Authors: John Newman
Notes
Introduction
1. For those interested in pursuing particular theories about the case, more information is available from two Washington-based organizations: The Assassination Archives Research Center 918 F St. Rm. 510 NW, Washington, D.C. 20004; and the Committee on Political Assassinations, P.O. Box 722, Washington D.C. 20044-0772.
2. See HSCA Report, p. 196.
3. See HSCA Report, p. 196.
4. The House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA), Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations, U.S. House of Representatives (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979) pp. 199-200; hereafter referred to as HSCA Report. Here is the remainder of the section on James Wilcott:
He further testified that he was told that Oswald had been assigned a cryptonym and that Wilcott himself had unknowingly disbursed payments for Oswald's project. Although Wilcott was unable to identify the specific case officer who had initially informed him of Oswald's agency relationship, he named several employees of the post abroad with whom he believed he had subsequently discussed the allegations.
Wilcott advised the committee that after learning of the alleged Oswald connection to the CIA, he never rechecked official Agency disbursement records for evidence of the Oswald project. He explained that this was because at that time he viewed the information as mere shop talk and gave it little credence. Neither did he report the allegations to any formal investigative bodies, as he considered the information hearsay. Wilcott was unable to recall the agency cryptonym for the particular project in which Oswald had been involved, nor was he familiar with the substance of that project. In this regard, however, because project funds were disbursed on a code basis, as a disbursement officer he would not have been apprised of the substantive aspects of projects.
In an attempt to investigate Wilcott's allegations, the committee interviewed several present and former CIA employees selected on the basis of the position each had held during the years 1954-64. Among the persons interviewed were individuals whose responsibilities covered a broad spectrum of areas in the post abroad, including the chief and deputy chief of station, as well as officers in finance, registry, the Soviet Branch and counterintelligence.
None of these individuals interviewed had ever seen any documents or heard any information indicating that Oswald was an agent. This allegation was not known by any of them until it was published by critics of the Warren Commission in the late 1960's. Some of the individuals, including a chief of counterintelligence in the Soviet Branch, expressed the belief that it was possible that Oswald had been recruited by the Soviet KGB during his military tour of duty overseas, as the CIA had identified a KGB program aimed at recruiting U.S. military personnel during the period Oswald was stationed there. An intelligence analyst whom Wilcott had specifically named as having been involved in a conversation about the Oswald allegation told the committee that he was not in the post abroad at the time of the assassination. A review of this individual's office of personnel file confirmed that, in fact, he had been transferred from the post abroad to the United States in 1962.
The chief of the post abroad from 1961 to 1964 stated that had Oswald been used by the Agency he certainly would have learned about it. Similarly, almost all those persons interviewed who [p. 200] worked in the Soviet Branch of that station indicated they would have known if Oswald had, in fact, been recruited by the CIA when he was overseas. These persons expressed the opinion that, had Oswald been recruited without their knowledge, it would have been a rare exception contrary to the working policy and guidelines of the post abroad.
Based on all the evidence, the committee concluded that Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief.
5. HSCA Report, p. 197.
6. Even though the HSCA Report went along with the CIA's official story about Oswald, that view was not entirely shared by some HSCA researchers who were closely associated with this part of the investigation. Even a closer look at the Report leaves one with some ambiguity:
For example, personnel testified to the committee that a review of Agency files would not always indicate whether an individual was affiliated with the Agency in any capacity [p. 197].... Nor was there always an independent means of verifying that all materials requested from the Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any finding that is essentially negative in nature-such as that Lee Harvey Oswald was neither associated with the CIA in any way, nor ever in contact with that institution-should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of oversight [p. 197].... One officer acknowledged the remote possibility that an individual could have been run by someone as part of a "vest pocket" (private or personal) operation without other Agency officials knowing about it. But even this possibility, as it applies to Oswald, was negated by the statement of the deputy chief of the Soviet Russia clandestine activities section. He commented that in 1963 he was involved in a review of every clandestine operation ever run in the Soviet Union, and Oswald was not involved in any of these cases (p. 198, footnote 51.