Authors: Winston S. Churchill
Tags: #Great Britain, #Western, #British, #Europe, #History, #Military, #Non-Fiction, #Political Science, #War, #World War II
B
US
Q
UEUES
Prime Minister to Minister of War Transport
16 Oct. 43
I am glad you are taking steps to improve the position. In the London Passenger Transport Board region about five and a half million bus journeys are made daily. An extra minute wasted per journey every day is equivalent to 10,000 persons working a nine-hour day over the year in this area alone.
11
Prime Minister to Brigadier Hollis, for C.O.S. Committee
24 Oct. 43
This paper about directives to Supreme Commanders looks very simple from a distance and appeals to the American sense of logic. However, in practice it is found not sufficient for a Government to give a general a directive to beat the enemy, and wait to see what happens. The matter is much more complicated. The general may well be below the level of his task, and has often been found so. A definite measure of guidance and control is required from the Staffs and from the high Government authorities. It would not be in accordance with the British view that any such element should be ruled out.
Prime Minister to Home Secretary
24 Oct. 43
Once we are sure that we have a plan for Food, Work, and Homes ready in case Hitler collapses, it will be quite possible to refine it.
Prime Minister to First Lord
24 Oct. 43
I do not consider you have any right to strike off these forty vessels from the escort and fleet destroyer strength. They may, if you will, be left unmanned in material reserve and only brought out in case of serious emergency.
It is quite impossible for us to take up so much of the war effort of the country in building up such enormous new programmes if you do not make full use of your material. Considering that you are now building destroyers which take two years to build, we must consider whether these older ones cannot be repaired and kept going. This failure, coupled with the immense demands for aircraft-carriers, causes me a great deal of concern now that the Italian Fleet and the German Navy are practically extinct. Future naval programmes must be subjected to a very strict scrutiny, not only by me but by the War Cabinet.
Prime Minister to Brigadier Hollis
27 Oct. 43
Why has it been decided to abandon the rubber Lilo? Let me have photographs showing the cruciform Lilo, and explain how it produces the desired effect. It seems to me that a complete change of plan has been made.
What is the difference between this concrete and steel structure and ordinary breakwaters? What time would it take to put down? How many ships would it require to carry, and so on?
It would be a pity to spoil a promising plan by magnifying the demands on material and labour to an excessive degree.
Prime Minister to Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster
27 Oct. 43
I am not in favour of the appointment to high military rank of, or of the wearing of uniform by, civilians holding civilian or quasi-civilian posts unless this is clearly necessary to the successful performance of their duties. In this light, pray inquire into the principles adopted in the Security Service for gazetting its officers to commissions and as regards their wearing uniform. Let me have a short report.
Prime Minister to Brigadier Hollis
31 Oct. 43
Let me have a return showing the present development of the British forces for “Overlord”; also a statement of what formations will be left here at home apart from the above.
1
See minute of July 3 to Lord President of the Council.
2
See minute of July 19 to C.I.G.S.
3
See minute of July 16 to Secretary of State for War
4
See minute of July 26 to President of the Board of Trade.
5
See minutes of July 16 and 26.
6
See previous minute.
7
See minute of July 16 to Chief of the Air Staff.
8
From Middle East Defence Committee, deprecating the employment of Commandos in the Dodecanese, etc., as the Italians and Germans were unlikely to surrender to them.
9
See minute of July 11 to Sir Edward Bridges.
10
See minute of September 16 to the Lord President of the Council.
11
See minutes of September 29 and October 11.
Appendix D, Book One
PLANS FOR THE TRANSITION PERIOD
23 Oct. 43
At their meeting on October 21, the War Cabinet approved generally the line of approach set out in my memorandum of October 19,
1
and I undertook to circulate a further note setting out the procedure for ensuring the completion of plans for the transition period.
I
2. The first step is to obtain a list of all the action which has to be taken, the schemes which must be prepared, and the administrative arrangements which must be planned and organised in advance, so that when hostilities with Germany cease, the country as a whole will find that the new emergency has been foreseen and the necessary preliminary action has been taken.
3. For this purpose each department is called upon to submit to the Secretary of the War Cabinet, not later than November 10, a schedule showing all the action which they will have to take and the measures required, (
a
) in the period immediately after hostilities with Germany end; (
b
) so far as can reasonably be foreseen during the rest of the transition period, which may be taken as a working basis as two years from the defeat of Germany.
