Fighting Terrorism (3 page)
Read Fighting Terrorism Online
Authors: Benjamin Netanyahu
Following these actions, many of the militias concluded that civil war was coming, and began to say so. Thus the Florida State Militia handbook warns: “We have had enough ⦠violence and bloodshed, enough Waco ⦠and government attacks on Christian Americans,” and calls on its members to “buy ammo now. You will not be able to get it later.” Bo Gritz, who founded an armed community in Idaho called Almost Heaven, has called for the trial and execution of “the traitors who ordered the assaults on the Weavers and Waco.” Samuel Sherwood of the United States Militia Association in Idaho has preached that “civil war could be coming, and with it the need to shoot Idaho legislators.” Norman Olson, leader of the Northern Michigan Regional Militia, understands “warfare, armed rebellion” to be coming “unless the spirit of the country changes.”
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And it is these beliefs which have in the last few years fueled an unprecedented explosion of
membership in these organizations, as thousands of sympathizers and fellow travelers have openly joined their ranks.
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And it is these beliefs which have in the last few years fueled an unprecedented explosion of
membership in these organizations, as thousands of sympathizers and fellow travelers have openly joined their ranks.
The language of militia and patriot ideology was exactly the kind of language used by Timothy McVeigh, the principal suspect in the Oklahoma City bombing, when he wrote in a letter in 1992 to the
Union Sun
&
Journal
of Lockport, New York, that the politicians had gone “out of control”: “Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I hope it doesn't come to that. But it might.”
Union Sun
&
Journal
of Lockport, New York, that the politicians had gone “out of control”: “Do we have to shed blood to reform the current system? I hope it doesn't come to that. But it might.”
None of the militias are willing to openly declare that the war with the United States has
already
started (much as Islamic radicals in the United States, whom I will discuss presently, are unwilling to state publicly that the
jihad
against the United States has already begun). None of them are willing to claim the Oklahoma City bombing as their own, although many profess to “understand the rage” which led to it. Many questions about the Oklahoma City bombing remain unanswered at the time of this writing, including who McVeigh's accomplices were and where he got the cash he used to plan his attack. What is clear is that in the heartland of America, the terrorist puddles are still puddlesâbut in the absence of forceful action by the government of the United States, there is the distinct danger that they will get larger and deeper.
already
started (much as Islamic radicals in the United States, whom I will discuss presently, are unwilling to state publicly that the
jihad
against the United States has already begun). None of them are willing to claim the Oklahoma City bombing as their own, although many profess to “understand the rage” which led to it. Many questions about the Oklahoma City bombing remain unanswered at the time of this writing, including who McVeigh's accomplices were and where he got the cash he used to plan his attack. What is clear is that in the heartland of America, the terrorist puddles are still puddlesâbut in the absence of forceful action by the government of the United States, there is the distinct danger that they will get larger and deeper.
Here one must be careful to maintain an important distinction between the xenophobia and bigotry of political extremism in the democracies, both on the left
and on the right, and actual terrorism. Democracies always have their share of anti-immigrant or antiestablishment parties, as well as advocates of extreme nationalism or internationalism. Though such organizationsâthe French National Front is a good exampleâare unsavory in their views, they are often genuinely convinced participants in democracy, accepting its basic ground rules and defending its central tenets. These can and must be distinguished from the tiny splinters at the absolute fringes of democratic society, which may endorse many similar ideas but use them as a pretext to step outside the rubric of the democratic system to resort to violence and terror. The Ku Klux Klan, which is today attempting a political comeback in America, is forced to adopt softer tones in an attempt to squeeze in at the fringes of the legitimate spectrum. How far would the “new” Klan get if it turned out that it was still active in lynching innocent people in the night, or that it had taken up bombing buildings?
and on the right, and actual terrorism. Democracies always have their share of anti-immigrant or antiestablishment parties, as well as advocates of extreme nationalism or internationalism. Though such organizationsâthe French National Front is a good exampleâare unsavory in their views, they are often genuinely convinced participants in democracy, accepting its basic ground rules and defending its central tenets. These can and must be distinguished from the tiny splinters at the absolute fringes of democratic society, which may endorse many similar ideas but use them as a pretext to step outside the rubric of the democratic system to resort to violence and terror. The Ku Klux Klan, which is today attempting a political comeback in America, is forced to adopt softer tones in an attempt to squeeze in at the fringes of the legitimate spectrum. How far would the “new” Klan get if it turned out that it was still active in lynching innocent people in the night, or that it had taken up bombing buildings?
