Gun Control in the Third Reich (12 page)

The administrative district of Seelow addressed control over “firearm permits, firearm acquisition permits, firearm arsenal permits, annual hunting permits, etc.,” stating that permits had not for some time been issued to “persons whose Communist attitude was known.” Moreover, the report continued: “After January 30, 1933, firearm permits were no longer issued to SPD members. Generally, when firearms were suspected to be possessed by SPD members and Communists, a search was executed. The firearms found were all confiscated. Generally in these cases when permits were presented, they were revoked.”
¹⁸

Rural districts reported details in July. Spremberg wrote: “For security and national political reasons, on March 1 of this year the head of the local police, Police Captain Knipple, confiscated and secured all firearms belonging to all of the persons belonging to the SPD who had firearm licenses.”
¹⁹
Guben “revoked 2 firearm carry licenses, 3 hunting licenses and a firearms acquisition license as well as confiscated the arms and ammunition” from “Social Democrat–leaning persons.”
²⁰

Rural district Luckau reported about former officials of the town of Finsterwalde who were SPD members. Former mayor Geist destroyed his firearm acquisition permit after it expired, and he had not obtained a firearm. The license issued to the former town manager Starke could not be found, but police had discovered him in possession of a pistol in March, and procedures to confiscate it were under review. Former assistant town manager Pietsch had his license revoked, but “a firearm acquired under this license could not be confiscated yet, since Pietsch spends time at an unknown address in Berlin.”
²¹

Meanwhile, the firearms being confiscated from opponents of Nazism and from Jews were being sent to concentration camps to guard these very same enemies of the regime. On July 28, Prussian interior minister Göring ordered the governmental heads to inform the Concentration Camp Sonnenburg about available confiscated firearms.
²²
Model 98 carbines, Model 08 army pistols, 9-mm submachine guns, and ammunition were of particular interest. The weapons were urgently needed for the arming of the concentration camp guards. Carbines for the Concentration Camp Oranienburg were also desired.

The preceding microscopic view illustrates how the National Socialist government used police licensing records generated by the 1928 Firearms Law to identify firearm license holders and to confiscate the firearms of those identified as enemies of the state. It also shows clearly that individuals' political or religious affiliations determined whether they were allowed access to guns. State authorities could find out who had firearms and could keep track of those citizens who did possess arms in case their “reliability” should change. Confiscation would have been all the easier in jurisdictions that authorized complete registration of all firearms under the decree of December 8, 1931.

1
. Der Pr.Min.d.Inn. to Reg. Präs., Feb. 15, 1933, Inhaber von Waffenscheinen listen-mäßig zu erfassen, Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv (BrLHA), Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

2
. Reg.Präs. Potsdam, Feb. 17, 1933, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

3
. Der Landrat d.Kr. Spremberg to Reg. Präs Frankfurt/O, Feb. 28, 1933, Verzeichnis der Waffenscheininhaber, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

4
. Der Landrat to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, Feb. 28, 1933, Verzeichnis der Waffenscheininhaber, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

5
. Der Landrat Königsberg to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, Mar. 10, 1933, Einziehung von Waffenscheinen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

6
. Der Landrat Königsberg to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, July 3, 1933, Einziehung von Waffenscheinen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

7
. Der Pr. Min.d.Inn. to Reg. Präsidenten, Feb. 22, 1933, Verwertung eingezogener u. beschlagnahmter Waffen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

8
. Reg. Präs. Potsdam to Pr. Min.d.Inn, Mar. 30, 1933, Erteilte Waffenscheine, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

9
. Der Pr. Min.d.Inn. to Reg. Präsidenten, June 8, 1933, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

10
. Reg. Präs. Potsdam to Landraete, June 17, 1933, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

11
. Der Erste Bürgermeister Wittenberge to Reg. Präs. Potsdam, July 7, 1933, Einziehung von Waffenscheinen, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3501, Ausstellung u. Einziehung von Waffenscheinen 1929–38.

12
. Der Landrat des Kr. Jüterbog-Luckenwalde to Reg. Präs. Potsdam, July 27, 1933, Waffenschein pp. für SPD-Angehörige, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3501, Ausstellung u. Einziehung von Waffenscheinen 1929–38.

