: They protected a mutual ally and in the process presented themselves as peacemakers trying to walk the Americans back from yet another military intervention in the Middle East. And, in fact, two years into the crisis, Putin’s staunch backing of Assad has now accomplished a
nearly complete reversal of fortune for the regime: Whereas the expectation two years ago was that Assad would go—it was just a matter of time—he’s now an essential partner in the process, whatever happens.

No wonder that
Forbes
, in its 2013 annual survey of the world’s most powerful people, selected Putin as Number One, elevating him above President Obama. “Who’s more powerful: The omnipotent head of a corroding but still feisty power or the handcuffed head of the most dominant country in the world?” the magazine asked. “This year’s snapshot of power puts the Russian president on top. Putin has solidified his control over Russia (‘dictator’ is no longer an outlandish word to ponder) and the global stage. Anyone watching the chess match over Syria has a clear idea of the shift in the power towards Putin.”
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Nevertheless, in Washington, there seems to be little urgency and even less understanding about the burgeoning Russian-Chinese alliance. Our leaders appear unwilling or unable to grasp the magnitude of the situation and the inadequacy of their approach. American policy has been weak, bordering on negligent—the approach of a nation that seems to be conceding power and the ability to shape events.

As this book went to press, the United States stood passively by as Russia, following its annexation of Crimea, continued to interfere overtly and covertly in Ukraine, sponsoring pro-Russian militias in the country’s east and south. Faced with Ukraine’s pleas for military assistance, President Obama responded with a meager offer to provide military rations—and even those were slow in coming.
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Unable to generate consensus among its NATO allies and unwilling to act decisively on its own, America seems to have all but conceded Ukraine to the Russian political orbit.
Washington Post
columnist Anne Applebaum quoted an exasperated Canadian diplomat who said, “It’s like watching a hockey game with only one team on the ice.”
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Even before these events unfolded, President Obama was sending similar signals—not only as regards Ukraine but also in connection
with the mounting challenges the United States faces on many fronts. In his State of the Union speech in January 2014, for instance, Obama made clear that the U.S. was practically withdrawing from the field. He put no emphasis on confronting our enemies and made no explicit mention about the need to compete with China and Russia. The administration’s much-heralded “pivot to Asia” got just one sentence, and the president’s comments about the Middle East were perfunctory—save for his reference to Iran, where Obama made it clear that he would do everything in his power to support an agreement that contains such egregious loopholes that the Iranians can continue to enrich uranium at low grades, keep tens of thousands of centrifuges, and restart their full-blown enrichment program on less than a day’s notice. The difficulty of enforcing even the best deals with such adversaries was illustrated a day after Obama’s speech, when reports surfaced that the Russians have tested a medium-range cruise missile, in violation of the landmark 1987 arms-control treaty.
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The 1987 treaty was thought to be sound; by contrast, few but the most devoted Obama defenders see the Iranian agreement as anything but reckless, a virtual giveaway to an outlaw regime that will endanger the United States and its allies.