Fighting Terrorism (5 page)
Read Fighting Terrorism Online
Authors: Benjamin Netanyahu
As the constitutional scholar Walter Berns pointed out at the Jonathan Institute's 1984 conference, even a great defender of democracy like Abraham Lincoln was forced to assume extraordinary powers when the security of the American nation was in jeopardy. Among his other encroachments on civil liberties which he deemed to be endangering the United States, he authorized the execution by firing squad of those who used their freedom of speech to demoralize the Union armies and incite criminal defections. His justification was that in impinging on the rights of the agitator, he protected the rights of the rest of society: “Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? ⦠I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but a great mercy.” What distinguishes Lincoln's case from our case today, in which the idea of curtailing freedom of speech in order to protect the United States is so difficult for many to accept? According to Berns, the answer is that Lincoln truly believed that the survival of the society he deeply cherished was in jeopardy. Lincoln called America “the last best hope of earth”âand meant it. And valuing the unique society that had been built there, he could not find the rationale to grant those who did not value it the freedoms that would enable them to destroy it.
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The terrorism of today has obviously in no way
reached the dimensions of the Civil War in jeopardizing the United States. Nor can we disregard the natural development of the concept of civil liberties over the intervening century. But the unchecked growth of terrorism is a grave danger in and of itself. Rampant terrorism is a mortal threat to any society. Of course, the need to cut back on the absolute freedom of the terrorist, a freedom which ultimately undermines democracy, does not by any means mean that law enforcement agencies should be granted absolute freedom either. As always in forging a legal system, the key is in striking a judicious compromise.
reached the dimensions of the Civil War in jeopardizing the United States. Nor can we disregard the natural development of the concept of civil liberties over the intervening century. But the unchecked growth of terrorism is a grave danger in and of itself. Rampant terrorism is a mortal threat to any society. Of course, the need to cut back on the absolute freedom of the terrorist, a freedom which ultimately undermines democracy, does not by any means mean that law enforcement agencies should be granted absolute freedom either. As always in forging a legal system, the key is in striking a judicious compromise.
In the European democracies, two methods have been developed for ensuring that the executive branch's efforts against terrorism remain within the bounds of the legitimate effort to save lives. The British model, which dates back to 1973 and the beginning of intensified terrorism by the new Irish Republican Army (IRA), controls the activities of the security services by requiring that they annually receive a new legislative mandate from Parliament. Thus, the burden of proof lies with law enforcement officials to demonstrate that their special powers are justified and under control; failure to do so means the automatic expiration of their license to act. On the Continent, on the other hand, the responsibility for keeping an eye on the activities of the security services is usually concentrated in the hands of the judicial system, which reviews anti-terror actions to make sure that they can be justified out of legitimate concerns for public safety, generally within a specified number of days. Requiring
periodic renewal of a legislative mandate and judicial review within a prescribed period permits the public, through its elected representatives and judges, to monitor the activities of its monitors.
periodic renewal of a legislative mandate and judicial review within a prescribed period permits the public, through its elected representatives and judges, to monitor the activities of its monitors.
But perhaps the most important factor in regulating the conduct of counter-terrorism by democratic governments is the independent investigative powers of the free pressâand the right of the citizens to turn their government out of power if they feel it has gone too far. Presumably a public recognizing that the govenment had begun to slide down the road to oppression through reckless violations of civil rights would in short order find somebody more respectful of its interests. Yet the history of European counter-terrorism reveals no such public reaction, and for good reason. In Britain, Germany, Italy, and France, such active measures have had next to no adverse effects on the civil liberties of the overwhelming majority of citizens, a fact which is emphasized by the lack of any democratic backlash worth mentioning. These countries remain perfectly and fully democratic in every wayâbut their citizens feel more secure as a result of responsible government efforts to ensure that those inciting and preparing for political violence are kept at bay.
Both experience and common sense suggest, then, that the fascist and Marxist theory that democracies are weak and incapable of defending themselves against the superior ideological motivation of their terrorist opponents is groundless. Indeed, the exact reverse is true: The Western democracies are inherently very strong, precisely due
to the nearly universal ideological ties which, beneath the cacophony of democratic politics, quietly unite their peoples. It is the terrorists who are in fact weak, resorting to bombs only because they can get no one to listen to them in any other fashion. It only remains to a democratic society to
decide
that it is willing to use the tools at its disposal to eliminate the scourge of domestic terror, and this end can be achieved with astonishing speed.
to the nearly universal ideological ties which, beneath the cacophony of democratic politics, quietly unite their peoples. It is the terrorists who are in fact weak, resorting to bombs only because they can get no one to listen to them in any other fashion. It only remains to a democratic society to
decide
that it is willing to use the tools at its disposal to eliminate the scourge of domestic terror, and this end can be achieved with astonishing speed.
