Closing the Ring (6 page)

General Eisenhower and his principal commanders now agreed that Italy should be the next and immediate target. They still preferred to land first on the toe, because they were short of landing-craft and planes, but for the first time they too began to favour the direct attack on Naples. This was so far from our newly won air bases in Sicily that it would much reduce the fighter cover for the landing. Nonetheless, Naples soon became the centre of all thoughts. The chance of quickly crushing Italy seemed to justify delaying operations against Burma; and the Admiralty stopped the assault shipping for India from leaving the Mediterranean.

On July 22, the British Chiefs of Staff urged their American colleagues to plan the direct attack on Naples on the assumption that extra shipping and aircraft carriers would be
available. The Americans took a different view. While agreeing to the attack, they adhered to their original decision that no reinforcements from America should be sent to General Eisenhower for this or any other purpose. He should do the best he could with what he had. Moreover, they insisted that three of his heavy bomber groups should be withdrawn to Britain. Conflict thus arose. The American Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the conquest of Italy would threaten Germany, and they also feared that the Germans would withdraw and that we should find ourselves hitting the air. They did not think there was much to be gained by bombing Southern Germany from airfields in Southern Italy, and they wanted all efforts against Germany to be concentrated on the shortest route across the English Channel, although nothing could happen there for ten months.

The British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that the Washington Conference had expressly stated that the elimination of Italy from the war was one of the prime Allied objects. The attack on Naples, now given the code-name of “Avalanche,” was the best means of accomplishing this, and the collapse of Italy would increase enormously the chances of the cross-Channel invasion being not only successful but decisive. Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, emphasised that the full-scale attack on German industry, particularly on factories producing fighters, could only be effective with the help of the Italian airfields. Their possession would therefore be a great contribution to a successful invasion of France. The Americans remained unmoved. However, most of the forces to be employed in “Avalanche” were British, and we resolved to do everything in our power to ensure its success. To overcome the weakness in long-range fighters the Admiralty allotted four escort carriers and a light fleet carrier to support the landing, and the Air Ministry gave General Eisenhower three of our bomber squadrons which had been due for early withdrawal.

While these somewhat sharp discussions were in progress, the scene was completely transformed by the fall of Mussolini on July 25. The argument for invading Italy seemed overwhelming.
As will be seen, the Germans reacted very quickly, and our invasion, and particularly the attack on Naples, was not greatly eased. “Avalanche” only just succeeded, and it was fortunate that we had provided additional British sea- and air-power. The risks would have been further reduced if there had been the extra shipping which we considered essential to accelerate the build-up after landing. In this we could not carry American opinion with us, and before the operation began many American ships were withdrawn, and some of the British assault shipping was also released to India.

*  *  * *  *

We must now return to the Sicilian battlefield. On August 3, Alexander telegraphed:

  The offensive has opened well. … I have just returned from a visit to General Patton, who is in great heart. The Seventh American Army have done a grand job of work and are fighting really well. The Canadians have made a very satisfactory début and are fighting well. Progress may be slow, but the country must be seen to be believed. Only a few mountain roads, which pass through gorges and round cliffs, which are easily defended and more easily demolished.

  The brilliant capture of Centuripe by our newly arrived 78th Division marked the last phase. Catania fell on the 5th, and thereafter the whole British line swung forward to the southern and western slopes of Mount Etna The United States 1st Division took Troina on August 6 after a stiff fight, and their 9th Division, passing through the 1st, entered Cesaro on the 8th. Along the north coast the United States 45h Division, followed by their 3d Division, reached Cape Orlando on August 10, with the aid of two small but skilful outflanking amphibious operations. After the capture of Randazzo on the 13th, the enemy broke contact all along the front, and, under cover of their strong anti-aircraft defences of the Messina Straits, escaped during the following nights to the mainland. Our armies raced for Messina. Enemy demolitions on the coastal road from Catania slowed up the Eighth Army, and by a narrow margin the prize fell to the Americans, who entered it on August 16.

General Alexander to Prime Minister

17 Aug. 43

The following facts are of interest.

