A History of Korea (80 page)

At dawn on 15 September the X Corps landed at three points on Inch’
ŏ
n, designated as “Beaches”—Green, Red, and Blue. By midnight of D-day, the Inch’
ŏ
n landing was a definite success. Casualties had been surprisingly light, and the invasion force now turned to the task of recapturing Seoul.

MacArthur was determined to capture Seoul on 25 September, three months to the day after the North Korean invasion. But the capital city was not completely taken by the
U.N.
forces until 28 September. The next day MacArthur and Syngman Rhee entered Seoul.

MacArthur’s plan was for the X Corps, now heading south, to act as an anvil on which North Korean forces would be smashed by Walker’s 8th Army and South Korean forces moving up from the south. After a crushing defeat, only one-fourth to one-third of the North Korean forces would eventually escape back across the 38th parallel.

With South Korea almost entirely under
U.N.
control by the end of September 1950, political leaders had to decide on the next step—whether to cross the 38th parallel. The Korean fighting had always been intended as a “police action,” meant only to repel the North Korean invaders and restore peace and security to the South. To carry the fighting into North Korea would go beyond the boundaries of a “police action.”

Bent on reunifying Korea, on 1 October units of the
ROK
3rd Infantry Division crossed the 38th parallel and started to drive North Korean forces up the east coast toward W
ŏ
nsan.
³⁷
That same day MacArthur demanded that Kim Il-sung surrender his country; the demand was ignored. On 2 October, the
PRC
issued the ominous warning that if U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel, it would send aid to North Korea. The
PRC
would not intervene, however, if South Korean troops alone crossed the border. On 7 October the
U.N.
General Assembly sanctioned the advance of
U.N.
forces into North Korea to establish a unified and democratic Korea.

To conquer North Korea, MacArthur launched a two-pronged attack northward to the Yalu River. Walker’s 8th Army would strike North Korea across the 38th parallel in the west, while Almond’s X Corps would conduct an amphibious landing at W
ŏ
nsan on the East Sea with a subsequent attack to link up with the 8th Army. The two forces would then drive North Korean forces back to the Yalu River. When there was no room left for North Koreans in the North, the war would end. The decision to entirely separate the X Corps from the 8th Army would have unfortunate repercussions. Although the Chinese warning triggered uneasiness, both the United States and the United Nations were inclined to accept MacArthur’s assessment that Chinese intervention was unlikely and that, in any case, MacArthur’s forces could deal with a Chinese attack.

On 9 October the 8th Army, led by its 1st Cavalry Division, crossed the 38th parallel and launched an attack north toward Pyongyang. On the east coast, South Korean army units moved steadily toward W
ŏ
nsan. All went well initially. W
ŏ
nsan fell to South Korean forces on 10 October, and Pyongyang was captured by
U.N.
forces on 19 October. On 21 October Kim Il-sung established a new capital at Sin
ŭ
iju on the Yalu River.

The
U.N.
advances were swift and smooth, but to ease his mind about the possibility of Chinese intervention, Truman met with MacArthur on Wake Island, in the Pacific, on 15 October. During the conversation, Truman asked about the possibility of Chinese intervention, and MacArthur assured the president that there was little chance of Chinese or Soviet intervention. He claimed that if the occasion arose, his forces could manage it. Truman later complained that MacArthur had misled him.

The participants in the Wake Island Conference were unaware that on 4 October
PRC
leader Mao Zedong had already decided to intervene militarily
in the Korean fighting. Actually, the day after the Wake Island meeting, troops of Lin Biao’s 4th Field Army began crossing the Yalu River into North Korea. By 20 October four Chinese field armies of 30,000 men each crossed the Yalu; three positioned themselves opposite 8th Army units on the western front and one opposite the X Corps on the eastern front. By the end of October two additional field armies were positioned in North Korea.

