Gun Control in the Third Reich (8 page)

12
. Loiperdinger, “Das Blutnest vom Boxheimer Hof,” 436–38.

13
. Loiperdinger, “Das Blutnest vom Boxheimer Hof,” 438–65.

14
. “Repudiators,”
Time
, Dec. 7, 1931,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,930407,00.html?promoid=googlep
(visited April 19, 2013).

15
. Loiperdinger, “Das Blutnest vom Boxheimer Hof,” 449; Herbert,
Best
, 129–30, 449.

16
. Hans Bernd Gisevius,
To the Bitter End: An Insider's Account of the Plot to Kill Hitler, 1933–1944
, trans. Richard Winston and Clara Winston (New York: Da Capo Press, 1998), 184.

17
. Herbert,
Best
, chaps. 4 and 5.

18
. Ordonnance concernant la détention d'armes et de radio-émetteurs dans les territoires occupés (Decree Concerning the Possession of Arms and Radio Transmitters in the Occupied Territory), on display at the Musée de l'Ordre de la Libération, Paris; Harold Flender,
Rescue in Denmark
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963; reprint, Washington, DC: Holocaust Library, n.d.), 40–41; Werner Best,
Dänemark in Hitlers Hand: Der Bericht des Reichsbevollmächtigten Werner Best
(Denmark in Hitler's Hands: The Report of Plenipotentiary Werner Best), ed. Siegfried Matlok (Husum, Germany: Husum Druck GmbH, 1988), 52–53.

19
. Wilhelm Elfes, “Die Waffen heraus!” (Weapons Out!),
Kölnische Volkszeitung
, Dec. 1, 1931.

20
. Albert Esser,
Wilhelm Elfes, 1884–1969: Arbeiterführer und Politiker
(Wilhelm Elfes, 1884–1969: Labor Leader and Politician) (Mainz: Matthias-Grunewald, 1990); Ingrid Schupetta, “Die Geheime Staatspolizei in Krefeld—von Polizisten und Schreibtischtätern” (The Gestapo in Krefeld – The Police and Masterminds),
Der vollständige Aufsatz—mit Bildmaterial und Fußnoten—erschien in der Zeitschrift Die Heimat
, Jg. 76/2005, S. 115–27.

21
. RMI to Polizeipräs. Elfes, Dec. 3, 1931, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, S. 286.

22
. RMI to Innenminister der Länder, Dec. 1, 1931, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, S. 280.

23
. Bremische Gesandtschaft, Dec. 3, 1931, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, S. 282.

24
. Vermerk, Dec. 3, 1931, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, S. 312.

25
. Hans Mommsen,
The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 361.

26
. “Germany Will Enforce Truce for Christmas by Barring Meetings and Controlling Arms,”
New York Times
, Dec. 5, 1931, 1.

27
. Loiperdinger, “Das Blutnest vom Boxheimer Hof,” 443.

28
. Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zur Sicherung von Wirtschaft und Finanzen und zum Schutze des inneren Friedens vom 8. Dezember 1931, Achter Teil, Kapitel I,
Reichsgesetzblatt
1931, I, S. 699, 742. See also William L. Patch,
Heinrich Brüning and the Dissolution of the Weimar Republic
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 172, 210–13, 227–29; Mommsen,
The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy
, 378.

29
. Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten, at 1(1).

30
. Id. at § 1(2).

31
. Id. at § 1.

32
. Id. at § 2, amending 16(1), first sentence, of the Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition (Law on Firearms and Ammunition) of April 12, 1928,
Reichsgesetzblatt
I, S. 143, 144.

33
. Vierte Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten at § 3.

34
.
Id
. at § 4–6.

35
. Quoted in Franz von Papen,
Memoirs
(London: Andre Deutsch, 1952), 145.

36
.
Reichsgesetzblatt
1931, I, 750.

37
.
Id
. at § 1.

38
.
Id
.

39
.
Id
. at § 2.

40
. RMI to Landesregierungen, Dec. 12, 1931, Durchführung der Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, Teil 8, Kap. I der Vierten VO des RP 8.12.31, RGBL I, p. 699, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, S. 314–15.