In short, American society at the close of the twentieth century still lacks a widespread and enduring social and cultural climate for the breeding of domestic terrorist organizations. It even lacks the pernicious chorus of intellectual rationalizers and legitimizers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon who gave European terrorism its short-lived flurry of faddish glamour when it first appeared. While there is a ready audience right now for instant experts expounding on the inevitable proliferation of domestic terrorism in America,
the fact is that domestic terrorism has a bleak future in the United States, precisely because Americansâvirtually
all
Americansâreject it out of hand.
the fact is that domestic terrorism has a bleak future in the United States, precisely because Americansâvirtually
all
Americansâreject it out of hand.
Before I discuss the operational issues involved in defeating domestic terrorism, it is crucial to mention the battle of ideas which constitutes the first and most fundamental defense against terrorism. I have said that Americans, as profound believers in democracy and genuine lovers of their country, are for the most part inoculated against the ideas which are the wellspring of terrorism. But, as in the South of the Ku Klux Klan, it is clear that this was not always the case, and it would be foolish to think that the cultural resistance of Americans is necessarily permanent and undamageable. The intellectual bulwarks of a free society, like all aspects of freedom, have to be constantly nurtured and protected. In the case of the intellectual defense against the appeal of terrorism, the continual explication of democratic values is a fundamental requirement. That means first and foremost advancing the idea that the essence of democratic societies, and that which distinguishes them from dictatorships, is the commitment to resolve conflict in a nonviolent fashion by settling issues through argument and debate, and if the issue is important enoughâthrough ballots rather than bullets.
As long as this ethos is widely maintained, democratic societies can cope with ethnic and social antagonisms, defusing their explosive potential and ultimately dissolving them. But when no such ethos is present, societies can descend into the most horrific bloodshed
over almost any issue, as we have seen most recently in the monumental bloodlettings in Bosnia, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, and Algeria. While the Western democracies are thankfully nowhere near the condition of such countries, they, like all societies, have their frayed edges of unresolved grievances and violent alienation, which, if unattended, can serve as fertile soil for the growth of extremism and terrorism. The continual cultivation of democratic values throughout all levels of society is thus not a luxury or an abstract exercise but a crucial instrument for the survival and well-being of democratic countries.
over almost any issue, as we have seen most recently in the monumental bloodlettings in Bosnia, Rwanda, Uganda, Somalia, and Algeria. While the Western democracies are thankfully nowhere near the condition of such countries, they, like all societies, have their frayed edges of unresolved grievances and violent alienation, which, if unattended, can serve as fertile soil for the growth of extremism and terrorism. The continual cultivation of democratic values throughout all levels of society is thus not a luxury or an abstract exercise but a crucial instrument for the survival and well-being of democratic countries.
The salient point that has to be underlined again and again is that
nothing
justifies terrorism, that it is evil
per se
âthat the various real or imagined reasons proffered by the terrorists to justify their actions are meaningless. In its long and unfinished march from barbarism to civilization, humanity has tried to delineate limits to conflict. It has developed laws of war which proscribe, even in wartime, the initiation of deliberate attacks on defenseless civilians. Without this limitation there is no meaning to the term “war crimes.” For if anything is allowable, then even the gassing of a million babies in Auschwitz and Dachau is also permissible. But by their uninhibited resort to violence and their repeated attacks on civilians, the terrorists brazenly cross the line between the permissible and the impermissible. By conditioning us to accept savage outrages as habitual or normal responses to undesired political circumstances, terrorism attacks the very foundations
of civilization and threatens to erase it altogether by killing man's sense of sin, as Pope John Paul II put it. The unequivocal and unrelenting moral condemnation of terrorism must therefore constitute the first line of defense against its most insidious effect.
