A History of Korea (74 page)

The widespread crackdown was closely related to a new U.S. policy on Korea. At the time the reconvened Joint Commission had reached another complete deadlock, and the United States was seeking a way out of the impasse. The only alternative under these hopelessly stalemated conditions was to establish a separate southern government. Thus the large-scale suppression of leftists was the direct result of the American plan to create a separate rightist regime in southern Korea.

Following the suppression, major leftist organizations went almost completely underground throughout the country. Leftists maintained offices in only a handful of large cities, and these, too, seemed on the verge of a shutdown. Finally, by the end of 1947, the way had been cleared to establish a separate rightist government in southern Korea.

In early 1947 the United States reconsidered its policy toward Korea, but it came at a particularly difficult moment. The crisis in Greece and Turkey had already forced the United States to reassess its overall strategy in the Cold War. As the Joint Commission meetings remained at a standstill throughout the summer of 1947, the United States decided to refer the Korean problem to the United Nations.
It even acknowledged that the creation of a separate government would be unavoidable.

On 17 September 1947, over the Soviet Union’s objection, the United States placed the Korean issue before the second regular session of the
U.N.
General Assembly. Although the Soviets argued that the United Nations had no jurisdiction over the Korean problem, the United States at the time had overwhelming support in the international forum. On 14 November 1947 the
U.N.
General Assembly unanimously adopted a U.S. resolution to hold elections throughout Korea in order to send representatives to a new body, the Korean National Assembly, which would in turn establish a National Government of Korea. The election would be based on a system of proportional representation from the population, and thus southern Korea would be assured roughly two-thirds of the total number of representatives. A Temporary Commission on Korea was to supervise the election, which would occur no later than 31 March 1948. The newly formed National Government would arrange with the occupying powers the complete withdrawal of their armed forces as soon as practical and, if possible, within 90 days. Then the Temporary Commission would report its conclusions to the General Assembly and consult with the Interim Committee.
⁸

U.S. policy in the United Nations appeared to be a great victory for the nation itself. But the transfer of the Korean problem to the international body was unfortunate for Korea, for, without Soviet cooperation, a unified Korea would be impossible. Actually, as the Soviet Union refused to help implement the American resolution, U.S. policy to submit the Korean problem to the United Nations only accelerated the creation of two separate Korean regimes and thereby perpetuated the divided Korean nation.

Because the Soviet Union denied the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (
UNTCOK
) access to northern Korea, the Commission was confined to southern Korea. It had little hope, therefore, of carrying out observations of an election in the northern zone. On 6 February 1948 the Temporary Commission finally decided to consult with the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, now in session in New York.

Meanwhile, the Korean domestic situation seriously worsened. The events in southern Korea had turned extremely violent after the Temporary Commission announced that it intended to consult the Interim Committee. A wave of sabotage
and strikes swept southern Korea. Organized by leftists, the sabotage, mass demonstrations, and attacks on the police posed a serious challenge to the authority of the U.S. Military Government. In scores of carefully planned attacks on the police and rightists, more than 40 persons were killed and thousands were arrested. Incidents continued for three months, right up to the 10 May election day.

In New York the Interim Committee considered the Korean problem, and on 26 February 1948 adopted the U.S. resolution by a vote of 31 to 2, with 11 abstentions. The main point of the resolution proposed that the
UNTCOK
observe elections for representatives to a national assembly in those areas of Korea accessible to the Commission, namely, southern Korea.
⁹

Immediately, extreme rightists jubilantly greeted the Interim Committee’s decision, whereas moderates and leftists expressed deep disappointment. The moderates and leftists, as well as Kim Ku’s rightist group, would not participate in separate election in southern Korea, which meant that the extreme rightist elements would coalesce around the Syngman Rhee–Korean Democratic Party coalition and control practically 100 percent of the vote in the forthcoming election.

News of the Interim Committee resolution reached the Temporary Commission by cable. Members of the Commission held an informal meeting on 28 February, where they agreed to implement the resolution of the Interim Committee and issued a statement that the Commission would observe elections in accessible parts of Korea no later than 10 May 1948.
¹⁰

Two days later General Hodge announced that the election would be held on 9 May, under the supervision of the
UNTCOK
. South Korean religious groups requested a one-day postponement of the elections, as 9 May was a Sunday, but the Americans refused. Ultimately, however, the date was changed to 10 May on the recommendation of the Chinese representative. A solar eclipse was expected on 9 May, which Koreans would construe as a bad omen.

After several heated discussions, the Temporary Commission formally decided on 12 March, by a small majority, to implement the resolution of the Interim Committee. Everything was now ready for an election in accordance with the wishes of the United States.

Korean political leaders who opposed the separate southern election sought to hold the North-South political leaders’ conference as an alternative. On 12 March 1948 certain prominent leaders, including Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, Cho So-ang, and Hong My
ŏ
ng-h
ŭ
i, issued a joint statement pledging to work for
a unified Korea and vowing not to participate in a separate election held in southern Korea alone. In a letter to Kim Il-sung, chairman of the North Korean People’s Committee, and Kim Tu-bong, chairman of the North Korean Workers Party, they proposed that measures to establish a unified Korean government be discussed through a conference of political leaders of northern and southern Korea. On 25 March the North Koreans invited all South Korean parties and groups opposing a separate southern election to meet on 14 April in Pyongyang with representatives of the North Korean political parties and social organizations to discuss the unification of Korea. Within a week, the South Korean political leaders accepted the invitation.

