Brothers in Arms (105 page)

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page_294<br/>

Page 294

speech to Beijing on October 9, 1959. See
Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao,
vol. 8, 564-5.

147. Zhou Wenqi and Zhu Liangru,
Teshu er fuzha de keti,
518-19; Liu Guoxin et al.,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo lishi changbian,
vol. 2, 65.

148. Han Nianlong et al.,
Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao,
116-19; Cong Jin,
Quzhe qianjin de shinian,
364; see also Chen Jian, "A Crucial Step toward the Breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960,"
CWHIP Bulletin
8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 246, 249-50.

149. In the wake of the Great Leap Forward, many top CCP leaders began to have serious doubts about Mao's radical plans to transform China's state and society, but they seldom questioned the wisdom of Mao's radical foreign policy.

150. Cong Jin,
Quzhe qianjin de suiyue,
505-24.

151. Li Cheng, chief ed.,
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shilu
[A factual history of the People's Republic of China] (Changchun: Jilin Renmin, 1994), vol. 2, 2nd part, 656-7.

152. Cong Jin,
Quzhe qianjin de suiyue,
576-7, 579.

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Appendix

I. Telegram, Stalin to Mao Zedong, Apri1 20, 1948	298
II. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Stalin, April 26, 1948	299
III. Liu Shaoqi's Report to the CPSU CC Politburo, July 4, 1949	301
IV. Record of Conversation, Stalin and Mao Zedong, December 16, 1949	314
V. Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to Beijing Nikolai Roshchin and Mao Zedong, in Moscow, January 1, 1950	319
VI. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, January 2, 1950	321
VII. Record of Conversation, Stalin and Mao Zedong, January 22, 1950	323
VIII. Record of Conversation, Stalin and Zhou Enlai, September 19, 1952	329
IX. Record of Conversation, Soviet Beijing Ambassador Pavel Iudin and Mao Zedong, March 31, 1956	335
X. Mao Zedong, Speech on Sino-American and Sino-Soviet Relations, January 27, 1957	343
XI. Record of conversation, Mao Zedong and Soviet Ambassador to Beijing Pavel Iudin, July 22, 1958	347
XII. Head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern Department, Mikhail Zimyanin, on Sino-Soviet Relations, September 15, 1959	356
XIII. Record of Conversation, Soviet Beijing Ambassador Stepan Chervonenko and Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi, August 4, 1960	361
XIV. Record of Conversation, Chervonenko and Mao Zedong, December 26, 1960	365
XV. Record of Conversation, Chervonenko and Zhou Enlai, June 25, 1961	369
XVI. Records of Conversations, Chervonenko and Deng Xiaoping, March-April 1962	374
XVII. Records of Meetings of the CPSU and CCP Delegations, Moscow, July 5-20, 1963	376

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Appendix
Some Documents on Sino-Soviet Relations, 1948 to 1963

We include a brief document appendix with this volume to illustrate terms, concepts, and issues in the Sino-Soviet relationship and how these developed over time during the period of the alliance. In order to understand how the alliance functioned, it is important to grasp the main terms the protagonists themselves used to describe their relationship. It is also necessary to have at least some insight into how Soviet and Chinese leaders used specific concepts both of a Marxist and a more general origin to discuss the present and to plan the future. And it is essential to have some idea about what mattered in the bilateral relationship which issues were important and which were not so important -in terms of both domestic priorities and international affairs.

By including some documents, we do not intend to argue for any specific interpretations or to come up with "proof" in old debates about chronology or the roles of individual leaders. The time is long passed when access to single documents (or parts thereof) from Soviet or Chinese archives could be transformed into sensational scholarly publications. The chapters in this collection show how wide the source base now is and, it is hoped, how the questions we ask have to be reoriented to suit this sudden availability of a historical record. So that the documents are seen in conjunction with the interpretative essays in the volume, we have chosen to avoid excessive annotations and to include only a brief identification of each document and notes to identify individuals and institutions mentioned therein.

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Page 298

I. Telegram, Stalin to Mao Zedong, April 20, 1948

Documents I and II are part of the 1947-1948 discussion on political strategy in China between Stalin and the CCP leadership. Although the Chinese Communists communicated frequently with Moscow by coded radio messages, Stalin obviously took his time in replying to some of the more general points that Mao had raised. One reason for the delay in this case may have been the fluid military situation in the Chinese civil war, in which the People's Liberation Army went on the offensive in the winter of 1947/48. Another reason may have been Mao's somewhat unfortunate reference to Yugoslavia, a country with which Moscow's relations were rapidly deteriorating during the spring of 1948. The text also set out Stalin's view of a CCP victory in China as part of the "bourgeois-democratic stage" of the Chinese revolution. In document II, Mao repeated his request to visit the Soviet Union, a request that Stalin had agreed to "in principle" already in February 1947. But in early May 1948 Stalin called the visit off, believing that Mao's presence was needed in China. Stalin also turned down a similar request by Mao in the late fall of 1948.

To Terebin
¹to be passed to Mao Zedong.

We have received both letters from Comrade Mao Zedong from November 30, 1947, and March 15, 1948. We could not react to them immediately because we were checking some information necessary for our answer. Now that the facts are verified, we can answer both letters.

First. The answer to the letter of November 30, 1947. We are very grateful for the information from Comrade Mao Zedong. We agree with the assessment of the situation given by Comrade Mao Zedong. We have doubts only about one point in the letter, where it is said that "In the period of the final victory of the Chinese revolution, following the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CCP should leave the political scene, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese revolution."

We do not agree with this. We think that the various opposition parties in China which are representing the middle strata of the Chinese population and are opposing the Guomindang clique will exist for a long time. And the CCP will have to involve them in cooperation against the Chinese reactionary forces and imperialist powers, while keeping hegemony, i.e., the leading position, in its hands. It is possible that some representatives of these parties will have to be included into the Chinese people's democratic govern-


¹Also known as Orlov or Zhelepin; Soviet military intelligence agent who was in charge of radio communications between Mao and Stalin during the Chinese civil war.

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