Closing the Ring (11 page)

I was very well satisfied with the prospect of having the whole of this story presented to President Roosevelt with my full support. At least it would convince the American authorities that we were not insincere about “Overlord” and had not grudged thought or time in preparation. I arranged to assemble in Quebec the best experts in such matters from London and Washington. Together they could pool resources and find the best answers to the many technical problems.

I was now convinced of the enormous advantages of attacking the Havre-Cherbourg sector, provided these unexpected harbours could be brought into being from the first and thus render possible the landing and sustained advance of armies of a million rising to two million men, with all their immense modern equipment and impedimenta. This would mean being able to unload at least twelve thousand tons a day.

*  *  * *  *

There was another associated problem on which my mind dwelt, namely, the maintenance of fighting air superiority over the battle area. If we could create a floating airfield, we could refuel our fighter aircraft within striking distance of the landing-points, and thus multiply our air-power on the spot at the decisive moment. Among the numerous devices discussed during this busy voyage was one called “Habakkuk.” This project was conceived by a Mr. Pyke on Mountbatten’s Staff. His idea was to form a structure of ice, large enough to serve
as a runway for aircraft. It would be of ship-like construction, displacing a million tons, self-propelled at slow speed, with its own anti-aircraft defence, with workshops and repair facilities, and with a surprisingly small refrigerating plant for preserving its own existence. It had been found that by adding a proportion of wood pulp in various forms to ordinary sea ice the mixture lost the brittle qualities associated with ice and became extremely tough. This substance, called “Pykrete,” after its inventor, seemed to offer great possibilities not only for our needs in Northwest Europe, but also elsewhere. It was found that as the ice melted the fibrous content quickly formed a furry outer surface which acted as an insulator and greatly retarded the melting process. Much development work was eventually done on this side, particularly in Canada, but for various reasons it never had any success.

I set forth my ideas about this in a minute to the Chiefs of Staff.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

9 Aug. 43

Few technical devices or constructions could exercise more important strategic effects than those which would give us the power to have a number of floating Air Force refuelling stations, movable at will for particular operations. In the “Habakkuk” discussions it is stated that a timber structure can be made, and obviously steel pontoons could be fastened together. But all these when subject to the movement of the waves are liable to break up, and anyhow they are subject to intense strain and do not give that smooth run which aircraft require.

2. If however the Bubble story works, there is no reason why a pipe should not be lowered from two or three suitable ships and dangled from them at the right depth, and thus immunity from waves would be secured within an area in which the raft or pontoon runway could be stationed. The runway could always be kept head to wind, and no moorings would be necessary in deep water, as the whole of the vessels and the raft would drift together a few miles this way or that in the course of the day. This matter therefore deserves very keen examination.

3. One can imagine the use of two or three such refuelling bases for an attack on “Jupiter” [Norway]. But what about two or three
stepping-stones of this kind across the Bay of Bengal for “Culverin” [Sumatra]? This would leave the carriers free to protect the vessels and the landing, and also the nearest of the stepping-stones concerned. The
fighter
aircraft could therefore do two or three hops across the bay and come into action in much larger numbers than would be possible if they were used from ships. This apparatus seems at first sight to be far less costly and quicker to make than aircraft-carriers. Naturally, you choose good weather conditions for the operation. I am most anxious that this subject should be pursued theoretically at once, and thereafter, if all is well, on a large scale. Pray let me have your opinion.

Three dominating assumptions were made both by the framers of the plan and the British Chiefs of Staff. With these I was in entire agreement, and, as will be seen later, they were approved by the Americans and accepted by the Russians.

That there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter aircraft in Northwest Europe before the assault took place.

2. That there should be not more than twelve mobile German divisions in Northern France at the time the operation was launched, and that it must not be possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions in the succeeding two months.

3. That the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. To ensure this it was essential that we should be able to construct at least two effective synthetic harbours.

