Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program (37 page)

2/5 Scale Model Tom Stafford and Alexei Yeliseyev

We left Moscow on December 7, 1971, thirty years after Pearl Harbor and on Japan airlines. There was a stop in London that was a very different scene from Moscow. There was a bustle in London and the blare of a vibrant city of the West. It was a celebration of colors and the department store windows featured the goods of the world in this most crossroads of a city. Even the firm stride of the walkers seemed to be full of purpose. The differences seemed sharply drawn.

We also visited the Farnborough Establishment where Dr. Gilruth was welcomed as an old and trusted friend. He had worked with the Royal Aircraft Establishment before, during and after the war. It was like an NACA center where I first started. I did not know when they last saw Dr. Gilruth but they seemed genuinely proud of their colleague in leading such a historic achievement during the ‘60s. It was heartwarming and a reminder of what binds our two countries. This was really a grand and moving experience for this thirty-five-year-old American to witness.

In the October 1970 meeting, Feoktistov suggested the three working groups as a way to address the technical problems and we agreed to it. We had to augment the scheme within one year but it was a good way to start. After agreement to consider a test mission, our forward plan had to grow – one for the longer term and the second one for the immediate future with current spacecraft. This was our plan for the September 1971 meeting. Working Group 1 (WG1) was to address the location of docking assemblies, atmospheric parameters, airlock, location of rendezvous aids, mission planning, flight operations. Initially, I was the chairman of WG1 and Bobkov was the chairman for the other side. He served as a Flight Director in the Soviet MCC. We also had Clarke Covington as follow on to his study contract work and Ed Lineberry who was our in-house wizard on the subject of rendezvous. We were also assisted by two life support experts: Ed Smylie of the MSC crew system division and Ilya Lavrov for the Soviet side.

Working Group 2 was to address requirements for lights, radios, guidance systems and spacecraft attitude control. The chairmen for WG 2 were Don Cheatham for us and Victor Legostayev for the Soviet side. WG3 was chaired by Caldwell Johnson and Vladimir Syromyatnikov. Their task was to agree on the basic functions of a universal docking system of the androgynous type, a move away from the probe and drogue devices we both used. The probe and drogue system did not allow a docking between any two spacecraft unless they were specially equipped with a complementary probes and drogues. (Caldwell loved the term “androgynous” and used it on every opportunity to explain the concept. He always did it with his sly grin.) We wanted to arrive at one universal configuration for a docking system so that any docking system could dock with another similar system. WG3 would also consult with WG1 on hatches, docking seals electrical connections. They would also consult with WG2 on the closing velocity and angle conditions for capture.

Comm Lab Testing (WG4) From Right: Rh Dietz and Boris Nikitin

In the June ‘71 meeting, Professor Bushuyev and I were appointed as Technical Directors. Since the number “one” was already assigned to a working group, we designated our group as WG0. There were lots of snickers about that number. The brief summary of the agenda above captures the issues that were on the front end of our work. Some of our preliminary ideas were presented in the technical proposal for the project. The proposal was sent early to the Soviets before the meeting so they had a chance to see our overall view of what the test mission might look like. This still allowed for significant changes if we found them useful during our discussions.

Working Group 5

Between the end of 1971 and before the June 1972 meeting, there were two more working group changes. We split the work of WG2 into two working groups. The designated WG2 would continue the work on the guidance equipment, GNC for all phases, closing velocities for the docking system and other related items. A new group WG4 was established for radios, communications, TV and related subjects. The chairmen were RH Dietz for NASA and Boris V. Nikitin on the Soviet side. It was also necessary to form another group, WG5, which was created to address all the subjects of life support, cabin atmospheres, airlock, flammability and other related life support subjects. The chairmen were Ed Smylie for us and Ilya Lavrov for the Soviets.

This final configuration of working groups through number five and, as of the first part of 1972, was the arrangement that continued for the rest of the project. Some chairmen were changed over time on both sides and for reasons internal to each side. As of the close of 1971, the major open issues or choices were:

1. WG0 – the management plan which addressed the methods and frequency of communications, written, oral and telex. It also addressed the logistics of the meetings and document support in both languages. We also made arrangements to accommodate management overview of the project by more senior levels in NASA and in the Academy of Sciences. The need for accurate and timely exchange of information and documents was a continuing challenge.
   

2. WG1 – the rendezvous mission sequence, rules and procedures, training and simulations (the sequence of launches was still unsettled and needed to be resolved).
   

3. WG2 – the use of the GNC systems, and all the provisions for locating them in the spacecraft.
   

4. WG3 – a significant new docking system design that moves beyond probes and drogues (not universal) and is more of an androgynous system, structural rings, guides, seals, latches and hatches.
   

5. WG4 – use of existing radios and communication equipment, exchange of hardware, any new equipment required.
   

6. WG5 – use of an airlock, design functions, reduction of the complexity of flight crew transfers because of the different atmospheres and flammability.
   

