Oswald and the CIA: The Documented Truth About the Unknown Relationship Between the U.S. Government and the Alleged Killer of JFK (41 page)

Hemming and Bartes in New Orleans

In June 1962, Hemming connected with another anti-Castro Cuban leader: Frank Bartes. According to a July 2, 1962, CIA memorandum from the Agency's New Orleans office of the Domestic Contacts Division, Frank Bartes provided the CIA with this information:

On 25 June 1962 Laurence Joseph Laborde and two other men had called on him [Bartes]. He had met Laborde earlier in Miami. The men said that they wanted to train Cuban refugees as guerrilla fighters and demolition experts who would then go to Cuba. The other men were Gerald P. Hemming, Jr. and Howard Kenneth Davis."'

Banes added that Laborde was "anti-CIA," which the New Orleans office said it had "confirmed." Bartes reported that he had "reached an agreement" with Laborde. Possibly related to such an agreement were documents that Laborde gave to Bartes, one of them a letter of recommendation from 30th of November leader Carlos Rodriguez Quesada.129

There is further documentary corroboration of the assistance Banes provided in getting Hemming, Laborde, and Davis into a training camp near New Orleans. According to a CIA "internal component" (presumably Task Force W or Branch 3 or 4 of the Western Hemisphere Division), a proposal had been made to a New Orleans "Cuban refugee group," probably the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), for military training of another Cuban refugee group, possibly the 30th of November Group. This the Agency learned on June 28, 1962, when Bartes, "one of our sources among the Cuban refugees," the CIA memo said, "asked for an appointment so that he could give us some interesting information."

Banes explained how it was that his activities in New Orleans became known to Laborde. Banes and the other "Cuban refugee from New Orleans" had been in Miami "a month or so ago" and met Laborde. At that time Laborde had told them of his interest in working with the Cuban refugees. Laborde lamented that "he had previously been connected with a training camp in the Everglades in Florida, but that that camp had to be abandoned because of fires in the Everglades." The CIA memo explains what happened then:

When Bartes returned to New Orleans, according to him, he contacted the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and asked them if they could, in his words, "clear" Laric Laborde. The Bureau told him that while they could not give him an official clearance, they would look into the situation and would contact Bartes and Mr. Ravel, who is the nominal head of the Cuban refugee movement in New Orleans.

Banes says that sometime later the Federal Bureau of Investigation did contact Ravel and told him that as far as Laborde was concerned it was "hands off." Curiously enough, both "source" [Bartes] and Ravel took this to mean that this was a clearance of Laborde by the FBI, so that when Laborde and the other two US citizens contacted Ravel and Bartes in New Orleans they had no hesitancy in dealing with them.10

The CIA memo said that the Agency Domestic Contacts office in New Orleans had told Bartes that "all of this" was out of their jurisdiction, that the CIA "had absolutely nothing to do with such matters," and that they "could not give him any advice" about what "he seemed to be seeking."

Bartes countered with the remark that the reason he was providing the CIA with this information was that "these three men hate CIA and they said that CIA is doing nothing and is preventing other people from doing anything and they are anxious to do something to help the Cubans without the help of CIA." Bartes added, defensively, that since he had furnished the CIA information in the past, "he thought that we should know about the present situation."

The documents that Hemming, Laborde, and Hall gave to Bartes were turned over to the CIA by the latter. They were a "clipping" from the June 3 Denver Post castigating the CIA and CRC leader Miro Cardona, and an undated document. The second (undated) document was signed by Luis del Nodal Vega, "who styles himself Military Coordinator" of the 30th of November Group, and Hemming and Davis, both instructors for Interpen. The document was "approved" by Quesada. Hemming told Bartes that this document "had been presented to CIA in Miami last year but that nothing had come of it." When Bartes passed this on to the Agency, they said they would be glad to "have copies of any of the documents which he had," but reiterated that they "could not and would not advise him in any manner, shape, or form in connection with any such operation."

