Julius Caesar (10 page)

The upshot was that—as there was no senatorial decree—Caesar took the whole matter to the popular assembly. The senators who opposed him had offered no constructive proposals on land reform, and therefore the people must decide. But he was clever enough to give the old guard one last chance to define their objections to the bill as it stood and invited Bibulus, as his fellow consul, to the popular assembly to say what he had against it, entreating him to give his objections to the bill, or to state any changes he would like made. Everything depended on Bibulus, he told the people, to which the unwise consul replied: “You are not going to get it—not even if you all want it!”

Caesar had trapped him into betraying the real position of the
Optimates
: total conservatism in their own interest, and the devil take the people! Having thus exposed his enemies in the senate, Caesar had yet a further trick up his sleeve. Both Crassus and Pompey addressed the popular assembly in the Forum and declared their complete assent to the land-bill as it stood. This was the moment of truth—especially for the senators. They were faced by an alliance of the three most powerful men in Rome. The point was emphasized when Caesar asked for Pompey’s support against those who opposed the bill, and the latter replied: “If anyone dares to draw a sword, I shall take up my shield as well.” (He emphasized that he meant what he said by summoning his veterans to Rome.) The velvet glove which Caesar had earlier displayed had been discarded. When it was suggested to Bibulus by the other
Optimates
that he should exercise his veto against his consular colleague he and Cato were attacked outside the temple of Castor by a crowd of people with armed men among them and forced to retreat to the safety of their homes. It was this open violence toward the senate which made it clear to all that the old days were indeed over. The rule of the three men—the First Triumvirate—had been established.

After this display of violence, Caesar put the bill to the people and it was immediately carried. A special clause laid down that within a given period all the senators had to take an oath to abide by it—thus preventing any further delaying tactics. All opposition was silenced and, although Cato and one or two others were still prepared to protest, it was pointed out to them by their friends and relatives that it would be not only political, but actual suicide to do so. Cicero indeed, who had prudently withdrawn to the country during this time of upheaval, wrote to Cato that “it would be foolish and indeed mad, to refuse to accept the accomplished fact.”

The hatred against Caesar was now manifest among all his opponents, for they had no doubt that it was his hand that lay behind not only the agrarian bill but also the violence with which leading members of the senate had been openly threatened. From this moment date nearly all the scurrilous attacks upon his private life and—if one doubts that he ever passed through a homosexual phase in his youth—it is clear that this was the worst that his enemies could impute against him. Bibulus, who now hated Caesar as much as anyone, after only four months of his term of office, now withdrew into his house for the rest of his consulship and became responsible for the widely-circulated and bitter jibe: “Pompey is king of Rome, and Caesar is his queen.”

It mattered little what was said. The fact remained that the senate had been powerless in the face of the triumvirate. Caesar’s dextrous handling of the situation—however sordid—was politically brilliant. He had right on his side, for the agrarian laws had long needed changing, and he had the people’s support for his actions. Pompey was satisfied, as were his veterans, and Pompey’s disposition of affairs in the East was now also ratified.

It remained to secure the concessions for the tax-farmers that Crassus had wanted and—despite fierce opposition from Cato—this was again achieved by taking the matter to the people. In the first six months of his consulship Caesar had succeeded in welding the triumvirate into an unbreakable chain against which the senate was powerless. He had also very naturally promoted his own interests, for he had endeared himself to the soldiers by his agrarian bill and, by his concessions to the tax-farmers, secured the approval of the knightly order (as well as almost certainly making money for himself). He now proceeded to extend the alliance by marrying Calpurnia, the daughter of a certain Piso. He was a friend of Clodius, had been involved in the Catiline conspiracy, and has been described as “an unprincipled debauchee and a cruel and corrupt magistrate.” Certainly he had considerable wealth and was to amass even more during a governship of Macedonia in which he plundered the province even beyond the limits that were normally considered tolerable in Rome.