*  *  * *  *

I also had many discussions with the Chiefs of Staff on our affairs in the Indian and Far Eastern theatres. We had none too good a tale to tell. A division had advanced at the end of 1942 down the Arakan coast of Burma to recapture the port of Akyab. Though strengthened until a complete corps was engaged, under the command of General Irwin, the operation had failed, and our troops were forced back over the Indian frontier.

Although there was much to be said in explanation, I felt that the whole question of the British High Command against Japan must come under review. New methods and new men
were needed. I had long felt that it was a bad arrangement for the Commander-in-Chief India to command the operations in Burma in addition to his other far-reaching responsibilities. It seemed to me that the vigorous prosecution of large-scale operations against the Japanese in Southeast Asia necessitated the creation of a separate Supreme Allied Command. The Chiefs of Staff were in complete agreement, and prepared a memorandum on these lines for discussion with their American colleagues in Quebec. There remained the question of the commander of this new theatre, and we were in no doubt that he should be British. Of the various names that were put forward, I was sure in my own mind that Admiral Mountbatten had superior qualifications for this great command, and I determined to make this proposal to President Roosevelt at the first opportunity. The appointment of an officer of the substantive rank of Captain R.N. to the Supreme Command of one of the main theatres of the war was an unusual step. But, having carefully prepared the ground beforehand, I was not surprised when the President cordially agreed.

*  *  * *  *

I produced for the Chiefs of Staff Committee a note on plans and policies, from which the following is an extract:

7 Aug. 43

Before we meet the Americans we must settle upon: (
a
) The general plan for the Southeast Asia Command and the Supreme Commander, and (
b
) positive proposals for attacking the enemy, and proving our zeal in this theatre of war, which by its failures and sluggishness is in a measure under reasonable reproach.

I feel that we ought to let Brigadier Wingate tell his story and furnish the United States Chiefs of Staff with copies of his report, and thus convince them that we mean business in this sector of the Southeast Asia Front. Obviously the Arakan force should lie up against the enemy and engage him. But the advance upon Akyab ought to be stopped now, not only in the interests of the Mediterranean campaign, which should be paramount, but also because it is in itself a faulty and unsound operation. It seeks to strike the enemy where he is best prepared. It lays itself open to serious counter-measures by him. It achieves no major strategic purpose.

*  *  * *  *

It is astonishing how quickly a voyage can pass if one has enough to do to occupy every waking minute. I had looked forward to an interval of rest and a change from the perpetual clatter of the war. But as we approached our destination, the holiday seemed to be over before it had begun.

¹
Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander.

²
See facsimile, page 73.

³
See Volume II,
Their Finest Hour
,
Chapter 12
, pages 252–54.

5
The Quebec Conference
“Quadrant”

The Citadel___My Telegram to The King, August
11___
Visit to Hyde Park___My Memorandum of August
17
About Italy___The “Quadrant” Conference Opens, August
19___
The Chiefs of Staff Report upon “Overlord”___I Propose an American Commander___Strategy in Italy___Mountbatten for Supreme Commander in Southeast Asia___Major Strategy Against Japan___Proposed British Contribution Against Sumatra___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee, August
22___
British Claims to Share in the Main Attack on Japan___A Comical Incident___“Habakkuk” Dismissed___Mountbatten Appointed___My Telegram to Mr. Attlee of August
25___
My Liaison Officers with General MacArthur and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek___Eisenhower Presses for the Invasion of Italy___Need to Take Naples___Disquieting Estimates of British Reinforcements___I Give Instructions for a Large Increase.

H
ALIFAX
was reached on August 9. The great ship drew in to the landing jetty and we went straight to our train. In spite of all precautions about secrecy, large crowds were assembled. As my wife and I sat in our saloon at the end of the train, the people gathered round and gave us welcome. Before we started, I made them sing “The Maple Leaf” and “O Canada!” I feared they did not know “Rule, Britannia,” though I am sure they would have enjoyed it if we had had a band. After about twenty minutes of handshakings, photographs, and autographs, we left for Quebec.