"He seemed to understand that we could not help him," the CIA memo said of Bartes, "and when he left he said that he thought he would tell the three men, Laborde, Hemming, and Davis, that he could not go along with them." The CIA memo went on to disclose that they had learned from another source who was a "close friend" of Bartes's, that he had seen Bartes with Hemming, Laborde, and Davis and that "they looked like a bunch of thugs." The friend also said that Bartes had said, "confidentially," that he was dealing with the three men "as a representative of the New Orleans Cuban Refugee Organization," meaning the CIA-backed CRC. Banes added, said the friend, "that these three men were armed and therefore potentially dangerous." 131

CIA files on Bartes show that on January 4, 1961, the Operational Approval and Support Division asked the Security Office for a check on Bartes for use in a "contact and assessment" role in the area "WH [Western Hemisphere] Cuba.""' By September 1965, Bartes was working for the CIA's Special Operations Division."' In between, he had a date on television with Oswald. That event, however, would not transpire until August 1963, and will be discussed in Chapter Seventeen. Before his Cuban escapades in New Orleans, however, Oswald spent almost ten months in Dallas. It is to that part of the story that we now turn.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

F-VIF
The Unworthy Oswald

The outward appearance of the documentary record covering Oswald's ten months in Fort Worth and Dallas, from June 1962 to April 1963, is dominated by a gaping hole. The story that goes with that record is about how the FBI closed its file on Oswald in October 1962, became interested in him again six months later because he wrote a letter to a communist newspaper, and then lost track of him in April 1963 only a month after reopening his file.

There are several problems with this activity, especially at the points when the Oswald FBI file is opened and closed. First of all, why was it that the FBI, which had been primed for Oswald's return from Russia, calmly closed the book on him in spite of his uncooperative and obstreperous attitude, refusal to take a lie detector test, and immediate mail activities with just about any communist or left wing organizations he could think of. For his performance, Oswald was deemed "unworthy" of further attention, so unworthy that when, on a Dallas spring day in 1963, when someone from the FBI went looking for Oswald and found he had gone, nobody cared. Oswald was just routine.

As we will see, the first intercepted FPCC letter to land in Oswald's file was discounted by the FBI agent in charge of the file. Dallas Special Agent James Hosty claims he did not believe Oswald's remark that he had handed out FPCC literature in Dallas. Perhaps, but the inconsistency is the FBI's claim that Oswald's file was reopened in March because of a letter to the Worker. The file had been closed in October 1962, just after learning-on 28 September-of a similar letter to the Worker.' The circumstances surrounding the closure of Oswald's file directly contradict the stated rationale for its reopening.

During the documentary dark zone covered in this chapter, Os wald wrote to-and received mail from-the Soviet Embassy, the American Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, and an assortment of other far left periodicals and organizations. FBI Director Kelley's book admits that the FBI knew about this all along. The story the FBI told the Warren Commission about its interest in Oswald was, at best, fictionalized to cover sensitive programs such as the opening of mail to and from the Soviet Embassy in Washington D.C. As we will see, this problem persisted and was related to Oswald's move to New Orleans.

New Orleans is the subject of Chapters Sixteen and Seventeen. They begin a new phase in Oswald's about-to-be-shortened life: his venture into the shadowy world of the Cuban exiles there, handing out leaflets on the streets, and appearing in courtroom scenes and debates covered by radio and television. Oswald's transition into his Cuban role begins in Dallas, just before the end of the period to which we now turn.

Labyrinth V: Closing the Oswald File

"You should be alert for subject's [Oswald] return to the United States," FBI headquarters directed the Dallas FBI office on May 31, 1962, "and immediately upon his arrival you should thoroughly interview him to determine whether he was recruited by Soviet intelligence or made any deals with Soviets in order to obtain permission to return to the United States." The Bureau memorandum further directed the following:

In your interview with subject, you should attempt to ascertain exactly what information he furnished to the Soviets. If any doubt exists as to subject's truthfulness during such interview, you should consider requesting his consent to a polygraph examination and, thereafter, obtain Bureau authority for such an examination. Results of interview with subject should be submitted in form suitable for dissemination.'

