Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America
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Authors: Douglas E. Schoen,Melik Kaylan
RETURN TO WINTER
PRAISE FOR
RETURN TO WINTER
, PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED AS
THE RUSSIA-CHINA AXIS
“
The Russia-China Axis
puts on the table what many have preferred to ignore or wish away, namely that our current foreign policy is causing grave and systemic harm to American interests all around the world. Schoen and Kaylan thoroughly document the problem and propose countermeasures that should jump-start a long-overdue national discussion of how America can right itself.”
John Bolton
Former United States ambassador to the United Nations
“Doug Schoen and Melik Kaylan’s book
The Russia-China Axis: The New Cold War and America’s Crisis of Leadership
is a wake-up call for the resurrection of American strategic, visionary leadership in the face of a growing global crisis for liberal democratic states. Schoen and Kaylan identify this adversarial global environment and present strategies for using elements of our national power to secure freedom on this complex 21st-century battlefield. This is a must-read for those who care about America’s place in the world and her security.”
Allen B. West
Lieutenant colonel, U.S. Army, retired (1982–2004) Member of 112th U.S. Congress (2011–2013)
“This book is a clarion call for American leaders to stand up against the burgeoning China-Russia axis that supports rogue states and values. Eloquently and with plentiful evidence, the authors splinter any illusion that these two rising powers share U.S. values or interests. They note that a new Cold War has erupted, and that we are the only ones not fighting. This is a must-read for anybody concerned about American foreign policy.”
Anders Åslund
Peterson Institute for International Economics Former economic adviser to the Russian government and author of
How Capitalism Was Built
© 2014, 2015 by Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan
Preface © 2015 by Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of Encounter Books, 900 Broadway, Suite 601, New York, New York, 10003.
First American edition published in 2014 by Encounter Books,
an activity of Encounter for Culture and Education, Inc.,
a nonprofit, tax exempt corporation.
Encounter Books website address:
www.encounterbooks.com
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992 (R 1997) (
Permanence of Paper
).
First paperback edition published in 2015.
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS HAS CATALOGUED
THE HARDCOVER EDITION AS FOLLOWS:
Schoen, Douglas E., 1953–, author.
Return to winter: Russia, China, and the new cold war against America / by Douglas E. Schoen and Melik Kaylan.
pages cm
Originally published in hardback in 2014 as: The Russia-China axis: the new cold war and America’s crisis of leadership.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-59403-844-0 (ebook)
1. United States—Foreign relations—21st century. 2. United States—Foreign relations administration—21st century. 3. National security—United States. 4. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—China. 5. China—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) 6. World politics—2005–2015. I. Kaylan, Melik, 1962–, author. II. Title.
JZ1480.S358 2014
327.47051—dc23
2014002441
Contents
Preface to the Paperback Edition
CHAPTER 2
Rogue Regimes: How the Axis Uses Proxies to Win
CHAPTER 3
Cyber Security: The New Battlefield
CHAPTER 4
Military Supremacy: America’s Fading Edge
CHAPTER 5
Nuclear Security: They Build Up, We Build Down
CHAPTER 6
The Economic Contest: America on the Sidelines
CHAPTER 7
Intelligence Wars: Stealing America’s Secrets
CHAPTER 8
Propaganda Wars: Losing Ground in the Battle for Hearts and Minds
CHAPTER 9
Countermoves: Some Thoughts on Fighting Back
CONCLUSION
Why America Must Wake Up
W
e wrote most of this book before the recent, unfolding events in Ukraine, as well as before further developments confirming the existence of a Russian-Chinese alliance. These events and others, in our view, only confirm the validity and relevance of our arguments, but we offer this foreword as a more current take on the state of affairs as we go to press (2014).
“Now Russia-China cooperation is advancing to a new stage of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction. It would not be wrong to say that it has reached the highest level in all its centuries-long history.”
—
VLADIMIR PUTIN
1
“[Russia’s and China’s] enhanced partnership marks the first emergence of a global coalition against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”
—
CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
2
“The Sino-Soviet rift that brought the two countries to the brink of nuclear war in the ’60s has been healed rather dramatically.”
—
STROBE TALBOTT
3
“The echoes of the non-aggression pacts of the 1930s get louder in this age of American retreat.”
—
WALL STREET JOURNAL
4
“If not letting America have its own way is Mr. Obama’s objective, he is an unparalleled foreign-policy success.”
—
JOHN BOLTON
5
“T
his will be the biggest construction project in the world for the next four years, without exaggeration,” Vladimir Putin said
in Shanghai in May 2014, as he raised a glass to drink a toast with Chinese president Xi Jinping.