41
. Werner Hoche, “Die neuen waffenrechtlichen Vorschriften” (The New Weapon Law Regulations),
Reichsverwaltungsblatt
, Dec. 26, 1931, S. 1025–27. See also Werner Hoche,
Schußwaffengesetz
(Firearm Law), (Berlin: Vahlen 3rd ed. 1931), 3.

42
. RMI to Landesregierungen, Feb. 8, 1932, Massnahmen gegen Waffenmissbrauch, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125940, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 4, 1931–32, 416–17.

43
. Bericht über einen polit. Vorfall, Oct. 4, 1938, Alfred Flatow, A Rep Pr. Br. Rep. 030/21620 Bd. 5, Haussuchungen bei Juden 1938–39 (FB Bd. 5), Landesarchiv Berlin.

44
. Der Polizeipräs, Potsdam to Reg. Präs., Feb. 21, 1932, Kriegsgerät, Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (BrLHA), Pr. Br. Rep. 2A Reg, Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33. The decree he refers to is the War Equipment Law. Kriegsgerätegesetz,
Reichsgesetzblatt
927, 239.

45
. Reg. Präs. Potsdam to Landräte, Feb. 20, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

46
. Landrat d. Kr. Westhavelland to Reg. Präs., Mar. 1, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

47
. Polizeiverw. Brandenburg to Reg. Präs., Feb. 3, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

48
. Bürgermeister Eberswalde to Reg. Präs., Feb. 24, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

49
. Section 17(2), Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition,
Reichsgesetzblatt
1928, I, 143, 145.

50
. Landrat d. Kr. Teltow to Reg. Präs., Feb. 29, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

51
. Pol. Präs. Potsdam to Reg. Präs., Feb. 26, 1932, Massnahmen geg. Waffenmissbrauch, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3492, Ablieferung von Waffen Bd. 8, 1923–33.

52
. Kurt Bader and Alfred Schühly, eds.,
Sammlung badischer Polizeiverordnungen
(Collection of Baden Police Ordinances) (Berlin: Verlag für Recht und Verwaltung, 1936), 4.

53
. Bader and Schühly eds.,
Sammlung badischer Polizeiverordnungen
, 5.

54
. Bader and Schühly eds.,
Sammlung badischer Polizeiverordnungen
, 5.

55
. Bader and Schühly eds.,
Sammlung badischer Polizeiverordnungen
, 5–6.

56
.
Anordnung des Regierungspräsidenten in Oppeln v. 19. Febr. 1932—Abl
., S. 69, cited in “Artikel 48, 102 der Reichsverfassung” (Article 48, 102, of the Reich Constitution),
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung
, Jan. 15, 1934, 150.

57
. Decision of January 21, 1937, Regional Court (Landgericht) Allenstein,
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen
(Decisions of the Reich Court in Criminal Matters) (Berlin: Gruyter, 1938), Band 71, S. 40.

58
. Rudolf Reger to Hindenburg, Mar. 3, 1932, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 4–5.

59
. U.S. Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1932
, vol. 2:
The British Commonwealth, Europe, Near East, and Africa
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), 288–89, 289, and 290 for dispatch of April 7, 1932.

60
. John R. Angolia and Hugh Page Taylor,
Uniforms, Organization, & History of the German Police
(San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 2004), 147.

61
. Decision of 5/23/1932, III 235/32, Regional Court (Landgericht) Kassel,
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen
, Band 66, S. 249.

62
. Decision of 5/23/1932, II 496/32, Reich Court,
Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen
, Band 66, S. 262.

63
. Der Pr. Min. für Handel u. Gewerbe to RMI, Feb. 29, 1932, Schusswaffengesetz, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 424–29.

64
. Verband Zeller-Mehliser Waffenfabriken e.V. to Thür. Min.d.Inn, Mar. 16, 1932, Aenderung der Ausführungsbestimmungs-VO zum Reichsschusswaffengesetz, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 461–62.

65
. Thür. Min.d.Inn to RMI, Mar. 17, 1932, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 462 (back side).

66
. RMI to Thür. Min.d.Inn, Apr. 4, 1932, Schusswaffengesetz, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 469.

67
. RMI to Landesregierungen, Mar. 29, 1932, Aenderungen der Ausführungsverordnung zum Schusswaffengesetz, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 453–60.