nothing
justifies terrorism, that it is evil
per se
âthat the various real or imagined reasons proffered by the terrorists to justify their actions are meaningless. In its long and unfinished march from barbarism to civilization, humanity has tried to delineate limits to conflict. It has developed laws of war which proscribe, even in wartime, the initiation of deliberate attacks on defenseless civilians. Without this limitation there is no meaning to the term “war crimes.” For if anything is allowable, then even the gassing of a million babies in Auschwitz and Dachau is also permissible. But by their uninhibited resort to violence and their repeated attacks on civilians, the terrorists brazenly cross the line between the permissible and the impermissible. By conditioning us to accept savage outrages as habitual or normal responses to undesired political circumstances, terrorism attacks the very foundations
of civilization and threatens to erase it altogether by killing man's sense of sin, as Pope John Paul II put it. The unequivocal and unrelenting moral condemnation of terrorism must therefore constitute the first line of defense against its most insidious effect.
Yet it is precisely this defense that has been weakened by the rush to “explain” and “understand” the terrorists' motivations after the Oklahoma City bombing. A vast instant literature sprang forth seeking to explain the motivations and psychological makeup of America's newfound terrorists, just as a similar literature was produced at the height of European terrorism in the 1970s. A clinical understanding of terrorist psychology is of course important for fighting terrorism, but it must not spill over into the other connotation of understanding, that of acceptance. “Understanding” the personal hang-ups of Nazi leaders was perfectly justifiable as a means of advancing the total war against Nazism, but it never should have become an excuse to weaken the resolve for fighting Nazism as an absolute evil. The citizens of free societies must be told again and again that terrorists are savage beasts of prey, and should be treated as such. Terrorism should be given no intellectual quarter.
Like organized crime, the battle against terrorism should be waged relentlessly, resisting the attempt to glorify or mystify its perpetrators or their cause in any way. Indeed, the point of departure for the domestic battle against terrorism is to treat it as a
crime
and terrorists as
criminals
. To do otherwise is to elevate both
to a higher status, thereby undermining the ability of governments to fight back. On the domestic level, the fact that terrorists are
politically
motivated criminals is irrelevant, except in providing clues for their apprehension.
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crime
and terrorists as
criminals
. To do otherwise is to elevate both
to a higher status, thereby undermining the ability of governments to fight back. On the domestic level, the fact that terrorists are
politically
motivated criminals is irrelevant, except in providing clues for their apprehension.
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If the first obstacle to the spread of domestic terrorism in most democracies is in the realm of political culture, the second is in the realm of operations. The advanced democracies usually have at their disposal a vast array of surveillance and other intelligence-gathering capabilities that give them the ability to track down terrorists, put them on trial, and punish them. The United States is especially capable of monitoring the activities of terrorists. It has technical capabilities that exceed anything available to any other country, especially formidable eavesdropping and photographic capabilities. The movements and activities of potential terrorists can thus be observed, and they may be apprehended before they strikeâat least when the law enforcement agencies are permitted to act.
A good example of just how powerful a national security agency can be in a democracy is provided by the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's crackdown which resulted in the elimination of the chief Puerto Rican terrorist group, the FALN. By 1982 the FALN had reached a peak of logistical capabilities, executing no fewer than twenty-five separate terrorist attacks including bombings of civilian targets and violent armed robberies. Additional and more ambitious attacks were in the works, including assaults on prisons in which
FALN members were being held. Yet eventually the FBI was able to catch up with the entire ring. It watched the movements of the group and literally listened in on its planning sessions for eighteen months. Finally, at the critical moment before a renewal of the terror spree, the FBI moved in and arrested four leaders of the group in the United States and tipped off the Mexican security services as to the location of a fifth. Without its head, the snake quickly expired, and by 1983 the FALN was unable to claim responsibility for a single terrorist act.
FALN members were being held. Yet eventually the FBI was able to catch up with the entire ring. It watched the movements of the group and literally listened in on its planning sessions for eighteen months. Finally, at the critical moment before a renewal of the terror spree, the FBI moved in and arrested four leaders of the group in the United States and tipped off the Mexican security services as to the location of a fifth. Without its head, the snake quickly expired, and by 1983 the FALN was unable to claim responsibility for a single terrorist act.
