Gun Control in the Third Reich (13 page)

Herr Fischer from the Prussian Interior Ministry responded in general agreement. The requirement of a police permit was the simplest way to prevent acquisition of firearms by “untrustworthy” persons. As political circumstances continued to develop, establishing the “reliability” of the applicant was imperative. It was doubtful that the time had come for a simplification of the police procedures. Any change in the regulations regarding the arms acquisition permit should be entrusted to “you, Herr Minister [Frick],” based on “the political situation and public security.”
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The Württemberg Interior Minister opined: “After the victory of the National Revolution and the carrying out of the weapons seizures from the politically unreliable persons, I believe that a careful relaxation of the rules of the Firearms Law would be justifiable.” Although proof of need for an acquisition permit would be dispensed with, it would be dangerous from the viewpoint of the security police to exempt from that permit certain arms that could be used in internal political confrontations. In particular, small-caliber target pistols should not be exempted from the permit requirement, he stated, because they have rifled barrels and accurate sights. “Even if a barrel length over 20 cm and a caliber no larger than 6 mm should be stipulated, target pistols are, even though one only shoots them at short distances, suitable to bring about the immediate
death of a person.” Nor should long arms be exempted from the requirement of an acquisition permit.
²⁴

The Saxon minister of foreign affairs opposed amendments to the weapons law. The availability of more arms possession by the people at large would only benefit the enemies of National Socialism:

As shown in the report of the Police President of Dresden, who has accumulated much experience in the course of the years on the arms question, it is untimely to change the prohibition on the carrying of arms, because of certain groups of people, particularly elements hostile to the people and the state. No urgent or general necessity exists that the great mass of citizens go about with arms, because the police have found, in times of greater unrest, generally accepted ways and means to protect the peaceful citizens. Further, at this time, when besides the SA and SS, the Stahlhelm and the bourgeoisie are ready to help, the possibility of so extensive an arming is superfluous. It could have a damaging effect in the opposite direction, because certain circles, which have not yet been considered as enemies of the people and the state, could feel the need to take revenge on the authorities and individuals, because they in the time of the National Revolution have suffered injury and so endanger the public peace and security. The elements hostile to the people and the state, from whom their well hidden arms have been seized, would however use every opportunity to replenish their supply again, which they could do all the more easily, the more persons who are in possession of arms.

The Saxon minister was particularly opposed to any relaxation of the need for police approval for permits to acquire long arms, explaining: “In the weapons caches seized from Communists and Marxists, long arms did not play an insignificant role. One remembers the street combat and roof shootings, where long arms were extensively used. About a year from now, when all enemy elements understand or are at least convinced by the hopelessness of hostile endeavors,
and if the factions here now are exhausted and are not renewed, then this question may be reconsidered.”
²⁵

By contrast, the Bavarian interior minister responded that the arms law could be altered without risk because the internal situation was under control. State security was not inconsistent with the interests of the weapons industry. Revisions to the law could be made because “[t]he authority of the state is consolidated to the extent that countercurrents that could become dangerous are not expected, and nothing serious is to be feared for the security of the state or for the maintenance of quiet and order.”
²⁶

The Bavarian minister noted that the requirement of showing a “need” for a weapon acquisition permit could be discontinued because the applicant's “reliability” would still need to be shown, thereby eliminating “untrustworthy” elements. Small-caliber target pistols with long barrels could be deregulated somewhat because they had played no role in domestic political struggles. But long arms should remain subject to an acquisition permit, for otherwise untrustworthy elements would see the opportunity to arm themselves with long arms, which would be used in street fighting. Decontrol of “poaching rifles” for export was inadvisable because they would invariably appear on the domestic market.

Finally, the Bavarian minister sought clarification of whether members of the SA and SS, who were not necessarily already exempt as police or military, should be required to obtain an arms acquisition permit.

In an August 31 summary of comments from the large states about the reform of the arms law, the Reich Interior Ministry noted that only Thuringia advocated liberalization that would remove the requirement of police permission to acquire firearms generally and would prohibit only certain categories of persons from carrying arms.
²⁷
Thuringia, of course, was the center of arms production. Prussia, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Hamburg, Lippe, and Lübeck demanded
retention of the acquisition permit. Bavaria's suggestion that members of the SA should receive special privileges was beyond the scope of the question presented.

The interior minister of Mecklenburg-Strelitzsches sent in a comment cautioning that subversives must be prevented from obtaining arms and that each person's political reliability should be determined: “Even if, after the victory of the National Revolution, a limited revision of the regulations of the Firearms Law can take place, a mass arming must be prevented. The repeated procurement of arms by enemies of the people and the state, as you know, was possible despite the weapons laws, and thus access to the possession of arms must be impeded. The check for the need for the acquisition of a firearm might be handled with less difficulty if more emphasis is placed on the personality of the acquirer and his impeccable National ideology.”
²⁸

The preceding discussion among state representatives was only theoretical in that the Firearms Law would not be amended for another five years. But it starkly exemplifies how the Weimar regulations were used to deny access to firearms to anyone who was not an adherent of Nazism.

On October 5, 1933, the Reich Interior Ministry wrote in a memorandum that more precise definitions were needed to prohibit possession of firearms by “persons dangerous to security—elements who are enemies of the people and the state and offenders sentenced to the penitentiary.” As drafted by an expert at the Reich Ministry of Justice, the memorandum recommended following English law in imposing severe punishment on the perpetrator of a serious crime who is found to be in possession of a firearm. Weimar decrees in 1931–32, which were similar but had less punishment, were not included in the Decree for the Protection of the German People of February 3, 1933, “because the Reich Chancellor [Hitler] then wanted no new criminal rules on weapons law.”
²⁹

Given that Hitler had just been named chancellor three days earlier, it is no wonder that he wished no revision of the law at that time. His consolidation of power had just begun, and it was unpredictable how long he would last.
He may have wished to preclude prosecution of Nazi hooligans for carrying firearms in crimes.

