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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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The Soviet technicians and nuclear scientists who were sent to China soon discovered that Beijing's main aim was to construct a nuclear weapon, not, as they had been told before departure, to solve China's energy problems. Still, Khrushchev decided to move ahead with the program, and the Soviet ministries involved already in 1955-1956 routinely accepted Chinese requests for technical drawings, designs, and measurements that could be used only to make a nuclear bomb. In October 1957 the Kremlin finally caved in to Chinese pressure and made a promise later withdrawn to supply Beijing outright with a prototype nuclear weapon and related technical data.

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The substantial upturn in the levels of civilian and military cooperation during Khrushchev's first years in power stimulated further growth of alliance cohesion on other issues. Chinese publishers translated large numbers of Soviet books and pamphlets and made them available to the public. Local authorities in even the most remote parts of the country screened Soviet films, put on cultural exhibits, and arranged language courses. Government officials at all levels studied the Soviet experience in economy, administration, and law (chapter 3).
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The successes of the bilateral assistance programs also helped solve potentially awkward problems in politics and diplomacy. The Soviets accepted Mao's 1954 purge of CCP Central Committee members Gao Gang and Rao Shushi, including the charges that Gao had attempted to subvert Mao's leadership by "undermining the CCP's relations with fraternal parties."
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Moscow also decided to be careful in criticizing the rapid and enforced collectivization of agriculture on which Mao embarked in early 1955 against Soviet advice. The "excesses" that the Chinese committed should be interpreted as signs of their eagerness in building socialism, according to Soviet foreign ministry analysts. In an era in which the enthusiasm for socialist construction probably was at its all-time high in the Soviet Union and in which Soviet leaders often despaired over hesitancy and skepticism in Eastern Europe the Chinese ardor was a welcome addition to Khrushchev's ebullience.
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In foreign policy, too, there was increasing cooperation between the two allies. Beijing and Moscow negotiated the end of the Korean War and set the framework for the future policies of Kim Il Sung's North Korean regime by frequent consultations and substantial understanding for each other's views. The two highlights of this diplomatic cooperation were the 1954 Geneva conference on Indochina in which the Chinese accepted, and brought Hanoi to accept, a de facto division of Vietnam and the 1956 crisis in North Korea, during which Beijing and Moscow forced Kim to accept the inclusion of some of his former opponents in the party leadership.
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The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954-1955 did not lead to a crisis in the Sino-Soviet relationship on the contrary, Beijing kept Moscow informed of its plans

 

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and intentions, and assured the Soviets that it would avoid a direct confrontation with the United States. Moscow, on its side, made clear both privately to Mao and publicly that the Soviet Union would assist China in case of a conflict with the Americans. Although the Soviets were puzzled and not too pleased by the timing of the Chinese military operations, Khrushchev accepted Mao's underlining of Beijing's need to keep the issue of Chinese reunification in focus and to pressure Washington to open negotiations with China.

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In 1955, as collectivization transformed ancient patterns of production and ownership in the Chinese countryside, Mao began to regret the measured pace of socialist change during the first years of the People's Republic. Enflamed by what he saw as the creativity and energy of the masses, Mao believed that the introduction of socialism and increases in productivity should be speeded up, and he started to suspect that some of the leaders of his own party had been holding him back deliberately, because they feared relying on the masses and were too bound up by the stages of the Soviet experience. The post-Stalin changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union emboldened Mao in his new revolutionary optimism just as Khrushchev had unleashed the full productive forces of socialism, Mao hoped to mobilize his party for a quicker and more thorough socialist transformation.
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Mao's response to the CPSU Twentieth Congress in February 1956 must be seen in light of these changes in his political attitudes. The chairman welcomed Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, noting to the Soviet ambassador in March that if the CCP had followed Stalin's advice, it never would have taken power. For Mao, de-Stalinization implied Soviet criticism of Stalin's China policy and Moscow's recognition of the achievements of the CCP and of Mao himself. Therefore, Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin would enable Mao to further his own visions of socialism in China.
But while welcoming Khrushchev's "secret" speech, Mao saw at least three problems with the way the criticism of Stalin had been presented. He resented not having been consulted before the speech was made. Also, Mao felt that Khrushchev's condemnation was too general and wanted specific criticism of Stalin's policies (including, to be sure, his policies on China). Third, Mao took exception to the fact that the speech had been leaked to the West and feared that Khrushchev's behavior would weaken international socialism.
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For Mao, the popular rebellions against Communist rule in Poland and Hungary in the summer and fall of 1956 confirmed his worst fears about the consequences of Khrushchev's behavior and made him turn violently against the process of de-Stalinization.
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The East European crises arose just as Mao was receiving reports of resistance to collectivization and the party's control of culture and city administration. Expecting a full-scale confrontation with "counter-

