Authors: Carl Walter,Fraser Howie
Tags: #Business & Economics, #Finance, #General
Contents
Chapter 1 : Looking Back at the Policy of Reform and Opening
Thirty Years of Opening up: 1978–2008
Thirteen Years of Reform: 1992–2005
The End of Reform: 2005
China is a Family Business
Endnotes
Chapter 2 : China’s Fortress Banking System
Banks are China’s Financial System
Crisis: The Stimulus to Bank Reform, 1988 and 1998
China’s Fortress Banking System in 2009
The Sudden thirst for Capital and Cash Dividends, 2010
Endnotes
Chapter 3 : The Fragile Fortress
The People’s Bank of China Restructuring Model
The Ministry of Finance Restructuring Model
The “Perpetual Put” Option to the PBOC
China’s Latest Banking Model
Implications
Endnotes
Chapter 4 : China’s Captive Bond Market
Why does China have a Bond Market?
Risk Management
The Base of the Pyramid: “Protecting” Household Depositors
Endnotes
Chapter 5 : The Struggle over China’s Bond Markets
The CDB, the MOF and the Big 4 Banks
Local Governments Unleashed
China Investment Corporation: Lynchpin of China’s Financial System
Cycles in the Financial Markets
Endnotes
Chapter 6 : Western Finance, SOE Reform and China’s Stock Markets
China’s Stock Markets Today
Why does China have Stock Markets?
What Stock Markets gave China
Endnotes
Chapter 7 : The National Team and China’s Government
Zhu Rongji’s Gift: Organizational Streamlining, 1998
How the National Team, Its Families and Friends Benefit
A Casino or a Success, or Both?
Implications
Endnotes
Chapter 8 : The Forbidden City
The Emperor of Finance
Behind the Vermillion Walls
An Empire Apart
Cracks in the Walls
Imperial Ornaments
Endnotes
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ISBN 978-0-470-82586-0 (Hardcover)
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To John Wilson Lewis
Preface
After three rounds of
Privatizing China
, our book about China’s stock markets, we felt like we wanted to look into something new. Since we took our first look at the stock markets in 1999, we have been interested to note the lack of work on the financial side of China’s miracle that gets beyond the macroeconomics of things. We are the first to agree that living and working in the country for 25 years may not qualify us as experts in economics. We do believe, however, that our experience has given us a feel for how China’s political elite manages money and the country’s economy. Having worked in banks for longer than we care to remember, we wanted to try to understand how China and its ruling class finance themselves and we knew we had to begin with the banks since, in truth, they are China’s financial system. Those looking for tales of corruption and princelings with their hands in the till will be disappointed though. We think that the financial side of the story behind a 30-year boom that changed the lives of one billion people is much more interesting; so this is our effort at staking out modern China’s political economy “inside the system.”
We do not believe in Chinese exceptionalism. China’s economy is no different from any other, in spite of the inevitable Chinese characteristics. If there are such things as economic laws, they work just as well in China and for Chinese businesses as they do in other markets. We also do not believe in the recent triumphalism of China’s bankers and many of its leaders; this is only a diplomatic ploy. China’s banks survived the global financial crisis, as one senior banker has publicly stated, simply because the financial system is closed off from the world. Having seriously studied the collapse of Mexico’s peso in 1994, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 and those sovereign-debt crises that have followed, China’s political elite has no intention of exposing itself to international capital markets. The domestic economy and markets are, and will continue to be, most deliberately closed off. With a non-convertible currency, minimal foreign participation and few overseas assets beyond US Treasuries and commodity investments that will neither be marked-to-market nor sold, why shouldn’t the system survive a major international crisis better than open economies? China’s financial system is designed so that no one is able to take a position opposite to that of the government.
Of course, the private export-oriented sector suffered massive losses in jobs, earnings and the closure of small companies in 2008 and 2009. But China’s banks were not exposed in any material way to this sector. It is a simple fact that China’s financial system and its stock, bond and loan markets cater only to the state sector, of which the “National Champions” represent the reddest of the Red. These corporations, the heart of China’s state-owned economy, are “inside the system.” The private economy, no matter how vibrant, is “outside the system” and, in fact, serves at the will of the system. If nothing else, the events of the fall of 2008 added an additional seal to the Party’s determination to sustain a closed, tightly controlled, economy. “Don’t show me any failed models,” is the refrain of the Chinese officialdom these days. But is China’s own financial system a model for the world to study? Can China be thought of as an economic superpower, either now or in the future, with such a system?
With this sort of question in mind, we began to look at the financial history of the People’s Republic of China. We were fortunate that 2008 was the thirtieth anniversary of China’s highly successful Reform and Opening Policy, so there were many excellent retrospectives prepared by the government agencies. The People’s Bank of China, in particular, produced very useful material, some of which took one of us back 30 years to Beijing University where his study of Chinese banks began. We hasten to emphasize that all the information used in writing this book derives from purely public sources. In China, all of the important ministries, corporations and banks maintain excellent websites, so data is just out there in the wind waiting to be downloaded. In particular, China Bond and the National Association of Financial Market Institutional Investors (NAFMII), a sub-set of the People’s Bank, have extensive websites providing access to information, in both Chinese and English, on China’s fixed-income markets. Data for the stock markets have always been plentiful and, we believe, accurate. Again, Wind Information, China’s Bloomberg equivalent, has been a rich source for us. Then, there are the audited financial statements of China’s banks, all available online since the respective listings of each bank. Reading these statements has been highly educational. We strongly encourage others, including China’s regulators, to do the same.