Highways Into Space: A first-hand account of the beginnings of the human space program (46 page)

By this time, Tom Stafford and Alexei Leonov had a solid and growing relationship as the public face of ASTP. We all enjoyed the exchanges between the two of them. And when it was time to tell an audience how it would be to fly on this pathfinder mission, Alexei would always finish the remarks with a heartfelt and a slightly accented, “We will do our best.” It was always a hit in any audience. Alexei and, even more often, Cernan, would rib Stafford about speaking a rare form of Rouston, little bit of Russian with a touch of Houston thrown in to cover the Oklahoman. It was also impressive to see the respect from everyday Russians accorded to Leonov who was usually recognized as one of “the cosmonauts.” When he came to the hotel Russiya to visit Stafford, the normally somber staff lit up with that “something special is going on tonight” energy. They were very proud of their cosmonauts and Leonov seemed to be one of the most popular.

In 1974, the project had three plenary sessions and thirteen splinter meetings. This was a time of hardware testing of qualification and flight units across the board – a natural result of the design schedules. The testing and training exercises, sometimes over months, gave the teams the opportunity to explore details and build a much more complete understanding for handling the possibility of unexpected surprises later in the flow or during the flight itself. This was done with various accommodations for the language skills of their respective participants. The resultant problem solving capability added depth, resilience and speed to our team. It was another part of the growing confidence in project readiness on both sides.

WG1 had a full year of work in 1974. The operations planning cycle emphasized the drive to finalize the flight documentation and the training exercises of both the flight crews and the ground based flight controllers. This latter training was for the flight controllers of one side to learn the spacecraft systems and operations of the MCC of the other side. There was also still new work on the emerging definition of the experiments complement and the photo and TV plan.

In January, in Houston, the group focused on finalizing some details of the mission plan, understanding the requirements for the five joint experiments, use of the communications and tracking systems, and the crew procedures for the transfer between ships. The five bilateral “joint” experiments addressed biological interaction, microbial exchange, use of a multi-purpose furnace, an artificial solar eclipse, and ultraviolet absorption and the other U.S. experiments. All of these had gone through the usual screening by a science board. Notification of selected experimenters went out within two months of the proposals submission. We were still limited by the Dale Myers cap of ten million dollars for the full complement. This cap led to a loosening of the usual quality/reliability schedules. These experiments were not in the same category as the high value experiments of Apollo, which were the main objectives of the lunar science program. The ASTP experiments were not tightly tied to the main purpose of the flight. It was more of an opportunity to do as much science as practical with less overhead. At some point in this process, the cap was also raised to sixteen million dollars, by virtue of our keeping the spacecraft expenditures a little lower. Some additional experiments were added or traded for others and by the end of the year, the total was twenty-eight experiments – five joint, twenty-one unilateral, and two from other international sponsors. The artificial flare/eclipse capitalized on using the circular pattern of the spacecraft to eclipse the sun and then focus on solar flares. The WG1 use of communications and tracking and crew transfer capitalized on the work done in Working Groups 2, 4 and 5. This process also enhanced understanding across working groups.

WG4 was involved in a major test of the compatibility of the communication and tracking systems. The test ran from early February to early April 1974 and gave the interfacing systems a very thorough workout. In addition, there were several systems (e.g. voice, TV, power) supported by a drag-through cable so that we had hard wire backup to the wireless systems. Several minor problems were quickly corrected. The extended test period also gave this group the opportunity to improve their personal communications. And that better understanding carried through the rest of the preps and the flight.

In March, some of our WG5 experts traveled to a Soviet Air Force base near Moscow for an altitude chamber test of the modified Soyuz life support systems, Walt Guy was the leader of this team and they were briefed on the design and operation of this altitude chamber. Besides steady state operation, this test also permitted the varying of the Soyuz cabin pressure to simulate the planned changes in flight and to verify that the gas composition was safe during these and other changes. It all worked fine. More joint participation enhanced our understanding and communications with the Soviet specialists. Our old friend, Lavrov, attended this demonstration of his modified life support system.