By the end of May 1962, the Bureau had already decided it wanted Oswald grilled. On June 14, FBI headquarters sent an air telegram to the New York FBI office relaying to them that "Bureau liaison was informed by ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] on 6/14/62 that ONI is aware of subject's [Oswald's] scheduled arrival in US but has no confirmation of his actual arrival." The air telegram also indicated that ONI contemplated taking no action against Oswald but "requested to be advised of results of our interview."

The point of adding the ONI's expressed interest in this telegram to New York was to underline the importance of monitoring Oswald's movements when he returned so that he could be immediately interviewed. The telegram then repeated all the instructions previously sent to Dallas about "thoroughly interviewing" Oswald, and added these additional orders: "New York should contact INS to verify subject's arrival, determine his destination in US, and advise Bureau, Dallas, and WFO."Z The New York FBI office verified Oswald's June 13 arrival and, as ordered, furnished Oswald's destination: Fort Worth, Texas.'

It was perhaps fitting that on the day the FBI interviewed Oswald, June 26, 1962, he walked into the Commercial Employment Agency and applied for a job saying he had been in Moscow working for the State Department.' The unsuspecting clerk probably failed to see the comedy in this. The FBI did not fare much better when Special Agent John Fain interviewed him in Fort Worth, Texas at one P.M. on June 26.5 Oswald reportedly went with Fain to the FBI office but refused to take a lie detector test.' But according to former FBI Director Kelley, the interview did not exactly begin this way. Kelley says Fain was trying to schedule a "fact-finding meeting" with Oswald when he burst into the Dallas FBI office unannounced, and said, "Here I am, what do you want me to talk about?"'

Before discussing the interview with Oswald, it is useful to know that, amazingly, the CIA was not furnished with a report of this interview. The moment that the FBI, ONI, INS, and the State Department had all been waiting for arrived the handwritten dissemination list neglected to add CIA,' and there is no surviving routing sheet from 1962 associated with the report. The State Department, INS, and the ONI all got their copies.

What did the CIA miss? Quite a show, from what the FBI says. Oswald was arrogant, intemperate, and impatient, often declining to answer questions. The agents' standing instructions when meeting such resistance were to request the subject to submit to a polygraph. They asked and he refused. Oswald said he had borrowed $435 from the American Embassy with which to come home, but then refused to answer Fain's question as to why he had gone to the Soviet Union in the first place. Oswald then made an angry "show of temper" stating that he did not want to "relive the past."9 Oswald reportedly shouted this last remark at Fain, after which "Fain and Oswald nearly squared off right there in Fain's office."10

"From the very beginning," said Director Kelley in his 1987 autobiography, "dealing with Lee Harvey Oswald was no picnic for the FBI." It was certainly no picnic for John Fain. This recollection includes this passage:

During most of the interview, Oswald exhibited an impatient and arrogant attitude. Oswald finally stated that Soviet officials had asked him upon his arrival why he had come to Russia. Oswald stated that he told them, "I came because I wanted to." Oswald added that he went to Russia to "see the country."

Oswald advised that newspaper reports which have appeared in the public press from time to time are highly exaggerated and untrue. He stated that the newspaper reports had pictured him as out of sympathy with the United States and had made him look attractive to the Russians. Oswald stated that by reason of such newspaper reports he had received better treatment by the Soviets than he otherwise would have received.

Oswald might have thought his remarks were clever, but Fain obviously did not. In addition, the interview highlighted Oswald's deep dislike for journalism.

Significantly, the interview did explore what Oswald had done in the Soviet Union, how he had had spent his time as a metal worker in a "television factory" [wrong, it was a radio factory], and had been permitted to live in Minsk as a "resident alien." Oswald said he had learned Russian by "self instruction" while in the Marines, but denied ever having been in the American Communist Party. According to Fain's recapitulation:

He denied that he went to Russia because of his lack of sympathy for the institutions of the United States or because of an admiration for the Russian system. He admitted that he had read books by Karl Marx while a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, but he stated that he was merely interested in the economic theories.

Oswald declined to explain what he meant when he wrote his mother while en route to Russia that his "values" and those of his mother and brother were different.