A History of Korea (81 page)

The very first problem was an argument over the conference site. Kaes
ŏ
ng was in communist-controlled territory. The
U.N.
side had been dissatisfied with the Kaes
ŏ
ng site from the beginning and sought to relocate the talks to a more neutral location. The communists suspended the talks, claiming that
U.N.
planes had strafed its troops at the Kaes
ŏ
ng site on 23 August, but the two sides resumed the talks on 25 August and agreed to change the site to the nearby village of P’anmunj
ŏ
m.

With the truce talks in progress, fighting continued at relatively low intensity. Each side had constructed deep defensive lines that would be very difficult to pierce. After Ridgway ordered an end to
UNC
offensive operations and the start of an active defense strategy on 12 November 1951, the fighting evolved into a series of raids, limited local attacks, combat patrols, and artillery fire in the valleys and on the ridge spanning the width of the peninsula. With the ground fighting diminished, the air campaign intensified. The U.S. Navy and Air Force conducted the largest air attacks of the war against the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and destroyed hydroelectric dams on the Yalu River. By this time the communists had hundreds of new MiG jet fighters, but
U.N.
fliers maintained air superiority throughout the war.

On 12 May 1952 Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark replaced Ridgway as head of the Far East Command in Japan and as commander-in-chief of the
U.N.
forces in Korea. He inherited a frustrating mission, waging a war of limited objectives with no clear end in sight. Then, on 10 February 1953, Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet retired and was succeeded by Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor as commander of the 8th Army.

A major debate during the truce talks was over the location of the North-South boundary and the demilitarized zone. The communists wanted the 38th parallel as the boundary, but the
U.N.
side, whose forces had pushed north of the 38th parallel except for an area near Kaes
ŏ
ng in the west, insisted that the boundary be based on the armies’ battlefield positions at the time the armistice was signed. Finally, in March 1953 the communists agreed to a line of ground contact. It was also agreed that the opposing armies would drop back to form a demilitarized zone 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) wide between the opposing forces. But the truce talks still deadlocked on the repatriation of prisoners of war.

At the time many North Korean and Chinese prisoners refused repatriation. The
U.N.
side proposed voluntary repatriation of prisoners, which the communists opposed. In April 1952,
U.N.
forces screened more than 170,000 prisoners and reported that only 70,000, including 5,100 Chinese, desired repatriation. The communist side refused to negotiate on the basis of this low figure. Thereupon the
U.N.
side declared an indefinite recess of the truce talks in October 1952. With the talks still deadlocked, the communists launched an intense propaganda campaign, accusing the United States of conducting germ warfare. This was vigorously denied by the United States, and international observers offered to go to North Korea to investigate the communist charge. Finally, the falseness of the charge became evident, but bloody uprisings in the
U.N.
-controlled
POW
camps provided fuel for the communists to continue their propaganda crusade. Embarrassingly, Chinese and North Korean prisoners at K
ŏ
je-do prison camp actually controlled the camp for a considerable period in May and June 1952.

Following the death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin on 5 March 1953, his successors were clearly predisposed to a settlement in Korea and encouraged the Chinese and North Koreans to conclude an armistice. Thus, on 28 March, the communists finally agreed to the principle of voluntary repatriation.

The following month, in April 1953, sick and wounded
POW
s were exchanged in Operation Little Switch at P’anmunj
ŏ
m. In the exchange the communists released 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, and 64 other sick and wounded
U.N.
Command troops, and the
U.N.
side returned 1,030 Chinese and 5,194 North Koreans, together with 446 civilian internees.

ROK
President Syngman Rhee, who had always opposed an armistice that would leave Korea divided, made a final effort to derail the agreement. Threatening to fight on alone, on 18 June 1953 he unilaterally released some 27,000 North Korean
POW
s, which almost disrupted the armistice talks. The sudden release of the North Korean prisoners was intended to stop the peace process. Responding to Rhee’s action, and perhaps seeking to improve the communist line and end the war with a military victory, Chinese forces launched a major offensive in June–July 1953, directed mainly against South Korean positions. U.S. reinforcements pushed back the Chinese who suffered perhaps as many as 72,000 casualties, with 25,000 killed. As a result of the huge South Korean casualties in the fighting, as well as the U.S. promise of a mutual security treaty and a major aid package, Rhee no longer interfered with the armistice talks.

The talks resumed on 10 July, and an armistice agreement was signed on 27 July 1953. Finally, the military demarcation line (
MDL
)—248 kilometers (155 miles) in length—was drawn at the center of the Korean peninsula, cutting the demilitarized zone (
DMZ
) in half and establishing the border between the two Koreas. The Korean Armistice Agreement established the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (
NNSC
) to supervise the armistice. The
NNSC
consisted of four senior officers from “neutral nations,” two of whom were nominated by the
U.N.
Command and two by the communists. The
UNC
chose Sweden and Switzerland, and the communists designated Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Military Armistice Commission (
MAC
), comprising representatives of the two opposing sides, would supervise the implementation of the armistice terms.

From 5 August to 6 September 1953, the main and final exchange of prisoners, Operation Big Switch, took place at P’anmunj
ŏ
m. The number of
POW
s returned included 75,823 communists (70,183 North Koreans and 5,640 Chinese) and 12,773
U.N.
forces (7,862 South Koreans, 3,597 Americans, and 946 British). More than 22,600 communist soldiers declined repatriation. More shocking was that 23 Americans, 1 Briton, and 333 South Korean soldiers also declined repatriation.