Sicily invaded July 10. Messina entered August 16. Island taken in thirty-eight days. Sicily has coastline 600 miles and area 10,000 square miles. Island is heavily fortified with concrete pill-boxes and wire. Axis garrison: Italian 9 divisions, German 4 divisions, equalling 13 divisions; total forces: Italian 315,000, German 90,000, making total 405,000 soldiers. Our forces: Seventh Army, 6 divisions, including airborne division; Eighth Army, 7 divisions, including airborne and armoured brigades, making Allied total 13 divisions. …

It can be assumed that all Italian forces in island on July 10 have been destroyed, though a few battered units may have escaped to mainland. It is impossible yet to estimate booty and war material captured. Guns, tanks, rifles, and machine-guns are lying scattered about all over island.

During whole operation the air forces have maintained domination throughout, and their tactical air forces have in consequence concentrated a record proportion of their efforts on support of our armies in the field. Over one thousand enemy aircraft have been taken on airfields. The Royal Navy have kept our sea-lanes open and supplied us with everything we needed.

And later:

General Alexander to Prime Minister

17 Aug. 43

By 10
A.M.
this morning, August 17, 1943, the last German soldier was flung out of Sicily and the whole island is now in our hands.

*  *  * *  *

So ended a successful and skilful campaign of thirty-eight days. The enemy, once they had recovered from the initial surprise, had fought stubbornly. The difficulties of the ground were great. The roads were narrow, and cross-country movement was often impossible except for men on foot. On the Eighth Army front the towering mass of Mount Etna blocked
the way, and enabled the enemy to watch our moves. As they lay on the low ground of the Catania plain, malaria ran riot among our men. Nevertheless, once we were safely ashore and our air forces were operating from captured airfields, the issue was never in doubt. The enemy, according to General Marshall’s report, lost 167,000 men, of whom 37,000 were Germans. The Allies lost 31,158 killed, wounded, and missing.

¹
Crusade in Europe
, chapter IX, page 159.

²
See map, “Conquest of Sicily,” page 25.

³
Order of battle:

E
IGHTH
A
RMY
, Headquarters XIIIth and XXXth Corps.

In the first assault:
1st Canadian 5th, 50th, 51st, Divisions; part of 1st Airborne Division, 231st Infantry Brigade, 4th and 23d Armoured Brigades, and three Commandos.

In reserve in North Africa:
78th, 46th Divisions: remainder of 1st Airborne Division.

U.S. S
EVENTH
A
RMY
, Headquarters IId Corps.

In the first assault:
1st, 3d, 45th Divisions, 2d Armoured Division; part of 82d Airborne Division, 1st Battalion Rangers (Commando).

In reserve in North Africa:
9th Division, remainder of 82d Airborne Division

3
The Fall of Mussolini

Mussolini in the Toils___My Agreement with Roosevelt About Our Joint Proclamation___Mussolini Confers with Hitler Near Rimini___The Fascist Grand Council Meets, July
24___
Grandi’s Motion Carried___The Arrest of Mussolini, July
25___
The End of Twenty-One Years’ Dictatorship___Hitler’s Unwise Dispersion of Forces___He Receives the News from Italy, Jul
y 26___
My Forecast of November
25, 1942___
Correspondence with Roosevelt on Impending Italian Peace Proposals___My Thoughts on the Fall of Mussolini, July
26___
Our Anxiety About British Prisoners in Italy___Anglo-American Discussion of Armistice Terms___An Emergency Draft___Correspondence with President Roosevelt About Dealing with the House of Savoy, or Badoglio.

M
USSOLINI
now had to bear the brunt of the military disasters into which he had, after so many years of rule, led his country. He had exercised almost absolute control and could not cast the burden on the Monarchy, Parliamentary institutions, the Fascist Party, or the General Staff. All fell on him. Now that the feeling that the war was lost spread throughout well-informed circles in Italy, the blame fell upon the man who had so imperiously thrust the nation onto the wrong and the losing side. These convictions formed and spread widely during the early months of 1943. The lonely Dictator sat at the summit of power, while military defeat and Italian slaughter in Russia, Tunis, and Sicily were the evident prelude to direct invasion.