It is natural that a society of free citizens should shrink before a path which inevitably involves limiting the very liberties which the society is committed to protect. For granting extensive security powers to law enforcement officials in a vast nation is impossible without encountering a certain number of abuses as well. And while such abuses may be relatively unimportant during wartime or when the terror threat appears to be entirely out of control, it is also natural that when the authorities get the upper hand and the threat recedes somewhat, the relative importance of every abuse will grow again, raising the demand for more careful oversight of the security services. Thus it seems that the democracies are destined to wander to and fro between the poles of too much liberty and too extensive a security effort, walking the fine line between security and freedom. But so long as the tension between these two poles is maintained, without one extreme becoming the permanent fixation of the society and its ruin, the democracies can hope to have the best of both, remaining at once free and secure.
The prospect of constantly being jostled by the swings of this pendulum is not all that pleasant, but it is not
that bad either. And as America stands before the crucial decision to embark on a path that many other mature democracies have had to take, it must bear in mind Spinoza's great injunction. No thinker was more important in laying the philosophical foundations of the modern democratic state, yet in his
Theological-Political Treatise
, Spinoza was careful to define clear limits to personal freedoms, including the pivotal one of freedom of speech, without which the meaning of democracy is vitiated. “We cannot deny that [the] authority [of the state] may be as much injured by words as by actions; hence ⦠[the] unlimited concession [of free speech] would be most baneful ⦔ Those kinds of speech which should not be permitted are “those which by their very nature nullify the [social] compact ⦔
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that bad either. And as America stands before the crucial decision to embark on a path that many other mature democracies have had to take, it must bear in mind Spinoza's great injunction. No thinker was more important in laying the philosophical foundations of the modern democratic state, yet in his
Theological-Political Treatise
, Spinoza was careful to define clear limits to personal freedoms, including the pivotal one of freedom of speech, without which the meaning of democracy is vitiated. “We cannot deny that [the] authority [of the state] may be as much injured by words as by actions; hence ⦠[the] unlimited concession [of free speech] would be most baneful ⦔ Those kinds of speech which should not be permitted are “those which by their very nature nullify the [social] compact ⦔
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We need not adopt Spinoza's particular prescription regarding which kinds of speech are to be regulated in order to preserve democracy. But we should recognize the larger principle that he is articulating: that civil liberties should sometimes be limited not only at the point when physical violence is actually being perpetrated against others but also when such action is being incited, planned, and organized. That is, democracies have a right and a duty to protect themselves in advance against those who would set out to destroy their societies and extinguish their freedoms.
The 1980s: Successes Against International Terrorism
T
he Western democracies are capable of eliminating the domestic terror in their midst only if they decide to make use of the operational tools presently at their disposal. But such optimism would be misplaced with regard to international terrorism, a much hardier and more implacable nemesis. What road should the United States and other democracies pursue if they are to overcome not only the domestic terror of Oklahoma City but the potentially much more insidious international terror which produced the World Trade Center bombing, and which may very well produce other such tragedies before it has been defeated? To answer this question, we must first understand the nature and genesis of international terrorism and the process by which it has assumed its present form.
he Western democracies are capable of eliminating the domestic terror in their midst only if they decide to make use of the operational tools presently at their disposal. But such optimism would be misplaced with regard to international terrorism, a much hardier and more implacable nemesis. What road should the United States and other democracies pursue if they are to overcome not only the domestic terror of Oklahoma City but the potentially much more insidious international terror which produced the World Trade Center bombing, and which may very well produce other such tragedies before it has been defeated? To answer this question, we must first understand the nature and genesis of international terrorism and the process by which it has assumed its present form.