68
. Verordnung zur Änderung der Ausführungsverordnung zu dem Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition (Regulations to Amend the Implementing Regulations of the Law on Firearms and Ammunition),
Reichsgesetzblatt
1932, I, S. 253.

69
.
Id
.

70
. Reichsverband Dt. Büchsenmacher, Waffen- u. Munitionshändler eV, to RMI, Aug. 4, 1932, Schusswaffengesetz, BA Lichterfelde, R 1501/125941, Gesetz über Schußwaffen und Munition Bd. 5, 1932–33, S. 374–72.

71
. Mommsen,
The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy
, 441–42.

72
. Mommsen,
The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy
, 444–45.

73
. Werner Hoche, “Die neue Phase im Kampf gegen politische Ausschreitungen” (The New Phase in the Battle Against Political Riots),
Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung
, Jan. 15, 1933, 138.

74
. Quoted in “Schleicher Hails Virtures of Army,”
New York Times
, Jan. 16, 1933, 4.

75
.
New York Times
, Jan. 22, 1933, 3.

76
. Mommsen,
The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy
, 504.

ADOLF HITLER WAS
named chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933. Seizing upon the Weimar firearms prohibitions and repressive emergency decrees, the New Order immediately began a campaign to disarm and obliterate all enemies of the state. To justify confiscating the arms of and repressing their enemies, the Nazis invariably designated their opponents “Communists.” Although Hindenburg continued as president until his death the following year, the old general could do little to restrain the former corporal whom he held in contempt.

The Nazis instigated aggressive repression against alleged Communists, including police searches of persons and houses to seize weapons, which led to armed clashes and deaths.
¹
For instance, on February 1 in the Charlottenburg area of Berlin a large police detachment arrived to investigate the alleged shooting deaths of two Nazi Party officers by Communists the night before. “The police closed off the street to all traffic while at the same time criminal detectives conducted extensive raids in the houses. Each individual apartment was searched for weapons.”
²
This use of police force was not a sudden or total break from previous policies enacted by the republic, however.

On February 12, eleven deaths resulted from political clashes in German cities. In Eisleben, a troop of Nazis was allegedly shot at from Communist Party headquarters, and so Nazis stormed the building. In Braunschweig, police fired on two women for failure the leave their windows when a Nazi troop was
passing. In Düsseldorf, police claimed to have discovered arms and arrested fifty Communists.
³

Police were given full reign to shoot enemies of the state. Prussian interior minister Hermann Göring mandated on February 17: “Police officers who make use of firearms in the exercise of their duties will, without regard to the consequences of such firearm use, benefit by my protection; those who out of a misplaced regard for such consequences fail in their duty will be punished in accordance with the regulations.”
⁴

Because Hitler had attained power legally, without violation of the Constitution, none of the parties on the left, center, or right had any plan or support for any kind of armed resistance. Not just the Communists (KPD) and Social Democrats (SPD), but also the German Center Party (Deutsche Zentrumspartei) and the German State Party (Deutsche Staatspartei) were harassed.
⁵
As Leon Dominian, the U.S. consul-general at Stuttgart, described the situation, roving bands of Nazis traveled about, entering homes to enquire whether residents were Nazis or Jews. “As in Italy, these Fascists carry arms openly and it is evident from their manner that their marching about is intended as a deliberate provocation to create disturbances and to intimidate peaceable citizens.” Despite resistance from leftist, center, and democratic circles, it was unlikely that “this opposition will assume the concrete form of an armed civil struggle.”
⁶

Illustrative of violence against centrists, in Stuttgart Nazis shot and wounded several persons in an attack on a parade of the Palatinate Guard, which was affiliated with the Bavarian People's Party (Bayrische Volkspartei). Police “arrested several Nazis for carrying concealed weapons, but there is scant indication that
the arrests will be followed by the infliction of penalties.” Nazis also attacked Catholic meetings in several other cities.
⁷

On February 24, Göring authorized the arming and use of SA, SS, and Stahlhelm members as auxiliary police. He admonished Prussian provincial and district governors for inadequate censorship, finding that “periodicals, leaflets and posters defaming the Chancellor [Hitler] and members of the Cabinet are suffered to appear.”
⁸