6
The two leaders were celebrating the signing of a 30-year, $400 billion natural-gas deal between their countries—the biggest in the history of the natural-gas industry. Under the terms of the deal, Russia would supply the Chinese with natural gas for the first time—38 billion cubic meters of gas per year, through pipelines and other massive infrastructure investments. The Chinese would gain a major new source of energy, and a cleaner-burning fuel, in a country facing major pollution problems. Russia would acquire a massive new customer base for its gas, at a time when Europe seeks to diversify from Russian sources. The deal, Putin said, was “an epochal event” in the relationship between the two nations. For his part, President Xi, always the less voluble of the two leaders, spoke of expanding commerce with Russia. “We are determined that trade between our countries will reach $100 billion by 2015,” he said. Moscow hopes to double that figure by 2020.
The agreement had been in the works for a decade, but some commentators saw it solely in the context of a current crisis: the Western reaction against Russia after its illegal annexation of Crimea in Ukraine, and the threat that war might break out between Russia and Ukraine. “The crisis in relations with the West over Ukraine has made ties to Asia, and particularly relations with its economic engine, China, a key strategic priority,” the
New York Times
asserted, discussing Putin’s interest in China.
7
That sounded perfectly logical. It was also perfectly wrong.
The truth is, Putin’s trip to Shanghai was only the latest evidence of an unfolding alliance between Russia and China that most observers are only now starting to acknowledge. The gas deal was so momentous that it would have been impossible to ignore; but the signs of Russian and Chinese collaboration are everywhere, and they have been mounting for more than a decade.
“Russia-China cooperation is advancing to a new stage of comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction,” Putin said on the eve of his visit to Shanghai. “It would not be wrong to say that it has reached the highest level in all its centuries-long history.”
8
He was preparing to sign “a record package of documents” and agreements between the two countries, covering trade, investment, energy, infrastructure development, Asia-Pacific cooperation, and cultural exchange.
9
“We are aiming at the creation of special areas of advanced economic development with an investment-friendly environment,” Putin said.
10
Indeed, Putin has turned to China for financing, trying to roll back limits on Chinese investment in the Russian economy in the hope of luring cash into industries from housing to infrastructure to natural resources. Russia seeks China’s help to build a bridge to the Crimean peninsula.
This expanding trade is part of a larger story: Russia and China, once Communist adversaries during the Cold War, now increasingly act in concert. Beijing tacitly supported Russian moves in Crimea by abstaining from a vote in the United Nations, even though Moscow’s actions violated a stated core principle of Beijing’s foreign policy: noninterference. The two countries also lined up on the same side at the UN regarding the Syrian civil war.
Militarily, the two nations are cooperating and collaborating like never before. In May 2014, the Russian and Chinese navies held large-scale joint drills in the East China Sea—sending a message, most experts felt, to Japan, which has found itself in increasing tension with Beijing. “Moscow and Beijing have found advantages in working together to diminish U.S. influence and create greater room for them to pursue international economic and strategic interests,” Brian Spegele and Wayne Ma noted in the
Wall Street Journal
. “Mr. Putin is widely depicted in Chinese official media as a powerful leader unafraid to take on the West.”
11
That’s not how the Chinese view American leaders, to put it mildly.
In spring 2014, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, on an official visit to Beijing that included a tour of China’s first aircraft carrier, stood at a press conference with his counterpart, Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan. With the media looking on, Wanquan made sure the Pentagon chief understood that the Chinese military had no fear of American power. “With the latest developments in China,” Wanquan told Hagel, “it can never be contained.”
12
In different ways, Russia and China also effectively tolerate, and even facilitate, the interests and goals of rogue nations—Iran, North Korea, Syria, and others. They use their political influence to assist these nations’ efforts to procure nuclear power or weaponry, to avoid international punishment for egregious human-rights abuses, and to prop up anti-Western dictators and even terrorist groups. Despite lingering differences and suspicions, Russia and China have become both newly aggressive in their own spheres and newly cooperative as partners and allies. They have forged a powerful new alliance that marks, as Charles Krauthammer rightly suggests, “the first emergence of a global coalition against American hegemony since the fall of the Berlin Wall.”
13
Put simply, this coalition has the potential to permanently and fundamentally alter international relations. It was envisioned as, and it has functioned as, a counterweight to liberal democracy generally and the United States specifically. “The unipolar model of the world order has failed,” Putin says, referring to what he sees as American hegemony. “Today this is obvious to everyone.”
14
The Russia-China alliance—we call it a new Axis—already possesses extraordinary power, as is clear not just with new economic and trade agreements and military cooperation but also in the areas of nuclear proliferation and cyber warfare. Individually and together, Russia and China seek to undermine the social, economic, and political framework of democratic societies and our alliances in a way that has yet to be fully understood.
Their efforts to do so are emboldened immeasurably by a United States that is losing the confidence and trust of its allies and partners around the world. From Europe to the Middle East to the Far East, American policy is muddled, irresolute, and even feckless—as was powerfully symbolized in June 2014 when the Obama administration stood by as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the al-Qaeda offshoot, quickly overran cities in Iraq. Our allies doubt American commitment and resolve, question or outright oppose our policies, and are increasingly looking elsewhere—or within—for sustenance and support. Even nations historically aligned with us are making tentative outreach elsewhere. The United States has no clear strategy other than retrenchment and the minimization of genuine threats. We seem unwilling to acknowledge what our adversaries our doing. Unless we fundamentally change the foreign-policy approach we have followed under President Obama, we will continue to lose ground—as will the cause of democracy and freedom around the world.
