Closing the Ring (77 page)

The King of Greece was reluctant to accept a new Government whose composition was in effect dictated by the mutineers. He considered that order in the Greek armed forces must be restored before any lawful reconstruction of the Government could be undertaken. I entirely agreed with him, and instructed our Ambassador to the Greek Government to do his utmost to induce the Greek Ministers to remain at their posts until the King could get back to Cairo and take stock of the situation. This, I am glad to say, they agreed to do. I also gave instructions to the military authorities in the Middle East to deal firmly with indiscipline in the Greek forces under their command. Order in the Greek Army and Navy has not been completely reestablished, but the dissident elements are being isolated, and once the ringleaders are under arrest the mutiny should rapidly subside.

The King of Greece has now reached Cairo, and, after studying the position for himself, has formed a Government under M. Venizelos.

  The President sent me the following most helpful message:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
    18 Apr. 44

Thank you for the information regarding recent difficulties encountered in Greek participation in our Allied effort.

I join with you in a hope that your line of action toward the problem may succeed in bringing the Greeks back into the Allied camp and to a participation against the barbarians that will be worthy of traditions established by the heroes of Greek history. Frankly, as one whose family and who personally has contributed by personal help to Greek independence for over a century, I am unhappy over the present situation, and hope that Greeks everywhere will set aside pettiness and regain their sense of proportion. Let every Greek think of their glorious past and show a personal unselfishness which is so necessary now. You can quote me if you want to in the above sense.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt
    18 Apr. 44

Thank you so much. I have told our people to make use of your message to the King and his new Ministers, and to read it to the mutinous brigade and recalcitrant ships. It may have a most salutary effect.

*  *  * *  *

As matters reached a climax at Alexandria, I telegraphed to the Naval Commander-in-Chief:

17 Apr. 44

You should leave the senior member of the
Averoff
¹
in no doubt that his guarantee that the use of firearms will be avoided will not be reciprocated by us. We shall fire on mutineers whenever it is necessary. No officers or sailors of the Greek Navy have the slightest right to meddle in the formation of the new Government. Their duty is to obey the orders they receive from the Greek Government recognised by the Great Allies.

  The mutiny in the Greek Brigade was also approaching a crisis.

Prime Minister to General Paget
    22 Apr. 44

If you find it necessary to open fire on the mutineers’ camp you should consider whether you might not start with a few ranging shots directed on their batteries which are aiming at you. If they make no reply, after an appropriate interval let them have a stiffer dose, and at the same time tell them the weight of fire which you are ready to direct on them if they persist. We are prepared to use the utmost force, but let us avoid slaughter if possible. It is proposed that the onus should lie to the account of the British rather than of the slender, tottering Greek Government.

  I received by return the following reply:

General Paget to Prime Minister
    23 Apr. 44

My plan is in line with your suggestions. In order to get close observation of their camp, we must first capture two Greek posts on high ground. This will be done, by infantry only, just before
dawn. When it is light, we will lay a smoke-screen over their camp for ten minutes. Then there will be a pause for the smoke to clear away, after which leaflets will be dropped. They will state that there will be a further smoke-screen for half an hour, under cover of which all who wish should leave camp and come over to our lines. If mutineers are still holding out after this, a few shells will be fired at one of their batteries, followed by a further pause to allow for surrender. We shall continue this process until all their guns are knocked out. If the mutineers still will not surrender, it will be necessary to make an infantry assault on the camp under covering fire from artillery and tanks; but tanks will be used in sniping rôle and will not advance into the camp, as the mutineers are known to be well supplied with anti-tank weapons. They are undoubtedly now very short of food, but they have managed to get some from the local Arabs. It has not proved possible to invest the camp closely enough to stop this.

  On the evening of the same day, the mutinous Greek ships were boarded by loyal Greek sailors, and with about fifty casualties the mutineers were collected and sent ashore. General Paget now hoped to obtain the surender of the Greek Brigade by parley and without bloodshed. The handling of the affair was completely successful, and I was able to inform President Roosevelt the next day that British troops had occupied key positions on the ridge overlooking the Greek camp after slight opposition. There were no Greek casualties, but one British officer was killed. The Greek Brigade surrendered and laid down its arms, and was evacuated to a prisoner-of-war cage, where the ringleaders were arrested. The naval mutineers had surrendered unconditionally twenty-four hours earlier.

To General Paget I said: “I congratulate you on the satisfactory outcome of your firm and well-devised action.”

The President shared my relief:

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
    26 Apr. 44

I am very pleased indeed by your success in handling the Greek naval and military mutiny. I will hope for a similar success in your efforts with the Egyptian political problem. Our prospects of assisting “Overlord” by vigorous action in Italy do look much
better with a fixed date upon which we may exert all our pressure against the enemy. In view of our postponement of “Anvil,” a real success in Italy now seems essential.

Everything goes well here in my vacation residence. The doctor agrees with me that I am better.

*  *  * *  *

We had also kept the Russians informed of these events, both by messages to Molotov and through the Soviet Embassy in Cairo. The Soviet Government confined itself to criticism of our actions, and when on May 5 a formal request to Russia for co-operation in Greek affairs was made in Moscow, the reply was that it would be improper to join in any public pronouncements on political matters in Greece.

