Closing the Ring (34 page)

  It would seem that the order of probability from the purely experimental point of view is: (1) Large glider bombs. (2) Pilotless aircraft. (3) Small long-range rockets. (4) Large long-range rockets.

The R.A.F. raid on Peenemünde was undoubtedly of the greatest value, and has set back the developments, whatever they may be, for the long-range offensive weapon.

There is no doubt that the Germans are doing their utmost to perfect some long-range weapon, and the new unexplained structures in Northern France are certainly most suspicious, unless we can assign some other use to them. Under these circumstances I feel we should make all reasonable preparations to cope with the consequences if and when the attack materialises, though there is no evidence of its materialisation before the New Year at the earliest.

We should at the same time maintain photographic cover, and destroy the sites whenever we get the opportunity to do so.

This certainly left much in doubt. On December 14, Air Marshal Bottomley, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, reported:

  The “Large Sites” in Northern France (including three which have been attacked) are suspected to be connected with long-range rocket attack. One of these sites is protected by as many as fifty-six heavy and seventy-six light anti-aircraft guns.

Evidence is accumulating that the “ski sites” are designed to launch pilotless aircraft. The existence of sixty-nine “ski sites” has been confirmed by photographic reconnaissance, and it is expected that the number will eventually total approximately a hundred. If present rates of construction are maintained, the work on some twenty sites should be completed by early January 1944, and the remainder by February. The launching points on the sites in the Pas de Calais and Somme-Seine areas are oriented on London, and those on some of the sites in the Cherbourg area on Bristol.

  On December 18, Lord Cherwell, who had been in close touch with Dr. Jones throughout, sent me a report giving his ideas about the date and intensity of the attack which might be expected from the flying bombs. In his view the bombardment would not begin before April, and not more than a hundred a day would be dispatched after the first day or two; of these about twenty-five would get within ten miles of the aiming point. As this would only correspond to fifty to a hundred fatal casualties a day, he deprecated large-scale panic measures of evacuation. He still discounted the probability of the use of large rockets. Even if they could be made, which seemed impossible with any existing technique, they would cost twenty or thirty times as many man-hours to produce as the flying bombs, without, in his view, being more efficient.

During the early months of 1944, we developed our plans for meeting the flying-bomb attack. It was decided that the defences should be laid out in three zones—a balloon barrage on the outskirts of London, beyond that a gun belt, and beyond that again, an area in which the fighter aircraft would operate. Steps were also taken to hasten the supply from America of the electronic predictors and radio proximity fuses, which, when the bombardment eventually started, made it possible for the gunners to take a heavy toll of the flying bombs.

Meanwhile, the British and American Air Forces continued to bomb the hundred or so “ski-sites” in Northern France. This was so effective that at the end of April aerial reconnaissance indicated that the enemy was giving up work on them. But our satisfaction was short-lived, for it was discovered that he was building instead modified sites which were much less elaborate and more carefully camouflaged and therefore harder to find and to hit. Wherever found these new sites were bombed. Many were destroyed, but about forty escaped damage or detection. It was from these that the attack was ultimately launched in June.

*  *  * *  *

Nearly fifteen months passed between the minute which the Chiefs of Staff sent me in April 1943 and the actual attack in June 1944. Not a day was wasted. No care was lacking. Preparations involving many months to perfect were set on foot on a large and costly scale in good time. When at length the blow fell upon us, we were able, as the next volume will describe, to ward it off, albeit with heavy loss in life and much damage to property, but without any effective hindrance to our war-making capacity or to the operations in France. The whole story may stand as an example of the efficiency of our governing machine, and of the foresight and vigilance of all connected with it.

¹
Our name for the rocket. Pilotless aircraft were called VI.

14
Deadlock on the Third Front

Hitler Resolves to Stand South of Rome___The German Winter Line___Alexander’s Army Weakened___My Telegram to Alexander of October
24___
General Eisenhower’s Conference of Commanders___He Endorses Alexander’s Review of the Battle Situation in Italy___The Withdrawal of Landing-Craft Deprives Our Armies of Flexibility___Fall in the Rate of Build-up___Survey of the Changed Situation___My Telegrams to General Marshall and President Roosevelt___I Appeal for the Retention of More Landing-Craft in the Mediterranean___Eisenhower Authorised to Retain an Extra Sixty-Eight until December
15___
My Telegram to Our Ambassador in Moscow, November
9___
Need for the Polish Corps___Undue Demands of the Allied Strategic Air Force for Transport to Italy___The Eighth Army Crosses the Sangro River___The United States Fifth Army Approaches the German Main Positions at Cassino___Air Fighting___Reduction of German Air Force in Italy___Diversionary Value of the Third Front.

E
ARLY IN
O
CTOBER
, on Kesselring’s advice, Hitler changed his mind about his Italian strategy. Till then he had meant to withdraw his forces behind Rome and hold only Northern Italy. Now he ordered them to fight as far south as possible. The line selected, the so-called “Winterstellung,” ran behind the river Sangro, on the Adriatic side, across the mountainous spine of Italy, to the mouth of the Garigliano on the west. The natural features of the country, its steep mountains and swift rivers, made this position, several miles in
depth, immensely strong. After a year of almost continuous retreat in Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the German troops were glad to turn about and fight.

Although the approach of winter would seriously impede our actions, the main strategic decisions taken at Quebec were helped by the Germans committing themselves so deeply. The primacy accorded to our cross-Channel invasion made Italy henceforward a secondary theatre. That Hitler felt impelled to use so many troops to resist our advance favoured our major objective, but did not justify our making a failure of the Italian campaign.