International terrorism is the use of terrorist violence against a given nation
by another state
, which uses the terrorists to fight a proxy war as an alternative to conventional war. Sometimes the terror is imported at the initiative of a foreign movement which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, at the very least in the form of a benign passivity which encourages the growth of such groups on its own soil. The reason that international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot is that the support of a modern state can provide the international terrorist with everything that the domestic terrorist usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assistance. An alien, non-democratic society may be able to provide the depth of support for terrorist ideas to spawn a genuine terrorist army; it can offer professional training and equipment for covert operations, as well as diplomatic cover and other crucial logistical aid; it can make available virtually unlimited funds; and most important of all, it can ensure a safe haven to which the terrorists may escape and from which they can then emerge anew. Thus, with the support of a terrorist state, the terrorist is no longer a lonely and hunted fugitive from society. He becomes part of a different social milieu, which encourages him, nurtures him, protects him, and sees to it that he succeeds. The absurdly lopsided contest between the Western security services and the terrorist is under these circumstances no longer lopsided. It now pits the formidable resources of the West against the nearly comparable resources of a foreign state or network of statesâand in this contest it is by no means immediately clear who will emerge the victor.
by another state
, which uses the terrorists to fight a proxy war as an alternative to conventional war. Sometimes the terror is imported at the initiative of a foreign movement which nevertheless enjoys the support of a sovereign state, at the very least in the form of a benign passivity which encourages the growth of such groups on its own soil. The reason that international terrorism is so persistent and so difficult to uproot is that the support of a modern state can provide the international terrorist with everything that the domestic terrorist usually lacks in the way of cultural and logistical assistance. An alien, non-democratic society may be able to provide the depth of support for terrorist ideas to spawn a genuine terrorist army; it can offer professional training and equipment for covert operations, as well as diplomatic cover and other crucial logistical aid; it can make available virtually unlimited funds; and most important of all, it can ensure a safe haven to which the terrorists may escape and from which they can then emerge anew. Thus, with the support of a terrorist state, the terrorist is no longer a lonely and hunted fugitive from society. He becomes part of a different social milieu, which encourages him, nurtures him, protects him, and sees to it that he succeeds. The absurdly lopsided contest between the Western security services and the terrorist is under these circumstances no longer lopsided. It now pits the formidable resources of the West against the nearly comparable resources of a foreign state or network of statesâand in this contest it is by no means immediately clear who will emerge the victor.
As late as 1979, when my colleagues and I had organized one of the first conferences on international terrorism, there were still many who did not recognize that there was such a thing as
international
terror. The wild growth of terrorism against the United States and virtually every one of its allies over the preceding two decades was often understood to be the result of a proliferation of technology, which had suddenly permitted “frustrated” individuals to become much more effective in expressing domestic social outrage that had always been there. At the time, many of the journalists attending the conference, and even some of the participants, believed that the support of states for terrorism was an incidental phenomenon, and that its essence lay in the domestic causes that “spontaneously” generated the violence.
international
terror. The wild growth of terrorism against the United States and virtually every one of its allies over the preceding two decades was often understood to be the result of a proliferation of technology, which had suddenly permitted “frustrated” individuals to become much more effective in expressing domestic social outrage that had always been there. At the time, many of the journalists attending the conference, and even some of the participants, believed that the support of states for terrorism was an incidental phenomenon, and that its essence lay in the domestic causes that “spontaneously” generated the violence.
But it was nothing of the sort. As has by now been revealed in the wake of the collapse of Soviet Communism in 1989, most of the international terror that plagued the world from the late 1960s through the mid-1980s was the product of an
ad hoc
alliance between the Soviet bloc and dictatorial Arab regimes. Together, these two groups of states sponsored or supported most of the international terrorist activities that took place during this period.
ad hoc
alliance between the Soviet bloc and dictatorial Arab regimes. Together, these two groups of states sponsored or supported most of the international terrorist activities that took place during this period.
The proclivity toward terror on the Soviet side had clearly defined origins. The philosophical roots of European and Soviet terrorism may be traced to an anti-czarist group called Narodnaya Volya, or The People's Will, which in 1879 began a campaign which eventually succeeded in killing Czar Alexander II as a representative
of the autocratic, capitalist, Russian Orthodox social system which was to be destroyed in its entirety. The success of subsequent domestic terrorists, such as the Social Revolutionaries (SR), in breaking down the prestige of the czarist government and preparing the way for the revolution taught the Bolshevik leadership the utility and importance of the terrorist method in destabilizing and eventually destroying regimes.
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When Soviet Communism finally emerged as an international power in 1945, after the defeat of Germany, it was these indelible memories which became one of the underlying motifs of Soviet foreign policy. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes trained insurgents and assassins from Italy, Greece, French Indochina, and Portuguese Africa in terrorist methods.
of the autocratic, capitalist, Russian Orthodox social system which was to be destroyed in its entirety. The success of subsequent domestic terrorists, such as the Social Revolutionaries (SR), in breaking down the prestige of the czarist government and preparing the way for the revolution taught the Bolshevik leadership the utility and importance of the terrorist method in destabilizing and eventually destroying regimes.
