Closing the Ring (13 page)

4. General Marshall has consented to my being represented on
General MacArthur’s staff by a British liaison officer of General’s rank. This will enable us to follow much more closely than hitherto what is happening in that theatre. I discussed this matter with Dr. Evatt when he was in London. He said he was all for it, and I am now telegraphing to Curtin about it, pointing out that this will bring us more closely into touch with the war in the Pacific.

5. Eden and Hull are locked in lengthy discussions. Hull remains completely obdurate about not using the word “recognition” in respect of the French Committee. We have therefore agreed that they shall publish their document, and we ours, and the Canadians theirs, after communicating with Russia and others concerned. Eden has this matter in hand. I have pointed out in the plainest terms to the President that they will certainly have a bad press, but he says he would rather have a sheet anchor out against the machinations of de Gaulle. Our position is of course different, for we are doing no more for the Committee by our formula than we did for de Gaulle when he was alone and quite uncontrolled by others.

*  *  * *  *

The Staff discussion upon the share we were to have in the major assault upon Japan became heated and led to an amusing incident. Each of the joint Staffs had behind them a considerable group of twelve to twenty high Staff officers, a quivering audience, silent, with gleaming eyes. Presently the Chairman said, “I think we had better discuss this without our Staffs being present,” upon which the group of high Staff officers filed out into a waiting-room. The quarrel was duly settled, as usual, and Mountbatten, whose position as Chief of Combined Operations gave him a seat on the British Chiefs of Staff Committee, seized this opportunity to ask the Chairman if he might give a demonstration of the special mixture of ice which his scientists had found. This was called Pykrete.
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On receiving permission, one of his Staff wheeled in on a large dumb-waiter two blocks of ice about three feet high, one common or garden ice, the other Pykrete. He invited the strongest man present to chop each block of ice in half with a special chopper he had brought. All present voted General Arnold into the job of “strong man.” He took off his coat, rolled up his sleeves, and swung the chopper, splitting the ordinary ice with one blow. He turned round, smiling, and, clasping his hands, seized the chopper again, and advanced upon the block of Pykrete. He swung the chopper, and as he brought it down let go with a cry of pain, for the Pykrete had suffered little damage and his elbows had been badly jarred.

Mountbatten then capped matters by drawing a pistol from his pocket to demonstrate the strength of Pykrete against gunfire. He first fired at the ordinary ice, which was shattered. He then fired at the Pykrete, which was so strong that the bullet ricocheted, narrowly missing Portal.

The waiting officers outside, who had been worried enough by the sound of the blows and the scream of pain from General Arnold, were horrified at the revolver shots, one of them crying out, “My God! They’ve now started shooting!”

But who in war will not have his laugh amid the skulls?—and here was one.

*  *  * *  *

Actually the dispute between the British and American Chiefs of Staff was on the issue that Britain demanded a full and fair place in the war against Japan from the moment when Germany was beaten. She demanded a share of the airfields, a share of the bases for the Royal Navy, a proper assignment of duties to whatever divisions she could transport to the Far East after the Hitler business was finished. In the end the Americans gave way. My friends on the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been pressed by me to fight this point, not indeed to pistols, but to the utmost limit, because at this stage in the war what I most feared was that American critics would say, “England, having taken all she could from us to help her beat Hitler, stands out of the war against Japan and will leave us in the lurch.” However, at the Quebec Conference this impression was effectively removed.

*  *  * *  *

On the late afternoon of August 23, we had our second plenary meeting to discuss the draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This document reiterated the points raised in their first report as amended after our discussion on them, and in addition set out in detail proposed operational arrangements in the Far East. No decision was reached in the report on the actual operations to be undertaken, though it was decided that the main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of “establishing land communications with China and improving and securing the air route.” In the “over-all strategic concept” of the Japan war, plans were to be made to bring about the defeat of Japan within twelve months after the collapse of Germany. I said I was glad to see that this was to be our target rather than planning on the basis of a prolonged war of attrition.

Finally, the general principle of a separate Southeast Asia Command, which I had proposed to the President before the Conference, was accepted. I said that I was anxious to make a public announcement about this as soon as possible. This would also help to show how much of the discussions at “Quadrant” had been concerned with the war against Japan, and thus set forth sufficient reasons why Russia had not been included in the deliberations. It was generally agreed by those present that we should do this.

*  *  * *  *

I now told the Viceroy of the decision to set up a Southeast Asia Command, with Mountbatten as Supreme Commander.

  
Prime Minister to Viceroy of India

24 Aug. 43

We have now formed and set up the Southeast Asia Command, separate from the command in India, which was foreshadowed by me at the time of Field-Marshal Wavell’s appointment to the Viceroyalty. There are great advantages in having under a British commander a combined command similar to that which exists in North Africa. We have had some discussions with the Americans in the weeks that have passed upon the person of the commander. After a great deal of consideration, I decided to propose Lord Louis
Mountbatten, now Chief of Combined Operations, for this very important post. Mountbatten has unique qualifications, in that he is intimately acquainted with all three branches of the Services, and also with amphibious operations. He has served for nearly a year and a half on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and thus knows the whole of our war story from the centre. I regard this as of great importance on account of the extremely varied character of the Southeast Asia front by land and sea. Mountbatten is a fine organiser and a man of great energy and daring. His appointment has been cordially welcomed by the President and by the American Chiefs of Staff, and was hailed with delight by Soong on behalf of the Generalissimo. I am therefore, with the approval of the Cabinet, making the necessary submissions to the King, and send this message to you for your information, as it is important that the announcement should emerge out of the present Conference. It will be made public tomorrow, August 25.

