Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program (38 page)

Our first teleconference occurred on March second, resulting from a January twenty-seventh letter to my counterpart, Professor Bushuyev. Note that that is more than a full month between “we need to do this” and doing it. I was in Washington and Caldwell Johnson spoke for us. The subjects were the agenda for the March meeting of WG3 in Houston and the WG2 meeting in Moscow in June. There were delays hooking up the telephone, about forty minutes, and the Soviets were using two phone handsets to pass between them. We had a conference hookup with voice available over speakers to the room. This whole telecom process was long used in our programs and we knew it could be made to work. The Soviets were not used to it and apparently did not use this as a communication method in their internal procedure for doing business. We were very surprised at that. But we were determined to make it work: we did not see any alternative. On the substance of the meeting, Syromyatnikov and Legostayev were constructive and helpful in gaining sufficient understanding for the next step.

Vladimir Syromyatnikov arrived with three other specialists on March twenty-seventh and quickly got down to the details, which was the MO we came to expect from him every time. Bill Creasy was our action leader to drive the work to resolution. They produced minutes and four engineering drawings. Both sides worked together on the same drawing board to analyze and finalize agreements. Their drawings endured as a faithful record of their progress with only minor changes over the next few years. They also provided a technical basis for entering into a contract for the new hardware.

Early in 1972, NASA HQ proposed putting the Apollo/Salyut mission on the agenda of the May summit between President Nixon and Premier Kosygin. That possibility was not communicated to us until the White House approved and set a deadline for a NASA recommendation by April fifteenth. When we were informed of this development by HQ, this deadline was just about a month away. We had a lot to learn about Salyut, compared to Soyuz. And it recently took little over one month to request and conduct a telecon with our partners. That would not cut it.

In response, I outlined the three documents needed to capture the necessary joint agreements in order to be able to make a firm recommendation to the White House. They were: a project technical proposal, an organization plan and a project schedule. They were ready for transmittal by the end of March. Much of this was already discussed, especially the need for rapid and effective communications. But we felt that the agreements on how to manage the effort needed clarification and firm commitments. The very recent telecon experience was a real measure of the challenge.

This would take another face-to-face meeting. Dr. Fletcher and George Low decided to avoid any publicity so as not to create any political pressure on the subject of a test flight before the Summit. As a result, I went on a regular working trip to Washington and Low had our tickets (Low, Frutkin and Lunney) for an Easter Sunday departure to Moscow. This whole effort to keep this activity a secret exposed to us how open our everyday efforts really were.

We learned that Academician Keldysh had been hospitalized and Vladimir Kotelnikov was now acting as the Academy President. He would meet with us on Tuesday afternoon. The ambassador invited George to a lunch later in the week. But the ambassador’s son Robert Kaiser was a Washington Post reporter and in town (i.e. Moscow). More concern for a leak. But the lunch went off without causing a problem to our clandestine purpose. We met with Kotelnikov, Petrov, Vereshchetin, Bushuyev and Rumyantsev for two hours on Tuesday and then with Petrov until well into the evening. In opening remarks, George Low said that the joint mission, in his judgment, was technically feasible but NASA was not sure about the management terms that were not yet agreed upon and in place. This was the issue for NASA.

To confirm George’s point and almost on cue to demonstrate that we were not yet together, Kotelnikov told us that they had reevaluated the technical proposal and it would NOT be feasible (technically or economically) to use the Salyut. They proposed to use the Soyuz and would conform to all the present requirements. It was obvious that a discussion as to why Salyut could not be used was academic at this point. I wondered what their plan was to reveal this change to us before we initiated this unscheduled meeting. My reaction to the change was to consider whether the use of Soyuz would compromise our purpose for the test mission. Our thinking about a test project had started there, with Soyuz. Turning it over, it did not appear that we would be compromising anything. In fact, it might be more assured because they had much more experience with the Soyuz.

We would still have a live demonstration that we could test and verify our ideas for the joint compatibility of rendezvous and docking techniques. We would also demonstrate that we could indeed work together to achieve a substantive mission. We would also have the same astronaut/cosmonaut interaction for all the world to see. We continued to think about the implications and the conclusion remained positive without any real downside emerging. When George asked me for a formal response, my position was that the change was acceptable and we should proceed.

The next step was to review, explain and reach agreement on the document describing the organization and management plan. As I briefed the document, our discussion degenerated into picky word-smithing of each paragraph. It was apparent that this was not going to work. George Low took a time-out for our side to discuss how to go forward. When we resumed, George again took this opportunity to emphasize that we needed documented agreement on how to manage this project. And if in the end, he was not comfortable that we could make it work, he would recommend NOT going forward. He was smooth and polite but very firm. Honesty and clarity carried the day. They got the message.

I used the draft summary of results that I had prepared and took what went into the management plan and reduced it to a list of the major principles governing the “how we will work together.” There were seventeen of these major principles, separated into preflight and flight. After discussion with Low and Frutkin, I prepared a new draft using these principles with all seventeen listed on one page. The Soviets caucused and came back with only editorial comments and a position that this new draft of principles was completely acceptable to them. There was some discussion about crews and public affairs issues and again Low made clear that we would not compromise on our standard policy of full public disclosure.

On return from Moscow, George Low remained satisfied that the management plan agreements would work. And he gave a positive recommendation to the execution of what was now the Apollo/Soyuz test project (ASTP).

