Goering (47 page)

At the same time this message was dispatched, Bormann sent orders to S.S. officers Frank and Bredow, who were stationed on the Obersalzberg, ordering them to arrest Goering for high treason and also to confine his staff, including Koller, as well as Lammers. “You will answer for this with your lives,” added Bormann to these local S.S. men in case they should feel intimidated by so grave a duty. The following day Bormann announced by radio to the German people on Hitler's behalf that Goering had resigned for reasons of health.

So when Koller failed to make contact with Goering by telephone between eight and nine o‘clock on the evening of April 23, the reason was that the Reich Marshal was already under arrest. As soon as Goering had received Hitler's first radio message, he had countermanded his original messages to Ribbentrop and Keitel and informed them he had heard from the Führer. But it was too late; according to Bernd von Brauchitsch, the chalet had already been surrounded by seven o'clock. Robert Kropp opened the door to the S.S. officers, who entered with their revolvers drawn and took immediate charge of the Reich Marshal, confining him to his room. He was not allowed to see his wife or daughter or to communicate with his staff. The house was turned into a miniature prison, with everyone kept in his room.

Meanwhile Koller was becoming increasingly worried. He had seen a copy of Hitler's reply and this naturally disturbed him. His wife had joined him, and as they were eating late at night his batman announced that an S.S. officer had arrived and wanted to see him. It was Bredow, who came in and saluted just as the batman was trying to persuade Koller to try to escape. Bredow apologized. “Herr General,” he said, “I have to arrest you by order of the Führer.”

“Do you know why?” asked Koller in astonishment.

“No, sir.”

“Where is the Reich Marshal?” asked Koller.

“Under arrest.”

“And Brauchitsch and the staff?”

“All under arrest.”

“Do you realize,” Koller protested, “that this is madness? The Reich Marshal has acted quite correctly. He merely put a question to the Führer.”

Bredow apologized again. This, he hastened to explain, was
Ehrenhaft,
honorable custody. Koller was invited to choose the room in which he preferred to be placed under guard together with his wife. He was forbidden to communicate with anyone. He had, however, managed to conceal the draft he had been making of Goering's proclamation, and he flushed these incriminating papers down the lavatory at the first opportunity.

At five o'clock in the morning Brauchitsch was brought in to Koller under guard with an order from Goering. Koller was to fly to Berlin at once and explain matters to Hitler. “This is not really Goering's order,” said Bredow to Koller. “It is Hitler's order.” Koller refused to fly before nightfall, and then only without an S.S. guard. Later he was released by Hitler's special command. When Koller heard that Hitler had summoned General Ritter von Greim from Munich to give him command of the Luftwaffe, he sent Greim a telephone message explaining all the facts in Goering's favor. But Greim expressed no sympathy at all for Goering; in his view the Reich Marshal should have stayed with Hitler in the bunker.

Greim, who was impatient to leave, had trouble finding an aircraft to take him to Berlin; the constant air raids had damaged every machine in the neighborhood. Eventually he arrived at the
Führerbunker
badly wounded, accompanied by the famous airwoman Hanna Reitsch, after hedge-hopping with a fighter escort as far as Gatow Airport outside Berlin and completing the journey to the bunker in a small training plane through fierce Russian fire. With Hanna Reitsch's assistance he had landed in an avenue near the Chancellery; his right foot had been shattered.

Hitler welcomed the visitors and, according to Hanna Reitsch's hysterical account of their emotional meeting, immediately started to attack Goering.
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He said that he had summoned Greim to Berlin “because Hermann Goering has betrayed and deserted both me and his Fatherland. Behind my back he has established connections with the enemy . . . and against my orders he has gone to save himself at Berchtesgaden. From there,” added Hitler, “he sent me a disgraceful telegram.” The Führer had tears in his eyes, according to Hanna Reitsch; his head sagged, his face was pale, and his hand was shaking uncontrollably as he showed them Goering's telegram. “An ultimatum!” he shouted. “A crass ultimatum.” Greim and Hanna Reitsch grasped Hitler's hands and swore to atone with their lives for the wrong Goering had done their beloved Führer.