Evading the intelligence-gathering efforts of a democratic government is to a certain extent possible for a professionally organized terrorist organization. But the conditions for achieving this kind of capability are exacting. In order to maintain consistent, long-term terrorist activity in the face of massive counter-terrorist efforts that can be mounted by federal and local authorities, a terrorist group must have a number of assets at its disposal. First, its members must be exceptionally well trained in maintaining organizational secrecy and in the professional methods of covert operations and intelligence techniques. Second, it must be well funded and equipped, with the budgetary requirements of an effective terrorist organization rapidly running into the millions. And third, it must have a safe haven in and out of which its operatives can maneuver in their efforts to dodge the government's security services.
In the advanced democracies, none of these requirements
is easy to meet, and for the same reasons that recruitment of terrorists is so difficult. Unwanted by the American public, the terrorists have neither the support of government officials who, in a non-democratic society, might share intelligence information with them or fail to take the necessary actions against themâthey generally do not have a significant enough backing among citizens who are sympathetic and willing to help fund their activitiesânor any piece of territory that has any kind of depth as a home base. In a modern democracy, the terrorist is most often alone, hunted, despised, and without means. Thus, the situation could in principle be created in which the terrorist would sooner or later succumb to the sophistication and sheer volume of activities against him.
is easy to meet, and for the same reasons that recruitment of terrorists is so difficult. Unwanted by the American public, the terrorists have neither the support of government officials who, in a non-democratic society, might share intelligence information with them or fail to take the necessary actions against themâthey generally do not have a significant enough backing among citizens who are sympathetic and willing to help fund their activitiesânor any piece of territory that has any kind of depth as a home base. In a modern democracy, the terrorist is most often alone, hunted, despised, and without means. Thus, the situation could in principle be created in which the terrorist would sooner or later succumb to the sophistication and sheer volume of activities against him.
The Question of Civil Liberties
I
f the chances of waging a campaign of domestic terrorism against a modern democracy are in theory marginal, there is a catch: The major democracies, although eminently capable of fighting terror effectively, are often hesistant to do so. To understand why, it is important to recognize that there are two kinds of strategies for fighting domestic terror. The first is a system of
passive
security, in which many of the potential targets of terrorists are “hardened” against a potential attack, both for deterrence and to actually blunt the effects of a possible assault. This involves the extensive use of watchmen and undercover security personnel, careful scrutiny of all individuals approaching likely targets such as government facilities and the public transportation system, on-site security systems, and heightened alertness of the civilian population. In Israel, much of the adult population are army reservists in combat units, and many of them also carry small arms, further increasing the difficulty of executing
a successful terror attack. Such measures have the advantage that they are relatively unobtrusive, having next to no consequences for the civil liberties of the citizens, who are merely better prepared for an attack that may come.
f the chances of waging a campaign of domestic terrorism against a modern democracy are in theory marginal, there is a catch: The major democracies, although eminently capable of fighting terror effectively, are often hesistant to do so. To understand why, it is important to recognize that there are two kinds of strategies for fighting domestic terror. The first is a system of
passive
security, in which many of the potential targets of terrorists are “hardened” against a potential attack, both for deterrence and to actually blunt the effects of a possible assault. This involves the extensive use of watchmen and undercover security personnel, careful scrutiny of all individuals approaching likely targets such as government facilities and the public transportation system, on-site security systems, and heightened alertness of the civilian population. In Israel, much of the adult population are army reservists in combat units, and many of them also carry small arms, further increasing the difficulty of executing
a successful terror attack. Such measures have the advantage that they are relatively unobtrusive, having next to no consequences for the civil liberties of the citizens, who are merely better prepared for an attack that may come.