The Interior Ministry wrote to the justice minister that the Firearms Law needed a definition of the term subversive. Agreement on the definition would facilitate approval by the Reich cabinet. The first and foremost objective must be that “[p]ersons who endanger the public security as well as persons who are enemies of the people and the state are prohibited from the acquisition, possession, and carrying of firearms.”
³⁰
Possession of a firearm after conviction for a felony or willful misdemeanor would be punishable by ten years imprisonment.

Further discussion illustrated the continuity between the new ministries and the Weimar Republic ministries. The views of Reich interior minister Frick were expressed by Assistant Minister Werner Hoche,
³¹
who had held the same position when working on the 1928 Firearms Law. Dr. Franz Gürtner, who had been the minister of justice since 1932, found workable a ban on firearm possession by subversives and persons who endanger public security because the government “knows the elements in question thanks to the work of the political and criminal police.”
³²

On November 21, Interior Minister Frick transmitted to the state secretary of the Reich Chancellory the draft proposal to amend the Firearms Law, with a cover letter requesting that it be placed on the agenda of the next cabinet meeting and that it be passed under the Enabling Act authorizing the cabinet to decree laws without passage by the legislature.
³³
Not surprisingly, the first section of the draft was entitled “Firearms Prohibition to Enemies of the People and the State,” and the amendment included punishing violators with ten years
imprisonment. Police could decide who was a subversive or a “danger to public security.”

The draft would have reaffirmed the 1928 law's limitation of firearm acquisition and carrying permits to “persons whose reliability is unquestioned” but would have eliminated the 1931 amendment requiring proof of the need for an acquisition license. It would have prohibited “firearms that are specially built to be easily disassembled to an extent that exceeds the normal extent for hunting and sports purposes,” firearms with noise mufflers or lights, and .22-caliber hollow-point cartridges. The decree of June 12, 1933, prohibiting importation of handguns was continued indefinitely.

The draft ended with a date to be signed, “November ———, 1933.” However, the signature blanks for “Der Reichskanzler” Hitler and Interior Minister Frick would not be filled in. A memorandum in support of the draft focused on the need to stimulate the arms industry, just as efforts were being made to stimulate other industries. No reference was made to the need for reform in the interests of the populace to have arms for defense or sport. Although any revisions in the law would be calculated to increase the market for firearms as a German product, the draft nevertheless indicated that persons who were not National Socialists must be eliminated from this market. The memorandum stated:

The time will come for a revision of the entire Firearms Law when the penetration of the German people with the ideology of National Socialism has progressed so far that armed riots by enemies of the people and the state in a considerable manner are no longer to be expected. However, the pacification of the domestic political situation now permits some relief from the previous legal situation, so that the arms industry would be urgently stimulated.

The prerequisite for any relaxation of the current firearm law, however, is that the sentencing and police authorities proceed with merciless severity against any possession of a weapon by any enemy of the people and the state.

The draft did not just punish carrying a firearm in a crime. “It also aims at enforcing the general principle that enemies of people and state and other elements endangering public security may not possess any firearms. To achieve that goal, the draft grants the police the authority to prohibit such persons
from acquiring, possessing and carrying of firearms and makes violations of this prohibition subject to severe penitentiary terms.”
³⁴

In short, the complete Nazification of German society would allow the “reliable” people to have firearms but disarm all “enemies.” Whereas the 1931 emergency decree required a showing of “need” to acquire any firearm, the new proposal would return to the 1928 Firearms Law, under which “the only requirement for the issuing of a weapons or ammunition acquisition permit was that the police did not have any concerns about the requestor.” The police under the new Nazi authorities, of course, had “concerns” about large segments of the population.

Making National Socialism all pervasive would take time—many enemies of the state had to be eliminated, the police state had to be built up, and the totalitarian regime had to threaten and brainwash the populace. Frick would not mention revisions to the firearm laws again until 1935.

Meanwhile, the Nazi courts continued to decide cases under the highly useful Weimar weapon laws. A November decision by the Supreme Court (Kammergericht) in Berlin, considered the 1928 Firearms Law, the decree of December 8, 1931 (authorizing the states to require the registration of firearms), and a weapon registration decree of 1932 by the administrative district of Oppeln, the provincial capital of Upper Silesia in Prussia.
³⁵

The defendant had bought a firearm without a license but argued that he could not be required to obtain one because it would be self-incriminating. The court held: “The reorganization of the state subsequent to the events of 1933 has not eliminated the obligation of criminal judges to follow the legal principles of the past (such as the emergency decree of the Reich President), at least insofar as those principles do not contradict the principles of National Socialism.” Referring to Oppein's 1932 decree requiring registration of firearms, the court averred that “the remote possibility that someone might be charged for the acquisition of weapons does not absolve that person from meeting his obligation
to register such weapons, which serves the public interest, if the registration does not include a criminal charge against himself.”

One can only wonder at how “remote” was the possibility that a person would be charged with a crime after incriminating himself by registering a firearm.

It was not, however, simply “unreliable” individuals who met with the Nazi state's discrimination and tightening controls. All elements, from shooting clubs to the gun industry, felt the pressure and were forced into line. Though the discussions on updating the gun laws were lengthy, they were merely an effort to put in writing the practices that were increasingly well established. Of course, the letter of the law on this topic or any other was subject to negation, given that the führer's will was the ultimate law and that the Gestapo could implement that will without judicial review. Nevertheless, the language of the firearm laws and drafted revisions thereof highlight the fact that discrimination and repression were common practice at every level.