Hitler and the Forgotten Nazis (40 page)

Few writers now believe that either Klausner or Seyss-Inquart was the real leader of the Austrian Nazis during the last weeks of the First Republic. Schuschnigg, in his most recent memoirs, sees Seyss-Inquart as “nothing but a figurehead ” whereas Klausner “had no say-so
.”
³⁸
Schuschnigg, Persche, and the Austrian historian Ludwig Jedlicka all consider Wilhelm Keppler, supported by his adjutant, Edmund Veesenmayer, a fellow German, to have been the chief manipulators
.
³⁷
Keppler’s task was to “build golden bridges for Schuschnigg,” that is, to convince the chancellor of the benefits of an Anschluss
.
³⁸
To make the job easier, Keppler told a meeting of Austrian Nazi

leaders on 4 March that an acceleration of party activities was not in the interests of Germany
.
³⁹
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The truth is, however, that Keppler was hardly more effective than Klausner or Seyss-Inquart in controlling the Nazi radicals. It was Friedrich Rainer and Odilo Globocnik who, in Schuschnigg’s words, “set about deliberately radicalizing the reorganized party over the head of Seyss-Inquart [and also Keppler]” Apparently no longer needing front men like Seyss, the program of the two young Carinthians in fact now scarcely differed from Leopold’s: internal Austrian politics should be sharpened until there was a danger of civil war. At that point the Reich would be forced to intervene, but (presumably) would not actually invade Austrian territory
.
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The Dam Bursts: Austrian Nazi Activities, 20 February-8 March

The dam holding back the Nazi flood developed its first leak in Styria, the longtime stronghold (
Hochburg
) of the party. Despite internal dissension and general dissatisfaction with their Gauleitung, the Styrian Nazis were brimming with confidence by the beginning of 1938. Party members were so well organized and numerous that Nazis in other states were actually jealous and eager to “catch up
”
⁴¹
By the party’s own (no doubt exaggerated) estimate, 80 percent of the capital city of Graz was sympathetic to the movement, while 90 percent of the municipal officials supported the party
.
⁴²
Even the commanding general of the Austrian army garrison in Graz estimated that at least 70 percent of the civil servants in the city were National Socialists
.
⁴³
Students at the University of Graz were so thoroughly Nazified that the half of the faculty who were anti-Nazi did not dare to criticize Hitler, Huge Nazi demonstrations on 19 February forced the temporary closing of both the university and the nearby technical institute.

Led by Armin Dadieu, a thirty-seven-year-old professor of physical chemistry, head of the Styrian section of the People’s Political Office (VPR), and friend of Hermann Goring’s brother-in-law, Franz Hueber, the Nazi party became increasingly aggressive during the last week in February and the first week of March. Especially helpful to the Nazi cause in Styria was the National Socialist Soldiers’ Ring, a secret organization within the army and police, which in Graz amounted to about one-fourth of the garrison and the police
.
⁴⁴
Also aiding the Nazi cause were the freshly amnestied Nazis (including the former governor of Styria and July Putsch conspirator, Anton Rintelen).

This group, anxious to make up for lost time, was especially radical. The Styrians were determined to prevent any compromise solution advocated by the Nazi moderates. Like Leopold before them, and in clear violation of the Berchtesgaden Agreement, they were determined to provoke an armed uprising in which the government would be obliged to shoot Nazis, thus at last compelling Germany to intervene
.
⁴⁵

The turning point for the Nazis of Styria and to a lesser extent the rest of Austria was Hitler’s Reichstag speech of 20 February. In this, the first speech by Hitler ever broadcast in its entirety over the Austrian radio, Hitler mentioned that Germany could not ignore the fate of the “ten million Germans outside the Reich. . . . The constitutional separation of the Austrians and Sudeten Germans from the Reich [could] not lead to a complete denial of self-determination which had been formally guaranteed in President Wilson’s Fourteen Points . . . Just as England [represented] its interests around the whole world so [would] the present-day Germany know how to take care of its much more limited interests.”
⁴
* In marked contrast to earlier addresses by Hitler, not a word was said about Austrian independence.