  Next day I sent the following telegram to my colleagues at home:

Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and War Cabinet only

25 Aug. 43

Everything here has gone off well. We have secured a settlement of a number of hitherto untractable questions, e.g., the Southeast Asia Command, “Tube Alloys,” and French Committee recognition. On this last we all had an awful time with Hull, who has at last gone off in a pretty sulky mood, especially with the Foreign Secretary who bore the brunt. Unanimous agreement is expressed in a masterly report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff which the President and I have both approved. All differences have been smoothed away except that the question of the exact form of our amphibious activities in the Bay of Bengal has been left over for further study. I think however it is settling itself as I wished. There is no doubt that Mackenzie King and the Canadian Government are delighted and feel themselves thoroughly “on the map.”

2. The black spot at the present time is the increasing bearishness of Soviet Russia. You will have seen the telegram received from Stalin about the Italian overtures. He has absolutely no ground for complaint, as we have done no more than to hand
the Italian representative the severe directions expressing unconditional surrender which had already received the cordial approval of the Soviet Government and have immediately reported all these matters to him.

3. The President was very much offended at the tone of this message. He gave directions to the effect that the new Soviet Chargé d’Affaires was to be told he was away in the country and would not be back for some days. Stalin has of course studiously ignored our offer to make a further long and hazardous journey in order to bring about a tripartite meeting. In spite of all this, I do not think his manifestations of ill temper and bad manners are preparatory to a separate peace with Germany, as the hatreds between the two races have now become a sanitary cordon in themselves. It is disheartening to make so little progress with these people, but I am sure my colleagues will not feel that I myself or our Government as a whole have been wanting in any way in patience and in loyalty.

4. I am feeling rather tired, as the work at the Conference has been very heavy and many large and difficult questions have weighed upon us. I hope my colleagues will think it proper for me to take two or three days’ rest at one of these mountain camps before I broadcast on Sunday and proceed to Washington. I am also planning to broadcast when taking a degree at Harvard University on September 3, and to return home immediately thereafter. It is only in the event of some unexpected development in Italy or elsewhere which would make it desirable for me and the President to be close together that I should prolong my stay. In any case, I shall be back in good time before the meeting of Parliament. The Foreign Secretary returns by air on Saturday and is sending Cadogan with me to Washington.

I decided to have two liaison officers, one with MacArthur and the other with Chiang Kai-shek. When I got home, I sent for Generals Lumsden and Carton de Wiart to come to Chequers, and offered them these appointments, to the great delight of both. Lumsden was one of our most distinguished and accomplished officers, who at the very beginning of the war, in the first contact with the enemy, had brought the armoured car back into popularity. He soon gained General MacArthur’s confidence and proved a valuable liaison officer.
He was killed in January 1945. A Japanese suicide bomber attacked the battleship
New Mexico
during the bombardment of Lingayen Gulf. On the bridge stood Admiral Fraser, the British Commander, and General Lumsden. By pure chance the first two moved to the opposite side to get a better view. A minute later the suicide bomber struck. All at Lumden’s end of the bridge were killed. His death was a loss to his country and to me personally.

*  *  * *  *

We must now return to the Italian scene. Contrary to our earlier hopes, the bulk of the Germans successfully withdrew across the Straits of Messina. On August 16, General Eisenhower had held a meeting of his commanders to select from a variety of proposals the means by which the campaign should be carried into Italy. He had to take special account of the enemy dispositions of that time. Eight of the sixteen German divisions in Italy were in the north under Rommel, two were near Rome, and six were farther south under Kesselring. These powerful forces might be reinforced from twenty German divisions which had been withdrawn from the Russian Front to refit in France. Nothing we might gather for a long time could equal the strength which the Germans could put in the field, but the British and Americans had command of sea and air, and also the initiative. The assault upon which all minds were now set was a daring enterprise. It was hoped to gain the ports of Naples and Taranto, whose combined facilities were proportioned to the scale of the armies we must use. The early capture of airfields was a prime aim. Those near Rome were as yet beyond our reach, but there was an important group at Foggia adaptable for heavy bombers, and our tactical air forces sought others in the heel of Italy and at Montecorvino, near Salerno.

General Eisenhower decided to begin the assault in early September by an attack across the Straits of Messina, with subsidiary descents on the Calabrian coast. This would be the prelude to the capture of Naples (Operation “Avalanche”) by a British and an American army corps landing on the good
beaches in the Gulf of Salerno. This was at the extreme range of fighter cover from the captured Sicilian airfields. As soon as possible after the landings, the Allied forces would drive north to capture Naples.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff advised the President and me to accept this plan and to authorise the seizure of Sardinia and Corsica in second priority. We did so with alacrity; indeed, it was exactly what I had hoped and striven for. As part of the plan, it was intended to land an airborne division to capture the airfields south of Rome. This also we accepted. The circumstances in which this feature was cancelled are recounted in a later chapter.

*  *  * *  *

What I regarded as highly satisfactory decisions had thus been obtained and all was moving forward. But towards the end of August, a British officer arrived at Quebec from General Eisenhower’s headquarters with very disconcerting news. He stated that by December 1 six divisions would have crossed the Straits of Messina and passed through Calabria, and another six would have landed at Salerno. I at once protested against this alarming underestimate of our resources.

Prime Minister to General Alexander

26 Aug. 43

General Whiteley, who has been here, has told us the dates and scales of “Baytown” and “Avalanche”
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respectively. This has filled me with the greatest concern, and I hope you will be able to reassure me. Assuming that our landings are successful and that we are not defeated in the subsequent battles, I cannot understand why two and a half months or more will be required to get ashore, or why it would be necessary, once we have obtained an effective port and bridgehead at “Avalanche,” to march all the “Baytown” divisions through Calabria instead of sending some at least of them round by sea.