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When Soviet Communism finally emerged as an international power in 1945, after the defeat of Germany, it was these indelible memories which became one of the underlying motifs of Soviet foreign policy. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes trained insurgents and assassins from Italy, Greece, French Indochina, and Portuguese Africa in terrorist methods.
Italy provides a telling example of how the Soviet terrorist network operated. Marxist assassins in Italy were already receiving training in the Soviet satellite states of Czechoslovakia and the former Yugoslavia in the period immediately following World War II. By the close of the 1940s, a terrorist group called Volante Rosa was carrying out attacks and assassinations against government targets in Italy, and fleeing to Czechoslovakia when they felt threatened by the authorities. Another subversive organization was Pietro Secchia's Communist paramilitary group, which was strong and professional enough in 1948 to seize control of some sections of northern Italy and assume control of the national telephone network. When Secchia's group disintegrated in 1953, he and many of his followers fled to the Czech capital of Prague. In the
late 1960s, Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) began operating a training course for foreign terrorists in Czechoslovakia, whose graduates included many of the early leaders of the Italian Red Brigades. The founder of the Red Brigades was Carlo Curcio, who also traveled repeatedly to Prague, where he conferred with veterans of the Secchia group. Similarly, the Italian publisher-terrorist Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, another graduate of the GRU course, traveled to Czechoslovakia twenty-two times between 1969 and 1971, finally defecting with the assistance of the Czech security services. Another Italian extremist group, the Nazi-Maoists, was also apparently a concoction of the Czech intelligence services. Additional assistance and training were later given the Red Brigades by the Bulgarian intelligence services, while Sardinian and Sicilian terrorists, as well as Italian neo-Nazi organizations such as Ordine Nero, began receiving training, money, and weapons from the Soviet's new Libyan ally, Muammar Qaddafi.
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late 1960s, Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) began operating a training course for foreign terrorists in Czechoslovakia, whose graduates included many of the early leaders of the Italian Red Brigades. The founder of the Red Brigades was Carlo Curcio, who also traveled repeatedly to Prague, where he conferred with veterans of the Secchia group. Similarly, the Italian publisher-terrorist Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, another graduate of the GRU course, traveled to Czechoslovakia twenty-two times between 1969 and 1971, finally defecting with the assistance of the Czech security services. Another Italian extremist group, the Nazi-Maoists, was also apparently a concoction of the Czech intelligence services. Additional assistance and training were later given the Red Brigades by the Bulgarian intelligence services, while Sardinian and Sicilian terrorists, as well as Italian neo-Nazi organizations such as Ordine Nero, began receiving training, money, and weapons from the Soviet's new Libyan ally, Muammar Qaddafi.
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By the 1960s, the Soviets had established recruitment centers for terrorists of both Marxist and non-Marxist varieties in MoscowâCommunist Party members at the Lenin Institute and the non-Marxists at the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University. There “students” were selected for training in a network of training camps in Odessa, Baku, Simferopol, and Tashkent, where they were taught propaganda, bomb making, urban warfare, and assassination techniques. The graduates of such courses were often sent to Cuba, Bulgaria, and North Korea. One of the best-known among them was the notorious
archterrorist RamÃrez Sánchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal.” Carlos had been recruited by the KGB in his native Venezuela and educated in the 1960s both in Cuba and at Patrice Lumumba in Moscow before embarking on one of the most publicized terror sprees of the century, including the takeover of an OPEC ministers' gathering in Vienna in 1975 and a murderous attack on a French police train in 1982.
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(When international terrorism could no longer be pursued on this footing, Carlos had outlived his usefulness, and apparently found a place of refuge in Syriaâuntil he was packed off to the Sudan in 1994 and from there deported to France, apparently sacrificed as a gambit by Syria in order to curry favor with the West.)
archterrorist RamÃrez Sánchez, known as “Carlos the Jackal.” Carlos had been recruited by the KGB in his native Venezuela and educated in the 1960s both in Cuba and at Patrice Lumumba in Moscow before embarking on one of the most publicized terror sprees of the century, including the takeover of an OPEC ministers' gathering in Vienna in 1975 and a murderous attack on a French police train in 1982.
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(When international terrorism could no longer be pursued on this footing, Carlos had outlived his usefulness, and apparently found a place of refuge in Syriaâuntil he was packed off to the Sudan in 1994 and from there deported to France, apparently sacrificed as a gambit by Syria in order to curry favor with the West.)