13
. Der Landrat Soldin to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, June 24, 1933, Einziehung von Bescheinigungen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

14
. Der Landrat Sorau to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, June 28, 1933, Waffenscheine für Angehörige der SPD, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

15
. Der Oberbürgermeister F/O to Reg.Präs. Frankfurt/O, June 26, 1933, Verfügung June 16, 1933, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

16
. Der Landrat d.Kr.Spremberg, June 22, 1933, Erteilung von Waffenscheinen an Angehörige der SPD, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

17
. Der Oberbürgermeister Landsberg to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, June 22, 1933, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

18
. Der Landrat Seelow to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, June 30, 1933, Einziehung von Waffenscheinen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

19
. Der Landrat d. Kr. Spremberg to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, July 19, 1933, Erteilung von Waffenscheinen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

20
. Der Landrat Guben to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, July 25, 1933, Einziehung von Waffenscheinen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

21
. Der Landrat d. Kr. Luckau to Reg. Präs. Frankfurt/O, Aug. 18, 1933, Bescheinigung, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 3B, Reg. Frankfurt/O I Pol/1877, Waffenscheine 1933–42.

22
. Der Pr. Min.d.Inn. to Reg. Präsidenten, July 28, 1933, Asservatwaffen, BrLHA, Pr. Br. Rep. 2A, Reg. Potsdam I Pol/3477, Waffenangelegenheiten Bd. 3, 1928–37.

THE REPRESSION OF
gun owners in Brandenburg was by no means unique. On seizing power, the Nazis began the policy of Gleichschaltung, the forcing into line of all institutions in society into a totalitarian system. Every aspect of the state, including industry, labor, education, law, culture, and sports, was to be harnessed to serve the National Socialist state, and every individual was to be subordinated to this goal.
¹
Gun owners, gun clubs, gun dealers, gun importers, and gun manufacturers were subjected to Gleichschaltung, if not to outright banning.

This forcing into line included generally all sporting organizations and in particular the shooting associations, a particularly sensitive topic because their members possessed firearms—which potentially could be used against the regime. Many of them had originated in medieval brotherhoods, and they had played a major role in the democratic revolution of 1848, which had failed in part because the standing armies of the forces of reaction were far better armed than the populace.
²
Although there are no comprehensive works on the Nazi repression of the gun clubs, studies exist on this topic for the regions of the Rhineland and Westphalia.
³

Shooting clubs, in particular those in rural areas, often united local populations into societal gathering hubs and political fora. Some were anti-Nazi, and they proliferated during the Weimar period. The process of forcing these clubs into line in 1933–34 illuminates the phases, objectives, and infiltration methods of National Socialism. The Nazis sought to force the shooting clubs into line by formal, institutional, and finally structural processes.
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In the Weimar Republic, the German Shooting Association (Deutscher Schützenbund) was a member of the German Reich Committee for Physical Exercise (Deutscher Reichsausschuss für Leibesübungen), the umbrella organization of the German sport associations, which was dissolved on May 10, 1933.
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The new umbrella organization, the Reich Leadership of German Sports (Reichsführerring des Deutschen Sports), formed two weeks later, created the German Shooting Sport Association (Deutscher Schießsportverband), which replaced the German Shooting Association.
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The Reich sport commissar (Reichssportkommissar, later renamed the Reichssportführer) was Hans von Tschammer und Osten, who would later lead Germany's hosting of the 1936 Olympics.

Under the Führer Principle (Führerprinzip), the Reich sport commissar was the sole decision maker, dictating to region (Gau), district, and local leadership jurisdictions. By order issued on July 12, 1933, all shooting clubs were required to join the German Shooting Sport Association. Those that failed to register by the deadline of August 15 were dissolved.
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Clubs that remained in existence would in the future be subjected to tighter institutional forcing into line with the Nazi agenda, and those that resisted would be banned.

The preexisting club leaderships remained in control well into 1933, whereby the mandated Führer Principle was often realized only in form, not in substance. This largely superficial adaptation did not remain concealed from the regime, however, which would thereupon require that more than half of each club's members as well as its president and entire board of directors must be Nazis.
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Meanwhile, as the firearm industry had done during the Weimar Republic, it appealed to the head of the government for relief from onerous regulations. The Reich Association of German Gunsmiths and Firearm and Ammunition Dealers wrote to Chancellor Hitler on March 18, 1933, complaining of the arms restrictions that disarmed law-abiding citizens while smugglers and traffickers supplied criminals with arms.
⁹
Taking note of a recent automobile exposition in Berlin at which Hitler acknowledged the emergency situation of that industry and facilitated economic relief, the letter sought similar attention to the firearm industry's dire needs, including liberalization of laws and decrees.

