Closing the Ring (88 page)

The General was bristling. He asked for an absolutely free right to telegraph to Algiers in his own cipher. As the recognised head of a great empire, he said it was impossible to deny
him free right of communication. I asked him for an assurance that he would not impart any military information about the forthcoming assault to any of his colleagues, except those actually at our meeting. De Gaulle said that he must be free to keep in touch with Algiers about operations in Italy, and I explained that I was only talking about “Overlord.” I then unfolded to him our plan. After he had thanked me for this, I asked him if he would send a public message to France as soon as the armada had actually sailed. Queen Wilhelmina, King Haakon of Norway, and rulers of other countries which the enemy expected us to attack had agreed to do so, and I hoped he would do the same. He said he would.

Mr. Eden now intervened in the conversation, saying that the great operation impending had taken all our thoughts, but after it was launched it might be useful to discuss certain political questions. I explained that I had been in correspondence with the President for some time, and that while he had begun by wanting the General to visit the United States, he did not seem so anxious about it now. This was perhaps because of the way General Giraud had been treated. The President had arranged with Giraud for the French forces to be equipped, and now Giraud was dismissed. To this, de Gaulle replied that he thought it was better at this moment to be in England rather than Washington. I warned him that “liberated France” might for some time only consist of a few people under fire, and both Eden and I strongly urged him to visit Mr. Roosevelt soon. De Gaulle said that he was quite willing to do this, and had so told the President, but he was anxious about who was to administer liberated France. This should have been arranged long ago, last September.

This remark made me speak bluntly. The United States and Great Britain were willing to risk the lives of scores of thousands of men to liberate France. Whether de Gaulle went to Washington or not was his own affair, but if there was a split between the National Committee of Liberation and the United States, we should almost certainly side with the Americans. About the administration of liberated French soil, if
General de Gaulle wanted us to ask the President to give him the title-deeds of France the answer was “No.” If he wanted us to ask the President to agree that the Committee was the principal body with whom he should deal in France, the answer was “Yes.” De Gaulle replied that he quite understood that if the United States and France disagreed, Britain would side with the United States. With this ungracious remark the interview ended.

In a little while I took de Gaulle to Eisenhower’s Headquarters in the woodland, where he was most ceremoniously received. Ike and Bedell Smith vied with one another in their courtesy. Presently Ike took him to their map tent, and for twenty minutes imparted to him the whole story of what was about to happen. We then returned to my train. I had expected that de Gaulle would dine with us and come back to London by this, the swiftest and most convenient route, but he drew himself up and stated that he preferred to motor with his French officers separately.

*  *  * *  *

The hours dragged slowly by until, at 9.15 on the evening of June 4, another fateful conference opened at Eisenhower’s battle headquarters. Conditions were bad, typical of December rather than June, but the weather experts gave some promise of a temporary improvement on the morning of the 6th. After this, they predicted a return of rough weather for an indefinite period. Faced with the desperate alternatives of accepting the immediate risks or of postponing the attack for at least a fortnight, General Eisenhower, with the advice of his Commanders, boldly, and as it proved wisely, chose to go ahead with the operation, subject to final confirmation early on the following morning. At 4
A.M
. on June 5, the die was irrevocably cast: the invasion would be launched on June 6.

In retrospect this decision rightly evokes admiration. It was amply justified by events, and was largely responsible for gaining us the precious advantage of surprise. We now know that the German meteorological officers informed their High Command that invasion on the 5th or 6th of June would not be possible owing to stormy weather, which might last for several days. The fact that such a complex series of movements could be accomplished without detection by a wary and determined enemy is a remarkable tribute to the work of the Allied Air Forces and the excellence of our deception plans.

*  *  * *  *

All day on June 5, the convoys bearing the spearhead of the invasion converged on the rendezvous south of the Isle of Wight. Thence, in an endless stream, led by the minesweepers on a wide front and protected on all sides by the might of the Allied Navies and Air Forces, the greatest armada that ever left our shores set out for the coast of France. The rough conditions at sea were a severe trial to troops on the eve of battle, particularly in the terrible discomfort of the smaller craft. Yet, in spite of all, the vast movement was carried through with almost the precision of a parade, and, although not wholly without loss, such casualties and delays as did occur, mostly to small craft in tow, had no appreciable effect on events.