 

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revolution" inside China, Mao convened all-night Politburo meetings with the Soviet ambassador present in which the chairman advised Khrushchev to crush the Hungarian revolution, while leaving the Polish party as much leeway as possible to solve its own problems.

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Mao still accepted that the Soviet Union was the "older brother" among socialist states and expected the Chinese involvement with Eastern Europe to strengthen Soviet authority inside the Eastern Bloc. But he was in no way blind to how Chinese missions to Moscow, Warsaw, and Budapest in the wake of the political upheavals also helped boost his own authority within the Communist world movement. "Now that the enemy is taking advantage of the criticism of Stalin to take the offensive on a worldwide scale, we ought to support the Soviet Union," Mao told a visiting Yugoslav delegation in January 1957.
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The year 1957 was to be the last time the Sino-Soviet alliance functioned well. With criticism of the CCP mounting in the Hundred Flowers campaign a wave of political openness initiated by Mao himself to prove mass support for his party the chairman drew parallels between mistakes made in the Soviet Union and mistakes made by CCP officials that had cost the party popular support and hindered the country's development. "We still need to learn from the Soviet Union," Mao said; "however, we shall learn from them in a selective way, only accept good things, while avoiding picking up the bad things."
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As Mao's doubts about the Soviets mounted, practical cooperation between the two sides continued. In some areas, such as military and nuclear technology, it even intensified. The secret October 1957 agreement on exchange of nuclear technology aimed at making China capable of producing its own nuclear weapons by 1960, and the many visits of high-level military delegations to each other's countries explored ways of extending Sino-Soviet cooperation in military production. Economic and educational cooperation also was extended in several agreements signed during 1957.
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Nikita Khrushchev's response to the trouble in his eastern alliance China's meddling in Europe and its criticism of his foreign and domestic policies was at first remarkably moderate. Khrushchev with his earthy sense of politics seems to have sensed that what the alliance needed was a perception of common purpose, of having joint strategies for dealing with the political and military situation in Pacific Asia. Throughout 1957 the Soviet ambassador was instructed to discuss American policies and the internal situation in Korea, Vietnam, and Indonesia in detail with Mao and the Chinese leaders and to pay special attention to China's defense needs. This belated Soviet attempt at foreign policy integration was obviously appreciated by Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and the heads of the Chinese military and intelligence services. But to Mao the Soviet initiatives seemed suspect in view of the political gap between his own aims for

 

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China and Soviet practices. When Khrushchev decided to turn to military integration, Mao's suspicions came out in full bloom.