As earlier, the next pages illustrate the content of our March eighth weekly session with Chris Kraft. ASTP is now at an advanced state and the Skylab work is in the history books.

Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 1, March 25, 1973

Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 2, March 25, 1973

Chris Kraft’s Meeting Notes Page 3, March 25, 1
973

Working Group 0 joined the full complement of working groups in the plenary session in April. Experiment planning was still the major topic for WG1 and the development schedule of the hardware allowed completion of the ICDs and high fidelity mockups for training in the spring of 1974. Testing of the Soyuz pyros in the Apollo radiation field was approved. The PAO subgroup had already finished Part One of the PAO document, and Part Two still needed more work. Also, in response to its high priority, the subgroup on photo and TV planning and simulations for the docked phase was making appropriate progress. The definition of what might be called the “ceremonial” crew activities while docked proceeded. More work was done on the checklists, but this is an area that continues with changes well into the final weeks.

We discussed the upcoming Soyuz 16 flight, which was planned as a dress rehearsal for our flight. There was some sparring on one aspect of this flight. The Soviets wanted us to join in the tracking of Soyuz 16 as we would for the joint flight. They wanted to tell us the launch date, but on condition that we not reveal the scheduled date to our media. Based on our previous position, articulated in the PAO discussions, we would not agree to withhold that information from the media. Rather, we agreed that they would call us after launch and its announcement and we would commence tracking.

The call came in at 6:30 a.m. on December second, and was answered by a guard. I called back later, copied the state vector and our tracking exercise went perfectly. Soyuz 16 was completely successful. Professor Bushuyev filled us in on the details during our next telecom, which we were doing regularly now. This was another good step for the project and another example of the Soviet willingness to commit more resources to verify their readiness. Another interesting sideline was the press conference that was held at Star City after the Soyuz 16 crew returned. Our Bob White, WG3 chairman, was in Moscow for the mate check of our flight docking system and attended the press conference. Our western media also attended the conference and were able to ask questions of the flight crew – a first for them.

WG3 conducted the major dynamic docking tests on the facility at JSC from July to September to qualify the design of the docking system. This took an all-out effort by our facility team and both sides of the WG3 team. All the tests were completed successfully within the test window – a credit to all involved.

The Soviet ground controllers traveled to Houston for their familiarization and training on the Apollo spacecraft and MCC operations. Likewise, the United States flight controllers completed their training in September. The training schedule for the astronauts and cosmonauts was for June and September. Frank and Timchenko met in December to continue their work, with emphasis on the joint experiment plan. The group also confirmed the updates of the flight documents and the continuing definition of the photo and TV plan. Both sides were very interested in doing this well because of the global attention this phase of the flight would receive.

Crew Training

WG2 was close to finished in its major area of work. Certainly, they were complete in their plan for using the Soyuz GNC system. But they were also the group studying the RCS thruster impingement on Soyuz and the recently identified Soyuz pyrotechnic testing to verify safety in the radiation environment of Apollo. They also were analyzing the reflectivity of Apollo-Soyuz external materials as it affected their instruments.

During September, the Soviet side reviewed the facility at the Institute of Space Research that would be used in November to December for inspection of both flight docking systems and the mate checks of the two flight units. This was the second major test effort associated with the docking system in 1974 and they were almost back-to-back on the calendar and in different countries. This second WG3 docking system activity was conducted over October to December, and both sides were completely satisfied.

One more possible docking system problem was identified late in 1974. In a docking system mate test in the U.S. preparations for shipment of the docking system to Moscow, there was an apparent problem in being unable to retract the docking system guide ring sufficiently to be able to engage the structural latches. This was resolved as a problem with the ground alignment fixture, and not with the flight hardware. However, this event caused a further look at other possible conditions that could prevent a successful docking.