Julius Caesar (9 page)

His province at once engaged his attention and he clearly showed which part of it was of most concern to him, for, not content with the twenty cohorts at his disposal (about 10,000 men), he at once set about enlisting a further ten. It was clear that he intended action against the mountain tribes, who were constantly harassing the peaceful inhabitants in the south. As he was to do many times afterward, he issued an ultimatum (which he knew would be ignored) telling them to leave their homes in the Herminius range and settle peacefully in the plain. Dio Cassius remarks that Caesar was perfectly well aware that they would refuse, but he now had his
casus belli;
the occasion for a war which he hoped would make him both rich and famous.

Compared with the campaigns which Pompey had been conducting in the East these military operations against mountain tribes were small indeed, but they nevertheless enabled Caesar and his soldiers to loot and despoil a number of cities—sometimes, so his critics maintained, ones which had offered no resistance or had previously submitted. This mattered little to Caesar and less to his troops, while as far as the distant senate in Rome was concerned he was taming and bringing within Roman control new areas of land and, therefore, new sources of wealth. He was careful also to see that the appropriate amount of money was sent back to Rome—and to the right people—so that any critics would be silenced. His dispatches (which we do not have) were almost certainly couched in the same exhilarating style as his famous later ones from Gaul. He had early discovered in himself a talent for soldiering, but now he showed that he was born to generalship. As an administrator he also displayed all his notable powers and he managed to secure for himself many grateful clients and followers among the peaceful inhabitants of Spain. His troops hailed him as
Imperator,
Victorious Commander, while by canceling a major part of outstanding debts he secured many supporters who would be useful in the future. But all the time he had his eye on Rome.

In the elections of 60 Caesar was entitled to stand for the consulship of 59. He was entitled to a triumph and, with this in mind, returned to Rome before the expiry of his office. However, all hinged on a legal technicality which forced him to choose between standing as a candidate for the consulship or being accorded a triumph. If the senate had been well-disposed toward him, and if Cato had not ensured that the law remained unchanged, he might have enjoyed both. As it was, and it shows as always Caesar’s choice of options when it came to military or political matters, he forwent the triumph and chose to stand for the consulship. In this he was wise, for many triumphs would fall his way in later years. It was a gamble, but at this moment he needed a consulship more than anything else. And Caesar was always a gambler.

Another candidate for the consulship was the same Marcus Calpurnius Bibulus who had been Caesar’s more-than-uneasy colleague as praetor and who took almost the same view of Caesar as did Cato. These two old aristocrats, as well as many others, regarded the profligate Caesar as a man who had used his birth—and the advantages which it gave him—as a means of attaining power by joining the Left. (Modern examples are not uncommon.) True conservatives viewed such men not only with suspicion but considerable dislike, which could easily turn to hatred.

Many in the senate believed Caesar might well become one of the next consuls, but whether his fellow consul would be Bibulus or a third candidate, one Lucius Lucceius (not even a member of the nobility), was in some doubt. Caesar, finding the idea of Lucceius as a colleague slightly less distasteful than his known enemy Bibulus, cultivated him, but the dominant junto in the senate, anxious that at least one of the future consuls should be acceptable to them, put their shoulders behind Bibulus and his campaign (and this meant money). Caesar now had even deeper grievances against the “old brigade”: they had managed to prevent him from securing a triumph and they were to go even farther. The rewards of a consulship were to be found in the year after it terminated, when the consuls were given the great provincial commands that secured wealth, prestige and often fame. The senators, recognizing the danger of Caesar and the ineffectiveness of Bibulus, gave them instead the insulting reward of something comparable to boundary and forestry commissions in areas belonging to the state. This not only deprived them of the expected profits of office but was an open humiliation. Bibulus might accept the position, being a wealthy conservative, but they had sadly misjudged their man if they thought that Caesar would take such an insult lying down.

The old caucus who had so offended Caesar had made an even bigger mistake (and one which shows only too clearly that the aristocratic so-called
Optimates
were quite unfit to rule an empire) by infuriating Pompey. They had long despised him for his comparatively humble origins and they now envied and feared him because he had made for himself a power base of immense proportions in the East. If Pompey had not been so unwise as to disband his army he might indeed have set himself up as a dictator, from which position he could have ensured that his soldiers received all that he had promised. But he had been foolish—or arrogant enough—to think he was a prince among men and above any of the senators. Now he was to be humiliated. The land-law which Pompey sought to enable his troops to be rewarded for their services was blocked. Pompey, who had ruled like an emperor in the East, who had held almost limitless power, organizing and apportioning territories as he thought fit, was to have his promises to his troops made null and void—as if he was just any other citizen who had promised more than he could perform. The senators who had feared his power when he had his army behind him had decided to remind him that, now that he was in Rome, and without his troops, he was no more than any other senator. For the moment the conservative
Optimates
seemed to have enjoyed great success by demeaning Caesar and injuring Pompey, but in the long run they had ensured their ultimate ruin. It was these actions of the senate that brought about the partnership of two powerful and embittered men, and the unlikely alliance of Caesar and Pompey dates from shortly after that time.

It seems that either before or after Caesar’s election as consul in the summer of 60 (and opinions differ among ancient authorities as well as subsequent historians) he and Pompey engaged in some kind of contract to support each other politically. Caesar promised that he would do all he could to ensure the distribution of land promised to Pompey’s troops. At a slightly later date, although all within the same year, the two men were joined in their agreement by yet a third—and this was Crassus. This was somewhat unexpected, for Crassus had made no secret of his dislike of Pompey. He feared and envied him for his victories, and he had clearly shown his feelings by opposing the land-bill. But Crassus had now also suffered at the hands of the senate (which seems to have been almost determined on its own overthrow). He had tried to introduce a measure which would mean that the tax-farmers would enjoy a certain financial rebate, his interest in this being solely that they were dependents of the knights. (Crassus’ policy was always to favor the knightly class since he was a business man as were many of them.) His opponents in the senate, the same type of men who had frustrated Caesar and Pompey, were equally willing to wound Crassus for his constant backing of opponents of the
Optimates.
The concessions that Crassus asked for were refused and yet another powerful man was left discountenanced and angry.