Federalism was also under attack. Wilhelm Frick, Reich interior minister, attacked “certain state governments that have not yet quite grasped the meaning of this new era and that show resistance to the policy of the government of the Reich.” State councilor Fritz Schaeffer, head of the Bavarian People's Party, responded: “Let the government of the Reich be assured that if it sends a Federal Commissioner to Bavaria, he will be arrested at the State line. We will have no Brown Party bailiff over us.” He denounced Nazism and posed the right of secession: “[I]f Berlin ceases to respect law and the Constitution that sets Bavaria free and we can choose what form of the State we will.”
⁹

On the night of February 27, the Reichstag was set ablaze. A Dutch Communist was caught in the building, but Nazi leaders may have organized the arson as a pretext against a parliament they detested. Working under Göring's command from already prepared lists, the Gestapo began that same night to arrest every deputy and functionary of the Communist Party.
¹⁰

On February 28, Hitler and Göring persuaded President Paul von Hindenburg to issue an emergency decree, based on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, suspending constitutional guarantees and authorizing the Reich to seize executive power in any state that failed to restore law and order. It was claimed that plans for Communist terrorism were found in a search of the Karl Liebknecht House, Berlin's Communist headquarters; that Communists
were responsible for the Reichstag fire; and that on the coming Sunday election day the Communists would attack Nazis and disarm the police.
¹¹
It never occurred to the non-Nazis in the cabinet, recalled Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, that the documents found were forged, adding: “We were all convinced that the Communists had planned an armed uprising and represented a menace to the security of the State.”
¹²

The Decree of the Reich President for the Protection of the People and the State of February 28, 1933, authorized the government to suspend the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, free expression of opinion, freedom of the press, and the rights to assemble and form associations. Secrecy of postal and telephonic communication was suspended, and the government was authorized to conduct search and seizure operations of homes.
¹³
The decree provided that whoever engaged in “severe rioting” or “severe breach of public peace” by “using weapons or in conscious and intentional cooperation with an armed person” were subject to the death penalty or to imprisonment up to life.
¹⁴
If the decree were applied to a protest march by political opponents, the mere keeping or bearing of a weapon might have become a capital offense.

The decree essentially became the constitution of the Third Reich, even though the Weimar Constitution formally remained valid during the entire Nazi regime. It created a “prerogative state” (Massnahmenstaat) in which the regime ruled not by law, but by arbitrary measures (Massnahmen). Protective custody and other repressive measures instituted by the Weimar Republic were found to be highly useful to the new regime.
¹⁵
So were the firearm restrictions and registration requirements.

“The task of combating all movements dangerous to the state implies the power of using all necessary means, provided they are not in conflict with
the law,” Werner Best, chief legal adviser for the Gestapo, would later explain. “Such conflicts with the law, however, are no longer possible since all restrictions have been removed following the Decree of February 28, 1933, and the triumph of National Socialist legal and political theory.”
¹⁶

In this bizarre New Order, legal formalities remained of great significance to the German people who expected state commands to be based on positive law, to the police who were trained to cite violations properly if “your papers are not in order,” to civil servants who carried out the letter of the law no matter who was in power, and even to judges who resisted the führer's will as law. This worldview would persist, but Hitler would after all become the führer, even though it would take the next half-decade to consolidate his and the Gestapo's total power.

At this time, throughout Germany police searched offices and houses for subversive literature and illegal weapons under the guise of suppressing Communists. Meanwhile, in Prussia some 60,000 Nazi and Stahlhelm members had been armed with revolvers and truncheons. The outcome of the coming “election” could not be in doubt.
¹⁷

Reich interior minister Frick sent an urgent missive on March 1 to state officials regarding the KPD, the German Communist Party: “The Police Headquarters in Berlin has established that the KPD intends to conduct systematic attacks against members of the national units, especially the SA and the SS, and by doing so to recklessly neutralize any armed members of those units by force of arms. The plan is to conduct the action in such a way that their authors will, if possible, not be recognized as Communists. The plan is also to compel patrolling policemen by force of arms to give up their weapons.”
¹⁸
Although Communists may have been capable of such attacks, this language is consistent with Nazi assaults on democrats and other opponents of the Nazis who might “not be recognized as Communists” and whose mere possession of firearms was evidence of the conspiracy.

