Goering (25 page)

GOERING: Well, with fourteen children you can't move as you like! Well, just tell Seyss to take over.

Urged on by Goering, Seyss-Inquart himself broadcast at 8 P.M., demanding that the people should keep calm and offer no resistance to the German troops.

At 8:48 the telephone was busy again.

KEPPLER: The government has ordered the Army not to put up any resistance.

GOERING: I don't give a damn.

KEPPLER: Might I ask you if a prominent personality in Berlin wants to add a few words for the Austrian people?

GOERING: Well, I don't know yet. Listen, the main thing is that Seyss takes over all powers of the government, that he keeps the radio stations occupied—

KEPPLER: Well, we represent the government now.

GOERING: Yes, that's it, you are the government. Listen carefully. The following telegram should be sent here by Seyss-Inquart. Write it down: “The provisional Austrian government, which after the dismissal of the Schuschnigg government considers it its task to establish peace and order in Austria, sends to the German government the urgent request to support it in its task and to help it prevent bloodshed. For this reason it asks the German government to send German troops as soon as possible.”

KEPPLER: Well, the S.A. and the S.S. are marching through the streets, but everything is quiet.

GOERING: . . . Seyss-Inquart has to take over . . . and appoint a few people—the people we recommend to him. He should now form a provisional government. It is absolutely unimportant what the Federal President may have to say . . . Then our troops will cross the border today.

KEPPLER: Yes.

GOERING: Look, and he should send the telegram as soon as possible. . . . Well, he does not even have to send the telegram—all he needs to do is to say, “Agreed!”

KEPPLER: Yes.

GOERING: Call me either at the Führer's or at my place. Well, good luck. Heil Hitler!

Goering leaned back. The matter was in effect settled. He cared nothing about the misgivings of his agents in Vienna. After Miklas had resigned at midnight, Seyss-Inquart, Keppler and Muff all tried to prevent the march into Austria ordered for daybreak, but they telephoned Berlin in vain. Hitler was determined on direct action in the face of the President's opposition, and he was further relieved and encouraged when, at 10:30 that night, Prince Philipp, his agent in Rome, telephoned at last with a message from Mussolini: “He sends you his regards. . . . Austria would be immaterial to him.” Hitler's relief sprang hysterically to his lips: “Please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for this. . . . Never, never, never, no matter what happens! . . . As soon as the Austrian affair is settled I shall be ready to go with him through thick and thin—through anything! . . . I thank him from the bottom of my heart. Never, never shall I forget it. . . .” He could not stop repeating gratitude upon gratitude. As for France and Britain, Hitler guessed they would do nothing, and he was right. His Majesty's Government had declined to offer any advice to Schuschnigg when he appealed to them by telegram on March 11; he was merely informed that Britain was “unable to guarantee protection.” Ribbentrop was back in London paying farewell visits before leaving his embassy to take up his duties as Hitler's Foreign Minister; he was in fact lunching at Downing Street with Chamberlain and Halifax when official news arrived reporting the German ultimatum to Austria. Winston Churchill, who was present at this lunch, describes Chamberlain's embarrassment at receiving the news and his endeavors to get rid of Ribbentrop and his wife, who lingered on in order, no doubt, to prevent Chamberlain from hastening into action.

Within the hour of closing his campaign by telephone, Goering was playing another part administering sedatives to the anxious neighbors of Germany. He went straight from a consultation with Hitler to a grand ball in the Haus der Flieger at which he was the host. Henderson was there with over a thousand other guests, including many of the diplomatic corps, all of whom were as anxious as the Germans themselves to know what was happening in Austria; all they knew was what they had read into the broadcasts of Schuschnigg and Seyss-Inquart. The curiosity of the whole assembly was raised when Ivone Kirkpatrick suddenly arrived and demanded an urgent consultation with his ambassador; all he had brought with him was the draft of the formal note of protest which the British government instructed the ambassador to send to the German Foreign Minister. Henderson approved the draft, and Kirkpatrick, feeling, as he put it, like Cinderella at Goering's Ball, slipped away to transmit the message, while a thousand pairs of eyes followed him out, trying to gather from his expression what form of intervention Britain might be considering.

Goering arrived late from his meeting with Hitler, but before joining his guests he talked in private with Dr. Vojtech Mastny, the Czechoslovak minister in Berlin, who was at the ball and was desperate to receive some form of reassurance. Goering had responded warmly at the sight of him and said how glad he was to find him there, “for he wanted to declare to me on his word of honor that there was not the least reason for Czechoslovakia to feel any anxiety. . . Germany had no hostile intentions of any kind toward her, but, on the contrary, wished to continue advancing toward a
rapprochement.”
The entry of Reich troops into Austria was only, he said, “a family affair.” However, Goering added that he had heard rumors of Czech mobilization. Mastny hastened off to his legation to check this.

Goering then joined the assembly, shaking hands with a few of the principal guests, including Henderson, who tried to make his handshake seem specially cold. Goering appeared very nervous and taken aback by this form of greeting from his British friend. Soon everyone was invited to sit down to watch the performance of a ballet by the State Opera; the circumstances could not have been less appropriate for music and dancing. Goering anxiously scribbled Henderson a note: “Immediately the music is over I should like to talk to you, and
will explain everything to you.”
The last words were underlined five times. The moment the ballet finished, Goering withdrew with Henderson to a private room. Henderson claims that he argued resolutely on behalf of Schuschnigg and the anti-Nazis in Austria, urging moderation in their treatment. Privately, however, Henderson believed that Schuschnigg had behaved foolishly, and that it had been inevitable that Austria and Germany should eventually unite. When he returned to the embassy in the middle of the night to report his conversation with Goering, he included a sentence stating that he had “reluctantly” admitted “that Dr. Schuschnigg had acted with precipitate folly.” Halifax reprimanded him for making any such remark to Goering, and the following month he was warned again to be careful what he said in private and unofficially about the next point of action on Hitler's agenda, the Sudeten question.

