Goering (21 page)

Goering's interest in taking part in the economic life of Germany had begun during 1935, when, after consultation with Dr. Schacht, Hitler's Minister of Economics and (after May 1935) Plenipotentiary-General for War Economy, he had made a speech in Hamburg on the German rearmament program in which he boasted of the need to sacrifice butter for guns. “What does butter do but make us fat?” he cried, and the crowd under the floodlights roared in response to Hermann's wit. Hitler's open proclamation, in March, of conscription to bring the Army up to thirty-six divisions, and then again, on April 1, of the official existence of Goering's Luftwaffe, dropped the transparent veil of secrecy surrounding German rearmament. Schacht, ever since his national appointment as Minister of Economics in September 1934, had acted in Hitler's interest with speed and skill, printing special paper money which did not even have to be accounted for in the published statements of the banks in order to pay the armaments manufacturers. He built up foreign credit like magic on the basis of barter, so that raw materials for the war industries might be imported. Such actions appealed to Goering, and he longed to play his part in them. As far as any knowledge of economics was concerned, he knew he was entirely ignorant, but he trusted his flair in this wide-open field just as he did in the field of diplomacy, and he shared Hitler's dislike of the professionals with their long-winded reasons why what was wanted could not be done. Schacht, in a matter of months, had maneuvered the German economy onto a war basis, organized the manufacture of tanks, aircraft and guns, and, by encouraging government expenditure, continued the spectacular conquest of unemployment, which had already been more than halved by December 1934.

Goering's first official step toward economic control of Germany came when Schacht asked Hitler for help from someone of high authority in the party to deal with currency abuses abroad which were being practiced by party officials at a time when Germany's resources in other countries were strained. Schacht suggested Goering, and on April 27, 1936, Hitler announced that the Minister President would in future take charge of foreign-exchange control and the import of raw materials. Goering accepted this new charge with alacrity, if only for the purpose of using it as a means toward extending his range of power; his nephew, Herbert Goering, was an official in the Reichsbank and anything Goering did not understand he could quite easily resolve within the family. Two weeks after his appointment he convened the first of a series of meetings at which Schacht was present; at these conferences he emphasized the necessity to develop synthetic raw-material substitutes and answered objections to the prohibitive costs involved by saying, “If we have war tomorrow we must help ourselves by substitutes. Then money will not play any part at all.”

Hitler found economic planning both troublesome and uninteresting except insofar as he could understand the subject in terms of political expediency. He regarded the plebiscite of March 27 as an overwhelming reassurance from the German people that his policy was approved by all. This convinced him that the German nation was ready to pay the price of rearmament, and that the most popular man among his leaders was necessary to rally the people and symbolize the cause.

During the summer Hitler drew up the model for a Four-Year Plan for the German economy; according to Gritzbach, Goering was summoned to Berchtesgaden to hear it and returned dazed with admiration. “Never have I been so impressed by the strength of the Führer, by his logic, and by the boldness of his ideas . . . There will be consternation abroad!” At a meeting of ministers at which he presided on September 4, Goering's new interest was already much in evidence, though his appointment had not been announced. He lectured his colleagues on the need to make German industry self-sufficient as if the nation were already at war. Germany must do what Russia had done; after all, he said, it was inevitable that one day Germany and Russia would be at war.
¹⁰

The first announcement of the plan and of the appointment of Goering as its Commissioner was made at the annual party rally at Nuremberg in September. This rally was the most spectacular yet staged and matched in splendor, pageantry and the magnificent organization of its processions and its patterns of massed humanity the grandeur that had been Germany. The formal proclamation giving Goering his new powers followed on October 18; he was authorized “to issue decrees and general administrative directions” and given the right to “question and issue directives to all, including the highest Reich authorities.” The plan was due to come into operation by February 1937, and Goering stated that his job was “to put the whole economy on a war footing within four years.”
¹¹

It is characteristic of Hitler that he gave this far-reaching authority to Goering without first consulting Schacht, who was merely informed a few days in advance that a new economic program was to be announced. He was expected to run his ministry alongside Goering's new department, which at once began to accumulate a large staff of officials and to increase the administrative complications involved in a controlled economy. It was inevitable that Schacht and Goering, who had formerly been on terms of friendship, should soon begin to differ. To Schacht the Four-Year Plan seemed little but a crude and unprofessional hastening of the measures he had himself taken. In his later writings he mentions as instances the extraction of benzine from coal and the extension of mining operations and of the whaling fleet; Goering simply took over Schacht's plans and inflated them. At the same time he mounted the platform and turned the rough lessons he had learned about economics into popular speech, hammering the message home with the blows of patriotism. “Never again must a foreign hand grip us by the throat . . . Our plan must succeed—say that over and over to yourselves as you get up in the morning . . . I shall suppress all parasites . . . hoarders will be treated as swindlers . . . A great age demands a great nation.” The audience filling the Deutschlandhalle on October 28 listened to the familiar voice vibrating through the loudspeakers, and the microphone on the platform carried the words throughout the land in a broadcast to the German people. Much was made in the press of the public response to this mighty harangue, and the sentimental stories grew of the party man who collected 637 wedding rings from the fingers of his comrades to help the nation and of the little girl who sent her golden bracelet as a gift to Goering. Later he himself stood in the streets of Berlin laughing and shaking a collection box while people pressed around him to push foreign coins into the slot.