*  *  * *  *

With the end of the mutiny, the question of the formation of a Greek Government became acute. It was not felt that Venizelos was suitable for this task, and the leader of the Greek Social Democratic Party, Papandreou, who had been specially brought out of Greece, took office on April 26. The following day he issued a proclamation which was to form the agenda for a conference of all parties, including leaders from the Greek mountains. These delegates met at a mountain resort in the Lebanon on May 17, where it was agreed, after a fierce debate lasting three days, to set up an administration in Cairo in which all groups would be represented under the Premiership of Papandreou, while in the mountains of Greece a united military organisation would continue to struggle against the Germans. This arrangement held promise for the future.

On May 24 came the announcement of the new Greek Government. I reported these events to the House of Commons on the same day:

After prolonged discussion complete unity was reached at the Lebanon Conference, and all parties will be represented in the new Government, which will devote itself to what is after all the only purpose worthy of consideration, namely, the formation of a
National Army in which all the guerrilla bands will be incorporated, and the driving, with this army, of the enemy from the country, or, better still, destroying him where he stands.

On Monday there was published in the newspapers the very agreeable letter which I received from the leaders of the [Greek] Communists and the extreme Left Wing Party. There is published today in the papers the letter I have received from M. Papandreou expressing the hopes which he has for the future of his Government, and thanks for the assistance we have given in getting round these troubles—what I call the diseases of defeat, which Greece has now a chance of shaking off. I believe that the present situation—I hope and pray that it may be so—indicates that a new and fair start will come to Greece in her struggle to cleanse her native soil from the foreign invader. I have therefore to report to the House that a very marked and beneficial change has occurred in the situation in Greece, which is more than I could say when I last spoke upon this subject.

  Thus this dangerous episode, which, although on a small scale compared with the vast movement of the war, might have been the cause of endless discussion detrimental to our affairs, came to a satisfactory conclusion. I have recorded it in detail because of the very direct personal responsibility which I assumed. I circulated all my telegrams to the War Cabinet as they were sent, and my colleagues in no way hampered my freedom of action. It was certainly an achievement that our military commanders were able, by overwhelming force, firmness, and patience, to quell these political mutinies among such fiery troops without bloodshed, except for the loss of a single British officer, Major J. R. Copeland, of the 2d Battalion Rifle Brigade, who certainly did not die in vain.

The difficulties and struggles which lay before us all in this nerve-centre of Europe and the world will be recounted in then proper place. I consider however that, taken by and large, my policy was vindicated by events; and this is true not only of the period of the war, but up to the present time of writing.

¹
The Greek cruiser.

14
Burma and Beyond

A Retrospect___The United States and Australian Advance in the Pacific___General MacArthur’s Four-Hundred-Mile Leap___His Attack on Salamaua
, 1943___
Rabaul By-Passed___Admiral Nimitz’s Attack on the Gilbert Islands___Admiral Spruance’s Attack on Tarawa___A Year of Immense Advance Against Japan___The American Airlift over the Hump___Our Divergence of View___The President’s Telegram of February
25___
Successful Opening of the Burma Campaign of
1944___
Japanese Offensive Against India___Wingate’s Brilliant Counter-Stroke___He is Killed___The Japanese Attack on Imphal Begins___Defence of Kohima___The Climax of the Battle___All Depends on the Air___General Stilwell Captures Myitkytna___The Struggle Around Imphal___Defeat of the Japanese Advance on India.

T
HE READER
must now be asked to hark back nearly a year in order that a summary may be presented to him of the war against Japan in the Pacific, which was at this time the main effort of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Australia.

By the latter half of 1943, the Japanese had lost the eastern end of New Guinea. Before he could attack the Philippines, General MacArthur had first to reoccupy all its northern shore. Part of the 41st United States Division worked their way towards Salamaua, and at the end of June other troops landed near it from the sea. They were joined by the 3d Australian Division from Wau, and began their attack on Salamaua. It was purposely deliberate, so as to draw reinforcements from
Lae, the next major objective. The attack on Lae began on September 4, 1943, when the 9th Australian Division, of Alamein fame, landed on the coast ten miles east of the town. Next day American parachutists dropped on Nadzab, in the Markham Valley, and, with the help of Australian pioneers, rapidly made an airfield. The 7th Australian Division flew in, and immediately advanced. Attacked from two sides, Lae was taken on September 16. Salamaua had fallen a few days before, and Finschhafen fell on October 2. All were fiercely defended. The Markham Valley, running northwest from Lae, had many potential airfields, and the 7th Australian Division, swift to exploit success, occupied its length in a series of airborne assaults. All the operations were well conceived and skilfully executed, and the co-operation of all three fighting Services was brought to a high pitch.

The Australian capture of Finschhafen was followed by fierce Japanese counter-attacks, and there was much fighting during the last fortnight of October. By mid-November, the 5th Australian
Division was moving forward through the mountains of the Huon peninsula, overcoming a series of strongly held positions, while the 9th Australian Division was clearing the heights overlooking the Markham Valley. Part of the 32d United States Division made an amphibious landing at Saidor early in January 1944, where they were joined on February 11 by the 5th Australian Division. It had taken five months to clear the Huon peninsula. Out of twelve thousand Japanese who had been engaged there not more than forty-two hundred survived.