Back in Houston, we had a telecon with Professor Bushuyev on the WG2 meeting in May. There was no joy on tying me in on the phone at KSC but Don Cheatham, our WG2 chairman, picked it up and moved the discussion so that both sides were ready for the meeting in Moscow on May fifteenth to the twentieth. WG2 had a lot of ground to cover in this meeting. Afterwards, Cheatham felt that there were no irreconcilable differences and he could proceed. Low helped the State Department with the language for the May ‘72 summit. Ultimately, it was approved and signed by Nixon and Kosygin. The Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty was the most significant step and there were others, including some NASA science agreements. Now the action was back in our court. I was looking forward to engaging Professor Bushuyev, all the working groups, staffs and contractors in executing this test project. I felt confident.

Sometime during 1972 and after the Summit, Nicholson and I began to focus on a number of indicators, which, when added up, spelled leverage. The George Low discussion in the April meeting with the Soviet leadership emphasized that Low needed to be convinced that the Soviet side was willing to do what was necessary to improve our joint communications to an acceptable level. He was satisfied with the progress of the technicals, but it still took too long to get communications, understanding and/or documents in some cases. The perfect example was the internal Soviet decision that they would NOT use Salyut for our proposed mission. That was decided by them before our meeting in the first week of April. Why didn’t somebody call us? What were they waiting for? What would they have done if we did not schedule the quick trip to Moscow in April to confirm the management plan?

Low was clear. If he was not satisfied, he would recommend not doing the project. That certainly got their attention. He did not think that he was obliged to say yes. On the contrary, his superiors expected an honest assessment from him.

On the other hand, Leonard’s impression (and mine) was that the people in our meetings could not or would not say no. They seemed bound to it as something their bosses wanted or even demanded. No discussion. They did have a way of referring to “decisions made at the highest level.” Said another way, we felt empowered to blow a whistle if we were not satisfied. We felt that we could go back up our chain of command, but our story would have to be good. Fair enough. We began to believe that our counterparts had no such freedom and would not even try. In football terms, we could blitz and they could not – Leverage.

Each experience building opportunity reinforced our assessment that we had it right. Still, we did not want to use it in “bully fashion.” But, the understanding helped when it came to pressing a matter of principle, for example, our concern for crew safety because of the unknowns of the Soyuz 11 accident. Paired with Stafford later, I pressed the issue of more complete disclosure as a showstopper for us. And it was.

As of March 1972, I had been reassigned to the Apollo Spacecraft program office (ASPO), reporting to Owen Morris. Jim McDivitt had left NASA earlier and Owen Morris became the program manager for the last two Apollo flights XVI and XVII. Owen was responsible for all the CSM and LM work and for the follow on Apollo spacecraft for Skylab and ATSP. I would continue the ASTP efforts for Owen. I had a big assist from Jess Goree in helping in my early transition to program office work. He did all he could to prepare me for what was coming.

As another organizational matter, René Berglund suggested that I be given full control of the Rockwell contract. René’s specialty was in the early phase A of a contracted activity. He did not manage things past the early conceptual phase. I should say here clearly that it is often difficult when there are two parties doing almost overlapping work like René and I were doing. We were connected by the work, but not at all on the organization chart. I thought René and Clarke Covington, as the project engineer for René’s study work, were very helpful and always constructive. We had no problem and I appreciated their help securing funding and managing early activities. We were at the point where the whole job had to be consolidated. As another indicator of the growing scope of ASTP, Dave Scott, recently of Apollo XV, joined the office to assist with crew relations, management subjects and the expected surge in crew training and other associated activities.

In a way, the meeting scheduled for July 1972 in Houston was the start – it was the first meeting since the May summit approved the test mission with the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft – there was agreement on a mid-1975 launch date – there had been two previous plenary meetings in 1971 and two splinter meetings of WG3 and WG2 in 1972 – this meeting would include all of the six working groups. Leonard Nicholson had prepared a proposed operating plan for the meeting for each working group, including the scope, agendas and milestones and a draft Summary of Results. The logistics for facilities, documentation, interpreters, translations, transportation, social plans, et cetera were also in place.

We were T-minus three years from launch.

WG0 approved the three documents – technical proposal, organization plan and project schedule – as adjusted for using the Soyuz. It went much easier than the first time I introduced these subjects in our pre-summit meeting in April. And we settled on July as the launch month and, soon, on July 15, 1975.

WG1 was struggling with the question of which vehicle to launch first in the rendezvous sequence. Clarke Covington came across some reference in the Soviet documents that helped to resolve the matter. Their side was very insistent on wanting to launch Soyuz first. We could not understand their position because the stay time on orbit for the Soyuz was four days and Apollo could do up to two weeks, giving much more opportunity to get a second launch off. Somewhat inadvertently, Clarke discovered that they were committing a second Soyuz and launch vehicle. If the first Soyuz came down without the Apollo launched, they would launch another Soyuz to be the target for the Apollo rendezvous. We never knew that before and it explained why they were taking their position. It was very sensible once the availability of the second vehicle became known. As a matter of fact, it was a sign of their level of commitment to the project in funding two full vehicles. Once the sequence was resolved, Pete Frank moved the mission plan to specific features of timing, content and reserve time for further experiment exercises after the undocking from Soyuz.