It was Caesar, the youngest, the least distinguished, and certainly by far the poorest of the three, who took the necessary steps to reconcile Crassus and Pompey. The two things Caesar did possess were political skill and sagacity. He saw that he needed both men at this stage in his career, for they represented in their different ways assets which he had not yet acquired. It was to his advantage, and theirs too, to bring them together into a united force.

There can have been no intention at this time of forming a triumvirate to dominate the Roman world, for an emissary of Caesar’s actually approached Cicero and invited him to join a partnership. This was almost certainly an idea of Caesar’s to disarm Cicero and have on their side—instead of against them—the clarity of his mind and the brilliance of his oratory. Cicero refused to join them, not perhaps so much out of ethical or republican scruples, but because he was even more jealous of Pompey than Crassus. This was largely because Pompey’s triumphs in the East had overshadowed Cicero’s year as consul, when he felt that he had been the man responsible for saving the Republic during the Catiline affair. It was a bad day for Rome when he declined the offer, for his influence and his respect for the law and for republican principles might have prevented the formation of what became known as the First Triumvirate. This was the agreement of Caesar, Crassus and Pompey to act in concert with one another and never oppose one another politically.

10

Caesar’s Consulship

FROM the moment that these three men had decided to pool their resources—military power and fame, monetary power, and political genius—the end of the republic was in sight. Cicero, who disliked or envied them almost equally, although reserving his deepest dislike and, indeed, fear for Caesar, recognized that such an autocracy could nullify the Senate’s power. Yet it cannot be overemphasized that Cicero’s dream republic had never existed in his own lifetime, if indeed ever. As a “new man,” one who was born neither noble nor rich, Cicero often seems like any middle-class man of great ability who has made his way to the top and is then captured by the glamour of his new associates—the old aristocrats who were born into positions of power as were their ancestors before them. On the one hand he saw the old order, men descended from the great days of the Republic, and on the other cynical self-seekers determined on personal power to the detriment of everything fine and noble. But, as Michael Grant has pointed out, things were not so simple:

The “free” republic that was now being superseded was not a democracy, and never had been. It had long been run by tough, unprogressive and dishonest cliques, whose incompetence to govern the large empire was now painfully clear. These cliques were now replaced by a board of three, who were exceptionally able men, and for the time being were united in their aims. In the end, they were destined to fail, because their unity could not be maintained. Yet their noble enemies would have failed as well—and for the same reason, because they would inevitably have become divided among themselves.

At the beginning of 59 Caesar and Bibulus assumed office, and it was not long before the antagonism between these two irreconcilable men became evident for all to see. At first, however, Caesar made it appear as if there had never been any differences of opinion between them and spoke blandly of the need to act only for the general good and in agreement with the senate. If, as one must presume, this was designed to reassure Bibulus and, on the surface at any rate, to make it look as if the two consuls were reconciled then he seems at first to have succeeded. Each consul was normally required to take precedence over the other for alternate months (since they were equal), and Caesar was meticulous in conforming to this ritual and to the formal technicalities that went with it. Similarly he pleased the senate by having an official record made of their daily transactions—something which had only been done before on special occasions. This naturally gratified their vanity and reassured Bibulus and the
Optimates
whom he represented that Caesar, now that he was consul, would conform. But the leopard does not change his spots and, as Appian remarks, “Caesar was very well versed in the art of hypocrisy.”

He needed to lull the suspicions of his opponents, for he knew that his first major action was certain to go completely against the grain of the old aristocrats. This was the land-bill for the resettlement of Pompey’s veterans, one of the things that he had promised his fellow triumvir, as well as the ratification of the settlements that Pompey had made in the East. A new agrarian law was badly needed, in any case, for great areas of Italy were uncultivated while a city like Rome was full of idle hands living, as it were, on the dole. A commission was to be put in charge of the distribution of the land and the cost would be defrayed by Pompey’s wealth from the East, as well as by the revenues from the new provinces that he had won. Realizing that such important an act as the redistribution of the state lands of Italy would cause a shudder to run through the ranks of the conservatives, Caesar wisely made a very necessary concession—that the rich southern lands of Campania should be excluded. Furthermore, not only would Pompey’s veterans be satisfied, but the poor from the city would also be entitled to land-grants. All in all, it was a judicious piece of legislation and Caesar was very careful to treat the senate with formal deference, inviting every senator to make criticisms of or suggestions for the draft, even to the extent of canceling anything that did not seem right. Most of the senators, who had been expecting Caesar to treat them in a high-handed, authoritarian way, were embarrassed by the scrupulosity with which the bill was presented.

They hated it of course, because it was contrary to their interests, but they had difficulty in finding arguments against something which was clearly to the benefit of the country (and all the time they must have been aware of the threat posed by Pompey’s disbanded soldiers). Cato had the courage of his convictions, however, and stood out against the whole bill, maintaining that people should be content with the constitution of the republic as it was. He attempted to talk out the bill, but Caesar, using his consular powers, had him placed under arrest. This high-handed action, though it was quite legitimate, caused those senators who would have liked to speak against the redistribution of land to walk out of the senate, one of them shouting at Caesar: “I would rather be in jail with Cato than here with you.” The consul realized that he had overstepped the mark and had Cato released; he did not want to create a martyr.