Meanwhile, Mastny had returned to the Haus der Flieger to tell Goering no mobilization had been ordered. Goering then repeated his reassurances to Mastny in the name of Hitler, and he took the trouble to telephone him again the following midday to remind him of what he had said and extract once more from Mastny official confirmation that the Czechs were not mobilizing. The next day, March 13, Henderson obtained Goering's permission for Chamberlain to refer in the House of Commons to the reassurances he had made to Mastny; the same day Henderson confirmed in writing that he had reported to the British government Goering's assurances on the night of March 11 that German troops would be withdrawn from Austria as soon as the situation was stable and that free elections would take place “without any intimidation whatever.” However, in a note to the German minister in Hungary written on March 21, Ribbentrop was more careful and specified that Goering's assurances referred exclusively to “
ad hoc
measures connected with carrying out action in Austria.”
³

Nazi celebrations in Austria followed hard upon the tanks that crossed her borders at daybreak on March 12. Neurath, still Acting Foreign Minister in Berlin while Ribbentrop was preparing to leave London, sent a curt reply to the British note of protest; this was a wholly German affair, he stated, and the German forces were entering Austria in response to an urgent telegram from the new Austrian government. In the afternoon Hitler followed his troops into Austria and made a triumphal entry into Linz, where he had been at school; he was received by Himmler and Seyss-Inquart. Hitler, overwhelmed by the tumult of the crowds, demanded that a law be drafted immediately making the
Anschluss
a total one; Austria was to become a province of the Reich with the Führer as its President. This law was promulgated on Sunday, March 13, by the new Austrian government under the signature of Seyss-Inquart; Goering was to be among the signatories for Germany. There was to be “a free and secret plebiscite” on April 10 on the reunion with Germany, held under Hitler's and not Schuschnigg's auspices.

That evening from Carinhall Goering made another of his exultant telephone calls, this time to Ribbentrop in London.
⁴
The almost one-way conversation was to last forty minutes.

GOERING: There is overwhelming joy in Austria. That you can hear over the radio.

RIBBENTROP: Yes. It's fantastic, isn't it?

GOERING: Yes, the last march into the Rhineland is completely overshadowed. The Führer was deeply moved when he talked to me last night. . . . Well, this story that we had given an ultimatum is just foolish gossip. From the very beginning the National Socialist Ministers and the representatives of the people presented the ultimatum. . . . The Ministers asked us to back them up, so they would not be completely beaten up again and subjected to terror and civil war. . . . Then you have to remember that Schuschnigg made his speeches, telling them the Fatherland Front would fight to its last man. One could not know they would capitulate like that, and therefore Seyss-Inquart, who had already taken over the government, asked us to march in immediately. . . . These are the actual facts which can be proved by documents. . . . The following is interesting, the absolutely complete enthusiasm for National Socialism, which is surprising even to us. . . .

RIBBENTROP: So it seems that all Austria is on our side.

GOERING: Well, let me tell you, if there were an election tomorrow . . . I have already told Seyss-Inquart he should invite representatives of the democratic powers; they could convince themselves that this was really an election carried out on a democratic basis—and we should have ninety per cent votes in our favor. Absolutely! . . . Responsible people from England and France should be asked to come over here and to watch what is actually going on. The biggest trick ever played was done here.

RIBBENTROP: I believe that this conviction will grow here.

GOERING: One thing I want to say: If it is claimed that we overpowered the Austrian people and took away their independence, then one should admit at least that just one little part of it was put under pressure—not by us—and that was the government which existed on such a small basis. The Austrian people have only been freed. . . . I also want to point out that yesterday . . . they were saying the most serious things, war, and so on; it made me laugh, because where would one find such an unscrupulous statesman who would send again millions of people to death only because two German brother nations—

RIBBENTROP: Yes, this is absolutely ridiculous; they realize that over here. I think they know pretty well over here what is going on.

GOERING: Ribbentrop, I would call attention to one fact particularly. What state in the whole world will get hurt by our union? Do we take away anything from any other state? . . . They could only have one interest, to create hostile feelings against Germany . . . Besides, I do want to point out that the Czechoslovakian minister came to see me yesterday and he explained that the rumor Czechoslovakia had mobilized was taken out of thin air and they would be satisfied with one word from me that I would not undertake the slightest thing against Czechoslovakia. . . . It was then that I said: The German troops are supposed to stay fifteen to twenty kilometers away from the border on their march through Austria; and north of the Danube in the whole sector only one partial battalion was to march, merely so that these villages can share in the joy and pleasure. . . . Tell the following to Halifax and Chamberlain: It is not correct that Germany has given any ultimatum. This is a lie by Schuschnigg. . . . I want to state that Seyss-Inquart asked us expressly by phone and by telegram to send troops. . . .

RIBBENTROP: Goering, tell me, how is the situation in Vienna? Is everything settled yet?

GOERING: Yes. Yesterday I landed hundreds of airplanes with some companies, in order to secure the airfields, and they were received with joy. The Austrian troops did not withdraw but . . . fraternized immediately with the German troops, wherever they were stationed.

RIBBENTROP: That had to be expected.

GOERING: . . . The whole affair is turning out as it was supposed to. . . . In no way are we threatening the Czechoslovakian Republic, but it has now the opportunity of coming to a friendly and reasonable agreement with us . . . on condition that France remains sensible. . . . Naturally, if France now organizes a big mobilization close to the border, then it won't be funny.

RIBBENTROP: I believe that they'll behave all right.

GOERING: We have a clear conscience, and that is a decisive factor. Before history we have a clear conscience. . . .