Calpurnia was to be Caesar’s last wife and, although he continued as openly unfaithful to her as to his previous wives, she seems to have genuinely cared for him: he remained irresistible to women. At almost the same time another marriage also took place—one that again was of the greatest advantage to Caesar. The forty-seven-year-old Pompey married Caesar’s seventeen-year-old daughter, Julia, thus binding these two members of the triumvirate even closer together. Despite the considerable age difference, this too seems to have been a happy marriage. Indeed from now on the influence of Crassus, although only very slowly, seems to decline. Pompey had the money and power, Caesar’s finances had improved through his own manipulations and by marriage, while Crassus could in no way match Caesar in political ability.

Further violence ensued when the agrarian law was extended to include Campania, but yet again there was little or nothing that those opposed to the triumvirate could do since Caesar had the backing of the people while the other consul, Bibulus, had more or less abandoned his duties. Meanwhile the triumvirs had their eyes on Egypt, particularly Caesar because of his previous interest and Pompey because he regarded the whole East as very much his concern. Earlier, the annexation of the kingdom had been urged on the grounds of the reported will of the late Ptolemy. The reigning king, Ptolemy Auletes, father of the famous Cleopatra, was eager enough to retain control of his wealthy kingdom but he found that the Romans demanded an enormous price for their support. Yet he needed official recognition and support from Rome to shore up his very shaky hold upon the throne. Caesar, as consul, was the man to secure this, and he spoke on the King’s behalf before both senate and people urging an official confirmation of the royal title as well as an alliance of the republic with Egypt. The confirmation of Ptolemy’s title meant little to the Romans, but all could see that to guarantee the King’s position by an alliance was halfway to laying their hands on his country. The innocent (and one sometimes wonders how many there can have been in that city) might even see Caesar and Pompey as benefactors of Rome—as indeed they were. But they had not done it for nothing, and the sum they received from the King in return for their help was so vast that even the wealthy Ptolemy had to borrow from Roman financiers to meet it. Caesar was now certainly tasting the fruits of office, but still he needed to look ahead and make plans for the proconsulship that would follow next year.

The only way to effect a change from the ignominious appointments was to secure one of the tribunes as an ally (well-compensated, of course) to introduce a motion before the people’s assembly appointing Caesar to a real command for the following year in a province that was worthy of his attention. He found his man in a certain Publius Vatinius, a tribune who was prepared to take up the matter without consulting the senate. Now Caesar knew well that, with the East settled by Pompey, the major areas of the Roman world where there was plenty of money to be made, as well as fame and reputation, were to the north and west. The areas in which he was interested, he indicated to Vatinius, were Cisalpine Gaul (northern Italy) and Illyricum (the Adriatic coast of what is now Yugoslavia). The reasons for his choice of Cisalpine Gaul were relatively simple. He had long shown an interest in its people and had tried to secure Roman citizenship for them, while the region was rich and its large population would make a good recruiting ground. Caesar would need troops, for in troops lay power. Illyricum, on the other hand, was Romanized only along the coast and Caesar no doubt had plans for campaigns which would extend far inland: an opportunity to gain fame, extend the empire, and loot without fear of consequences. Vatinius secured both of these provinces for him, and something more. The governorship of the two areas was to be extended from the usual one or two years to five, starting from the expiry of his consulship on 1 January 58.

11

Proconsul

WHILE “Pompey was king, and Caesar was queen,” his fellow consul Bibulus had not entirely given up the battle. True, he had withdrawn to his: house, but from here he waged a propaganda war against Caesar that attracted the attention of Rome. Even the ordinary people of the city must have felt that there was something very curious about a year in which there appeared to be only one consul: “The event occurred, as I recall, when
Caesar
governed Rome…”

