Brothers in Arms (38 page)

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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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terms but without saying so openly. Stalin began by informing Zhou that the Soviet delegation at the United Nations would reject the proposal advanced by Mexico concerning exchange of POWs, since it conformed to the American position in the negotiations. Instead, the Soviet Union would repeat its call for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and a political settlement to be reached by "Koreans themselves under the observation of a committee" whose composition could be discussed further. Stalin also informed Zhou that the Soviet delegation would leave "in Mao Zedong's hands" the response to the proposal to withhold temporarily 20 percent of POWs from each side while returning the remaining POWs.
Zhou then raised the question of the third strategy outlined on August 20, asking Stalin's opinion about whether it was possible to accept the proposal then under discussion to transfer POWs to a neutral country so that their fate could be decided separate from an armistice. Stalin answered that the Soviet Union also wanted the return of all POWs, but that "if an agreement cannot be reached on this basis, we cannot deliver the POWs to the UN because the UN is a military participant in the war." Stalin asked Zhou to which country the Chinese proposed to send the prisoners. When Zhou answered with the plausible proposal that India would serve this function, Stalin questioned who would cover the expenses of maintaining the prisoners. Zhou replied rather vaguely that the POWs would "after some time" be transferred to China and then the Chinese and Koreans would cover their expenses.
Stalin admitted that Zhou's proposal could be acceptable but at the same time attempted to dissuade him by cautioning that they "must keep in mind that the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them" as spies. Zhou agreed with this warning but nonetheless pressed for a specific strategy with which to end the war, suggesting a cease-fire with resolution of the POW question to come later. He reminded Stalin that he had agreed with this strategy if no agreement were reached about the percentage of POWs to be withheld. Stalin avoided committing himself to this resolution, however. He acknowledged that "this can be considered as one of possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it." Zhou countered by saying that the United States might suggest such a resolution; when Stalin agreed that this would be good, the two turned to other issues.

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Thus the discussion ended without clear agreement on strategy for ending the war.

According to the records released thus far by the Russian Presidential Archive, Stalin's final instruction to Mao regarding the war in Korea was his puzzling comment on December 27, 1952, before discussing the latest Chinese request for armaments, that Mao's observations about the probability of an American attack in the spring of 1953

 

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reflect the plans of the present American command in Korea, who are operating under the leadership of the Truman government. It is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea. Nevertheless, you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.

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In light of the hard line toward communism Eisenhower maintained during the presidential campaign, Stalin's assessment seems illogical; it perhaps reflects his estimation of the general as more "realistic" than the civilian Truman.
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At any rate, advising the Chinese to prepare for a new American attack served to maintain the status quo in Korea.
Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, resulted in a radical change in the Soviet approach to the Korean War and hence in the position of the Chinese and North Koreans as well, as they were dependent on Soviet support and therefore subordinate to Moscow's directions. Despite the great uncertainty and anxiety within which the new collective leadership operated, it nonetheless moved immediately to bring an end to the war in Korea. On March 19 the Council of Ministers adopted a lengthy resolution on the war, with attached letters to Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung. In tortuously convoluted language reflecting the great psychological difficulty of altering the policy pursued by Stalin, the resolution declared that
the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea. . . .
It went on to outline statements that should be made by Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai, the government of the People's Republic, and the Soviet delegation at the United Nations indicating their willingness to resolve the outstanding issues in order to reach an armistice agreement.
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The seat change in Moscow that followed Stalin's death was not accompanied, of course, by a corresponding shift within the People's Republic. However, the leadership change in Moscow necessarily affected Chinese strategy since the People's Republic could not pursue the war without continued Soviet support. Furthermore, Russian evidence suggests that the Chinese leadership saw

 

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Stalin's death as an opportunity to bring the war to an end. According to an internal history of the Korean War written by the Soviet Foreign Ministry in 1966, when Zhou discussed plans to end the war while in Moscow for Stalin's funeral, he "urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of the negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice."

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Thus it appears that Stalin's desire to continue the war had compelled the Chinese to prolong the straggle longer than they wished.

Russian documents also reveal, however, that Mao made a remarkably bellicose statement to an official of the Soviet embassy in Beijing on July 29, after the armistice had been concluded. He declared that
from a purely military point of view it would not be bad to continue to strike the Americans for approximately another year in order to occupy more favorable borders along the Changan River. Further movement to the south would risk stretching out the flanks in the west and east shore of Korea. In this case the danger of landings in the rear of the Chinese-Korean troops would grow significantly.
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This statement may well have been a case of posturing before the Soviets; we must learn the context of the discussion before we can determine the meaning of this statement.
What can we conclude at this point about why the Korean War was prolonged for two years after the opening of armistice negotiations? Unreasonable American demands were partly responsible,
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as they particularly affected PRC calculations of its needs for international prestige and revolutionary momentum. Mao Zedong apparently would have been willing to reach a negotiated settlement as early as mid-1951 if he could have secured acceptable terms. The fail-tare of the UN command to press their advantage in the summer of 1951 was also a factor. We cannot know, of course, whether a UN offensive would have succeeded, but we do know that following the failed offensive of April/May 1951, the Communist allies considered themselves so vulnerable that they were forced to initiate negotiations in order to buy time.
The leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea apparently wanted to end the war by 1952, but its views were overridden by Beijing and Moscow. Likewise, the Chinese wished to reach a negotiated settlement by late 1952 but were unable to bring Stalin around to their position. On the Communist side, the fundamental factor in prolonging the war appears to have been Stalin's calculation by mid-1951 that it was advantageous to the Soviet Union. Viewed in the perspective of the Soviet international position as a whole, the stalemate in Korea produced several beneficial results. It tied down American forces while providing an excellent opportunity for gathering intelligence on

 

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