All the while
U.N.
forces remained unaware of the growing presence of Chinese Communist Forces (
CCF
), calling themselves the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, a fig leaf enabling the
PRC
to go to war with the United States without a formal declaration. Obviously they were the regular armed forces of the
PRC
. Unaware of the Chinese armies amassed deep in North Korea, MacArthur’s troops continued pressing north. After taking Pyongyang, Walker’s 8th Army quickly advanced to the Ch’
ŏ
ngch’
ŏ
n River, some 45 miles north of Pyongyang. For their push toward the Yalu and final victory, on 26 October 8th Army troops crossed the river. That same day a reconnaissance platoon of the
ROK
6th Division reached the Yalu at Ch’osan. On the eastern front, the 1st Marine Division of the X Corps climbed to the vast 4,000-foot plateau where they came to the Changjin Reservoir. From there they were to link up with the 8th Army in the west for the final thrust to the Yalu River.

At the time the North Korean forces were, for all practical purposes, dissolved. On 25 October, however, massive numbers of
PRC
troops attacked
U.N.
forces on both the western and eastern fronts. The attacks continued into early November. Then, on 6 November, just as suddenly as they began, the Chinese halted operations and broke off contact. The initial Chinese intervention raised questions that no one could answer. MacArthur believed the two-week-long Chinese intervention was only an attempt to save what remained of the shattered North Korean forces and perhaps hold part of the country. But the disappearance of the Chinese troops was to conceal their strength, deceive the enemy, and prepare for future hard blows against MacArthur’s army.

Blinded by his own optimism and relying on inadequate intelligence, MacArthur was slow to grasp the measure and gravity of the
PRC
intervention. Intelligence estimates of Chinese strength were far off the mark. By mid-November some 300,000 Chinese troops were in North Korea. After a three-week lull in the fighting, on 24 November
U.N.
forces renewed their offensive toward the Yalu River. Within 24 hours, however, the situation changed dramatically. On the night of 25–26 November the Chinese launched a massive assault on
U.N.
forces, particularly the 8th Army on the western front. With its advance
halted, the 8th Army’s survival was in jeopardy. The 2nd Infantry Division was charged with the mission of preventing a total catastrophe for the 8th Army. At Kunu-ri it purchased sufficient time for other 8th Army units to cross over the Ch’
ŏ
ngch’
ŏ
n River and reach safety south of the river. While fulfilling its mission, however, the 2nd Division suffered appalling losses. With the 8th Army in full retreat, its rear guard under heavy
PRC
pressure, Walker brought his forces just below the 38th parallel to protect Seoul. There, at the end of the year, the 8th Army awaited a new Chinese offensive. Soon the 8th Army had a new commander, as General Walker was killed in a jeep accident on 23 December. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway was named to succeed Walker and arrived in Korea on 26 December.

The X Corps at the Changjin Reservoir also opened an offensive on 24 November. Like the
U.N.
forces in the west, it faced a momentous enemy force that engulfed the reservoir and the entire road back to H
ŭ
ngnam, the X Corps’ supply base. To escape annihilation, the X Corps would have to battle its way back to the coast, 78 miles away—and they did just that, rumbling past
CCF
units and entering H
ŭ
ngnam on 11 December. The campaign in northeastern Korea had tied down 12 Chinese divisions that could otherwise have been utilized against the 8th Army on the western front.

U.N. forces evacuated northeastern Korea through a U.S. Navy’s masterful and massive evacuation plan. With substantial naval air cover and 193 ships, the evacuation at H
ŭ
ngnam began on 11 December and cleared out some 105,000 troops, their 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of equipment, along with some 98,000 Korean civilian refugees who did not want to remain in the North. When it was completed on Christmas Eve, engineers blew up the H
ŭ
ngnam waterfront with explosives, again leaving North Korea to the communists.

The Korean fighting would continue for more than two years, but it was to be a totally different kind of war. On New Year’s Eve the
PRC
launched the third phase of their offensive, again crossing the 38th parallel, striking the 8th Army’s line in the Seoul area and recapturing the capital on 4 January 1951. They continued advancing southward until the 8th Army stopped them 75 miles below Seoul. On 1 February 1951 the
U.N.
General Assembly voted to condemn the Chinese “aggression” in Korea. Then,
U.N.
forces were pressing north against the overextended Chinese, finally liberating Seoul once again on 14 March. It was the fourth (and final) time that the capital changed hands. By the end
of March 1951
U.N.
forces were once more at the 38th parallel, and in April they crossed it.

