Battle Story (12 page)

Battle commenced in the Sarimbun beach area, when Australian troops of Brigadier Taylor’s 22nd Brigade fired on landing craft and requisitioned civilian boats carrying elements of the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions sometime after 2200hrs on 8 February.
By midnight it had become apparent that the Japanese were attempting to land in considerable strength all along a wide front from Tanjong Murai to Tanjong Buloh. The first wave of over 4,000 infantry landed safely with good artillery support and was able to make decent headway through the gaps between the Australian positions, exploiting many small inlets and river mouths. Brigadier Taylor had issued orders that searchlights were not to be used until such time as the enemy were clearly engaged in a major landing, for fear that the lights would be put out of action almost as soon as they started operating. However, a large proportion of the lights that were available had already been disabled by artillery and mortar fire from Johore and from the Sarimbun beachhead, which the Japanese had secured in the first hour or so of the battle. The few that had survived were never put to use due, among other reasons, to the fact that communications between the searchlight units and the different battalion headquarters had been destroyed during the preliminary bombardment and air strikes.

Assault on Singapore.

Although fire plans had been made with a landing in mind, the disruption of signals made it impossible for the infantry battalions to call for the artillery support they required if the Japanese were to be slowed down let alone stopped on the beaches, but in fact the available support consisted of only three batteries (29th, 30th and 65th) and was not adequate to the task of delivering bombardments all along the brigade front, a distance of over 5 miles.

At different locations the landing forces suffered heavy casualties and in some places troops were only landed successfully after a fierce struggle, but the front was far too extensive to be held by a single brigade and the Japanese were able to secure the landing areas, infiltrate between the scattered posts along the coast and press inland toward the village of Ama Keng. This would develop a salient that would divide 22nd Brigade in two, with 2/18th Battalion and 2/20th Battalion to the north and 2/19th to the south. It would also threaten the position of the brigade headquarters, just a few hundred yards to the south of Ama Keng, and the position of 29th Battery only a further half mile south.

The Japanese made incredibly quick headway and caused a great deal of confusion, which was amplified by the absence of reliable communications within 22nd Brigade. A little before midnight, Brigadier Taylor was able to make some sense of the tactical picture and communicated his view to General Bennett’s headquarters. His brigade reserve had been committed to the fight and he was convinced that the situation could only be retrieved by a major counter-attack at dawn. To this end, Bennett gave him command of another battalion (2/29th Australian), ordered fire on the Skudai estuary in Johore (which had been identified as a major route for Japanese reinforcements) and asked Percival’s headquarters for all the air support that could be mustered. However, by this stage the RAF’s offensive capacity had been reduced to a mere fourteen aircraft (four Fairey Swordfish and ten Hurricanes) still based on the island.

Bennett had formed a ‘Special Reserve battalion’ of over 400 men from Royal Army Service Corps personnel and others and at 0300hrs he put them and elements of 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion under Taylor’s command. The reserve battalion had been formed over the previous week and had had little time for training or to develop the cohesion that is vital for effective infantry units, but in any case, the forces now at Taylor’s disposal were completely inadequate to the task of mounting a major counter-attack over a front of some miles. Although Taylor’s tactical instinct was probably correct – that an immediate counter-attack would have been the preferable course of action – it was not a realistic proposition under the circumstances. Several units and sub-units of his brigade were at risk of being surrounded, and he did not have sufficient strength to secure their positions.

In a matter of a few hours the Japanese managed to sever communications between 22nd and 27th Australian Brigades. 22nd Brigade was forced to retreat and by 0100hrs on 9 February they were unable to present a united opposition to the Japanese advance, now supported by a second wave of troops landing in the north-west. Elements of 22nd Brigade became isolated and were forced to surrender despite Taylor committing such reserves as he had to hand. Fighting was fierce everywhere along the front. Casualties and prisoners reduced Australian 2/18th Battalion to below half numbers. By 0300hrs each of the three battalion commanders had given orders for their units to retire to pre-planned fall-back positions. The actions through the night of 9 February rather encapsulate the story of the whole Malayan campaign: a pattern of Japanese forces infiltrating between Allied units and making daring attacks, obliging Allied units to retire to another position, which in turn forces neighbouring units to conform to a new ‘line’ and supporting units to withdraw in order to make space for new arrivals. During the campaign on the mainland, repeated withdrawals had had the apparent value of allowing units to regroup and sometimes gain a little time to prepare new positions while the Japanese reorganised for a further advance. Now that the battle had been carried on to Singapore itself there was simply no physical space for manoeuvres of that ilk.

Although elements of 2/18th Battalion managed to make their way to their new position at Ama Keng, they were attacked again a short while after sunrise (about 0715hrs). Despite hard fighting and a counter-attack in conjunction with the engineers of 2/10th Field Company, the battalion could not hold their position and by 0930hrs had been forced back to the airfield of RAF Tengah. Meanwhile, most of 2/19th Battalion had become seriously disrupted by near-continual combat through the night. Many of the troops had become detached from the battalion and were turning up as far back as the 8th Division headquarters area at Bukit Timah, some 3 miles or more east of Tengah. The remaining battalion of Taylor’s 22nd Brigade, 2/20th, had been heavily engaged by overwhelming numbers all along its front and had been forced to retire from its positions in the Namazhe estate and then separated from the remainder of the brigade by Japanese troops moving inland along the line of the Sungei Sarimbun. Shortly after dawn, the battalion attempted to rejoin the brigade by moving south toward Ama Keng only to find that their path was blocked by strong Japanese forces. The battalion was now broken up into small parties, some of which moved east to cross Sungei Kranji then headed south. Some elements were able to make their way to the brigade headquarters, now at Bulim, but all of the battalions had sustained heavy losses through a mixture of combat and disruption, and the brigade was no longer an effective force.