The willingness to engage in terror, albeit under the control and supervision of the Party hierarchy in Moscow, was always part of Soviet Communist internationalism. Support for the construction of the international terrorist infrastructure was provided by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Soviet Security Police (KGB), and Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU).
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But the centrality of terrorism to Soviet foreign policy emerged only in the 1960s, with the stalemate in the Cold War and the emergence of independent Arab states willing to hitch their oil revenues and their war against Israel to the terrorist internationale. During the 1950s, it still appeared as though containment might fail, and the Communist juggernaut would continue its expansion into Southeast Asia, southern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South America. But by the 1960s, the nuclear balance of terror between
the superpowers had cooled any lingering Soviet interest in open confrontations with the West. The borders of the conflict had more or less stabilized. The Soviet Union was shut out of any substantial influence in the democratic countries, and the Cold War had devolved into a series of proxy confrontations in the Third World. Since a direct assault on the democracies had become unthinkable, the Soviets developed international terror as one of the weapons in their arsenal for carrying on the Communist struggle in many Western strongholds, while maintaining plausible deniability about their complicity.
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But the centrality of terrorism to Soviet foreign policy emerged only in the 1960s, with the stalemate in the Cold War and the emergence of independent Arab states willing to hitch their oil revenues and their war against Israel to the terrorist internationale. During the 1950s, it still appeared as though containment might fail, and the Communist juggernaut would continue its expansion into Southeast Asia, southern Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and South America. But by the 1960s, the nuclear balance of terror between
the superpowers had cooled any lingering Soviet interest in open confrontations with the West. The borders of the conflict had more or less stabilized. The Soviet Union was shut out of any substantial influence in the democratic countries, and the Cold War had devolved into a series of proxy confrontations in the Third World. Since a direct assault on the democracies had become unthinkable, the Soviets developed international terror as one of the weapons in their arsenal for carrying on the Communist struggle in many Western strongholds, while maintaining plausible deniability about their complicity.
Here the carefully concealed, one-step-removed brand of Soviet-supported terrorism found a ready partner in the rabid anti-Western antipathies of the radical Arab regimes led by Syria, Libya, and Iraq. Most of these countries were established in mid-century, and they fulminated with rage over what they considered to be centuries of Western oppression of a humiliated Arab world. Even less able than the Soviets to take on the West directly, these Arab regimes embarked on a covert terrorist campaign against American and Western targets, though they showed little of the aptitude and finesse of the Soviets in covering their tracks. Terror, of course, had been a staple crop of Middle Eastern politics for a thousand years, since the time of the eleventh-century Shiite Assassin sect, originally called
hashishin
, for the hashish with which they drugged themselves to better carry out their deadly attacks against their Seljuk Turkish rulers. But it was only with the emergence of independent Arab states that this tested weapon of subduing opponents was transformed
into a habitual tool of foreign policy, rivaling oil as the Middle East's chief export, and reaching practically every part of the world.
hashishin
, for the hashish with which they drugged themselves to better carry out their deadly attacks against their Seljuk Turkish rulers. But it was only with the emergence of independent Arab states that this tested weapon of subduing opponents was transformed
into a habitual tool of foreign policy, rivaling oil as the Middle East's chief export, and reaching practically every part of the world.
State-sponsored terror of a more limited variety had in fact been a constant factor in the Arab war against Israel. The Jewish communities in mandatory Palestine were subjected to campaigns of terror from the 1920s on. After Israel's independence in 1948, Egypt and Syria continued to encourage cross-border
fedayeen
attacks, which claimed hundreds of lives and resulted in Israeli counteractions on the Arab side of its borders. In 1964 and 1965, Egypt and Syria established rival “Palestine Liberation” groups modeled after the National Liberation Front (FLN), whose eight-year insurgent war had succeeded in driving the French from Algeria only two years earlier. The avowed goal of both of these organizations was the “liberation of Palestine,” which in practice meant liberating it from both the Israeli and the Jordanian states. The Egyptian group, called the Palestine Liberation Organization, was led by Ahmed Shukeiri, whom the diplomat and historian Conor Cruise O'Brien later referred to as a “windbag's windbag.” More deadly was the Fatah organization sponsored by Syria and headed by Yasir Arafat, which by 1967 had mounted a campaign of cross-border attacks primarily against Israeli civilian targets. After the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of that year, Arafat dumped Shukeiri and became the head of a unified PLO structure.
