Brothers in Arms (97 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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page_283<br/>
Page 283
45. This is the term used by Shi Zhe, Mao Zedong's and Zhou Enlai's Russian-language interpreter, in describing Sino-Soviet relations in October 1950. Interviews with Shi Zhe, August 1992.
46. For a more detailed discussion based on Shi Zhe's recollections, which is checked against other Chinese sources, see Chen Jian,
China's Road to the Korean War,
197-200.
47. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and others, October 12, 1950,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,
vol. 1, 552.
48. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 13, 1950, ibid., 556. The telegram published in
Mao Zedong wengao
is abridged. The citation here is based on the original of the telegram, kept at the Chinese Central Archives in Beijing. For a more comprehensive discussion of this telegram and the meeting from which it resulted, see Chen Jian,
China's Road to the Korean War,
200-3.
49. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, Gao Gang, and others, October 17, 1950; telegram, Mao Zedong to Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi, Han Xianchu, and Xie Fang, October 18, 1950,
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,
vol. 1, 566-8; see also Zhang Xi, ''Peng Dehuai and China's Entry into the Korean War," 27-8.
50.
Weida de KangMei yuanChao yundong
[The great movement to resist America and assist Korea] (Beijing: Renmin, 1954), 7-8.
51. See State Council and Supreme People's Court, "Instructions on Suppressing Reactionary Activities," issued on July 23, 1950, in
Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xianbian
[Selected important documents since the founding of the People's Republic] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1992), vol. 1, 358-60; see also Zhang Min, "A Survey of the Struggle to Suppress Reactionaries in the Early Years of the PRC,"
Dangde wenxian
[Party documents], no. 2 (1988).
52. For Russian documentary evidence on this issue, see "New Russian Documents on the Korean War,"
CWIHP Bulletin
6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 47-53.
53. Beijing reached the decision to come to the negotiating table after extensive consultation with Stalin, who approved it in a meeting with Gao Gang and Kim I1 Sung in June 1951. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, "China's Strategies to End the Korean War," paper presented to an international conference entitled "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," organized by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), Hong Kong University, January 9-12, 1996; see also Shi Zhe,
Zai lishi jüren

 

page_284<br/>
Page 284
shenbian,
505-9; "New Russian Documents on the Korean War,"
CWIHP Bulletin
6-7 (Winter 1995/1996): 59-66.
54. Beijing maintained daily telegraphic communication with Moscow during the armistice negotiations. Indeed, Beijing's leaders even forwarded copies of correspondence between Chinese negotiators at Panmunjom and the leaders in Beijing to Stalin to keep him abreast of developments. Copies of these and other Russian documents on the Korean War obtained by CWIHP are available for research at the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. For examples of these communications, see "New Russian Documents on the Korean War," 66-84.
55. When and how the Soviet air force entered operations in Korea has been a confusing question for scholars in recent years. While some scholars, basing their discussion on information provided by Russian recollections and documents, believe that this occurred as early as November 1950, others, following the insights gained from Chinese sources, argue that the Soviet air force began operations in Korea in January 1951. We believe that the key here is to make a distinction between operations for the purpose of defending China's Northeast (Manchuria) and the transportation lines across the Chinese-Korean border, especially the bridge over the Yalu River, and operations designed for supporting Chinese-North Korean land forces fighting in Korean territory. While the former did happen as early as November 1950 (as an inevitable extension of defending the air space of China's Northeast), the latter did not occur until January 1951.
56. Han Nianlong et al.,
Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao,
28-30; Pei Jianzhang,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo waijiaoshi,
40-1.
57. The "Three Antis" movement was designed to oppose corrupt Communist cadres; the "Five Antis" movement was aimed at the national bourgeoisie "who should not be destroyed at this stage but who needed to be tightly controlled by the power of the people's state.'' For discussions of these movements, see Frederick C. Teiwes, "Establishment and Consolidation of the New Regime," in Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank, eds.,
The Cambridge History of China
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), vol. 14, 88-91.
58. During the war years, the Soviet Union provided China with military equipment for 64 army divisions and 22 air force divisions, which placed China in a debt totaling 3 billion old rubles (about USS 650 million); China did not pay off this debt (plus interest) until 1965. See Xu Yan,
Diyici jiaoliang
[The first test of strength] (Beijing: Zhongguo guang bo dianshi, 1990), 31-2.

 

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