4. The returns should cover all matters for which each department is primarily responsible. There are however numerous questions of common concern to many departments which have been remitted for examination to special organisations or committees. In these cases returns should be submitted by the head of the organisation or the chairman of the committee concerned.
5. The returns should include the following particulars: (
a
) The state of preparedness of the schemes—i.e., whether they are ready now or how long they will take to complete. (
b
) Points of principle on which decisions are necessary before further work can be carried out. (
c
) Whether legislation by statute, Order in Council, or Defence Regulation is called for, whether such legislation has been prepared, and whether it needs to be enacted before the defeat of Germany.
6. An important part of the plan will be a careful survey of the whole field of legislation (including Defence Regulations and other subordinate legislation) to determine which war-time powers must be retained and which can be dispensed with in the transitional period.
II
7. The second stage will be for a general survey to be framed showing the whole range of preparations for the transition period. At this stage we must make sure that there are no gaps or contradictions between the different parts of the plan. I will myself supervise this process.
8. While the transition from peace to war differs in many respects from the transition from war to peace, and War Book procedure is not altogether appropriate, it will probably be convenient that all departments should have a copy of this survey to assist them in understanding how their preparations fit in with the general scheme.
An officer of high rank should be designated in each department who should be personally responsible for seeing that the schedule of the preparations for which his department is primarily responsible is kept continuously up to date.
III
9. The third stage will be to make sure that the whole scheme is brought to a state of readiness and is so maintained. It may be found, in the first instance, that preparatory action on a number of important matters is being delayed because decisions have not been reached on points of principle. I propose, when the general plan has been drawn up, to preside over a series of meetings at which the various parts will be reviewed, and decisions thereafter obtained from the War Cabinet on any matters which hamper the progress of preparations.
1
See Book One,
Chapter 9
, pages 170–171.
Appendix E, Book One
Appendix F, Book One
1
SUMMARY OF ORDER OF BATTLE, GERMAN AND ITALIAN DIVISIONS, SEPTEMBER 8, 1943
2
I
TALIAN
D
IVISIONS
Divisions marked with a star are recorded as being weak or of low category
| Italian | German |
North Italy | 5 infantry | 6 1/3 infantry |
| *5 infantry | 2 motor and armoured |
Central Italy | 3 infantry | 2 motor and armoured |
| 2 motor and armoured | |
| *2 infantry | |
South Italy | 3 infantry | 2 infantry |
| *1 infantry | 4 motor and armoured |
Sardinia | 4 infantry | 1 |
South France | 4 infantry (under relief by German troops, strength unknown, from Rundstedt’s Command) | |
Corsica | 2 infantry | 1/3 infantry |
| | 2 motor and armoured |
Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia | 8 infantry | 9 infantry |
| | 6 brigades (Croat Alpine troops) |
Herzegovina, Montenegro | 6 infantry | 2 infantry |
| | 1 motor and armoured |
| | 2 brigades (Croat Alpine troops) |
Albania | 5 infantry | Nil |
| 1 motor | (but a will on 2 German and 2 Bulgarian Divisions in Serbia and Macedonia) |
Greece | 7 infantry | 6 infantry |
| | 1 armoured |
Crete | 1 infantry | 1 infantry |
Aegean | 2 infantry | 1 infantry with A.F.V.s |
Total : | Italian | German |
Italian mainland | 21 divisions (of which 8 are weak or of low category) | 16 1/⅓ |
“Overseas” | 36 | 24 1/3 |
Grand Total: | 61 divisions (of which 8 are weak or of low category) | 40 2/3 divisions |
G
ERMAN
D
ISPOSITIONS
IN
D
ETAIL
Army Group—Rommel
North Italy | Area |
24th Armoured Division | Parma—Bologna |
Hitler S.S. Armoured Division | |
44th Infantry Division | Alto Adige |
One Infantry Brigade | |
71st Infantry Division | Tarvisio—Piedicolle—Postumia |
65th Infantry Division | Sestri Levante—Val Taro—Pontremoli—Apuania |
76th Infantry Division | |
94th Infantry Division | |
305th Infantry Division |
German Southern Command—Kesselring
Central Italy
3d Panzer Group Motor and Armoured Lake Bolsena—Viterbo
2d Panzer Group Parachute
South Italy
15th Infantry Division | Formia |
Goering Armoured Division | Naples |
16th Armoured Division | Salerno |
1st Parachute Division | Puglia Basilicata |
26th Armoured Division | Calabria |
29th Panzer Group Motor Division | Calabria |