An association of arms makers in Thuringia likewise wrote to Hitler pleading for a relaxation of the arms laws.
¹⁰
It pointed to the arms industries of Russia, Poland, Finland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and Switzerland, which supplied military arms and then proceeded to produce hunting, sport, and defensive arms. In the letter, the association noted how it deeply resented smuggled arms from Belgium and Spain, especially pistols and revolvers, which members of the public could obtain without the knowledge of the police. Besides the Weimar firearm laws, the letter complained of monopoly contracts to supply military and police weapons between the government and firms such as Simson & Co. of Suhl, which eliminated competition from other firms.

Hitler did not answer these letters, nor did his new government take any action on their petitions.

Indeed, on seizing power, the Nazis were well served by the 1928 and 1931 firearm laws. Most obvious were the laws requiring firearm owners to be licensed or registered with the police and empowering the authorities to decree the confiscation of arms. Civilian possession of pistols became increasingly suspect, and the Nazi regime decided to decrease the supply by banning imports. On May 31, deeply concerned about the importation of pistols, Wilhelm Frick, the Reich minister of the interior, wrote to Hermann Göring, interior minister of Prussia and head of that state's police, explaining:

In the past few months the import of pistols from abroad, in particular from Belgium and Spain, has increased considerably. I have been informed that in March of this year, approximately 17,000 pistols were imported from abroad. This amounts to ten times the average import of the preceding three months. It is clear that for reasons of public security we cannot tolerate the unrestrained import of such huge amounts of weapons. Even though the acquisition of firearms in Germany is permitted only if the strict requirements of the Firearms Law are met, we have to take into account the fact that the rules will not be observed by all of the arms dealers, that unauthorized persons will obtain foreign arms flowing into the country and that hidden arms caches will be established. From a security standpoint, I therefore consider it necessary to prohibit the import of small arms from abroad for a certain time.
¹¹

Pointing to the 1928 Firearms Law, Frick continued that exceptions in certain cases might be made for an individual under an acquisition, carry, or hunting permit, but that arms dealers would be prohibited from importing pistols even though they were authorized to do so by the Firearms Law. Reflecting the system of legislating by decree, Frick added, “Unless I receive your objection by June 10 of this year, I will assume that you agree with this draft and will put the decree into force.”
¹²
This was yet another instance of the Hitler regime nullifying statutory law by decree.

Göring did not object, and on June 12 Frick decreed the prohibition on the importation of handguns.
¹³
The next day he sent a memorandum to the governments of the Länder (states) and to the Ministry of the Interior for Prussia (Göring) explaining that “the import of handguns from abroad has increased dramatically. For reasons of public safety it was no longer possible to tolerate this situation.” It was now “illegal to import handguns until further notice.” Exceptions could be made for individuals, such as hunters returning from trips abroad, but dealers could no longer import handguns.
¹⁴

Leisurely discussions on possible amendments to the firearm laws were held over the coming five years. The discussants included Wilhelm Frick, the Reich interior minister; Hermann Göring, who as the Prussian interior minister controlled the police of that state; Heinrich Himmler, the SS
Reichsführer
and chief of the German police; the Head Office of the Security Police (Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei), which included the criminal police and the Gestapo (Secret State Police);
¹⁵
and other members of the Nazi hierarchy.

In July 1933, Frick initiated a reexamination of the Firearms Law, which would be debated in drafts back and forth and would culminate in revisions in 1938. By now, the Nazi government had succeeded in using the registration lists to confiscate firearms from SPD members and other political enemies. On July 7, Frick wrote to the Reich minister of justice, minister of commerce, and secretary of the Reich Chancellory; the Prussian interior minister; and the states: “Following the victory of the National Revolution I consider it necessary to undertake a basic examination of the Firearms Law to decide which provisions should be kept, and in particular, whether the acquisition of firearms should remain in the domain of the police where it generates a lot of administrative work or whether, as before the war, it would be sufficient to prohibit certain categories of persons from carrying weapons, such as in particular enemies of the people and the state.” If that sounded like a liberalization of the Firearms
Law, it wasn't: the “enemies of the people and the state” now included large segments of the population—indeed, everyone who disagreed with the new regime. Citing a need “to improve the situation of the weapons industry,” Frick suggested that the 1931 decree requiring “need” to acquire a weapon
¹⁶
should be reconsidered to “make it easier for patriotically-minded citizens to acquire a firearm.” However, “the requirement that a need has to be proven to obtain a permit for the carrying of firearms outside one's apartment, etc. shall not be changed.”
¹⁷