Under these circumstances, 7,837,504 voters actually registered during the period of registration from 5 to 10 April. The
UNTCOK
reported that the estimated population in southern Korea on 1 April 1948 was 19,947,000. The possible total number of registrants, based on the percentage of 49.3 as derived from the 1947 National Registration, was 9,834,000. On this basis, the number of actual registrants was some 79.7 percent of the potential electorate.
¹¹
But the high percentage of registration did not necessarily accurately reflect the popular will. The very high registration number could be partly explained by police threats to withdraw individual rice ration cards from those who failed to register.

The Soviet Union did not sit still. To offset America’s success in southern Korea, the Soviet Union attempted to force the United States to recognize the legitimacy of the northern regime. On 17 March 1948 G. P. Korotkov, commander of the Soviet forces in northern Korea, delivered an ultimatum to General Hodge from Kim Il-sung threatening to cut off the flow of electricity to the U.S. zone on 15 April.

The North-South Korean political leaders’ conference in Pyongyang opened on 19 April but was delayed because Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, the two leading South Korean delegates, had not yet arrived. Then, after a private meeting on the morning of 30 April between Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, Kim Il-sung, and Kim Tu-bong, the conference was finally held that afternoon and attended by one representative from each of the political parties and social groups. The plenary meeting unanimously adopted a statement attacking the United States, the United Nations, and Syngman Rhee’s extreme rightists who were seeking a southern election, and appealing to the Korean people to oppose that election. A resolution also called for the withdrawal of foreign troops.

When they returned to Seoul on 5 May, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik declared that their North Korean counterparts had agreed to hold a nationwide election
after foreign troops left Korea and that the North Koreans had promised not to cut off electric power to southern Korea. Because a separate southern election appeared to be inevitable, however, the two Kims gradually retreated from their earlier hard-line positions.

In a move obviously intended to punish and humiliate Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik for not taking strong action against the separate election, on 7 May North Koreans renewed their intimidation to cut electric power to their southern neighbors. The unilateral North Korean breach of their earlier promise hit the two leaders hard. The North Korean threat was also designed to force the southern electorate to boycott the voting and to distract their attention from the separate election by arousing fears of suspension of electricity.
¹²
Finally, North Koreans did stop supplying electric power to southern Korea on 14 May, immediately after the separate election in the U.S. zone.

The Korean leaders’ efforts to unify Korea ended in complete failure. Without the close cooperation of the occupying powers, their efforts were fated to fail; from the start, the Korean problem could be solved only by negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Actually, Koreans never had any say in their own destiny.

Immediately following the conference, communists in southern Korea intensified their program of violence and subversion. They used threats of violence and assassination to convince the
UNTCOK
that it should not supervise the separate election. Even if this strategy failed, the chaos caused by their activity at least would discourage voter turnout. The local police retaliated with accelerated anti-leftist repression. During the first four months of 1948, the police and political extremists killed more than 250 people. Another 200 fell victim to indiscriminate violence in April, including 8 election officials and 2 candidates. Domestic instability peaked during the week just prior to the 10 May election, when more than 300 people died. Threats, beatings, robbery, and imprisonment were the order of the day.

Because leftists and moderates opposed and boycotted the separate election in southern Korea, the major concern was not whether a predominantly rightist victory would be possible but whether a successful election could be held at all. The main concern was the activities of the police and rightist youth organizations, as they were closely aligned with the Rhee-
KDP
coalition that was determined to force the separate election at any cost.

To uphold law and order during the election period, the U.S. Military Government authorized the police to mobilize some one million members of the Community Protection Corps, which was formed on 21 April 1948. Membership was necessarily drawn from among rightists and, in many instances, right-wing terrorist youth organizations. The Military Government also engaged in a large-scale propaganda campaign to persuade people to participate in the election despite the opposition of leftists and moderates.

On election day the voting went smoothly in most areas. Of the 7,837,504 registrants, 7,036,750, or 95.2 percent of registrants, actually took part in the voting.
¹³
The Americans described the election as a great victory for democracy and a repudiation of communism. Although its members discovered evidence of oppression and intimidation wherever they observed the voting, the
UNTCOK
reported that the high percentage of voting might be explained by the Koreans’ patriotism.

The results of the election were ambiguous nevertheless. Rhee’s National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence elected 55 candidates, the Korean Democratic Party 29, and the rightist Taedong Youth Corps 12; 6 others were elected from another rightist group, the Taehan Youth Corps, which had been supported by the U.S. Military Government. Overall, these rightist parties and social organizations won 102 seats out of 198. Although independents obtained nearly 40 percent of the seats and thus formed the largest single group of successful candidates, they were never a cohesive political force but featured many disparate political elements. Many of them were
KDP
candidates only disguised as independents to hide their party membership.
¹⁴
So, although no party had a clear-cut majority, effectively the National Assembly was predominantly rightist.

After the election the creation of a southern government was just a matter of procedure. The U.S. Military Government and the rightist political parties that participated in the election busily hammered out the final shape of a new government. Politics in southern Korea during that summer centered on a power struggle within the once solid rightist alliance for control of the new government.

A dispute flared between Rhee and the Korean Democratic Party when the National Assembly convened on 31 May 1948, but ultimately the Assembly elected Rhee as chairman. Almost certain to become the first president of South Korea, Rhee was growing increasingly aloof. Concerned about its participation in the new government, the
KDP
pushed hard for the adoption
of a constitutional draft that would establish a parliamentary system. Angry over what he saw as a challenge to his transcendent authority, Rhee threatened to resign his Assembly seat and actively oppose the new government. Yielding to Rhee’s intimidation, the National Assembly adopted a constitution incorporating some superficial concessions to the
KDP
but basically creating a strong presidential system with a four-year term for the presidency. The first constitution was adopted by the National Assembly on 12 July and was promulgated five days later. On 20 July the National Assembly elected Syngman Rhee president of South Korea.