Hitler’s scarcely veiled threat depressed supporters of the Fatherland Front and emboldened Nazi sympathizers in Graz to display the forbidden swastika flag. Schuschnigg’s reply, delivered to the Austrian Parliament four days later, contained the assertion that Austria would go “up to here but no further” in fulfilling the Berchtesgaden Protocol. This defiance temporarily raised the morale of government loyalists, but only angered and further radicalized the Nazis
.
⁴⁷

Sensing an imminent Anschluss, and therefore no longer fearing imprisonment, the
20,000
Nazis in Graz, listening to Schuschnigg’s speech over loudspeakers in the city’s main square, reacted by demanding that the pro-Nazi mayor, Hans Schmidt, hoist the swastika flag over the city hall and switch off the loudspeakers. The demands were promptly fulfilled. The next day every student at the University of Graz was wearing a swastika armband; people in public places not displaying the insignia were beaten up. In Graz, as elsewhere in Austria, the illegal greeting “Heil Hitler” was openly used and old Nazi marching songs were sung in the streets. One American journalist in the Styrian capital was shocked to see uniformed Nazis calmly cleaning a disassembled machine gun in a tavern.

Seyss-Inquart and Lukesch now joined Klausner and Keppler in trying to halt the runaway Styrian Nazi steamroller. But when Seyss-Inquart spoke in Graz on 1 March, his appearance merely touched off a Nazi demonstration of strength. Twenty thousand Nazis from all over Styria, including uniformed SA and SS men, greeted Seyss, who felt compelled to respond with the Nazi

salute. After his return to Vienna he confided to his friend Guido Zematto that he doubted whether his program could be enacted against the will of the party
.
⁴⁸

Johann Lukesch was equally helpless to stem the Nazi-tide. In order to accede to the wishes of Keppler and Seyss-Inquart for a nonviolent evolutionary Gleichschaltung, Lukesch was even willing to disband the SA for as long as two years. When he issued an order to this effect in late February, the response was exactly the opposite of what he had wanted: the tempo of illegal SA activity increased, especially in Styria. After one meeting between the Landesleitung and SA brigade staff leaders in Vienna, the Styrian representatives taunted: “The Landesleitung can lick our asses, we are going back to'~ our men and march
!”
⁴⁹
Lukesch made several trips to Styria in late February and early March to try to contain the radicals; but each time he only returned to Vienna inspired by the Styrians’ enthusiasm. He described to Persche the many “Heil Hitlers” he had heard and swastika-bedecked vehicles he had seen. Although he had first believed in the program of Keppler, Seyss-Inquart, and Klausner, Lukesch finally concluded that their policy was hopeless; thereafter he allowed himself to be driven along by the course of events
.
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Schuschnigg’s Desperate Gamble

As early as the eighth of March, events in Styria, and only to a lesser extent in the rest of Austria, were threatening to outstrip the government’s ability to control. Wilhelm Keppler, who made a tour of inspection throughout Austria between the third and sixth of March, noted in a memorandum that

there is satisfaction [among Nazis] at the fact that the road for further progress is now clearly outlined. The various parades and demonstrations have taken place under surprisingly good discipline, and the joining of the Fatherland Front is understood. The expression “The New Fatherland Front” was coined as a contrast with the old Front. National Socialist demonstrations everywhere had five to ten times as many participants as the parades of the old system. . . .