On 30 August 1953 General Mark W. Clark set the Northern Limitation Line (
NLL
), a disputed maritime demarcation line in the Yellow Sea between North and South Korean waters, as the
U.N.
and communist sides failed to reach an agreement on a maritime border The
U.N.
side wanted the border set at 3 nautical miles, whereas North Korea wanted a 12 nautical-mile border. The
NLL
was based on a 3 nautical-mile limit, recognized in the 1950s, extending from the Han River estuary and cutting between North Korea’s mainland and five offshore islands, which now remain under South Korean administrative control. The
NLL
was not a de jure border, as the
U.N.
side drew it unilaterally and then notified North Korea. But it has served ever since as a de facto maritime border between the two Koreas. After fierce fighting spanning more than three years, with the establishment of the Korean Armistice, the sound of gunfire was finally silenced.

Although the Korean Armistice Agreement ended the fighting in Korea, it did not drastically alter the prewar status quo. Korea remained divided, with the north-south boundary still extending roughly along the 38th parallel. Nor did the agreement require the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean peninsula.

The most tragic consequence of the Korean War was the staggering loss of life. South Korea listed its casualties during the war at 901,656 (184,573 killed or missing and 717,083 wounded). U.S. losses amounted to 140,200 (33,667 killed or missing, 3,249 dead from other causes, and 103,284 wounded). Other
UNC
losses came to 15,488 (3,960 killed and 11,528 wounded), and North Korean casualties were estimated at 520,000, while China’s exceeded more than 1 million dead. Perhaps 3 million Korean civilians died as a direct result of the war. More than 80,000 South Koreans were forcibly taken to North Korea.

Both Koreas also suffered an irreparable loss of property. The Korean peninsula was in total ruin, with its cities, towns, and villages ravaged by the battle.
The economic cost for the United States alone was more than $15 billion, making the Korean War one of the most expensive conflicts in U.S. history.

The Korean conflict has long been known as “the war that nobody won,” because no outright victor emerged from the conflict. But the United States and the United Nations deserve certain laurels. In coming boldly to South Korea’s defense, the United States proved itself an undisputable leader of the free world, prepared to act decisively against communist aggression. It emerged from the war as a superpower with the world’s most powerful military, and this situation has continued to the present day. Before the war the United Nations had been widely criticized for its inability in promoting international peace and was in danger of being disbanded. In coming to South Korea’s aid, however, it changed its image on the world scene. Its action on behalf of the Republic of Korea enhanced its reputation. The
PRC
, by entering the war and standing up to the United States, also gained in international stature, and it stood as a major power in Asia. A large number of Chinese forces remained stationed in North Korea until October 1958, and China began to play an increasingly important role in Korean affairs. As time passed, this trend increased. The war also spurred Japan’s industrial recovery and the U.S. decision to rearm Japan as a bulwark against communism in Asia.

In the United States, immediately after the fighting ceased, the Korean War was soon forgotten. That it has been called the “forgotten war” may be attributed to the fact that the United States neither won nor lost. Because it was unpopular among the general population, book publishers and movie makers, unlike their response to World War II or the Vietnam War, were reluctant to exploit the Korean War either for educating or entertaining the public. From the early 1980s, however, historians, especially revisionists, began to rediscover and write about the Korean War.

For Koreans, the war hardened the division between the North and South, adding to the enmity between the two Koreas. Particularly in the Republic of Korea, it gave rise to extreme anticommunism and a sense of permanent antagonism that ended up infringing on the basic rights of South Koreans. On the other hand, in some sense the war paved the way for South Koreans to abandon narrow regionalism and their traditional sense of social hierarchy. Also, as a U.S. ally, South Korea was accepted into the circle of “maritime civilizations” as a free market economy.

“The war that has never ended” is an accurate description of the Korean War. The armistice of 1953 was only the first, temporary step along the way to a peace
treaty that would formally end the conflict. But because no such pact has ever been arranged, technically the two Koreas are still at war. To this day the border between North and South Korea remains one of the most dangerous flash points in the world, pitting about 1.1 million North Korean troops against some 600,000 South Korean troops and their 28,500 American allies. Korea remains the only divided nation in the world.

The period between 1945 and 1953 is characterized as an era of terrible upheavals in Korean history. As soon as the Koreans were liberated from harsh Japanese colonial rule, they were drawn into the maelstrom of the Cold War and experienced the pain of national division. Their suffering increased with the fratricidal Korean War, a consequence of the tragic division of the country. This period of cataclysm was to have profound impacts on subsequent developments in Korea, including many instances of incurable, continuing rivalry and hostility between the two Koreas. A stark reminder that the Korean War remains unfinished was the unprovoked North Korean artillery attack on South Korean territory (Y
ŏ
np’y
ŏ
ng-do) near the Northern Limitation Line on 23 November 2010.

South Korean politics during the Rhee regime (1948–1960) revolved around his struggle to remain in power indefinitely against the opposition’s efforts to unseat him. Since the inauguration of the
ROK
, on 15 August 1948, Rhee disingenuously portrayed himself as a transcendent leader who stood out above the partisan and factional struggles of daily politics, and at first this proved to be an indispensable political asset for his public image, as well as a key source of his popular support. As time went by, however, this strategy grew increasingly ineffectual in the face of the more stubborn opposition, which forced him to increasingly pursue authoritarian measures to retain power.
¹

The 1948 constitution provided for a popularly elected National Assembly, the members of which elected the president for a four-year term. The president could be elected for a second term. Although he lacked grass-roots support in his homeland, Syngman Rhee was handily elected to the presidency by the National Assembly on 20 July 1948 as a reward for his lifetime struggle against Japanese rule. He garnered 180 votes out of 198, and his rival, Kim Ku, obtained just 13 votes. But Rhee escalated the institutional tension between the president
and the legislature by seeking more terms and refusing to share power with the National Assembly.