But while passive measures against terror may be partially effective in a small country such as Israel, they are of only limited use in a vast nation like the United States, which has thousands of airports and tens of thousands of federal buildings strewn throughout the fifty states. The symbols of national authority are accordingly more diffuse by order of magnitude, and the potential sites where spectacular damage can be done are nearly infinite. Conversely, the security services, unlike those of the authoritarian regimes, are extremely limited in number, the FBI commanding no more than 11,000 men. As was demonstrated by the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City, the terrorists can strike at any one of an unlimited number of possible targets, and the government has no hope of adequately protecting them all. In order to defend such an immense and complex society against terrorismâand the same must be said of other major democracies, such as Britain, France, and Germanyâthere is little choice but to adopt an
active
posture against terror, taking the initiative to put into use the overwhelming technological and logistical advantages in the hands of law enforcement agencies. This means actively identifying the “puddles” from which terrorist activity is likely to emerge, monitoring the activities of
groups and individuals which advocate violence, analyzing and pooling intelligence on their nature, goals, and technical capacity for violence, and employing preemptive surveillance, search and seizure, interrogations, detentions, and prosecutions when it becomes apparent that planning for terrorist violence is taking place.
active
posture against terror, taking the initiative to put into use the overwhelming technological and logistical advantages in the hands of law enforcement agencies. This means actively identifying the “puddles” from which terrorist activity is likely to emerge, monitoring the activities of
groups and individuals which advocate violence, analyzing and pooling intelligence on their nature, goals, and technical capacity for violence, and employing preemptive surveillance, search and seizure, interrogations, detentions, and prosecutions when it becomes apparent that planning for terrorist violence is taking place.
Against such active anti-terror activities, the amateur practitioners of domestic terrorism, unschooled in the arts of covert action, do not stand a chance. But the trouble with such active anti-terror activities is that, unlike passive measures, they
do
constitute a substantial intrusion on the lives of those who are being monitored. Steeped as they are in moral and legal respect for the privacy of the individual, Western democracies have been hesitantâand justifiably soâto embark on activities which remind them too much of the doings of the authoritarian states they so abhor. Indeed, every one of the active steps that a democratic state can take against domestic terrorists constitutes a certain curtailment of
someone's
freedom to speak, assemble, or practice his religion without interference. One need only consider the activities involved in building a domestic terrorist organization to recognize that these groups invariably engage in incitement, pamphleteering, and indoctrination toward their purposes, and gather to lay plans and prepare for their execution. In some cases, the incitement is also of a religious or quasi-religious natureâas in the cases of abortion-clinic bombers and Islamic advocates of
jihad
, Islamic holy war. And it is just these kinds of speech, assembly, and religious
expression which, if properly monitored, give law enforcement agencies the warning they need in order to head off calamity.
do
constitute a substantial intrusion on the lives of those who are being monitored. Steeped as they are in moral and legal respect for the privacy of the individual, Western democracies have been hesitantâand justifiably soâto embark on activities which remind them too much of the doings of the authoritarian states they so abhor. Indeed, every one of the active steps that a democratic state can take against domestic terrorists constitutes a certain curtailment of
someone's
freedom to speak, assemble, or practice his religion without interference. One need only consider the activities involved in building a domestic terrorist organization to recognize that these groups invariably engage in incitement, pamphleteering, and indoctrination toward their purposes, and gather to lay plans and prepare for their execution. In some cases, the incitement is also of a religious or quasi-religious natureâas in the cases of abortion-clinic bombers and Islamic advocates of
jihad
, Islamic holy war. And it is just these kinds of speech, assembly, and religious
expression which, if properly monitored, give law enforcement agencies the warning they need in order to head off calamity.
The governments of free societies charged with fighting a rising tide of terrorism are thus faced with a democratic dilemma: If they do not fight terrorism with the means available to them, they endanger their citizenry; if they do, they appear to endanger the very freedoms which they are charged to protect.
In the United States, such freedoms are more scrupulously protected than in any other country in the world, and there are even some who claim that free speech and religious freedom should be considered “absolute” rights. While even the most passionate advocates of civil liberties concede, along with Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, that freedom of expression must stop at “shouting âfire' in a crowded theater,” American law has thus far been rigidly resistant to limiting the scope of such exceptions. Just how far the concern with free speech has gone was driven home to me in a recent conversation with a security expert who explained the constraints imposed on the FBI by the Attorney General's guidelines which govern monitoring activities: They prohibit law enforcement officials from using government funds to so much as buy a newsletter by a militant group in order to examine it for threats of terrorist activityâand if an official were to pay for the newsletter out of his own pocket, he would be prohibited from storing the clippings in a government office, because such rudimentary intelligence gathering is considered
an “infringement” on the liberties of the groups involved.
an “infringement” on the liberties of the groups involved.