When the cabin pressure difference exceeds a certain level, Soyuz near fifteen pounds per square inch and Apollo near five pounds per square inch, crew transfer when moving from the higher pressure of Soyuz to the lower pressure in Apollo requires a period of special precautions. To avoid the bends, pre-breathing pure oxygen purges the blood stream of nitrogen bubbles. In the case of scuba divers, slowing the rate of ascent – even holding at certain depths – serves as the mechanism for avoiding the risk of bends. Pre-breathing oxygen gets complicated in equipment, procedures, time and it introduces some constraints. So, we wanted to avoid it. Based on their experience and abilities, Ed Smylie and Ilya Lavrov were perfectly matched for this task. Lavrov did not stay with the WG very long, but his initiative on his side provided the solution in 1972. From then on, Lavrov had made his contribution, moved on and Dolgopolov was named the chairman.

We always had difficulty fathoming their organization and methods. Partially this was because, by contrast, our organization had worked for a long time in the Apollo mode and we were comfortable with it. I know it had some kinks during its early time. But by my time, all of the resources at MSC, the other NASA Centers and at our contractor plants were operating at a very high level of cooperation and performance. I was lucky to be in such a focused and well-oiled system. By contrast, we could hardly ever determine where individual Soviet participants worked. It seemed that they were all in different bureaus or institutes throughout Moscow. It also seemed like they did not see each other except at our meetings. MSC was all on one campus. Of course, the rest of the needed U.S. infrastructure (other Centers, contractors) was scattered across the country and we learned how to work that with travel and mostly telecons.

Also, it was clear they were all part of a government system. Therefore, all parties were more or less equal with no hard authority over other units. It was more of a “we need this, will you do it for us.” Bureaucracies have every incentive to say no to peer bureaucracies. Or they try to extract some kind of compensation for compliance. At one time, later in ASTP, when comments were becoming more frank, the Professor was explaining his difficulties with one of our requests. He observed that when I wanted something, I simply called the contractor (or a government employee) and made my request. They were most impressed with the Rockwell response and he assumed that I controlled their profit in some way. He wished that his country had some equivalent system of incentives.

After returning to Houston in December, I prepared a very top-level outline of what had to be done for long term compatibility and the Apollo/Soyuz mission for the next two, three, four and six months. This was useful but I did not anticipate a higher-level event that would cause some new and accelerated milestones to be necessary. In the meantime, OMSF at NASA HQ worked on the assignments of CSM vehicles to ASTP and Skylab rescue and what to do with CSM 115 and 115A which both had the J mission SIM bay provisions.

Helping to clarify, NASA also ruled out a Soyuz to Skylab option, because Skylab had not flown yet but did fly in less than eighteen months. Looking forward, it would have been very difficult to accommodate a Soyuz visit to Skylab because it flew in the second half of 1973. That would have been a very tight schedule and, when it actually launched, the NASA Skylab program was severely tested when the first launch of the Skylab vehicle itself resulted in tearing away one of two sides of the solar panels. This left the Skylab damaged and underpowered and with a loss of its thermal protection so that inside it was overheating. This condition would have resulted in a very poor condition for most of its six months of flying. If we tried to schedule a Soyuz visit, it would have been a nightmare and probably would have been cancelled in the end.

The other issue was the procurement process to buy the new hardware, primarily the docking module. The options, of course, were sole source to the existing CSM contractor, Rockwell, or a competitive procurement. Wrapped around this question was another possibly complexifying (my meaning is “to make a situation or condition more complicated than it needs to be for no good reason”) decision as to which Center (MSC or MSFC) would oversee the docking module project. This particular option of dividing up a relatively simple job with new people at the MSFC and their fabrication contractor is typical of an agency with too many people for its mission. And the prospect of another group of people intimately involved in all the preparations and negotiations sounded like a recipe for unnecessary complexity.

Dale Meyers, the head of OMSF at headquarters, made several decisions in February ‘72. He capped the cost of the near term test project at two hundred fifty million dollars and he ruled out the use of 115 or 115A CSMs. He approved the plan of using CSM111 for ASTP and CSM119 as a backup after it is released from Skylab as a rescue ship. Meyers also capped the funding for the experiments, which would be flown on either the CSM, or the DM. He also decided that MSC would manage the development of any new hardware (DM, DS, et cetera). The other major management change was the appointment of Chris Kraft as the new Center Director, replacing Dr. Gilruth. Dr. Gilruth would take an advisory position for NASA. This had been planned since Chris Kraft moved in as the deputy to Dr. Gilruth after Apollo XII. Sig Sjoberg who was Chris’ long time deputy in flight operations, became the chief of that (my) Directorate and was in place for Apollo XIII. All in all, this was a good month for Dale Myers and us.