Frick also suggested that it may be appropriate to “abolish the mandatory weapons acquisition permit for target pistols, i.e., small firearms with a barrel that is longer than 20 centimeters and a caliber of not more than 6 millimeter. These weapons play no role in internal conflicts because they are unwieldy.”
¹⁸
Sporting pistols would be exempt, but defensive pistols would not.

The supposed ability to trace crime guns and domestic protectionism were combined in Frick's next proposal. He noted: “To facilitate the investigation of crimes committed by means of firearms, § 9 of the weapons law provides that firearms have to bear a marking. This is meant to make it possible for the police finding a firearm at a crime scene to determine first the manufacturer of the weapon or the dealer who put it into circulation and, second, based on the weapons book or the weapons dealing book, the person who acquired the weapon.” Current law required that the firearm be stamped with the dealer's name, but not that of the manufacturer. “This has led to the fact that large numbers of foreign weapons bearing only the name of a German weapons dealer are on the German market and the buyer is unable to determine whether a weapon is a foreign weapon. For national and economic reasons I consider this situation no longer tolerable.”
¹⁹
Thus, manufacturers—including foreign ones—must stamp their names on the firearms.

Not surprisingly, the interior minister of Thuringia, a center of arms making, had a positive reaction to the liberalization of the Firearms Law, noting that “it will suffice, as before the war, to prohibit only certain groups of people,
particularly persons who are enemies of the people and the state, from bearing arms.” He knew from members of the firearms industry that potential customers were deterred from making purchases by the red tape involved in applying for an acquisition permit, for which the police must determine their reliability. This application process was a burden on both the consumers and the police, and it could be alleviated by requiring an acquisition permit only for revolvers and self-loading pistols and subjecting all other arms acquisitions to record keeping by manufacturers and dealers.
²⁰

The Thuringian minister advocated that imported arms should be marked with the country of origin and name of manufacturer, as England and France already required. Further, “poacher guns” (compact rifles) had been a significant export item for Thuringia to the Balkans, Turkey, and South America, but the Firearms Law prohibited trade in these arms, which were now made in Belgium. “It cannot be a matter for German legislation to take care of the hunting laws of foreign countries.” Production for export should thus be allowed, he argued.

In response to these points, the state police president of the Hessian State Ministry expressed his opposition to any liberalization of the Firearms Law. “Discontinuing the arms acquisition permit completely in the future would be dubious, since Communist and Marxist elements would then be entitled to uncontrolled acquisition of arms.” Any benefit would be negated by “the danger that the arming of enemies of the state entails.”
²¹

He proposed that members of the “National Associations” (nationalen Verbände)—a euphemism for the SS, the SA, and the Stahlhelm—be able to obtain easier police permission for firearms and ammunition than the Firearms Law currently allowed. To prevent misuse, it could be required that the arms be for service in the organization and that permission would be given only if the applicant had been a member of the organization for at least two years.

Revealingly, the Weimar law disqualified persons from arms both on reliability and need grounds, and the comments from the Hessian police president exemplify how the police could deny a permit on either ground: “Regarding the
proof of a need for the acquisition of arms or ammunition, however, the police power of the Reich should, without exception, be viewed from a consistent National Socialist viewpoint. Accordingly, the Reich legal guidelines broadly negate the reliability of former Marxists of every shade.” Although the condition of the arms industry was a grave concern, its proposals should be rejected. In particular: “Marxism is still not at all sufficiently repressed to prevent the flaring up of Communist resistance. I therefore do not consider it permissible at this time to exclude long arms from the requirement of an acquisition permit.” Further, manufacture for export of poacher guns should remain prohibited, he stated, because gun dealers would always find ways to sell the poacher gun domestically.
²²