Two days later I telegraphed to the King:

11 Aug. 43

Prime Minister to His Majesty the King, with humble duty

The Citadel is in every way delightful and ideally suited to the purpose. Arrangements for the President are perfect. He has the upper floor and ramps are fitted everywhere for his convenience. I am most grateful to Your Majesty for arranging this. I have telegraphed to the Governor-General thanking him for the trouble he has taken and for his kindly welcome.

2. The holding of this conference in Canada, and especially at Quebec, is most timely, as there is a lot of fretfulness here which I believe will soon be removed. I meet the Canadian Cabinet this morning and the Quebec Cabinet this afternoon, and start thereafter for Hyde Park.

3. I presume Your Majesty will already have seen the question that I put to the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary about Dickie.
¹
I have not yet heard from them, but I am increasingly inclined to suggest this solution to the President. Brigadier Wingate made a deep impression on all during the voyage, and I look for a new turn being given to the campaign in Upper Burma.

4. Your Majesty will also have noticed that I have heard from the Great Bear and that we are on speaking, or at least growling, terms again.

  I also telegraphed to the President:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

11 Aug. 43

I have just arrived, after a most swift and agreeable journey, on which it has been possible to work continuously. The Warden family
²
are looking forward keenly to their visit to Hyde Park, where we propose to arrive the afternoon of the 12th. Are we right in thinking we should all bring our thinnest clothes?

  My wife was forced to rest in the Citadel, but next day Mary and I travelled to Hyde Park. We visited the Niagara Falls on the way. The reporters asked me what I thought of them, and gave the following account of our talk: “ ‘I saw them before you were born. I came here first in 1900.’ ‘Do they look the same?’ ‘Well,’ he replied, ‘the principle seems the same. The
water still keeps falling over.’ ” We were the President’s guests till August 14. It was indeed so hot that I got up one night because I was unable to sleep and hardly able to breathe, and went outside to sit on a bluff overlooking the Hudson River. Here I watched the dawn.

Harry Hopkins came to Hyde Park. He was obviously invited to please me. He explained to me his altered position. He had declined in the favour of the President. There was a curious incident at luncheon, when he arrived a few minutes late and the President did not even greet him. It was remarkable how definitely my contacts with the President improved, and our affairs moved quicker as Hopkins appeared to regain his influence. In two days it seemed to be like old times. He said to me, “You must know I am not what I was.” He had tried too much at once. Even his greatness of spirit broke under his variegated activities.

*  *  * *  *

In these same August days I prepared a general statement upon the whole of our war policy. The greater part of it concerned operations in Burma and the Indian Ocean and their reactions upon the war against Japan. These will be described later. The paper is dated August 17. The immediate point on which my mind was focused was to procure the invasion of Italy as the natural consequence and exploitation of our victory in Sicily and Mussolini’s fall.

  Should Naples be captured [Operation “Avalanche”] in the near future, we shall have a first-rate port in Italy, and other harbours, like Brindisi and Taranto, will fall into our possession thereafter. If by November our front can be established as far north as the Leghorn-Ancona line, the landing-craft in the Mediterranean will have played their part. A detachment would be required from the landing fleet for amphibious turning movements such as we have seen in Sicily, for minor descents across the Adriatic, and for operations such as “Accolade” [the capture of Rhodes and other islands in the Aegean]. The disappearance of the Italian Fleet as a factor should enable a great diminution in naval strength in the Mediterranean
to be made, just as the use of first-class harbours supersedes the need of landing-craft. There should therefore be during the late autumn the power to move landing-craft and assault ships back for “Overlord,” and also to send a sufficient detachment through the Suez Canal to the Indian theatre. I repeat however that the
maximum
number for which landing-craft should be supplied in a single flight is thirty thousand men.