Although Bennett had authorised reinforcements for Taylor’s command, the battalion allocated, 2/29th, had not been in a position to move immediately to his aid. Some of the battalion were in a position on the Woodlands Road about halfway between Mandai and Bukit Timah; a considerable portion was engaged in training elsewhere. It took some time to concentrate the battalion and consequently they did not arrive at Tengah until about an hour before dawn on 9 February. Taylor now had three units from outside his own brigade under his command: the Jind Battalion from 44th Indian Brigade, 2/29th from 27th Australian Brigade
and the Special Reserve Battalion that Bennett had assembled over the previous week. He deployed the Jinds and 2/29th on a line running from just north of Tengah to the north of Sungei Berih, where one company of 2/19th Battalion was still in position at the village of Choa Chu Kang. Taylor clearly intended to reorganise his own battalions behind these units, but was given the additional task of mounting a counter-attack by 2/29th, with the intention of pushing the enemy back beyond Ama Keng. The proposition that one infantry battalion would be able to throw back the scale of force that had already put an entire brigade out of the battle was clearly unsustainable, but was not put to the test. By mid-morning, well before the time set for the proposed attack, Taylor’s position was threatened by Japanese units that had moved east and then south to compromise his right flank.

Brigadier Paris’ 12th Indian Brigade were brought in to reinforce the Australians, but communications with 8th Division headquarters at Bukit Timah were now non-existent and Taylor had no means of ascertaining General Bennett’s intentions or the condition of neighbouring formations. Thus he and Paris agreed that 12th Brigade should deploy between Bulim and Keat Hong at the northern end of the Jurong Line – a series of half-prepared positions running north from the head of Sungei Jurong. Aware that 22nd Brigade could now be in danger of being cut off either by direct attacks on its own positions around Bulim and Tengah, or if the Japanese were able to dislodge 12th Brigade, Taylor decided to rationalise his line by adopting a position running south from Bulim to the Jurong Road, thus conforming to the Jurong Line. By the time the move was initiated, the Japanese, like the Australians, had been in near-continuous action for more than fifteen hours and were now tired and short of ammunition, and the nature of their attack – infiltrating between the Australian positions – meant that several of their battalions had become scattered and disorganised. Although Taylor’s troops were subjected to several air strikes and some artillery fire, they were able to take up their new positions largely unimpeded and some progress could be made toward
regrouping the battalions. Although his actions were unauthorised – and he received a stern warning from Bennett accordingly – Taylor had had little choice but to retire if his brigade was not to be destroyed, but his withdrawal was completely contrary to the orders received from his senior officer and to the general principles on which the battle was supposed to be fought. The only hope for success was to fight a battle of attrition that would inflict so many casualties on the Japanese that they would be forced to withdraw, regroup and make a new attempt. With hindsight it is easy to conclude that the battle for Singapore had already been lost some time before, but Taylor’s decisions ceded ground to the Japanese at no cost at all – and not only within his own sector of responsibility. The neighbouring formation, 44th Indian Brigade under Brigadier Ballentine, would be in danger of becoming isolated if it was not re-deployed to take account of Taylor’s movements.

When General Percival visited Bennett’s headquarters on the afternoon of the 9th they had given some thought to the possibility that 44th Brigade might be concentrated – the troops were dispersed in defensive positions from Jurong to Pasir Laba – and make an attack on the southern flank of the Japanese forces engaged with 22nd Brigade. The idea had been abandoned almost as soon as it was suggested, though it is hard to see why. The positions occupied by 44th Brigade were clearly going to have to be abandoned unless the Japanese could be repelled and there could hardly be a better opportunity. The Japanese were tired, scattered and disorganised from hard fighting; even if the attack made little progress it would allow a bit of breathing space for 22nd Brigade, and 44th Brigade would be able to attack the enemy when they did not have the benefit of armoured support. However, instead of making a bold move that might have a positive outcome, Ballentine was ordered to move his brigade eastward to take up positions on the southern end of the Jurong with 22nd Brigade; 12th Brigade held the northern portion and 15th Brigade was in reserve to their rear, screening the crucial supply dumps around Bukit Timah.

The rapid progress of the Japanese against 22nd Brigade had consequences elsewhere. Of the three battalions of the Australian 27th Brigade (Brigadier Maxwell), one (2/29th) was assigned to support 22nd Brigade, but by dusk the left flank of the remaining battalions (2/26th and 2/30th, deployed around Kranji and the causeway respectively) was under threat. Maxwell wanted to move 2/26th to prevent the Japanese from crossing the Sungei Kranji, but instead was given permission to use two companies to guard the Sungei Peng Siang, a tributary to the Kranji. One of these was the reserve company of the 2/26th, but the other was to be a more ad hoc body drawn from the other companies in the battalion, thus weakening each of them. Throughout the day, the brigade area had been subjected to increasingly heavy artillery fire and air strikes, which, though they inflicted relatively light casualties, damaged or destroyed a good deal of transport and, more importantly, damaged defences and thoroughly disrupted brigade communications. Firing ceased about an hour after dusk, sometime around 2200hrs, as the first elements of the 4th Regiment of the Japanese Guards Division landed.