The guidelines, instituted as a reaction to federal activities in the Vietnam War era, permit the FBI to engage in “investigations” of crimes committed in the past or crimes presently being planned. But in the long run, each criminal investigation produces only a tiny part of the picture of extremist organization and political violence in the United States; the total is no more than a collection of fragments. At present, the FBI is not allowed to perform the most basic intelligence activities required for piecing together the puzzle of political ideology, incitement, infrastructure, and paramilitary organization which, once assembled, could lead to an understanding of where the most deadly terrorism is
likely
to come from. Such monitoring could possibly have led to an early identification of the Patriots of Arizona as a probable trouble spot, and might even have prevented the tragedy in Oklahoma City; without it, the FBI is a blinded Samson, fit to fight but incapable of seeing its enemies.
likely
to come from. Such monitoring could possibly have led to an early identification of the Patriots of Arizona as a probable trouble spot, and might even have prevented the tragedy in Oklahoma City; without it, the FBI is a blinded Samson, fit to fight but incapable of seeing its enemies.
An example of how domestic intelligence work such as that forbidden to the FBI has made all the difference in the European counter-terror effort was provided by Christian Lochte, former head of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the branch of the German security services responsible for anti-terror activities. In December 1982, a neo-Nazi terrorist group embarked on a campaign of bombings against the cars of American GIs, eventually turning on Israeli targets in Vienna, Amsterdam,
and Geneva. Lochte reports that at first the security services were baffled by the attacks, since they seemed to be part of the neo-Nazi terrorism which had spawned attacks like the 1980 bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest, which had claimed thirteen lives. But while some of the existing neo-Nazi groups had clearly begun to practice terror against German targets, their association with attacks against American servicemen could not be explained by any of the information available from previous crimes. The key to the mystery was found in an ideological tract published in 1982 by two West German radicals, Walter Hexel and Odfried Hepp, entitled
Farewell to Hitlerism
. In it, Hexel and Hepp renounced the traditional Nazi hostility toward Soviet Communism, identifying American imperialism as a hostile occupying force from which West Germany had to be freed through a “liberation struggle” by a renewed Nazism. The idea of an anti-Western Nazism sympathetic to the Soviet Union eventually led to the identification of Hexel and Hepp as the leaders of a new terrorist group, which was eventually found to have been trained in Lebanon by the Soviet-sponsored PLO and to have mounted the attacks in collusion with Abul Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front faction.
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and Geneva. Lochte reports that at first the security services were baffled by the attacks, since they seemed to be part of the neo-Nazi terrorism which had spawned attacks like the 1980 bombing of the Munich Oktoberfest, which had claimed thirteen lives. But while some of the existing neo-Nazi groups had clearly begun to practice terror against German targets, their association with attacks against American servicemen could not be explained by any of the information available from previous crimes. The key to the mystery was found in an ideological tract published in 1982 by two West German radicals, Walter Hexel and Odfried Hepp, entitled
Farewell to Hitlerism
. In it, Hexel and Hepp renounced the traditional Nazi hostility toward Soviet Communism, identifying American imperialism as a hostile occupying force from which West Germany had to be freed through a “liberation struggle” by a renewed Nazism. The idea of an anti-Western Nazism sympathetic to the Soviet Union eventually led to the identification of Hexel and Hepp as the leaders of a new terrorist group, which was eventually found to have been trained in Lebanon by the Soviet-sponsored PLO and to have mounted the attacks in collusion with Abul Abbas's Palestine Liberation Front faction.