fedayeen
attacks, which claimed hundreds of lives and resulted in Israeli counteractions on the Arab side of its borders. In 1964 and 1965, Egypt and Syria established rival “Palestine Liberation” groups modeled after the National Liberation Front (FLN), whose eight-year insurgent war had succeeded in driving the French from Algeria only two years earlier. The avowed goal of both of these organizations was the “liberation of Palestine,” which in practice meant liberating it from both the Israeli and the Jordanian states. The Egyptian group, called the Palestine Liberation Organization, was led by Ahmed Shukeiri, whom the diplomat and historian Conor Cruise O'Brien later referred to as a “windbag's windbag.” More deadly was the Fatah organization sponsored by Syria and headed by Yasir Arafat, which by 1967 had mounted a campaign of cross-border attacks primarily against Israeli civilian targets. After the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War of that year, Arafat dumped Shukeiri and became the head of a unified PLO structure.
Early on, Arafat recognized that the support of various Arab states would be insufficient to produce any kind of
sustained terrorist campaign against Israel. Egyptian President Nasser's fulminations notwithstanding, Shukeiri had never been permitted to launch extensive attacks from Egyptian soil for fear of triggering an unplanned Israeli response; Arafat himself had been kept on a short leash in Syria, and his gunmen had run into trouble with Jordanian troops from the very first. (In September 1970, King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan in a bloody stroke that left ten thousand dead.) Arafat therefore intensified PLO ties with the Soviet bloc, which would help him wage an unrelenting terrorist war against Israel. One of his first encounters was with Fidel Castro, who had repeatedly welcomed him to Havana from 1965 on. Later, the Soviets trained thousands of PLO operatives, awarded them special diplomatic status, and allowed them free movement throughout the countries of the Eastern bloc.
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sustained terrorist campaign against Israel. Egyptian President Nasser's fulminations notwithstanding, Shukeiri had never been permitted to launch extensive attacks from Egyptian soil for fear of triggering an unplanned Israeli response; Arafat himself had been kept on a short leash in Syria, and his gunmen had run into trouble with Jordanian troops from the very first. (In September 1970, King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan in a bloody stroke that left ten thousand dead.) Arafat therefore intensified PLO ties with the Soviet bloc, which would help him wage an unrelenting terrorist war against Israel. One of his first encounters was with Fidel Castro, who had repeatedly welcomed him to Havana from 1965 on. Later, the Soviets trained thousands of PLO operatives, awarded them special diplomatic status, and allowed them free movement throughout the countries of the Eastern bloc.
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By the early 1970s, Arafat had established a quasi-independent PLO state in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government was too weak to extend its authority into the south of the country, and within this domain Arafat was able to set up shop, creating a mini-state which enjoyed a close relationship with the Soviet Union and its satellites. This quasi-independent base was to be the propelling force behind the tidal wave of international terror which hit the Western democracies in the two decades that followed.
As noted, the Soviets had supported terrorist insurgents since World War II, but had carefully avoided taking direct responsibility for launching terrorist campaigns
against the NATO powers. Other states were in some cases willing to take the heat in exchange for Soviet support in other areas; Libya and North Korea, for example, covered for the Soviets by providing a place of refuge for airline hijackers, allowing the Soviets to insist that they were opposed to this particular type of terror. But Arafat offered what no other nation in the world was willing to provide. Receiving generous Eastern bloc support, he established in Lebanon a training center and launching ground for international terrorism the world over. The Soviets could merely deny knowledge of what was taking place, and the various branches of the PLO would happily collude in a worldwide movement of terror against the Western countries. Like Lenin before him observing the destabilization of czarist Russia at the hands of the SR, Brezhnev could benefit from the destabilization of the capitalist societies under pressure of the terrorist weapon, while being able to keep his hands relatively clean.
against the NATO powers. Other states were in some cases willing to take the heat in exchange for Soviet support in other areas; Libya and North Korea, for example, covered for the Soviets by providing a place of refuge for airline hijackers, allowing the Soviets to insist that they were opposed to this particular type of terror. But Arafat offered what no other nation in the world was willing to provide. Receiving generous Eastern bloc support, he established in Lebanon a training center and launching ground for international terrorism the world over. The Soviets could merely deny knowledge of what was taking place, and the various branches of the PLO would happily collude in a worldwide movement of terror against the Western countries. Like Lenin before him observing the destabilization of czarist Russia at the hands of the SR, Brezhnev could benefit from the destabilization of the capitalist societies under pressure of the terrorist weapon, while being able to keep his hands relatively clean.
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