In the United States, meanwhile, the Truman administration had now recognized that complete victory was impossible. A way had to be found to end the Korean conflict through talks with the communists. As a result combat activities slowed, and the battle line stabilized along the 38th parallel where the war originally began.

Truman planned to announce that, on behalf of the United Nations, his representatives were willing to meet with
PRC
and North Korean officials to negotiate an end to the war. He was prevented from doing this, however, when, unexpectedly and without Truman’s authorization, MacArthur issued a demand to the North Koreans that they surrender immediately. Behind MacArthur’s dramatic move was his long disagreement with Truman’s policy of limited war. The general wanted nothing less than complete victory over the communists, no matter the cost. Seeking revenge for his humiliation when the
PRC
armies invaded across the Yalu, he wanted to bomb their bases in Manchuria to destroy China’s industrial capacity to wage war, blockade the coast of the Chinese mainland, and enlist the forces of Jiang Jieshi on Taiwan to fight in Korea. The general was even prepared to use the atomic bomb against the People’s Republic of China. Truman, on the other hand, did not want to expand the war beyond the borders of Korea for fear that it would bring in the Soviet Union and possibly initiate a general war and the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, Truman’s advisers feared getting tied down in a war with China when they considered the real danger to be a Soviet incursion into Western Europe or Japan. According to General Omar Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a larger war in East Asia would be “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”
³⁸

Increasingly disturbed by the stalemate in Korea and his government’s restrictions, on 24 March MacArthur issued his demand for China to surrender, directly violating Truman’s directive. Five days later the
PRC
rejected MacArthur’s ultimatum and called for renewed fighting. Truman was convinced that the general had to be discharged, and as if to seal his own dismissal, MacArthur sent an inflammatory letter to U.S. Republican Party House Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin, again calling for victory in the Korean War. With the rift between Truman and MacArthur making world headlines, Truman finally charged MacArthur with insubordination and relieved him of his command on 11 April 1951. Lieutenant General Ridgway succeeded MacArthur as commander
of the
U.N.
forces and faithfully followed the administration’s guidelines, and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet took command of the 8th Army.Now the United States decided to end its attempts to “liberate” North Korea and instead concentrated on pushing back the communist forces beyond the 38th parallel. After this goal was achieved in May 1951, the United States proposed negotiations to end the fighting and restore the prewar status quo.

With the war now at a stalemate and the U.S. government signaling that it was prepared to accept a truce line in the vicinity of the 38th parallel, on 23 June 1951 Yakov A. Malik recommended talks to bring about a cease-fire and reestablish the status quo ante bellum in Korea. On 30 June, on instructions from Truman, General Ridgway offered to meet communist commanders in the field to discuss a cease-fire and terms for an armistice. The following day, on 1 July, Kim Il-sung and Peng Duhuai, commander of the Chinese forces in Korea, agreed to armistice talks at Kaes
ŏ
ng.

The truce talks began at Kaes
ŏ
ng on 10 July 1951 and continued with two long recesses and the relocation of the conference site until the armistice was signed on 27 July 1953. As scheduled, a
U.N.
team headed by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy met with North Korean and
PRC
delegates at Kaes
ŏ
ng on 10 July. The chief communist delegate at the table was North Korean general Nam Il. Whereas the
U.N.
delegates were authorized only to discuss military matters, the communists used the talks as a propaganda vehicle, presenting the
U.N.
side as defeated and suing for peace. Two weeks were needed to hammer out the agenda for armistice talks, and on 26 July the negotiators completed the agenda leading to an armistice. Its major points included the establishment of a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone between the opposing armies; the exchange of prisoners of war; and supervision to ensure that the terms of armistice were carried out. The agenda itself raised one problem after another, however, and many obstacles dragged the armistice talks out for two years.