In vain he made changes among the politicians and generals. In February, General Ambrosio had succeeded Cavallero as Chief of the Italian General Staff. Ambrosio, together with the Duke of Acquarone, the Minister of Court, were personal advisers of the King and had the confidence of the Royal circle. For months they had been hoping to overthrow the Duce and put an end to the Fascist régime. But Mussolini still dwelt in the European scene as if he were a principal factor. He was affronted when his new military chief proposed the immediate withdrawal of the Italian divisions from the Balkans. He regarded these forces as the counterpoise to German predominance in Europe. He did not realise that defeats abroad and internal demoralisation had robbed him of his status as Hitler’s ally. He cherished the illusion of power and consequence when the reality had gone. Thus he resisted Ambrosio’s formidable request. So durable however was the impression of his authority and the fear of his personal action in extremity that there was prolonged hesitation throughout all the forces of Italian society about how to oust him. Who would “bell the cat”? Thus the spring had passed, with invasion by a mighty foe, possessing superior power by land, sea, and air, drawing ever nearer.

During July the climax came. Since February the taciturn, cautious-minded, constitutional King had been in contact with Marshal Badoglio, who had been dismissed after the Greek disasters in 1940. He found in him at length a figure to whom he might entrust the conduct of the state. A definite plan was made. It was resolved that Mussolini should be arrested on July 26, and General Ambrosio agreed to find the agents and create the situation for this stroke. The General was aided unwittingly by elements in the Fascist Old Guard, who sought a new revival of the Party, by which, in many cases, they would not be the losers. They saw in the summoning of the highest Party organ, the Fascist Grand Council, which had not met since 1939, the means of confronting the Duce with an ultimatum. On July 13, they called on Mussolini and induced him to convene a formal session of the Council on July 24.
The two movements appear to have been separate and independent, but their close coincidence in date is significant.

*  *  * *  *

We had at the time no definite knowledge of the inner stresses of Italian politics, but reports of growing demoralisation and unrest had for some time reached Allied Headquarters. Strikes and rioting in the Northern Italian cities had followed on our bombing raids. We knew that the food situation in Italy had worsened as rail traffic was disrupted. It seemed that the time had come to launch an appeal to the Italian people upon the Sicily landing. President Roosevelt had proposed a proclamation which seemed to us to assume for the United States a position which was not fair to the British share in the Italian war. On July 5 I cabled him as follows:

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

5 July 43

The War Cabinet had contemplated a joint declaration to the Italian people in the name of both our countries. Whereas “Torch” was by agreement planned as an American expedition with a British contingent and I have acted as your lieutenant throughout, we consider “Husky” [Sicily] and post-“Husky” as joint undertakings in which we are equal partners. This would certainly seem justified by the proportion of troops, naval forces, shipping, and aircraft involved. I fully accept your dictum that “there should be no senior partner.”

2. However, since we have been longer in quarrel or war with Italy than you, and also since a document of this character written by one man in its integrity is better than a joint production, we are ready that you should speak at this juncture to the Italian people on behalf of both our countries and in the interests of the common cause.

3. There are a few amendments which I venture to suggest to you in all the frankness of our friendship. They are of importance, because without them untoward reactions might grow among the British people and their forces that their contribution had not received equal or sufficient recognition. In fact, they are only mentioned once, and all else is either United States or United Nations.

4. The amendments are as follows: (
a
) After the words, “against whom on December 11, 1941, your Government declared war,” insert, “I speak also on behalf of His Britannic Majesty’s Government and in their name.” (
b
) After the words, “under the command of General Eisenhower,” insert, “and his Deputy, General Alexander.” (
c
) The end of the sentence, “The skies over Italy are dominated by the vast air armadas of the United Nations,” should read, “of the United States and Great Britain. Italy’s seacoasts are threatened by the greatest accumulation of British and Allied sea-power ever concentrated in the Mediterranean.” I am sure you will see the justice of this, as after all it is the United States and Great Britain who are doing virtually the whole thing.