The
Volkspolitiscke Referat,
and the racial German labor union connected with it, will now be extended down to the single local groups, and the direct leaders of the Party are now to be firmly placed in it. The

Hitlerjugend
has already to a great extent been incorporated in the Youth Organization [Jungvolk] of the Fatherland Front and in many parts of the country already controls it
.
⁵¹

The Styrian Nazis had succeeded in turning their province into a virtual Nazi republic from the Semmering Pass to the Yugoslav border. In Graz, which Hitler a few weeks later would call “the city of the people’s revolution”
(Stadt der Volkserhebung),
Nazi leaders negotiated with representatives of the federal government on
8
March over the participation of Nazis in the provincial cabinet. When the federal authorities refused a demand for three Nazi seats, thousands of Nazi demonstrators surrounded the building in which the talks were being held and could be cleared away only through the combined efforts of policemen and soldiers. Although this show of strength had succeeded in its immediate aim, it seemed to be only a question of time until the Schuschnigg regime lost control of the situation and collapsed. It was on account of this danger and the need to head off more Nazi demands that the chancellor made one last gamble
.
⁵²

Since the outlawing of their party in 1933, the Austrian Nazis had been demanding a plebiscite on the Anschluss question, claiming that in any fair vote they would get about 80 percent of the ballots
.
⁵³
As long as the position of the Austrian government was strong, it had little to gain and much to lose by any such poll. The Tyroleans and Salzburgers had voted overwhelmingly in favor of an Anschluss in 1919 and the Saarlanders had favored a return to the Reich by a ratio of nine to one in a plebiscite held in 1935.

Even if the Nazis had gained no more than the 41 percent they had garnered in the Innsbruck election of April 1933, the Austrian government would have been seriously embarrassed. By making their demands, the Nazis could pose as the champions of freedom and self-determination, while, by refusing, the government would look dictatorial and insecure. Moreover, if there should be a vote purely on the Anschluss issue, the Nazis could expect to gain the votes of many non-Nazis who simply wanted an end to their country’s apparently hopeless economic situation. American press representatives in Vienna estimated that the National Socialists would win 55 to 60 percent of the vote on the question of Anschluss alone
.*
⁴

These considerations made it obvious why neither Dollfuss nor Schuschnigg had been willing to take such a high risk. But by March 1938 the situation had altered radically from what it had been only a few weeks before. To do nothing entailed the probability of at least a Gleichschaltung in the near future. On the other hand, a progovemment vote would seriously embarrass the Nazis and make any aggressive move by either the Austrian or

German Nazis appear to be a clear violation of their own principle of self-determination.

But as we have seen, to hold the plebiscite on the straightforward issue of a union with Germany would be very much to the Nazis’ advantage: Therefore the question put to the voters was whether they approved of the government’s all-inclusive slogan, “for a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria; for freedom and work, and for the equality of all who declare for race and fatherland
.”
⁵⁵
Voting against such a question would be like an American rejecting the Stars and Stripes, apple pie, and motherhood. Even the Nazis would be attracted by the words
German, social, work,
and
race.
And if the vote should be positive, as expected, the words
free, independent
,
Christian
,
Austria,
and
Fatherland
could be interpreted to mean that the Austrian people had rejected the union with Germany.

Only the Legitimists, Jews, and Communists were ignored by the slogan. But the first two groups could be counted on to vote yes in any event, and the Communists were too few to matter. By choosing the positive approach of asking for approval of the regime rather than approval for an Anschluss, Schuschnigg expected to win 65 to 70 percent of the vote
.
⁵⁶

In order to make a positive outcome even more likely the voting was to be held on 13 March, only four days after Schuschnigg announced the forthcoming plebiscite. Thus, the startled Nazis would have little or no opportunity to organize a response to the government’s propaganda. The voting conditions, as they were originally announced on
10
March, were also blatantly unfair and undemocratic. The minimum voting age had earlier been set at twenty-four to exclude a large number of Nazi youths. Only yes ballots with patriotic red-white-red stripes on both sides were to be issued; those wishing to vote no had to bring their own paper (thus revealing their voting preference). “Good Austrians” were to be allowed to show their yes ballots, thereby making a truly secret vote impossible
.
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Registration procedures were also highly irregular and would not have prevented multiple voting.