House searches were reported to have revealed not only arms and illegal publications, but also catacombs used for hiding alleged Communists and their arms.
¹⁹

The
Völkische Beobachter
, the official Nazi newspaper, found much grist for the mill. Several articles in the March 4, 1933, issue alleged that house searches revealed detonators, subversive literature, and a machine gun. One headline sounded the alarm, “Firefight in Hamburg, Communist Snipers Armed with Carbines,” and the article averred that shots were fired at SA men marching in a Nazi torchlight procession and that police searches of houses and restaurants revealed numerous weapons. Scores were being settled for anti-Nazi activity that had taken place before Hitler's ascension to power—a Berlin prosecutor charged Communists with severe breach of peace, attempted murder, and Firearms Law offenses during a December 1932 assault against Nazis.
²⁰

Similar reports appeared in foreign presses. A Swiss newspaper reported searches in Düsseldorf, resulting in discovery of a clandestine publisher, Communist propaganda, and arms.
²¹
The Nazis succeeded in creating a “Communist gun owner” bogeyman to justify extensive searches and seizures conducted by the police to confiscate firearms and arrest their owners. To carry out these measures, some 5,000 auxiliary police composed of SA, SS, and Stahlhelm members were enrolled in Berlin alone.
²²

Despite the repression, the Nazis won only about 44 percent of the vote in the elections of March 5. But that portion sufficed for the Hitler regime to remain in power in the coalition government and to have executive power in all the German states.
²³

Searches and seizures of firearms continued against persons of all types, not just so-called Communists. Wilhelm Willers of the Bavarian town of Bad Tölz complained to the Bavarian Interior Ministry about a police–SA search of his house under the pretext that his son had Communist affiliations. The police found no weapons hidden in a compost pile that was not even on his property. They returned early the next morning “to conduct a house search for weapons and documents…. From the attic to the basement, every corner, every closet, every drawer, even in my daughter's bedroom and in my own, my records and even my bed were searched.” His son had belonged to socialist student organizations a decade earlier, but not since then. Willers demanded the return of his pistol, which had been seized.
²⁴

The monthly cocktail party of Bella Fromm, a high-society Berlin socialite and journalist who was Jewish, was raided by an SA gang. An SA officer alleged that informers saw “that arms and ammunition have been delivered to the house…. We know very well that this house belongs to non-Aryans.” Regular police later arrived, to whom she served coffee and cake. After the captain rejected her offer to “search the house for arms and ammunition,” she left in full evening dress to a dinner with Reich vice chancellor Franz von Papen.
²⁵

Anti-Semitic actions began to be reported. One account noted, “The Produce Exchange in Breslau was entered today by Nazi storm troops, who searched the place for arms and ousted the occupants. Several Jewish-owned department stores there were forcibly closed, and the storm troopers ejected Jewish judges and lawyers from the courts.”
²⁶

Raids against labor union buildings were explained as necessary to crush Communist subversion. A Reich radio broadcast from Munich on March 11 explained that an SA occupation of a union house in Munich was not aimed at the General German Federation of German Trade Unions (Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund), but at the SPD and the Reichsbanner, described as “a center of Marxist terror.” “During the search,” it was claimed, “two
machine guns, hand grenades, pistols, ammunition and numerous cutting and stabbing weapons were found.”
²⁷

In Dresden, the State of Saxony's federal commissioner banned the republican Reichsbanner organization. The following report was typical of the time: “In Koenigsberg, Nazi storm troops occupied trade union headquarters after an exchange of shots during which four Reichsbanner men were wounded. The police reported that a quantity of arms was confiscated.” Socialist newspaper offices were seized, and numerous Communists and Socialists were arrested. “A prominent attorney at Kiel who represented Socialists at a number of political trials was slain when he admitted into his home several men who posed as police.”
²⁸

On Sunday, March 12, six Nazi SA raided the apartment of the widow of Friedrich Ebert, the Social Democrat who had served as the first president of the Weimar Republic from 1919 until his death in 1925. They demanded the widow's “mustard flag,” the republican black, red, and gold emblem, but her son protested that they had no flag. “They decided finally to look for hidden arms, but found only a revolver belonging to Herr Ebert, which he handed to them together with a permit that had expired.” President von Hindenburg ordered a police investigation of this “unchivalrous treatment.”
²⁹
However, Weimar-era Firearms Law made this seizure of the revolver lawful merely because the permit had not been renewed.