These, then, are the subjects of the book you are about to read: the Russia-China alliance, the dangers that it poses, and the desperate need for a cogent and committed American response. Without unduly flattering ourselves, let us be frank: We tried to sell the idea of this book for years before we found a taker. We’d rather have been wrong than right. Now that more Americans are paying attention, there might yet be a chance to reverse the tide.
ON THE MARCH: RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE ROGUES
On May 9, 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin coasted into the Crimean port of Sevastopol on a naval launch, gliding past Russian warships arrayed to greet him. It was Victory Day, the Russian holiday commemorating the Soviet Union’s triumph over Nazi Germany. Over the years, Putin has made the occasion a great celebration of Russian
nationalism. He had spent the morning in Moscow attending a military parade in Red Square, an old Soviet practice he resurrected in 2008. His visit to Crimea came two months after he led Russia’s illegal annexation of the Ukrainian territory—a move condemned not only by Ukraine’s government but also by much of the world. In his remarks at Sevastopol, Putin roused his audience with patriotic themes.
“I think 2014 will also be an important year in the annals of Sevastopol and our whole country, as the year when people living here firmly decided to be together with Russia, and thus confirmed their faith in the historic truth and the memory of our forefathers,” he said, in remarks broadcast nationally.
15
Putin called Victory Day “the holiday when the invincible power of patriotism triumphs, when all of us particularly feel what it means to be faithful to the Motherland and how important it is to defend its interests.”
16
After the speech, Russian jets flew over the crowd, through what mere months before had been Ukrainian airspace.
17
While Putin was in Crimea, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin celebrated Victory Day in Moldova’s breakaway pro-Russian region of Transnistria, declaring Russia the “guarantor of security” for what he provocatively called “the republic of Transnistria,” echoing the language Russia has used to justify intervention in Ukraine.
18
On May 11, in a referendum widely denounced by the West, 90 percent of voters in the eastern Ukraine provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk voted for secession from Ukraine.
19
Pro-Russian activists were soon saying that they wanted to become part of Russia; annexation might be only a matter of time.
Regardless of what ultimately happens in Ukraine, the Russian seizure of Crimea has fundamentally changed the international power balance. Despite the sanctions that have been put in place, Russian aggression and assertiveness have yet to be deterred, and the United States and its European allies have no clear consensus on how to proceed.
For the first time, the essential principles of the NATO alliance have been called into question—with implications for Eastern and Central Europe, and indeed for the world.
While the world anxiously watched the Ukraine situation, an 80-ship Chinese fleet sailed into waters claimed by Vietnam to install a billion-dollar oil rig in the energy-rich South China Sea. When Vietnam’s coast guard arrived, the Chinese flotilla responded with force, ramming at least one Vietnamese ship and firing water cannons at others.
20
Then, later in May, a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat in the disputed waters.
21
China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea as its own, rejecting the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and staking claims to dozens of islands and reefs that Beijing claims are historically Chinese.
22
New examples of Chinese assertiveness in regional waters occur regularly. As this book went to press, Chinese jet fighters armed with missiles “buzzed” two Japanese reconnaissance planes in the two countries’ overlapping air-defense zones over the East China Sea. The Chinese fighters got within 100 feet of the Japanese planes, in what the Japanese defense minister described as a dangerous act that would increase tensions between the two nations.
23
Those tensions have been rising for years. In late 2013, China unilaterally imposed an “air-defense identification zone” in the East China Sea in airspace that overlaps with Japanese and South Korean airspace, and it threatened any aircraft that penetrated the zone.
24
The incident with the Japanese planes could mark a new and more dangerous stage in the standoff.
China has been acting more provocatively toward its Asian neighbors for years. Beijing recently began a construction project in the disputed Spratly Islands, despite a long-standing agreement with the Philippines and other nations in the region not to build on these disputed landmasses. The Philippines filed a formal protest, and the action worsened relations with Vietnam, already angered by the oil-rig incident. It wasn’t clear what
the Chinese were building in the Spratlys—only that Beijing insisted that its right to do so was purely a matter of “Chinese sovereignty.”
25
In March 2014, China blockaded Philippine marines stationed on Second Thomas Shoal, an uninhabited atoll China claims for itself.
26
While some foreign-policy observers may believe that Beijing is acting recklessly, it’s more likely that these provocations are all part of a broader strategy to undermine U.S. authority in the region by picking small, winnable fights. “China is seeking to prove to its neighbors that containment cannot work and that the U.S. cannot be relied upon to defend them,” wrote David Pilling in the
Financial Times
. “If it can do so, they and Washington will have to acknowledge that the status quo is untenable. It is a dangerous strategy. It is also a clever one.”
27