It should be made clear that I am not speaking here of warnings of impending terrorist attacks. Those are now shared instantaneously by virtually all the intelligence agencies of the West. What is not shared is basic data about terrorist organizations, their membership and their operational structure. These “cards” are often withheld from the intelligence services of other countries (and sometimes even from a rival service in the
same
country) for two reasons: either to protect the source of the information or else, at least as often, out of a habitual organizational
jealousy. But the absence of systematic sharing of intelligence is not a matter of petty one-upmanship. It greatly hinders each democracy as it struggles alone to get a full picture of terrorist activity directed against its citizens, with the inevitable result that lives are needlessly lost. If the democracies wish to successfully confront the new terrorism, there is no choice but for the scope of intelligence cooperation to be increased, and the scope of the jealousies reduced.
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6. Revise legislation to enable greater surveillance and action against organizations inciting to violence, subject to periodic renewal.
In countries repeatedly assaulted by terrorism, a thorough review of the legal measures governing the battle against terrorism may become a necessity from time to time. There are those who say, for example, that the existing powers of the security services of the United States are sufficient to enable them to track terrorist threats; others disagree. I do not presume to enter into this legal debate over the specifics of standing American law. Rather, I propose that the laws of every free society must be such as to permit the security services to move against groups which incite to violence against the country's government or its citizens. The test is simple. If the law does not allow a government to sift through the extremist splinters advocating violence in order to identify which groups are actively
planning
terrorist actions and to shut them down
before
they strike, then the law is insufficient.
Legislation should be reviewed and if necessary
revised to facilitate the following measures in all or part, depending on the degree of the terrorist threat facing each society and its particular culture and legal traditions.
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Outlaw fund-raising and channeling of funds to terrorist groups
. The funding of terrorist activity, both inside and outside a given country, must be made illegal. At present, terrorist groups often “skim” an allocation off charitable funds raised by sympathetic ethnic or religious organizations. Involvement in any stage of this process is tantamount to directly facilitating lethal terror and should be regarded as a crime of that magnitude. The American counter-terror bill more or less takes this step by outlawing fund-raising for any organization designated by the President to be a terrorist group. It does, however, include the bizarre proviso that such terrorist groups may apply for a U.S. government license to fund-raise for those of their activities which are “legitimate.” Whether such an approach can have the intended effect of stopping fund-raising for terrorism in America remains to be seen.
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Permit investigation of groups preaching terror and planning the violent overthrow of the government
. Surveillance of and intelligence gathering on groups exhorting violence and suspected of planning violent attacks must be permitted. If the security services cannot research which groups may be dangerous before they strike, there is little hope of being able to
prevent terrorism from springing up again and again.
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Loosen warrant requirements in terrorist cases. Search
and seizure, detention, and interrogation may be necessary for short periods without a warrant where there is a strong suspicion of terrorist activity. Strict and prompt judicial oversight of such actions can serve as a sufficient deterrent to most government abuses, but it is important to experiment as many democracies have done with the particular regulations. Law enforcement officials should be given considerable freedom to respond quickly to information as it is brought to light, but they should know that they will be subject to review of their activities after the fact.
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Restrict ownership of weapons.
Tighten gun control, beginning with registry of weapons. Israeli law, for example, requires careful licensing of handguns and prohibits the ownership of more powerful weapons, yet gun ownership is widespread. Forbidding the ownership of machine guns is not a denial of the right to own a weapon for self-defense; it is a denial of the right to organize private armiesâa right which no society can grant without eventually having to fight those armies. The continued existence in the United States of heavily armed antigovernment militias numbering thousands of members is a grotesque distortion of the idea of civil freedom, which should be brought to a speedy end.
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Tighten immigration laws.
It is now well known that terrorists from the Middle East and elsewhere have made the United States, Germany, Italy, and other countries into terrorist havens because of laxity in immigration regulation. This era of immigration free-for-all should be brought to an end. An important aspect of taking control of the immigration situation is stricter background checks of potential immigrants, coupled with the real possibility of deportation. The possibility of expulsion must be a threat hovering over all terrorist and pro-terrorist activity in the democracies. The new Clinton administration initiative, for example, defines spokesmen and fund-raisers for terrorist organizations as liable to deportation, makes immigration files available to federal investigators, and establishes a special judicial process for deportations in which classified evidence may be brought without giving the terrorist organizations access to the materials.
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Require periodic legislative review to safeguard civil liberties
. The concern of civil libertarians over possible infringements of the rights of innocent citizens is well placed, and all additional powers granted the security services should require annual renewal by the legislature, this in addition to judicial oversight of actions as they are taken in the field. Thus, hearings may be held to consider the record of possible abuses which have resulted from changes in police authority. If the abuses prove to be too frequent or the results inconclusive in terms of the citizens, the
particular provisions in question can be jettisoned automatically.
The legal provisions suggested above constitute a roster of measures available to a democracy subjected to a sustained threat of terror. A lesser threat usually could require fewer measures. In some countries, these measures would necessarily mean shifting the legal balance between civil liberties and security. There is nothing easy in making this choice. But it is nevertheless crucial that the citizens of the West understand that such options are legitimately available to them, and that, judiciously applied, they may serve to put terrorism back on the defensive.
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7. Actively pursue terrorists.