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Descent, 1958-1960
Mao's November 1957 visit to Moscow for the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution marked a watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. The chairman's official and unofficial remarks during his trip show that he no longer deferred to Soviet views on ideology and policies; on the contrary, Mao expected Soviet and East European leaders to learn from him. His lessons were clear: The Soviet Union, China, and socialist and progressive movements around the world constituted a stronger force than the United States and its allies: "The east wind prevails over the west wind." The Soviet leadership should confront the Americans with confidence in their own strength and without fearing war. These international policies should be underpinned in all socialist countries by a reinvigora-tion of socialist transformation and mobilization of the masses.
In his rambling speeches in Moscow in which he demonstrated his agitation and his determination not to be humiliated as he had been during his first visit Mao took care not to be accused of anti-Soviet attitudes. "The Soviet Union is the only country which is qualified to be a leader," Mao said, adding "I have been to Moscow twice, the first time made me very unhappy. 'Brotherly parties' it sounded beautiful, but actually we were not equal. Now I feel some kind of equality."
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For Khrushchev himself and for many of the East and West European Communist leaders present, Mao's behavior could not have come at a more unfortunate time. In the summer of 1957 Khrushchev had defeated a Stalinist plot against his leadership in the CPSU Politburo, in which the plotters Molotov, Lazar Kaganovich, and others had argued for positions not unlike those of Mao. In the fall Khrushchev wanted to take advantage of his victory to redirect Soviet foreign policy toward a relaxation of tensions with the West. Most Communist leaders welcomed the new trend in Soviet policy and the beliefs in peaceful coexistence and nonviolent revolution that accompanied it.69
Mao and Deng Xiaoping, who had accompanied the chairman to Moscow for secret talks on Chinese complaints concerning Soviet aid, felt that the other Communist parties had taken note of the Chinese positions. In the spring of 1958 Mao repeatedly assured the Soviets of his intentions to follow the Soviet lead in foreign policy. "We completely support every one of the recent foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union," Mao told Ambassador Parel Iudin on February 28. "[They are] distinguished by great flexibility and thorough thinking."
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Mao's concurrence with Khrushchev's early attempts at Great Power détente

 

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may have been a way of deflecting Soviet criticism of the Great Leap Forward, the intense campaign to raise production through mass mobilization that Mao promoted from 1957-1958 on. Soviet diplomats and experts noted very early on that production targets were inflated and that the sudden collapse in central planning and shifting of labor from agriculture to rudimentary steel mills and production plants were recipes for disaster. Mao did not respond to the Soviet criticism, even though he must have been very annoyed by it. According to his colleagues, he waited for the results of the Leap to prove the Soviets wrong.

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In late May and early June 1958 the Soviet Union started presenting a new set of proposals for military cooperation and integration between the two allies. These plans had been under preparation for some time in the Soviet ministries of defense and foreign affairs. The main points of the plans were joint technical intelligence facilities, Soviet-operated early-warning systems, and long-distance naval communications stations, all to be installed in China and paid for by the Soviet Union. Moscow would supply China with advanced equipment for amphibious operations and send instructors. In early July the Soviets also suggested setting up a joint force of nuclear submarines to operate along the Chinese coast and in the western Pacific. This latter initiative was intended as a positive response to the Chinese request to buy nuclear submarines from the Soviet Union.
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For the Sino-Soviet relationship, the Soviet initiatives came at the worst possible moment. Mao had called a meeting of the Chinese military leadership in late May, probably because he needed to shore up the army's support for his Great Leap initiatives, enthusiasm for which was flagging among several of his Politburo colleagues. During the two-month meeting of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, Mao repeatedly stressed self-reliance, criticized "dogmatism" and excessive dependence on the Soviet Union, and underlined the "high tide" of the international revolutionary movement. Turning down or amending the Soviet proposals became a way visibly to demonstrate the correctness of Mao's positions.
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Mao's reaction to the Soviet proposals set off alarm bells in Moscow. In the summer of 1958 the Soviet leaders reviewed their aid programs to China and started to worry about how China would use the technologies transferred from the Soviet Union. After receiving a thorough report about the status of the Chinese nuclear programs and the effects further Soviet assistance would have on Chinese capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, Khrushchev decided to slow down the transfer of nuclear technology under pretext of technical difficulties. After learning in early July of the CCP's intentions to put military pressure on Taiwan to challenge U.S. resolve in the Taiwan Straits, the Soviet leaders wor-

 

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