While Hitler was cursing the name of Goering on the evening of April 26, the former Reich Marshal, his staff, his family and his guards were facing the ordeal of life in an air-raid shelter without adequate sanitary equipment. Early in the morning there had been a heavy raid on Berchtesgaden during which considerable damage had been done to Hitler's and Goering's chalets; captives and captors alike only just reached the shelter in time.
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By dawn the following day, April 27, Koller, in response to Hitler's summons, managed to fly north as far as Rechlin. There he found it impossible to continue his journey, and he spent an unhappy day with Jodl, Keitel, Doenitz and Himmler, who avoided any mention of Goering in case they might seem to share in his disgrace. “Why, yes,” said Himmler. “That affair of the Reich Marshal. Most unfortunate.” He said he would talk about it later, but had far too much to do at present. jodl and Keitel also feigned such pressure of work that they could not possibly spare time to listen to Koller's loyal attempts to re-establish Goering's name. “No doubt Goering meant well,” said Doenitz noncommitally. “We'll talk about it after lunch.” Eventually Greim spoke to Koller on the telephone and told him that there were after all no orders for him to come to Berlin (Bormann was seeing to it that any further thought of Goering should be banished from Hitler's mind), and that he had better go back to Berchtesgaden. Much relieved, he left at three-ten on the morning of April 28, but he was delayed on his journey and did not reach the Obersalzberg until April 29. There he learned that Goering had been removed, no one knew where.

Goering had in fact been taken to his castle of Mauterndorf at his own request.
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The shelter was plainly an impossible place for a prolonged stay, and the S.S. had been persuaded to transport Goering, together with his family and certain members of his staff, on the icy mountain roads between Berchtesgaden and Mauterndorf.

Meanwhile in Berlin, Hitler had gone through the macabre celebration of his underground marriage to Eva Braun preparatory to his suicide, and then left his bride while he dictated his last will and testament during the small hours of the night. In it he referred directly to his suicide in the same sentence in which he formally rid himself of his oldest surviving comrade. “Before my death,” he dictated to his secretary, “I expel former Reich Marshal Hermann Goering from the party and withdraw from him all rights that were conferred on him by the decree of June 29, 1941 . . . In his place I appoint Admiral Doenitz as President of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. . . . Goering and Himmler, by their secret negotiations with the enemy without my knowledge or approval, and by their illegal attempts to seize power in the State, quite apart from their treachery to my person, have brought irreparable shame on the country and the whole people.” Later that day he added a postscript to this formidable document of revenge on the German people; this postscript was addressed to Keitel on behalf of the armed forces. It does not survive, but was seen by Colonel von Below, who was a witness of Hitler's personal will. In it he uttered his final denunciation of Goering, praised the Luftwaffe for its bravery and blamed Goering for its failure. The next day, after formal handshakes, Hitler went to his room and shot himself through the mouth. This was at half past three on the afternoon of April 30. His body and that of his Eva, who had poisoned herself, were burned outside in the Chancellery garden in the late afternoon. Hitler's death destroyed the Third Reich and ended the martyrdom of Europe.

That same day two messengers in civilian clothes slipped into Berchtesgaden and visited Koller. They came, it seemed, from Goering in order to tell Koller how angry he was at what he termed Koller's “betrayal.” This oral message was followed by one even more insulting. Koller's secretary received a telephone message from Mauterndorf in which Goering said, “If Koller isn't a swine, if he has a spark of decency left, he will come to see me tomorrow morning.” This, naturally enough, angered Koller, more especially as it would mean spending many hours on the treacherous roads between Berchtesgaden and Mauterndorf.

The following day, May 1, was the first on which the world was free from the shadow of Hitler. But in the south they knew nothing yet of this. All Koller knew during the morning was that the road to Mauterndorf was almost impassable owing to military traffic and the icy conditions. But at noon a senior officer of the S.S. arrived with a sinister message signed by Bormann: “The situation in Berlin is more tense. If Berlin and we should fall, the traitors of April 23 must be exterminated. Men, do your duty! Your life and honor depend on it!” Koller, nervous that he might be considered one of these traitors, was relieved to find that the officer had come to him to explain that the S.S. hated Bormann and would never obey this order.