1
Of course, there is something laudable in the efforts of Western democracies to hold their governments to the highest possible standards when it comes to respecting the rights of their citizensâincluding not having intelligence gathered about them. From the days of Robespierre's infamous Committee for Public Safety,
democracies have had to guard against this danger, couched in terms of national security, which unduly invades the privacy of each citizen in the name of national security. Yet the threat to the basic civic rights of
not
fighting terrorism are even more debilitating to a free society. We often forget the monstrous violation of personal rights which is the lot of the
victims
of terror and their families, or the wholesale violation of the rights of entire citizenries when they are forced to expend time and resources to protect themselves against potential terrorist attacksânot to mention the more subtle violation of basic human rights involved when a person, or an entire people, must learn to live in fear.
democracies have had to guard against this danger, couched in terms of national security, which unduly invades the privacy of each citizen in the name of national security. Yet the threat to the basic civic rights of
not
fighting terrorism are even more debilitating to a free society. We often forget the monstrous violation of personal rights which is the lot of the
victims
of terror and their families, or the wholesale violation of the rights of entire citizenries when they are forced to expend time and resources to protect themselves against potential terrorist attacksânot to mention the more subtle violation of basic human rights involved when a person, or an entire people, must learn to live in fear.
The belief that freedom of speech and religion are absolutes that cannot be compromised even in the slightest way out of very real security concerns is merely tantamount to replacing one kind of violation of rights with another, even worse violation of those same rights. It is evident that such terror-inflicted violations of the civil rights of a people may, if attacks are an extraordinary rarity, be insufficient to justify taking any kind of serious action; but it is equally evident that there is some point at which terror becomes by far the bigger threat to citizens' rights and the time comes to take unflinching action. In this regard, there is apparently a moment of truth in the life of many modern democracies when it is clear that the unlimited defense of civil liberties has gone too far and impedes the protection of life and liberty, and governments decide to adopt active measures against the forces that menace their societies. In Britain, that moment
came in 1973, after IRA violence had reached unprecedented heights. That year the British Parliament passed an Emergency Provisions Act, providing for arrest, search and seizure without a warrant, relaxed rules of evidence, trials conducted by lone judges (to avoid intimidated juries), and outlawing membership in a terrorist organization. For Germany, the moment of truth came in 1976, with the kidnapping and murder of the industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer by the Baader-Meinhof group. The result was a revolution in German criminal law giving the security services an extended right of detention without warrant, as well as a substantial removal of constraints on search and seizure. For Italy, the moment came in 1978, with the abduction and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, which led the Italians to give their security services powers similar to those adopted in Germany, plus a special amnesty law allowing terrorists to turn themselves in and become state's witnesses. In France, a spree of bombings by Hizballah in the mid-1980s at the Galeries Lafayette, the Place de l'Opéra, the Champs-Elysées and other centers of cultural life led to a build-up of passive defenses so thick that parts of Paris had at times begun to look like an army encampment. Finally, in 1986, the French reached their moment of truth and moved to an active anti-terror policy that led to the elimination of that terrorist threat on French soil.
came in 1973, after IRA violence had reached unprecedented heights. That year the British Parliament passed an Emergency Provisions Act, providing for arrest, search and seizure without a warrant, relaxed rules of evidence, trials conducted by lone judges (to avoid intimidated juries), and outlawing membership in a terrorist organization. For Germany, the moment of truth came in 1976, with the kidnapping and murder of the industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer by the Baader-Meinhof group. The result was a revolution in German criminal law giving the security services an extended right of detention without warrant, as well as a substantial removal of constraints on search and seizure. For Italy, the moment came in 1978, with the abduction and murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro, which led the Italians to give their security services powers similar to those adopted in Germany, plus a special amnesty law allowing terrorists to turn themselves in and become state's witnesses. In France, a spree of bombings by Hizballah in the mid-1980s at the Galeries Lafayette, the Place de l'Opéra, the Champs-Elysées and other centers of cultural life led to a build-up of passive defenses so thick that parts of Paris had at times begun to look like an army encampment. Finally, in 1986, the French reached their moment of truth and moved to an active anti-terror policy that led to the elimination of that terrorist threat on French soil.
In fact, the record of active anti-terror techniques, once adopted, has been excellent. In the wake of active anti-terror action by democratic governments in the 1970s and
1980s, the most notorious of European domestic terrorist groups were eliminated one by one, including the Baader-Meinhof, the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, Action Directe in France, and Germany's bizarre anti-Western neo-Nazi terrorist cells. Thus Europe was for the most part freed of the plague of domestically grown terrorism. Lethal IRA terrorism, while not eliminated, was reduced by more than 80 percent.