Goering had already announced his first labor decree on October 24, ordering additional labor for harvesting vegetable crops. On November 9 further decrees were issued to recruit labor for the rearmament program. As economic dictator of Germany, Goering gloried in his amateur status. “I do not acknowledge the sanctity of any economic law,” he said. “Economy must always be the servant of the nation . . . I have never been a director or on a board of directors and never shall be. Neither am I an agriculturist. Except for a few flower pots on the balcony I have never cultivated anything. But I am ready with all my heart and soul, and with firm belief in the greatness of the German nation, to devote all my energies to this mighty task.”

In December Goering held a conference of industrialists, and Schacht was shocked to hear him invite his audience to bring foreign bills of exchange into the country by any method, legal or illegal, and urge industry to produce whether it made a profit or a loss. Schacht claims that he responded by telling a similar audience a few weeks later that evasions of the laws of exchange were still punishable as far as he was concerned, and that to produce at a loss would be to “consume the very life substance of the German people.” When Goering complained of this, Schacht refused to change his attitude, so Goering took over the responsibility for placing all orders for armaments from Schacht's ministry .
¹²
Having established his department, he placed his old friend Pilli Koerner in charge of it with the rank of Secretary of State. This was to prove a grave error; Koerner was quite incompetent to deal with the intricate problems of industry, of which he had no understanding whatsoever.

In foreign affairs, the second six months of 1936 saw the gradual closing of the gap between Germany and Italy. Mussolini had approved the “gentleman's agreement” negotiated by Papen with Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, successor to Dollfuss as Federal Chancellor of Austria, and signed in July; in this Hitler had recognized the sovereignty of Austria in exchange for the right of the Austrian Nazis to share political responsibility in the State—an important step toward the future
Anschluss.
Mussolini's open intervention in Spain hardened Britain against Italy, while British sponsorship of sanctions in the League Assembly hardened Mussolini against Britain. By November the Duce was using the term “axis” in reference to Italy's relations with Germany and was losing interest in giving active support to the independence of Austria, where Papen was slowly but successfully preparing the way for the
Anschluss.
Ribbentrop was appointed ambassador to Britain to keep relations with Britain as favorable as could be, and in May 1937 Neville Chamberlain became British Prime Minister, with Lord Halifax as his Foreign Secretary.

In January 1937 Goering went to Italy to exercise what influence he could on Mussolini, who had just signed what Papen would have called a “gentleman's agreement” with Britain, in which both countries guaranteed to maintain the freedom of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, Mussolini was equally aware of Ribbentrop's attempts to win support in Britain for Germany's territorial ambitions. At the beginning of 1937 Hitler's attitude to Austria still remained the most serious stumbling block in the path of friendship between the two dictators.

Goering traveled by train from Berlin to Rome with Count Massimo Magistrati, a senior official on the staff of the Italian embassy and the brother-in-law of Count Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. Goering was in the habit of talking against Britain to Magistrati, and, like Hitler, he was annoyed about the naval agreement. On the train he said that Italy and Germany must prepare for the final clash with Britain; militarily speaking, Germany would be ready for this in three years; he explained that discussion of the Austrian problem was the principal reason for his journey, and that Italy need never fear to have a common frontier with Germany. “In any case,” Goering added as the train neared Rome, “Germany will indulge in no surprises, and whatever decision she makes on questions so vital to her as those of Austria, Danzig or Memel will be preceded by understandings with Italy.” When Mussolini received the report of this conversation, he expressed anger that Goering should think he feared having the Germans at the Brenner.
¹³

Goering took Schmidt with him to Italy to interpret, and, after some discussions with Count Ciano on mutual aid to Franco, they went in the afternoon of January 15 to the Palazzo Venezia to meet Mussolini. Goering and the
chef de
protocol
, standing stomach to stomach, filled the only lift available, and Schmidt had to run up the stairs and round the rising carriage to be ready to meet his chief at the upper door. They passed along passages hung with armor, through the Hall of the Fascist High Council with its furnishings covered in dark-blue velvet, into an anteroom where Ciano was waiting for them, ready to take them to Mussolini's large but sparsely furnished study, with its marble floor and large globe of the world. Mussolini rose in the distance and walked the full length of the room to greet them. He gave Goering the Fascist salute, and they sat down.

They spoke of Spain, the bravery of the Spaniards and their poor tactics, and the unofficial, “voluntary” help Italy and Germany were giving to Franco. Mussolini was very guarded in what he said. Goering, less guarded, boasted enthusiastically of the German transport planes that were carrying Franco's Moroccan troops into Spain. “Franco has much to thank us for,” he added. “I hope he'll remember it later.”

When they turned to the discussion of Europe, the conversation went less well. Mussolini showed his anger about sanctions; Goering was blunt about the coming of the
Anschluss
in Austria. Mussolini, who understood and spoke some German, watched Goering closely while he talked, but he asked Schmidt to translate what Goering said into French and then shook his head vigorously, though he said nothing. He sat upright, short and squat, his brown eyes fixed on Goering; in most matters except Austria he expressed agreement in short, concise sentences with Hitler's view of Europe as Goering explained it.

Yet it was to gain ground on the Austrian question that was the principal reason for Goering's visit. Ulrich von Hassell, the German ambassador in Rome, was particularly anxious that he should be reticent. When Goering had told him, “Italy should keep her hands off Austria and recognize her as a German sphere of interest so that even an
Anschluss
could be carried out if we so desired,” Hassell had replied that the Duce did indeed now recognize that a union of some sort was inevitable, but feared that Hitler's ambitions would tempt him to expand further south than the Brenner frontier; he urged Goering to make the whole matter seem as long-term as possible and to assure Mussolini that he would be consulted before any action was taken. Goering was to see Mussolini again on January 23 after a brief trip to Capri; meanwhile in Rome he made no secret in various conversations he had that the Nazis were being persecuted in Austria.