Legal powers are of course meaningless if they are not accompanied by a commensurate mustering of will to act on the part of the executive branch and the security services. Rooting out terrorist groups must become a top priority for elected officials of all partiesâand one that cannot be allowed to slide from political relevance after a few cases have been cracked. In an age in which the power of the weapons which individuals may obtain grows incredibly from one year to the next, and in which information about how to obtain and use such weapons can be instantly transmitted by electronic mail from any part of the world, an active internal-security policy and aggressive counter-terrorism actions are becoming a crucial part of the mandate of every government, and officials must learn to rise to this challenge. Potential sources of terror
must be studied and understood, groups preaching violence must be penetrated and catalogued, and groups actually preparing for it must be uprooted.
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8. Do not release jailed terrorists.
Among the most important policies which must be adopted in the face of terrorism is the refusal to release convicted terrorists from prisons. This is a mistake that Israel, once the leader in anti-terror techniques, has made over and over again. Release of convicted terrorists before they have served their full sentences seems like an easy and tempting way of defusing blackmail situations in which innocent people may lose their lives. But its utility is momentary at best. Prisoner releases only embolden terrorists by giving them the feeling that even if they are caught their punishment will be brief. Worse, by leading terrorists to think such demands are likely to be met, they encourage precisely the kind of terrorist blackmail which they are supposed to defuse: All that Timothy McVeigh's compatriots need to know is that the United States government is susceptible to releasing him in exchange for the lives of innocent hostages in order to get the terrorists to make just such a demand; only the most unrelenting refusal to ever give in to such blackmail can prevent most such situations from arising.
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9. Train special forces to fight terrorism.
Greater emphasis must be placed on the training of special units equipped for anti-terror operations. In anti-terror training, law enforcers learn to fight a completely different
kind of gun battle, in which the goal is to
hold
their fire rather than to unleash it. Operations against terrorists often involve the rescue of hostages or the possibility that innocent bystanders might be hurt. This necessarily means that the soldiers or policemen charged with fighting terrorism must learn to subdue the natural temptation to concentrate overwhelming fire on the enemy. Counter-terrorist operations usually require the barest minimum application of force necessary to overcome the terrorists, who often use hostages as a human shield.
While those branches of Western security services specializing in counter-intelligence and surveillance generally enjoy a high level of professionalism and training, this is often not the case with the forces that have to do the actual fighting against terrorists. It may be impossible to guarantee that there will be no more scenes such as the one in Waco, Texas, in which scores of cultists and four lawmen were killed. But the likelihood of avoiding such catastrophes is considerably increased if the forces involved are proficient in anti-terror techniques. Such units at the national or federal level are usually adequately trained for these missions, but in a crisis it may take them many hours to arrive on the scene. It is therefore important that units of local police forces be trained in anti-terror tactics as well.
Israel has had some spectacular successes in this area, including the rescue of 103 hostages at Entebbe. But it has also had its share of spectacular failures, the worst of which was the loss of twenty-six schoolchildren being
held hostage in a school building in Maalot. Having specially trained troops that accumulate and refine anti-terror techniques reduces the probability of failure; it does not, of course, mean that terrorists may be fought and hostages rescued without risk. What is crucial to recognize is that the risk to society of
not
challenging the terrorists forcefullyâthat is, of negotiating with them and accepting their demandsâis far greater than the risk involved in the use of special forces. For in negotiating, the government issues an open invitation for more terror, an invitation which puts at risk the safety of every citizen in society.
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10. Educate the public.
The terrorist uses violence to erode the resistance of the public and leaders alike to his political demands. But the resistance of a society to terrorist blackmail may likewise be
strengthened
by counter-terrorist education, which clearly puts forth what the terrorists are trying to achieve, elucidates the immorality of their methods, and explains the necessity of resisting them. Such education is usually unnecessary in the case of sporadic and isolated terrorist attacks, which are almost universally met with an appropriate and natural revulsion. But in the case of a prolonged and sustained campaign lasting months or years, the natural disgust of the public with the terrorist's message begins to break down and is often replaced by a willingness to accommodate terrorist demands. By preparing terrorism-education programs for various age groups and including
them in the school curriculum, the government can inoculate the population against the impulse to give in when faced with protracted terrorist pressure. Familiarity with terrorism and its complete rejection would create a citizenry which is capable of “living with terror”ânot in the sense of accepting terror, but rather in the sense of understanding what is needed for society to survive its attacks with the least damage. And once the terrorists know that virtually the entire population will stand behind the government's decision never to negotiate with them, the possibility of actually extracting political concessions will begin to look exceedingly remote to them.
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With such a program of steadfast resistance to the rising tide of terror, the United States may once again lead the West, as it did in the 1980s, in successfully fighting terrorism. Of course, much of this program is laced with obstacles that only purposeful determination may overcome. The leaders of Western countries may choose instead to avoid taking the tough decisions and continue doing business as usual; they may adopt few or none of these measures, believing that the new wave of terrorism will somehow dissipate of its own accord. It will not. Terrorism has the unfortunate quality of expanding to fill the vacuum left to it by passivity or weakness. And it shrinks accordingly when confronted with resolute and decisive action. Terrorists may test this resolution a number of times before they draw back, and a government has to be prepared to sustain its anti-terror
policies through shrill criticism, anxious calls to give in to terrorists' demands, and even responses of panic. But it is a certainty that there is no way to fight terrorismâother than to fight it.