Closing the Ring (95 page)

Sardinia

90th Infantry Motor Division

Corsica

One brigade, “Reich Fuehrer,” Motor and Armoured

German Southeast Command—Lohar

Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia

Herzegovina, Montenegro

Greece

Crete

22d Infantry Division

Rhodes

55th Motor and Armoured Division

¹
See Book One,
Chapter 8
.

²
From General Francesco Rossi,
Come arrivammo all’ armistizio.

*
B
OOK TWO

Appendix A, Book Two
THE RELEASE OF THE MOSLEYS CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

W
HILE WE WERE IN CONFERENCE
at Cairo and Teheran, a domestic issue of Constitutional importance which had been before us since the beginning of October came to a head. It is recounted here in order not to break the general narrative.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary
    6 Oct. 43

Let me know what is the report of the Medical Commissioners upon Sir Oswald Mosley’s state of health. I have received privately some rather serious medical reports about him, but they are of course unofficial.

Mr. Morrison’s reports confirmed this information, and he decided to release Sir Oswald and his wife. I was sure this would raise controversy.

Prime Minister to Home Secretary
    21 Nov. 43

I expect you will be questioned about the release of the Mosleys. No doubt the pith of your case is health and humanity. You might however consider whether you should not unfold as a background the great principle of
habeas corpus
and trial by jury, which are the supreme protection invented by the British people for ordinary individuals against the State. The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him judgment by his peers for an indefinite period, is in the highest degree odious, and is the foundation of all totalitarian Governments, whether Nazi or Communist. It is only when extreme danger to the State can be pleaded that this power may be temporarily assumed by the Executive, and even so its working must be interpreted with the utmost vigilance by a Free Parliament. As the danger passes, persons so imprisoned, against whom there is no charge which courts and juries would accept, should be released, as you have been steadily doing, until hardly any are left. Extraordinary powers assumed by the Executive with the consent of Parliament in emergencies should be yielded up when and as the emergency declines. Nothing can be more abhorrent to democracy than to imprison a person or keep him in prison because he is unpopular. This is really the test of civilisation.

Differences arose between Ministers on the step the Home Secretary proposed to take. I assured him of my full support, though I should have preferred to deal with the question as a whole, rather than in a particular case.

Prime Minister (Cairo) to Home Secretary
    25 Nov. 43

I am convinced 18B should be completely abolished, as the national emergency no longer justifies abrogation of individual rights of
habeas corpus
and trial by jury on definite charges. I doubt very much whether any serious resistance would be made to this. There are of course a number of totalitarian-minded people who like to keep their political opponents in prison on
lettres de cachet
, but I do not think they constitute a majority. I have already on more than one occasion expressed in Parliament my distaste for these exceptional powers, and my hope that success and security would enable us to dispense with them. However, as these views conflict with the line you have adopted I shall not press them at this stage.

Any unpopularity you have incurred through correct and humane exercise of your functions will be repaid in a few months by public respect.

Prime Minister (Cairo) to Deputy Prime Minister and Home Secretary
    25 Nov. 43

In case there is a debate on an amendment to the Address to terminate 18B, I would strongly counsel the line that we very much regret having to be responsible for such powers, which we fully admit are contrary to the whole spirit of British public life and British history. These powers were conferred on us by Parliament because of the dire peril of the State, and we have to administer them in accordance with the principles of humanity, but all the time we desire to give back these powers from the Executive to Parliament. The fact that we have gained great victories and are in a much safer position makes the Government the more desirous of parting with exceptional powers. The time has not yet come when these can be fully dispensed with, but we can look forward to that day.

2. On no account should we lend any countenance to the totalitarian idea of the right of the Executive to lock up its political opponents or unpopular people. The door should be kept open for the full restoration of the fundamental British rights of
habeas corpus
and trial by jury on charges known to the law. I must warn you that departure from these broad principles because the Home Office have a few people they like to keep under control by exceptional means may become a source of very grave difference between us and the totalitarian-minded folk. In such a quarrel I am sure I could carry the majority in the House of Commons and the mass of the nation. Anyhow, I would try. It seems to me you have a perfectly good line in deploring the fact that such powers are thrust on you and in proclaiming your resolve to use them with the utmost circumspection and humanity. Do not quit the heights.

Mr. Attlee now reported to me that the Cabinet had decided to support the Home Secretary in releasing the Mosleys from prison. There was, I learned, considerable Parliamentary agitation against this step.

Prime Minister (Teheran) to Home Secretary
    29 Nov. 43

Considering you are supported by the Cabinet, and by me as Prime Minister, you have no choice whatever but to fight the matter through, and you will no doubt be supported in any direct issue by a very large majority.

2. There is no hurry about the general question of 18B. I certainly recommend however that you express your distaste for such powers and your regret that dangers of the country have forced you to assume them, and your earnest desire to return to normal. This is a becoming attitude in a democratic Minister.