Round all our coasts the network of defence was keyed to the highest pitch of activity. The Home Fleet was alert against any move by German surface ships, while air patrols watched the enemy coast from Norway to the Channel. Far out at sea, in the Western Approaches and in the Bay of Biscay, aircraft of Coastal Command, in great strength, supported by flotillas of destroyers, kept watch for possible enemy reactions. Our Intelligence told us that over fifty U-boats were concentrated in the French Biscay ports ready to intervene when the moment came. The hour was now striking.

*  *  * *  *

Here, then, we reach what the Western Powers may justly regard as the supreme climax of the war. Nor, though the road might be long and hard, could we doubt that decisive victory would be gained. Africa was cleared. India had been defended from invasion. Japan, overstrained and disillusioned, was recoiling on her home land. All danger to Australia and New Zealand had passed away. Italy was fighting on our side. The Russian armies had driven the German invaders from their country. All the gains Hitler had acquired so swiftly from the Soviets three years before had vanished with staggering losses of men and equipment. The Crimea had been cleared. The Polish frontiers had been reached. Rumania and Bulgaria were desperately seeking to escape the vengeance of their Eastern conquerors. Russia’s new offensive timed with our Continental landing was about to break. While I sat in my chair in the Map Room of the Annexe, the thrilling news of the capture of Rome arrived. The immense cross-Channel enterprise for the liberation of France had begun. All the ships were at sea. We had the mastery of the oceans and of the air.

The Hitler tyranny was doomed. Here, then, we might pause in thankfulness and take hope, not only for victory on all fronts and in all three elements, but also for a safe and happy future for tormented mankind.

END OF BOOK TWO

¹
Crusade in Europe
, page 245.

*
A
PPENDICES

*
C
ONTENTS

APPENDICES TO BOOK ONE

A.
List of Abbreviations

B.
List of Code-Names

C.
Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes and Telegrams, June–October
1943

D.
Plans for the Transition Period

E.
Monthly Totals of Shipping Losses, British, Allied, and Neutral, by Enemy Action

F.
Summary of Order of Battle, German and Italian Divisions

APPENDICES TO BOOK TWO

A.
The Release of the Mosleys Constitutional Issues

B.
Prime Minister’s Personal Minutes and Telegrams, November
1943—
May
1944

C.
Ministerial Appointments, June
1943—
June
1944

*
Book one

Appendix A, Book One
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Appendix B, Book One
LIST OF CODE-NAMES

A
CCOLADE
: Operations in the Aegean:

A
DMIRAL
Q: President Roosevelt.

A
NAKIM
: Recapture of Burma.

A
NVIL
: Allied landings in the South of France, 1944.

A
VALANCHE
: Amphibious assault on Naples (Salerno).

B
AYTOWN
: Attack across the Straits of Messina.

B
OMBARDON
: Steel outer breakwater used in artificial harbours:

B
UCCANEER
: Operation against the Andaman Islands.

C
OLONEL
W
ARDEN
: The Prime Minister.

C
ULVERIN
: Operations against Northern Sumatra.

E
UREKA
: The Teheran Conference, 1943.

G
EE
: Radar aid to bomber navigation.

G
OOSEBERRY
: Breakwater used in artificial harbours:

H
ABAKKUK
: Floating seadrome made of ice.

H
ERCULES
: The Capture of Rhodes.

H
USKY
: The Capture of Sicily.

J
UPITER
: Operations in Northern Norway.

L
ILO
: Breakwater used in artificial harbours:

M
ULBERRY
: Artificial harbour.

O
BOE
: Blind-bombing device.

O
LEANDER
: Akyab.

O
VERLORD
: The Liberation of France in 1944.

P
ENITENT
: Operations against the Dalmatian coast.

P
HOENIX
: Concrete caisson used in artificial harbours.

P
IGSTICK
: Landings behind the Japanese positions south of Mayu peninsula, on the Arakan coast of Burma.

P
LOUGH
F
ORCE
: Special Combined Operations Force.

P
LUTO
: Oil pipe-line across the English Channel.