And as early as this in Caesar’s career Bibulus was able to circulate via gossip and graffiti the telling words: “Caesar was once in love with a king, but now he is in love with kingship.” There can be little doubt that in the latter part of the consulship this constant slanderous activity managed to damage him, even in the eyes of some of those who had been his supporters. Moreover, once a politician is in power he becomes a different man from the one who has previously held out promises. Caesar on his own had not only possessed grace and charm and oratorical skills, but had displayed all the popular traits of caring for the masses—and indeed doing something for them. He had shown this already in his consulship, but the people in general did not take to his associates: Crassus the millionaire without the human touch, and Pompey, respected as a soldier yet somehow unable to show much warmth or communicate with his fellows. Cicero, who had returned to Rome now that the most dangerous troubles seemed to be over, was happy to be able to report to his friend Atticus that Caesar had been ill-received at a new play, and that among the lines which had caused the audience to applaud was one where the principal actor turned toward Caesar’s seat and, pointing, said: “It is our misery which has made you so great…”

It was a year of great bitterness on account of numerous actions initiated by Caesar in the senate, but in which nevertheless he overcame his opponents. Even Pompey and Crassus must occasionally have felt a twinge of concern at the superlative ease with which their fellow triumvir rode the horse of power. Caesar, with his almost feline prescience, must have sensed this—and have known that, as the year drew to an end, it was fortunate that he had to go to his commands where he would be far from Rome, yet able to lay his hands on the source of power as Pompey had done in his military career in the East. At the instigation of Vatinius he had been voted three legions for the task and, with the view to campaigning in Illyricum, he stationed them at Aquileia, one of the strongest of all Roman fortresses, standing at the head of the Adriatic.

As the year of Caesar’s consulship drew to an end it was seen to have been, for those times, relatively moderate. Even those who had anticipated anarchy, revolution and terror, had to acknowledge that such had not been the case, although it was clear that the senate was cowed by the triumvirate. Cicero, who had gloomily foreseen the establishment of a dictatorship, was proved incorrect, while the rich found that their wealth had remained relatively unassailed. The people, on the other hand, had benefited comparatively little from the new agrarian law, except some of the poor and, of course, Pompey’s soldiers. On the one side there was probably a feeling of some relief, and on the other some disappointment, but it would take a very long time to improve the condition of the poor and Caesar seems to some extent to have adopted the motto that was to be dear to his successor Octavius/Augustus: “Hasten slowly.” Now that he had held the consulship and could, as it were, proceed no farther in that direction of political power, he looked to the coming years to give him an unassailable power-base. Meanwhile Pompey and Crassus would remain in Rome to uphold the triumvirate. Then, almost as Caesar was about to leave for his province in the north and east, the appointee to the other Gallic province, Narbonese or Transalpine Gaul, suddenly died.

Named after its capital Narbo (Narbonne) this area of southern France had been Romanized for at least fifty years. The great port of Massilia (Marseilles), which had been an early Greek foundation, had been faithful to Rome right through the Hannibalic war and had disseminated Greco-Roman trade and culture for over a century. The Romans had taken it under their protection and using it as a base had gradually infiltrated most of the area of the Rhone valley. Beyond it lay the lowering North: the lands of the untamed Gauls who threatened the Roman province, and beyond that the savage and almost unknown tribes of the Belgians and the Germans. Here was an area quite unlike the civilized regions of the East which Pompey had conquered, and it was here, Caesar felt, that immense gains might be won. (He had to counterbalance his fellow triumvir’s triumphs with something distinctive, something quite new.) Illyricum could wait, while Cisalpine Gaul was quiet enough, and more than useful for manpower in the legions. But north of Narbonese Gaul lay an area of unknown wealth which could provide a singular addition to the empire. It had never figured in history and had been seen by relatively few Romans—merchants and adventurous traders for the most part.

It is evidence of Pompey’s political naivety that, when his fellow triumvir suggested adding Narbonese Gaul to his other proconsular attachments, Pompey was prepared to stand up in the senate and propose that the responsibility for Transalpine Gaul should be added to Caesar’s commands. The senators—even those among them who favored the popular party—were amazed at the idea that this clearly dangerous man should be given even more power, but they were too cowed by the triumvirate to do anything save acquiesce. Only Cato, with his usual intransigence (and his true love of republican principles), was man enough to speak out against the proposal, denouncing Caesar for trading his daughter for the support of Pompey and a further province. He spoke with the voice of an Old Rome that had died with the advent of Empire.