Mr. Morrison showed firmness and courage in resisting the storm that threatened him, and, as is often the case, it dispersed. People who are not prepared to do unpopular things and to defy clamour are not fit to be Ministers in times of stress.

Prime Minister (Teheran) to Home Secretary
    2 Dec. 43

I congratulate you on the strong support given to you by the House of Commons. Your courageous and humane discharge of your most difficult and disagreeable functions will gain its reward in the respect of the British nation.

Appendix B, Book Two
PRIME MINISTER’S PERSONAL MINUTES AND TELEGRAMS

November
1943-
May
1944

N
OVEMBER

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
    1 Nov. 43

Thank you for your information, which still however leaves me mystified on various points. I entirely agree that we must have a “yardstick,” and that is exactly what I am in search of. A yardstick is a common measure, and it is just by this test that the use of the word “division,” which may mean a German 20,000 or a Russian 15,000 or a British and American 42,000, so lamentably fails.

2. Please let me have the best analysis the Intelligence Department can make of a gross British and a full German division,
¹
showing of what elements the additional British 22,000 consists. …

4. Let us take the 5th British Infantry Division, which has newly arrived in Italy, as an example. It has 18,480 men on its strength. Where are the other 23,000-odd? When do they come into Italy? What proportion of these 23,000 are combatant troops in the sense of taking their places in the fighting line at some time or other?

5. Could I also have a list of the corps and army formations in Italy, with their estimated ration strength attached? Of course, I quite understand these estimates may not be exactly up to date.

6. In the British Expeditionary Force what part is played by the Polish Armoured Division, which I see has no fewer than 400 tanks? It does not appear to be included either in the Twenty-First Army Group or the Home Field Army. Are there any other units of this kind? What happens to all the army tank brigades, of which there are eight on my latest return? It is absolutely necessary for me to form an opinion on these matters.

7. My impression is that the Germans get about 12,000 men who actually fight out of divisions of 20,000 gross, and we get about 15,000 or 16,000 out of divisions of 42,000. If so, the result is not very encouraging, considering that the Germans fight at least as well as we do and move over great distances with much rapidity. On the other hand, the British corps and army commanders have larger proportions of artillery, engineers, signals, etc., in their
hands than the Germans, and can therefore support their divisions more powerfully as circumstances require.

8. As far as possible, when giving me returns, pray let me have ration strength, number of battalions, number of tanks, and number of guns. I take a grave view of the increasing sedentary and non-combatant tail which we are acquiring. For an operation like “Overlord,” where every man has to have his place in the boat and be fed over beaches, the most thorough analysis must be made of the rearward services, especially in the opening phases. I hope to find time shortly to go into this in some detail at the Defence Committee or Staff meeting.

Prime Minister to First Lord
    1 Nov. 43

I am at first sight wholly in favour of your view about the light fleet carriers and I shall be glad to discuss the matter with you and the First Sea Lord and Controller some time this week. I cannot see that there is any need for such great numbers in 1945 and 1946.

2. The whole question of our naval strength must however now be raised. The Admiralty are demanding 288,000 more men for the Fleet in 1944 and 71,000 for the shipyards, total about 360,000. This is at a time when the manpower shortage enforces heavy cuts on every form of national war activity. The question arises, why does the Admiralty require more men in 1944 than in 1943, observing that the new facts are: (
a
) The decisive defeat of the U-boats, largely through the air assistance. (
b
) The surrender of the Italian Fleet. (
c
) The accession of the
Richelieu
and many lesser French units to active service. (
d
) The establishment by the United States of two-to-one strength over the Japanese in the Pacific. (
e
) The immobilisation for a good many months to come of the
Tirpitz
, the only hostile capital unit in the Western world (unless the new German carrier is ready).

3. One would expect that in view of these immense new facts it would be possible to make very sensible reductions even in the existing personnel of the Navy and to lay up old vessels in care and maintenance without hesitation as new ones come out. It is for Cabinet consideration whether a very large programme of laying up old vessels and also of slowing down or suspending the more distant units now under construction should not be adopted. All this would be in answer to the question, why should you ask for so much more when your opponents’ force is so much less and your Allies’ so much stronger? The Admiralty would not render the best service to the country at this crisis if it kept in commission a single vessel that was not needed against the enemy.

4. With regard to the forty-odd destroyers which it is proposed to lay up, I think the right course would be to keep them all in care and maintenance after refitting them and to slow down or suspend the long-range fleet destroyers, which we shall not get for two years.

5. Let me now have a list of all warshipe which you propose to keep in commission in 1944, compared with those which existed at the time when Italy and Germany were both our enemies, say January 1, 1941, together with their complements. The destroyers and smaller craft may be stated in categories with the complements aggregated. Let me have the estimate as it stood at January 1, 1941, as it stands today, and as you propose it for January 1, 1945, distinguishing between afloat and ashore and including the Fleet Air Arm.