Later that evening another S.S. officer, Standartenführer Brause, arrived from Mauterndorf after taking some thirty-six hours to complete a journey that normally took less than three. Brause was quite open about the matter; he had made friends with Goering, but could not liberate him without proper authorization. “Herr General,” he said, “you have more troops than I have. Why don't you liberate Goering by force?” Everyone by now needed an alibi. Koller felt he should get Goering liberated by order of Kesselring, the commander in the south. Kesselring, whom he telephoned, felt the order should come through Doenitz. All of them by now had heard officially of Hitler's death and knew of Doenitz' new position of authority. It had been announced by the Hamburg radio at ten o'clock that night.

The following day, May 2, Koller, who still felt it was useless for him to respond to Goering's continual commands and travel personally to Mauterndorf, attempted in vain to press Kesselring to give the order for his release. Meanwhile he sent what Luftwaffe men he could to Mauterndorf to give Goering as large a personal entourage as possible.

The situation was so uncertain and the communications so poor that no one seemed to know how best to fulfill what might be thought his duty. Both the Russians and the Americans were advancing closer each day, and everyone was anxious to fall into the hands of the Americans if possible. For this reason Koller began to worry about Goering, since Mauterndorf was east and therefore nearer to the Russians. It seemed plain from what he had heard that Goering had regained the initiative and, short of actual freedom, was having things much his own way. Koller, who very sensibly insisted on staying where he was and sending what help and messages he could to Goering, heard on May 4 that the Americans were advancing toward Berchtesgaden. On May 5 a certain General Pickert, who had passed through Mauterndorf the previous day, told Koller he had seen Goering standing at the entrance to the castle and had spoken to him in the presence of Brause. Goering wanted more men to protect him. “Koller must act now,” he had said. He believed he was the most popular member of the Nazi leadership abroad, and that but for Bormann's intrigues he would now be Hitler's lawful successor. “Everyone knew my first move would have been to liquidate Bormann,” he said. Asrit was, he still wanted to meet Eisenhower and talk things out “man to man.”
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According to an account he gave subsequently, Goering in fact brought about his own release. During an interrogation he explained that he had seen men from a Luftwaffe signals unit passing by the castle; he had shouted to them, ordering them to come and rescue him. This was precisely what the S.S. wanted in any case, and no resistance was offered. Goering was delighted with this piece of strategy. “It was one of the most beautiful moments in my life,” he said, “to stand there in front of my troops and see them present arms to their Commander in Chief.” On May 5 Kesselring formally notified Koller of Goering's release and that he was sending a signal to Doenitz stating that Goering was ready to go and talk to Eisenhower.

Once he was released, Goering himself sent a message to Doenitz, dated May 6.

Are you, Admiral, familiar with the intrigues, dangerous to the security of the State, which Reich Leader Bormann has carried on to eliminate me? All steps taken against me arose out of the request sent by me in all loyalty to the Führer, asking whether he wished that his order concerning his succession should come into force. . . . The steps taken against me were carried out on the authority of a radiogram signed “Bormann.” I have not been interrogated by anybody in spite of my requests and no attempt of mine to justify my position has been accepted. Reichführer-S. S. Himmler can confirm the immense extent of these intrigues.

I have just learned that you intend to send Jodl to Eisenhower with a view to negotiating. I think it important in the interests of our people that, besides the official negotiations of Jodl, I should officially approach Eisenhower, as one marshal to another. My success in all the important negotiations abroad with which the Führer always entrusted me before the war is sufficient guarantee that I can hope to create the personal atmosphere appropriate for Jodl's negotiations. Moreover, both Great Britain and America have proved through their press and their radio, and in the declarations of their statesmen during the last few years, that their attitude toward me is more favorable than toward other political leaders in Germany. I think that at this most difficult hour all should collaborate and that nothing should be neglected which might assure as far as possible the future of Germany.