2
1980s, the most notorious of European domestic terrorist groups were eliminated one by one, including the Baader-Meinhof, the German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, Action Directe in France, and Germany's bizarre anti-Western neo-Nazi terrorist cells. Thus Europe was for the most part freed of the plague of domestically grown terrorism. Lethal IRA terrorism, while not eliminated, was reduced by more than 80 percent.
2
Most recently, it was Japan that faced a potentially disastrous domestic terrorist threat and moved swiftly to overcome it. The attempt by an obscure cultist group Aum Shinrikyo to poison Tokyo's congested subways with sarinâone of the most toxic chemicals ever developedâwas not the first time Japan had to deal with Japanese-bred terrorists. The Japanese Red Army, whose heyday was in the 1970s, had been a terrorist group directed primarily
outward
. Cooperating openly with the PLO, and less openly as well with European terrorist factions, most of its attacks were carried out beyond Japan's borders. The Japanese powers therefore did not apply their full weight against the group, and did not in any way test the limits of Japan's democratic institutions in fighting it. Japan's Red Army withered as the pro-Soviet terror axis of which it was a part disintegrated, eventually all but disappearing under less than overwhelming pressure from the Japanese government.
outward
. Cooperating openly with the PLO, and less openly as well with European terrorist factions, most of its attacks were carried out beyond Japan's borders. The Japanese powers therefore did not apply their full weight against the group, and did not in any way test the limits of Japan's democratic institutions in fighting it. Japan's Red Army withered as the pro-Soviet terror axis of which it was a part disintegrated, eventually all but disappearing under less than overwhelming pressure from the Japanese government.
Yet in 1995 Japan found itself facing a much more immediate terrorist threat. As in any other land, Japanese culture occasionally breeds wild offshoots of what could
be called Japanese fundamentalistsâprivate militias centered around charismatic leaders who use terrorism and violence to bring a straying Japan back to the “pure” ways of an older order. Well remembered is the warrior group of the celebrated ultra-nationalist novelist Yukio Mishima, who in 1970 attempted a takeover of the government as unfeasible as it was public, only to commit suicide before the watching eyes of his nation. The sarin attack was of course a far more serious event, drawing the attention of the world because of the extraordinary deadliness of the menace. Although it failed to produce the mass catastrophe that had been planned, it became immediately clear that without the most determined action, the next attack could indeed succeed in bringing about the deaths of thousands. Faced with this contingency, the Japanese government did what it had failed to do in the past. It used every power available to it, including unlimited surveillance and an aggressive sweep of searches and seizures. Results quickly followed: The group's leader was located and placed under arrest, the group's weapons' caches and poison factories uncoveredâalong with two tons of chemicals and over $7 million in cashâand its thousands of members all but neutralized as a challenge to Japanese society. Japan, like many democracies before it, had reached its moment of truthâand acted.
be called Japanese fundamentalistsâprivate militias centered around charismatic leaders who use terrorism and violence to bring a straying Japan back to the “pure” ways of an older order. Well remembered is the warrior group of the celebrated ultra-nationalist novelist Yukio Mishima, who in 1970 attempted a takeover of the government as unfeasible as it was public, only to commit suicide before the watching eyes of his nation. The sarin attack was of course a far more serious event, drawing the attention of the world because of the extraordinary deadliness of the menace. Although it failed to produce the mass catastrophe that had been planned, it became immediately clear that without the most determined action, the next attack could indeed succeed in bringing about the deaths of thousands. Faced with this contingency, the Japanese government did what it had failed to do in the past. It used every power available to it, including unlimited surveillance and an aggressive sweep of searches and seizures. Results quickly followed: The group's leader was located and placed under arrest, the group's weapons' caches and poison factories uncoveredâalong with two tons of chemicals and over $7 million in cashâand its thousands of members all but neutralized as a challenge to Japanese society. Japan, like many democracies before it, had reached its moment of truthâand acted.
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