The Fifth Army resumed their attacks on October 12, and after a ten days’ struggle both its corps, the Xth British and VIth American, were well established across the river Volturno and ready to engage the enemy’s next delaying position, a series of heights lying south of the river Garigliano. Another week of fighting was needed to eject the enemy from these, but in the first fortnight in November the Army came to grips with the forward defences of the “Winterstellung.” On this front the Fifth Army, of six divisions, was faced by an equal number of Germans, who were fighting with their usual stubbornness. The first probing efforts at the German line met with little success. Our men had been fighting hard for two months, the weather was shocking, and troops needed rest and regrouping. Nevertheless, the plans made at Quebec for a different situation were rigidly enforced, and the Mediterranean was to be largely stripped of landing-craft.

Thus the position in Italy was changed greatly to our disadvantage. The Germans were strongly reinforced and ordered to resist instead of to withdraw. The Allies, on the contrary, were sending seven of their best divisions from Italy and the Mediterranean back to England for the cross-Channel attack in 1944. The four extra divisions I was gathering or had sent did not repair the loss. A deadlock supervened and was not relieved for eight months of severe fighting, which will presently be recounted.

*  *  * *  *

With these facts on my mind, I telegraphed to General Alexander on October 24:

Prime Minister to General Alexander

24 Oct. 43

Naturally I am made anxious by the departure while your battle is on of our two fine divisions, 50th and 51st, in pursuance of Quebec decisions. I should like to have your feelings about the strength of your army for the tasks which lie immediately ahead. Has the Eighth Army yet pulled its tail up? You mentioned 24th as the date.

2. I am asking for a Combined Staffs Conference somewhere in Africa about November 15. Anyhow, I shall be along your way about that time. I have much to tell you. Every good wish.

  Alexander replied that the number of German divisions in Italy was naturally causing him some anxiety. Their effect would depend on how far the enemy could maintain strong forces south of Rome. Everything was being done to paralyse the German lines of communication by air action, and he was keen to build up our air forces in Italy. All this took time, labour, and material. The Eighth Army had wound up their tail and started their offensive, which was making satisfactory progress in its early stages. “I consider,” he said, “that the situation requires very careful watching. I am glad to hear you are visiting us shortly, and will be very glad to see you.”

*  *  * *  *

On the same day, General Eisenhower held a Commanders’ Conference. He called upon Alexander to review the situation. His report was so serious that Eisenhower transmitted the entire text to President Roosevelt and to me. He endorsed all that Alexander had said and described his statement as giving a clear and accurate picture.

P
ART
I

1(
a
) On September 9, the date of the launching of “Avalanche” and the announcement of the Italian Armistice, the estimate of the general enemy situation was that two divisions were opposing the advance of the Eighth Army in Calabria: one division was in the heel of Italy; three divisions were in a position south of Rome and available to take action against the Allied landing in Salerno Bay; more than two divisions were in the neighbourhood of Rome and nine in the north of Italy. The Germans therefore had a total of some eighteen divisions at their disposal on the mainland. Of these it was considered that some would be engaged in Northern Italy to deal with the internal situation which was expected to cause them considerable embarrassment.

(
b
) It was of course realised that our assaults near Salerno would prove hazardous in the face of German opposition, but it was thought that the Italian situation, coupled with the opportunity of landing light forces in the heel and our overwhelming air superiority, weighted the scales sufficiently in our favour, and the risks quite rightly were taken. Further, landing-craft were available in large numbers and gave us liberty of manoeuvre and flexibility in both build-up and maintenance by sea. They also afforded the possibility of further amphibious operations to assist the advance by land. This flexibility proved invaluable and was utilised fully by the Eighth Army in its operations along the coast of Calabria and by the Seventh Army in reinforcing the Salerno area with one division from Sicily in the critical early days of the battle.

(
c
) Although at that time it was known that craft were to be withdrawn during the winter, the number to be withdrawn and the dates of withdrawal were not established. Our plans then envisaged an estimated build-up of thirteen hundred vehicles a day from all Mediterranean ports. Such a figure meant that a total of twenty Allied divisions, together with the Tactical Air Forces, could factually have been put into Italy by the end of the year, provided that they could be equipped and their maintenance assured. At the same time, the estimates of craft available for the future allowed sufficient elasticity to assist maintenance and to provide for amphibious operations in conjunction with the land advance to Rome, should such steps be necessary.

P
ART
II

2 (
a
) Today the situation has changed greatly. In the south, 11 Allied divisions oppose 9 German, while farther north there are some 15 more, a known total of 24 divisions, and perhaps as high as 28 divisions. On the basis that there are no unforeseen causes of a still lower rate of build-up, the optimum number of formations at our disposal on the mainland will be: end of November, 13 divisions; end of December, 14/15 divisions; end of January, 16/17 divisions. Our rate of build-up has fallen from the previous estimate of thirteen hundred vehicles a day to an estimated 2000 a week with a consequent delay in the calling forward of air forces and army formations. The reduction in the build-up of ground forces has also been influenced by the decision to move the strategic air force into the Foggia area as rapidly as possible rather than to wait for the capture of bases in the Rome area. The demands of the air forces should be met by the end of the year.

(
b
) The reduction in craft, already decreased by wear and tear, has been so serious as to preclude us from taking advantage, other than with minor forces, of the enemy’s inherent weakness, which is the exposure of his two flanks to turning movements from the sea. The majority of such craft as are available are required for build-up and for coastwise maintenance on account of demolitions to road and rail facilities, and traffic in the ports, owing to the shortage of lighters and tugs and enemy sabotage to berthing facilities, which will take time to repair.

3 (
a
) An examination of the enemy position has shown that his lines of communication enable him to build up in Italy, mainly in the north, to the order of sixty divisions, should they be available, and maintain them there in the winter months, despite our air superiority. The Germans clearly are trying to form a reserve by shortening their lines round the Fortress of Europe. Such a reserve could be employed in reinforcing further their armies in Italy.